Measuring
effectiveness,
efficiency
and
equity
in
an
experimental
Payments
for
Ecosystem
Services
trial
Adrian
Martin
*
,
Nicole
Gross-Camp,
Bereket
Kebede,
Shawn
McGuire
UniversityofEastAnglia,SchoolofInternationalDevelopment,NorwichNR47TJ,UnitedKingdom
1. Introduction
Early proponents of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)
arguedthattheyofferedapotentialimprovementuponIntegrated
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs). ICDPs were
consideredtobeineffectiveduetooverlyambitiouscombinations
ofenvironmental and social goals, and a lack ofcausal linkage
between delivery of social benefits and desired conservation
outcomes(FerraroandSimpson,2005;Ferraro,2001;Ferraroand
Kiss,2002).Whilstrecentstudiesidentifysomepositiveoutcomes
fromICDPsin somecases(Blomleyetal.,2010;Morgan-Brown
etal.,2010),advocatesofPESproposethatmakingbenefitsdirectly
contingent on provision of outcomes would, in some
circum-stances,bemoreeffectiveandthatenablingcompetitionamong
possible service providers would also lead to efficiency gains.
Therearestillveryfew rigorousempiricalstudiesthattest this
proposition(Mitevaetal.,2012)andthispapercontributestothis
knowledgegap.
Such ‘direct paymentsfor conservation’ werewellknown in
Europe,wherepayingfarmersforconservation-orientedpractices
wasalreadyanimportantpartoftheCommonAgriculturalPolicy’s
environmentpillar (Gomez-Baggethunetal., 2010). There were
someconcernsabouttheequityoftheseschemes,asfarmerswith
thelargestlandholdingswereabletoprovidethemostservicesand
receivedthegreaterpayments(Wilson,1997),butthiswasoffsetby
thepoliticalexpedienceoffindinganeligiblewaytopackagefarm
subsidies.However,concernsaboutthedistributionaloutcomesof
PESschemeshavebecomemoresalientbecausePESisnowmore
widespread in developing countries, in contextswhere poverty
alleviationisoftenadesiredco-benefitofconservation
interven-tions(Pagiolaetal.,2005).ThusthequestionofwhetherPESismore
effectivein achievingdesired outcomesandmore cost-efficient
thanitsalternativesmustbeconsideredalongsidequestionsabout
itsimpactsonpovertyand,moregenerally,equity.Putsimply,will
efficient modes of providing environmental goods bypass the
poorestandbeconsideredinequitable?Wethinkthisquestionwill
becomeincreasingly importantbecause(a)those livingnear to
forestsandterrestrialprotectedareasinthetropicsarelikelytobe
poorerthantheircompatriots(Ferraroetal.,2011;Sunderlinetal.,
2008),(b)theselocationswherepovertyandbiodiversitycoincide
willbeincreasinglytargetedbyPESschemessuchasREDD+,for
exampleduetoincreasingconfidenceintheevidenceofsynergies
between biodiversityconservationand carbonstorage (Parrotta
et al.,2012), and (c) becausethepoor sellcheap due tolower
ARTICLE INFO
Articlehistory:
Received18November2013 Receivedinrevisedform18April2014 Accepted10July2014
Availableonline6August2014 Keywords:
Ecosystemservices Conservationincentives Conservationeffectiveness Motivationcrowdingtheory Rwanda
ABSTRACT
ThereiscurrentlyaconsiderableefforttoevaluatetheperformanceofPaymentsforEcosystemServices asanenvironmentalmanagementtool.Theresearchpresentedherecontributestothisworkbyusingan experimentaldesigntoevaluatePaymentsforEcosystemServicesasatoolforsupportingbiodiversity conservationinthecontextofanAfricanprotectedarea.Thetrialemployeda‘beforeandafter’and‘with andwithout’design.Wepresenttheresultsofsocialandecologicalsurveystoinvestigatetheimpactsof thetrialintermsofitseffectiveness,efficiencyandequity.Wefindtheschemetobeeffectiveatbringing aboutadditionalconservationoutcomes.However,wealsofoundthatincreasedmonitoringissimilarly effectiveintheshortterm,atlowercost.Themajordifference–andarguablythesignificantcontribution ofthePaymentsforEcosystemServices–wasthatitchangedthemotivesforprotectingtheparkand improvedlocalperceptionsbothoftheparkanditsauthority.Wediscusstheimplicationsofthese resultsforconservationefficiency,arguingthatefficiencyshouldnotbedefinedintermsofshort-term cost-effectiveness,butalsointermsofthesustainabilityofbehavioralmotivesinthelongterm.This insighthelpsustoresolvetheapparenttrade-offbetweengoalsofequityandefficiencyinPaymentsfor EcosystemServices.
ß2014TheAuthors.PublishedbyElsevierLtd.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCCBY-NC-SA license(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
* Correspondingauthor.Tel.:+4401603593723. E-mailaddress:[email protected](A.Martin).
ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect
Global
Environmental
Change
j ou rna l hom e pa ge : w w w. e l s e v i e r. c om/ l o ca t e / gl oe n v cha
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.07.003
opportunitycostsandthereforePESismorelikelytotargettheir
lands (Kosoy and Corbera,2010). In this paper, we assess the
effectiveness,efficiencyandequityofaPESschemeinRwanda.As
the argument proceeds, we ask whether equity, rather than
efficiency,mightin fact bethegreatestadvantagearising from
ourPESand,following-on,whetherefficiencyandequitycanreally
beconsideredtobeindependentoutcomes.
2. Theory
Wedefineeffectivenessastheachievementofstatedobjectives
additionaltowhatwouldhavebeenachievedintheabsenceofthe
PESintervention.Weprovisionallydefineefficiencyinutilitarian,
economictermsasmaximizingtotalwelfare(Adgeretal.,2003);it
typicallyimpliesa‘valueformoney’characteristicwherebyhuman
wellbeingoutcomesareachievedatleastcostsothatwecanafford
moreofthem.
Equityisnotsoamenabletoauniversaldefinitionbecauseitis
typically understood through reference to both objective and
contextual assessments (Miller, 2013). In pursuit of a more
objective and universal benchmark of equity, conservation
practitionershavetendedtoconsider‘equity’tomean‘pro-poor’
(Pascual etal., 2010). Thismore oftenreferstoimpacts on the
distributionofmaterialcostsandbenefits,but canalsoreferto
proceduralinclusion,waysofinteracting,andimpactsonauthority
and control. Oneway of operationalizing ‘pro-poor’ is tothink
abouttheimpactofaninterventiononthedifferencebetweenrich
andpoor–doesitincreaseordecreasethegap?Bythisreading,a
‘weak’renderingof‘pro-poor’isthatenvironmentalmanagement
interventionsshould‘donoharm’tothepoor(Barrettetal.,2011).
A slightly stronger, Rawlsian egalitarian reading, is that any
deviationfromequaltreatmentshouldbepositivelyinfavorofthe
poorand,mostparticularly,thepoorest(Rawls,1971).Inpractice,
thistendstobeinterpretedasacallforpositivediscrimination,
witha‘good’outcomebeinganarrowingofthegapbetweenrich
andpoor(Brock,2009).
Asecondwayofoperationalizing‘pro-poor’thatiscommonin
theconservationliteratureistoassociateitwithacommitmentto
upholdhumanrights(Greiberetal.,2009;Kashwan,2013).Fora
rights-basedapproach,pro-pooroutcomescanbeassessedfrom
theperspectiveofthresholds.Forhumancapabilitiesandrights
thinkers,equityoutcomesareatleastpartlyjudgedbywhether
statesandotheragentsarestrivingtosecureminimummaterial
andsocialthresholds –supportingthosecapabilitiesconsidered
minimally necessary tolive a valued and dignifiedlife (Brock,
2009;DoyalandGough,1991;Gough,2004;Nussbaum,2011).
Giventhatourfocalcountry,Rwanda,isalowincomecountry
withhighlevelsof ruralpoverty,we consideritappropriate to
considerapro-poorconceptionofequity,especiallygivenprevious
evidencethatthepoorhaveoftenfounditdifficulttoparticipatein
PESschemesduetohightransactioncostsorstructuralbarriers
(Corberaetal.,2007a,b;Engeletal.,2008).However,itisimportant
torecognizethatwhatconstitutes anequitabledistributioncan
varyfromsituationtosituationaswellasfrompersontoperson:
forexamplean‘equalshare’mightbeconsideredtheequitableway
to distribute votes, whereas ‘need’ might be seen as a more
equitablebasisforallocationof aid,andmerit thebestwayfor
allocating employment (Deutsch, 2000; Martin et al., 2014).
Furthermore, different individuals and groups, perhaps with
affinities to different political philosophies, may view each
situation differently, giving rise to plural, rational ideas about
theright thing to do (Sen, 2009). Moralvaluation is therefore
contextual, determined by individual and social characteristics
acrosstimeandspace,andnotreducibletosingularnotionsofthe
‘good’,tosimpleaggregation,ortoindividualisticanalysis(Sandel,
1998). Thus we reject theusefulness of looking for a singular,
universal definition of the good, such as that presented in
utilitarian political philosophies (Nussbaum, 2011; Sen, 2009).
Ourinterestinthispaperistheplace-boundconceptionsofequity
that areusedbydifferentgroupstoconstructclaimsaboutthe
fairness of conservation interventions and that we ultimately
considertoberelatedtoconservationoutcomes.
It is important to note that the acceptance of a pro-poor
conceptionofequity,aswellasaninclinationtowardapluralist
conceptions of the ends of justice, puts us in opposition to
utilitarianism (Rawls,1971; Sen, 2009). Whilst utilitarianism is
equitabletowardthepoorinthesensethat enhancementtoall
people’s utility is equally valued, an ultimate concern with
aggregate utility is problematic. Firstly, to define the ends of
justiceasthemaximizationofaggregateutility(thegreatergood)
ispotentiallyconsistentwithallowingthepoortobecomepoorer
orforminimumcapabilitythresholdstobetransgressed.Secondly,
theuseofasinglemetric(utility)assumesthatdiversevaluesare
ultimatelycommensurateandsuitedtoaggregation.Weflagthis
point at the outset because it creates a tension between our
conceptionsofefficiencyandequity.Efficiencyisconcernedwith
totalwelfareirrespectiveofitsdistribution,andsocanbeatodds
withequitygoals. For example,throughourefficiency lens we
might not be concerned if the poor sell their environmental
services‘cheap’,whereasthroughourequitylenswemightbe.
Theapparenttrade-offbetweencommonworkingdefinitionsof
efficiency (utilitarian, aggregate welfare gains) and equity
(egalitarian)cutstotheheartofmanyenvironmentaldilemmas,
presentingatensionbetween‘pursuitofthegreatesthappinessfor
thegreatestnumber,andtheassertionofindividual,localorethnic
rightsthat oughtnottobeviolated,evenattheexpenseofthe
aggregate good’ (Rayner and Malone, 2000). Such tension has
recentlycometotheforeinacademicdebateaboutPES(Corbera,
2012;Gross-Campetal.,2012a;Kinzigetal.,2011;Pascualetal.,
2010). Whilst nobody denies that equity is important, there is
disagreementastowhetheritshouldbeafirstorderobjectiveof
PES. Whilst there is a spectrum of thinking, we think it is
reasonable tosaythatthedominantviewof PES holdsthat, in
situations where PES is appropriate, utilitarian efficiency is its
principleadvantageoveralternatives,andshouldbetheoverriding
objectiveforthePESinstrumentitself(FerraroandSimpson,2005;
Kinzigetal.,2011;Wunder,2007).Thispaperquestionsthisview,
asking whether equity might in fact be so deeply linked to
efficiencythatthelattercannotbeprioritizedor,alternatively,that
equityrather than efficiencymight sometimesprove tobethe
primary advantage of PES over some alternative conservation
practicessuchasafocusonruleenforcementalone.
The prioritizationof effectivenessand efficiencyposessome
problems for PES in practice. Firstly, there is the problem of
measuringtheadditionalgoodprovidedbytheinterventiondueto
scientific uncertaintyaboutthelinkbetweenland management
practices,ecosystemfunctionsandserviceprovision(Fisheretal.,
2009). Where this problem can be addressed,it will normally
require greatly increasing the transaction costs of monitoring.
Secondly,thereisaproblemoflegitimacy,becausenoteveryone
agreesthatefficiencyconcernsshouldprevailoverequityonesin
PES design (Pascual et al., 2010) and because humankind’s
deontologicalattachmenttofairnessisconsideredtobeawidely
distributedhumancharacteristic(Brock,2009;Rawls,1971;Sen,
2009)thatmight evenberootedinourneuralprocessing(Hsu
etal.,2008).Thefactthathumansholdequitysodearmayhelpto
explainwhyenvironmentalconflictsoftenarisefromcompeting
visionsoffairness(Harvey,1996;Redpathetal.,2013;Schlosberg,
2004;Whiteman,2009)andindeedwhy‘real’PESschemescannot
avoid meeting legitimacy requirements and therefore seldom
resembletheirimaginary,‘efficient’form(MilneandAdams,2012;
whetherourexperimentalPESschemewaseffective,efficientand
equitable, and by considering the relationship between these
values.
3. StudysiteandPESfeatures
The Nyungwe National Park (1013km2) is part of the
biologicallyrichAlbertineRift(Plumptreetal.,2002)andoneof
thelargestremainingblocks ofhighaltituderainforest on the
continent.Theparkwasinitiallygazettedasaforestreserveinthe
early1930sbuthadlittleruleenforcementupuntilthelate1980s
when the management authority, Rwanda Development Board
(RDB), was first mandated tooversee activities in thereserve.
Althoughclearingoftheforestforagriculturewasprohibited,local
rightstocollectwoodwererecognizedandupheldin theearly
1970swiththeinitiationofabufferzoneoffast-growingexotic
trees(Weber,1989).Thereservetransitionedtonationalparkin
2004 and is now a strictly protected area with no human
inhabitants or permitted use. There are a totalof 52 cells (an
administrativeunit consisting of a cluster of 3–6 villages, and
populationof1500–6000people)abuttingthepark.Ourproject
wasbasedinatotalofeightofthesecells–fourexperimentaland
fourcontrols(Fig.1).
Currently, there are only a small number of published PES
evaluationsthatseektorigorouslyestablishcausalimpactthrough
use of controls to construct counterfactuals (Pattanayak et al.,
2010).Furthermore,theseareallinLatinAmericaandallinvolve
PESschemesthatincentivizemanagementofhouseholdfarmor
forestplots(Mitevaetal.,2012).Thesiteforthisstudyistherefore
unusual,bothforbeinginAfrica,aswellasforusingPESforthe
managementofpublic-ratherthanprivately-managedlands.This
isacritical sitecharacteristicbecauseitiswellestablishedthat
tenure, amongst other institutional factors, is important for
understandingtheoutcomesofPESschemes(Tacconietal.,2012).
Thereisconsiderabledebateintheliteratureaboutwhatcan
rightfullybedescribedasa PES,andwhatshouldbeconsidered
insteadas‘PES-like’(Engeletal.,2008;Sommervilleetal.,2009).
ThedefiningfeaturesofaPESschemearewidelycitedasbeing(a)
thatitisvoluntary,(b)thatadefinedenvironmental(?)serviceis
bought by one party from another party, and (c) payment is
conditionalonprovisionofthatdefinedservice(Wunder,2005).In
ourownPEStrial,(a)communitiesenterintocontractsvoluntarily,
(b) we (a research partnership backed by EU funding) pay
communitiestoprovidespecifiedconservationservices, and (c)
paymentsareconditionalbasedonmeasuredperformanceofthose
services.Indeed,ourPESwasdesignedwiththeseverycriteriain
mindandonthefaceofit,thereisaclearmatch.Butaswithmost
schemeslabeledasPES, therearegrayareas.First, somemight
questionwhetherparticipationis voluntaryforeach individual,
giventhat entryisa collectivedecision. Second,theservice we
valueisbiodiversityconservationbutwhatweactuallypayforand
monitor are proxy measures that we think will lead to this
(reduced tree cutting, hunting and mining, and increased tree
planting).Third,somemightarguethatsomeofthesethingsare
coveredbyrules oftheparkand aPES shouldnotpayfor rule
abeyance. Fourth, one might also argue that PES transactions
shouldinvolve marketexchange, orpurchase by private sector
service buyers – although such criteria would make ‘real’ PES
vanishinglyrare(MilneandAdams,2012).Weconsiderthekey
criteriatobedirectlinkage,conditionalityandtheexpectationof
additionality.Regardinglinkage,whatwepayforcanreasonably
be expected to have a direct impact on the target service –
biodiversity. Regarding conditionality (?), our monitoring of
performanceinvolvedsystematicmonitoringoflevelsofprovision,
withpaymentsscaledaccordingly.Concerningadditionality,the
useofcontrolswasdesignedtotestwhetheranymeasuredeffects
wereaboveandbeyondthosebroughtaboutbypre-existingrules
andenforcement.Onbalancewethinkithelpfultodescribethisas
aPES.
We provided financial incentives tocommunities to reduce
activities that were widely considered to be detrimental to
biodiversity conservation, predominantly hunting with snares,
cuttingtrees,andmining.Atthesametime,weincentivizedthose
activities outside of the park that were considered to support
reduction of these in-park activities in the long-term, mainly
private tree and bamboo planting. Performance was measured
once a year and based upon the collective actions of the
community. Specific performance indicators and targets were
negotiated through community meetings in each of the four
participatingcells.Performancetargetswerealsoinformedby,and
measured against, baseline assessments. Methods of payment
were partly negotiated with communities. In particular, each
participatingcelldecidedtheproportionoftotalpaymenttobe
retained for communal activities and the proportion to be
distributedat thehouseholdlevel(Gross-Campetal.,2012a,b).
Allpaymentswerecashratherthanin-kind,withcommunitieson
average deciding to distribute 68% of total payments in equal
shares to each household, and to retain the remainder for
investmentin community activities. Bothparts werediscussed
atpublicmeetingsand werebothpresentedas partofthePES
payment.
Communitieshadcompletediscretionoverhowtospendthe
collective part of the payment, spending it on, for example,
provisionoftreesaplingsandpurchaseofgoatsforpoorerfamilies.
Thelevelofpaymentwasupto25USDperhouseholdannually,
determinedtobetheaverageopportunitycostforreducedpark
access(usingMasozeraandAlavalpati,2004).Itwasdetermined
through consultation with park authorities and community
representativesthat theactualpayment(conditionally awarded
andscaledaccordingtoperformancemonitoring)wouldbepaidas
a flat, undifferentiated rate to each household, regardless of
household-levelopportunitycost.Elsewhere,wepresentevidence
that this equal distribution was the most widely held to be
equitableatlocallevel,whilstdistributionbyopportunitycostwas
theleastpopularconceptionofequity(Martinetal.,2014).Ashas
beenarguedinSection2,conceptionsofwhatisfairandequitable
aredeterminedincontextandthisisapotentialchallengeforany
pre-determinedviewthatthestudyofopportunitycostcanhelp
establishpaymentlevelsthatarefairandefficient.Weshouldalso
notethat,whilstitwouldhavebeenpossibletouseourbaseline
householdsurveystodifferentiatehouseholdopportunitycosts,
doingthis rigorouslywould haveaddedconsiderablytoproject
transactioncosts.Furthermore,measuringperformanceat
house-holdlevelisimpracticalduetothepublicnatureofthegood–a
NationalPark.Thus,therewasinpracticesomethingofapragmatic
alignment between what communities wanted, and what was
possible.Intermsofguidingobjectives,therewasalsopragmatic
alignmentbetweeneffectivenessandequitygoalsasthedesignof
thePESwereadaptedtolocalnorms.Forexample,forthePEStobe
successfullylauncheditwasallbutessentialtoalignwithlocal
stakeholders’ views about what constituted fair distribution of
payments.
The counterfactual was established through (1) control
communitieswithnoPESbutwithsimilaradditionalmonitoring
efforttotheexperimentalunits(e.g.similarsurveyingofhuman
activityalongtransectsintheforest)and(2)therestofthepark
whichhadnoPESandnoadditionalmonitoring.The
counterfac-tual that we constructed would clearly not satisfy the most
stringent standards for Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs).
Perhaps most importantly, it was not considered practical to
employdouble-orevensingle-blindingintothedesign,andthus
membersofbothexperimentalandcontrolcellswerepotentially
awareoftheirroles.Ashasbeennoted,thechallengeofmeasuring
theeffectivenessofPEStypicallyrequiresasignificantandcostly
monitoringeffort.Inthiscase,monitoringcouldnotbeconducted
remotelyandrequiredon-the-groundobservationofforest-based
activitiesthroughregularvisitsbymonitoringteams.
Asaresearch-orientedtrial,theshortdurationoftheproject
meantthatpaymentsonlylastedfortwoyears,whichisashorter
commitment period than most PES schemes. We consulted at
lengthwithlocalauthoritieshowbesttohandlethisinorderto
avoidanypotentialnegativeimpactswhenpaymentsfinished.The
resultantapproachwasoneofopencommunication–tostressin
allofourdealingswithcommunitiesandotherstakeholdersthat
this was a temporary trial. For communities, this was hardly
unusual,inthesensethatitconformstotheirexperienceofproject
interventions.
4. Methods
The basic design of the study was (a) ‘with and without’,
through selection and monitoring of both experimental and
controllocationsand(b)‘beforeandafter’throughbaselinesocial
andecologicalsurveysin2009andsubsequentsurveystomonitor
change.WeestablishedanexperimentalPESinfourselectedcells
adjacenttotheNyungweNationalPark.Threecellswererandomly
selected with the fourth (Uwumusebeya) being intentionally
includedbasedontheexpressedinterestofourprojectpartners
and park authority. Uwumusebeya is adjacent to the largest
bambooecosysteminthepark(3174ha)whichishometoarare
and endemic primate, the owl-faced monkey (Cercopithecus
hamlynii).Thebamboohasmultipleuses,includingconstruction,
household and agricultural instruments such as baskets, and
makingsnaresfortrappinganimals.Thefourcontrolcellswere
located adjacent to experimental cells in an effort to improve
matchingandpotentiallycaptureproblemsofleakageofhuman
activities fromexperimental cells. We considered thepotential
benefitsofplacingcontrolsfurtherfromtheexperimentalcells(i.e.
totrytoreducecontamination)butdecidedthatthiswouldadd
significantly toourmonitoring costsand stillnot eliminatethe
likelihood that our presence (forestmonitoring and household
surveys) would influence people’s behavior. Distant controls
wouldequallyhavebeenlesswellmatched.
HumanactivitymonitoringbythePESteam(ReDirect).Human
activityin theparkwasmeasured bywalkingtheexistingtrail
systemwithinadefinedsub-sectionoftheparkabuttingeachcell
andgeo-referencingdefinedhumanactivitiesastheywerefound.
The existing trail system was geo-referenced in 2009 when
baseline information was collected and followed during
subse-quentsurveys.Atotalof7surveyswereconductedineachofthe8
cellsoverthecourseofthestudy.Themonitoredareawasdefined
boundary into thepark using ArcGIS v.9.3. This distance was
chosen based on previous research that foundhuman activity
tendstooccur within1.5km of protectedarea boundaries and
sharplydeclinesatadistancegreaterthan5km(Waas,1995).We
examinedwhetherhumanactivitiesdifferedsignificantlybycell
type(controlversusexperimental)throughtimeusinga
general-izedlinearmodelonthemeannumberofhumanactivities(snares
andwoodcutting) usingRversion2.15.1 andtheMASS7.3-18
package.We utilized a log-link function and negativebinomial
modelbasedonoverdispersionofthedatasetinthePoissonGLM.
Humanactivitymonitoringbytheparkauthority.Ranger-based
monitoring (RBM) data were collected by the park authority,
RwandaDevelopmentBoard,ourpartnersonthisproject.TheRBM
iscollectedbyrangersthatextensivelypatrolthepark’sexisting
trailsystemon anapproximatelydaily basis, geo-referencing a
broadnumberofobservationsofhumanimpact.Weutilizedthe
RBMdataoverlappingwiththeperiodofourPES(2009–2012)to
examinethepark-widehumanactivities(i.e.limitedtosnaresand
woodcutting)aswellasactivitieswithinareaswherethePESwas
active.Patrolsand theirassociated findingswereisolatedusing
ArcGISv.9.3andtheshapefilesofourmonitoredareas.Similarto
thedatacollected byReDirect, weutilized a negativebinomial
GLMtodeterminewhetherhumanactivitydifferedsignificantly
through time in areas where the PES was active (control and
experimental cells) from that of park-wide trends. To test for
trendsovertime,Mann–KendalltestswererunusingtheKendall
2.2package.
Livelihood survey data. We collected extensive livelihood
informationinalleightcells,experimentaland control,in2009
and 2012. Forty-eight households in each cell were randomly
selectedforinterviews(N=376,8householdswerelostin2012
due to death and movement). The baseline interviews were
conducted in September 2009 and the same households
re-interviewedattheendofthestudyinearly2012.Theseinterviews
enabledustocalculatehouseholdconsumptionasameasurement
ofwealthandincludedthemarketvalueofitemsconsumedfrom
thepark,fooditems,durablegoods(e.g.bicycles,radios),social
events, and educational expenses. Mean market values were
establishedthroughaseriesofpricesurveysinmarketsclosetothe
cells where interviews occurred coinciding withthe livelihood
interviewsin2009and2012.Allanalysesofthesurveydatawere
doneinSPSS.
5. Results
5.1. Effectiveness
Ageneralizedlinearmodel(GLM)showedsignificantlyfewer
humanactivitiesintheexperimentalcells(Celltype(exp) 0.98)
thancontrolcellswithasmalldownwardtrendforbothcelltypes
over the course of the study period (Month 0.04; Table 1).
However,therewasnosignificantinteractionbetweencelltype
andmonth(dataformorecomplexmodelswithinteractionterms
notshown,modelselectioncarriedoutvialikelihoodratiotests)
indicatingthatthisdownwardtrendwasofasimilarnatureinboth
experimentalandcontrolcells(Fig.2).Inotherwordsalthoughthe
modelsuggeststhatexperimentalcellshavealowerrateofhuman
activitythancontrols,therateofchangethroughtimeissimilar
suggestingthatsomethingisinfluencinghumanactivityinboth
celltypes.
We generatedalternative hypothesestoexplainthis finding.
Our null hypothesis proposed that the PES intervention was
ineffectiveinsomuchashumanactivitywaschangingasa
park-wideprocessand that thetrendsobservedin themodelabove
(Table1)weremerelyareflectionofthatprocess.Weconsidered
thisspecificallyinrelationtotheserviceofbiodiversitygainsfrom
reducedhumanactivitywithinthepark.Totestthisweutilized
ranger-based monitoring (RBM) data collected by the park
authority(RDB) tocomparepark-widehumanactivitywithour
experimental and control cells. The selected RBM data model
(againchosenvialikelihoodratiotestsofnestedmodels)indicated
significantdifferencesinthelevelofhumanactivitybycelltype
(Table 2). Human activity in the experimental cells was
significantly less than that of the controlcells (Cell type (exp)
2.661),whereastheactivitythroughouttheparkwashigherbut
notsignificantlyso(Celltype(park-wide)0.779).Furthermore,an
examinationofmodeltermsincluding‘Month’showedthattrends
over time were different in all three cell types, with a slight
increaseinobservedhumanactivitythroughouttheparkovertime
aswellasinexperimentalcells,andaslightdecreaseincontrol
cells (Month:Cell typeinteractions).However, theneteffectin
experimentalcells (theestimatevalueforCelltype (exp)isthe
singlegreatestvalueofthemodel)suggeststhatthelevelofhuman
activityintheseareasissignificantlylowerfromthatinboththe
control and parkwide, i.e. something is strongly suppressing
humanactivityinthesecells.
AdditionalMann–Kendalltrendtestscorroboratedthefinding
that park-wide activities are increasing slightly, but lacked
significance for a downward trendin control cells, presumably
dueinparttotheweaknessofthetrend(park-wide:tau=0.23,
p=0.05,control:tau= 0.15,p=0.20;Fig.3aandb).Experimental
Table1
Asummaryoftheselectedgeneralizedlinearmodel(vialikelihoodratiotestsfor nestedmodels)usingalog-linkfunctionandnegativebinomialdistributionto investigatechangeinhumanactivitythroughtimeincontrolandexperimental cellsascollectedbythePESteam(ReDirect).Underthismodel,logsofexpected monthlyactivitycountsinexperimentalcellsareexpectedtobealmostoneunit lowerthanthoseofcontrolcells.(0‘***’,0.001‘**’,and0.01‘*’).
GLMhumanactivity(PES) Snare&treecuttings
Estimate zvalue
Intercept 2.05 6.75***
Numberofpatrols 0.37 6.16***
Month 0.04 2.30*
Celltype(exp) 0.98 3.45***
Log-likelihood 298.65
AIC 308.65
Samplesize 20
Fig.2.Themeannumberofhumanactivitiesorthreatsperpatrolthroughtimein controland experimental cells usingdatacollected by thePES team (N=20 samplingmonths).
cellssimilarlylackedsignificanceforachangeinhumanactivity
(experimental:tau= 0.12,p=0.32;Fig.3c)yetactivityappearsto
be decreasing after the first initial months of the project,
suggesting that this change may be due in part to the PES
intervention(Fig.3d;anobservationsupportedbyasubsequent
Mann–Kendalltest,experimentaltruncated:tau= 0.30,p=0.02).
Wethereforerejectthenullhypothesisthatthetrendsinthefirst
model(Table1)aremerelyareflectionofpark-widetrendsand
concludethatthePESinterventionhashadasignificantimpacton
levels of human activity in experimental (and potentially
neighboring control) cells,but withexperimentalcells showing
thelowestactivitylevelsofall.
5.2. Efficiency
The second alternative hypothesis concerning the lack of a
significantdifferencebetweentherateofchangeinhumanactivity
levelsthroughtimebetweencontrolandexperimentalcells(ofthe
ReDirectdatasetTable1)isduetocontaminationofcontrolsby
theadditionalmonitoringeffort–i.e.theyarenottrue
counter-factuals.Thedifficultyofprovidingadequatecontrolsin
conser-vationresearchiswellknown(SouleandOrians,2001).Onereason
forthisisthatitisbothimpracticaland/orunethicaltoapplya
double-blinded or even a single-blinded experimental design.
Resulting bias can include the Hawthorne effect, whereby
participants change behavior in response to being monitored,
ratherthanorinadditiontorespondingtotheinterventionitself;
andtheJohnHenryeffect,wherebycontrolschangetheirbehavior
in response to knowing that they are being compared to an
experimentalgroup(FuenteandWhittington,2012;Zwaneetal.,
2011).JohnHenrywasasteelworkerwhoworkedhimselftodeath
in the 1870s having learned that his performance was being
compared tothat ofa steam-powered drill(Irvingand Holden,
2013).Inourcasetherewereatleasttwounavoidablesourcesof
contamination.Firstly,itwasnotpracticaltocreatecontrolsthat
we could be certain to be blind to their role. Indeed, it was
necessarytoconsultwithlocalleaderstoensurethattheywere
Table2
Asummaryoftheselectedgeneralizedlinearmodel(vialikelihoodratiotestsof nestedmodels)usingalog-linkfunctionandnegativebinomialdistributionto investigatechangeinhumanactivityinareaswherethePESwasactive(controland experimentalcells)aswellaspark-wide.Thesedatawerecollectedbythepark authority(RDB)ranger-basedmonitoringprogram.(0‘***’,0.001‘**’,and0.01‘*’).
GLMhumanactivity(RBM) Snares&treecuttings Estimate zvalue
Intercept 1.884 3.359***
Numberofpatrols 0.020 0.583
Month 0.070 2.714**
Celltype(exp) 2.661 3.424***
Celltype(park-wide) 0.779 1.004
Numberofpatrols:Month 0.004 2.209*
Numberofpatrols:Celltype (exp)
0.228 3.952***
Numberofpatrols:Celltype (park-wide)
0.009 0.274
Month:Celltype(exp) 0.095 2.668**
Month:Celltype(park-wide) 0.078 2.457* Numberofpatrols:Month:
Celltype(exp)
0.009 3.108**
Numberofpatrols:Month: Celltype(parkwide)
0.004 2.170*
Log-likelihood 665.961
AIC 691.96
Samplesize 36
Fig.3.ThemeannumberofhumanactivitiesorthreatsperpatroloverthecourseofthePESwithalowesssmoothinglinetodepictthetrendofactivity(ranger-based monitoringdatacollectedbythemanagementauthority,RDB).
comfortablewithouractivities.Secondly,andmostpertinent to
ourhypothesis,becomingacontrolinvolvedbeingmonitoredby
teamsontheground,whichmayitselfleadtobehavioralchange.
RegardingthepossibilityofaJohnHenryeffect,weundertooka
smallsurveyincontrolcellsandfoundthat23%(n=17of73)of
respondentscouldcorrectlyanswerthreequestionsaboutthePES
scheme, confirming that communication about the trial was
indeed taking place and that the control was not fully blind.
Furthermore, 44%of respondentsfromcontrol cells stated that
reducedillicitactivitiesintheparkwerepartlyduetoexpectations
offutureinclusioninaPESscheme(FigureB1).
However,ourresearchshowsthatthesecondtypeof
contami-nation(theeffectofouradditionalmonitoringinthecontrols)was
the most important. When asked to identify the single most
important reason for reduced illicit activities in their cell, no
respondentcitedexpectedPESinclusionwhilst50%(n=29of58)
cited the presence of park guards (Figure B1). PES monitoring
activitiesintheparkoccurredeveryfourmonthsandinvolvedthe
presenceofateamof6peoplethatspentapproximatelyoneweekin
thearea.Whilstthemonitoringteamarenotinfact‘parkguards’we
learned that local people tended to associate them with the
managementauthority(RDB).Thisisconfirmedbyfindingsthat
households in both experimental and control cells reported a
significantincreaseininteractionwithparkauthoritystaffbetween
2009and2012(pairedt-test:controlt(175)= 11.51,p<0.0001
andparticipatingt(180)= 20.61,p<0.0001;FigureB2).
These results suggest that the PES trial hasnot been
cost-effective,becauseasimilaroutcomehasbeenachievedincontrols
(intheshorttermatleast),asaresultofenhancedmonitoringalone,
at lower intervention cost. The cost of ecological and social
monitoringwasonaverage3068and6793USDpercellrespectively,
thesameforparticipatingandcontrolcells.Thecostofpayments,
forparticipatingcellsonly,was23,110USDpercellperyear.Lack
of cost-effectiveness is likely here to reduce efficiency, in the
sensethatweassumetheconservationoutcometobringwelfare
benefitsandthatamorecost-effectiveinterventioncouldproduce
agreatertotalwelfaregain.However,asourdiscussionofequity
willreveal,thereisyetacrucialdistinctiontobemadebetween
theimpactoftheprojectonexperimentalversuscontrolcells.
5.3. Equity
Becauseconceptionsofequitytendtobecontextspecificwe
investigated whether an egalitarianperspective resonatedwith
localnorms.We testeda totaloffouralternative principlesfor
payment distribution and found that respondents selected
egalitarian(38%) astheir firstchoicemore oftenthanexpected
by chance (N=78, Chi-square=14.4, df=3, p=0.002). The
alternative principles of ‘effort’, ‘need’ and, ‘opportunity costs’
wererankedfirstby29%,23%and9%ofrespondents,respectively.
Similarly respondents’ least preferred method of payment
distribution was opportunity costs, with 54% ranking this last
(Chi-square=35.3,df=3,p=<0.001).Whilstthismaybeafavored
systemofdistributionforutilitarianefficiency,itwasreportedto
ustobemorallyperverse(andunpalatabletoourRDBpartners)
becauseitisseenasrewardingtheworstoffenders.
ThesizeofannualhouseholdPESpaymentswascalculatedto
offsetcostsratherthanenhanceincome.Asexpected,wefoundno
significantchangeinhouseholdconsumption(asanindicationof
wealth) across all cells as well as between cells, control and
experimental (Wilcoxon signed-rank: z= 0.98, p=0.32 and
z= 0.83and 0.48,p>0.05,respectively)basedonpaneldata
collected in2009and 2012(N=357households).Weare more
interestedinthedistributionofanyincomeeffectsandhowthisis
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000 350000
lower median upper lower median upper
C C C E E E H o usehol d weal th per capa (RWF )
Income quarles for control ('C') and experimental ('E') cells
2009 2012
Fig.4.Quartilesofhouseholdconsumptionwithstandarderrorbarsincontrolandexperimentalcells(N=176and181forcontrolandexperimentalcells,respectively; 1USD=600RWF).
locallyperceived.Comparingchangeofconsumptionper
house-hold,wefindsomeevidencethatthelowestincomequartilesare
doingrelativelywellinthattheirconsumptiongrowthisfavorable
compared toother quartiles (Fig. 4). Given a range of possible
confounding factors, we cannot confidently attribute any such
changetotheproject,butthisatleastsupportstheviewthatthe
project did no obvious harm to the material wellbeing of the
poorest.
We further assessed equity by testing for elite capture of
benefits – given that less than 100% of households actually
receivedthepaymentstheyweredue1(FigureB3),and
consider-ablylessgainedotherbenefits,wasthereevidenceof
discrimina-tion against thepoor? We examined therelationship between
wealthandthelikelihoodofreceiving(a)eachofthethreePES
paymentsmadeoverthecourseoftheproject,(b)employmentas
localmonitors,(c)receiptofsmalllivestockand/ortreesaplings,
and(d)involvementinanti-cropraidingprograms.Noneofthese
relationships were significantsuggesting that distribution
con-formedtoanegalitarianconceptionofequity(TableA1andFigure
B4).Theexceptiontothiswastheobservationthatasmallnumber
(n=6of29)ofhouseholdsreceivingfreelivestockwereamongthe
highestincomequintilethatcontrastswithourstatedobjectiveto
targetthepoor.
In addition to distribution of material benefits, we also
considered the equity of social impacts. We were particularly
interestedin whetherPES mightlead toinjustices arisingfrom
failuresofrecognition,includinginsensitivitytolocalcultureand
theunderminingof non-monetarywaysofvaluing interactions
withtheenvironment.Qualitativeinterviewsrevealedhardlyany
concernwithculturallossordominationarisingfromthePES.The
attachment of monetary value to particular practices was not
articulated as dominating other ways of valuing livelihood
practicesorrelationshipswithnature.Wealsofoundverylittle
concernaboutthefactthattheincentivestructureofthePESledto
adeepeningofantagonismtowardtraditionalforestusessuchas
hunting.Wewanttostressthatthesefindingsarehighly
context-specificandreflectiveofaparticularRwandanhistoricalprocessof
modernization that tends to construct notions of progress in
contrasttotraditionalculturalpracticesassociatedwithaviolent
past(Martinetal.,2014).
A related concern in critical PES literature is that extrinsic
incentivesintroducedthroughPESmightleadtoa‘crowdingout’of
intrinsicmotivesforconservation(Corbera,2012;Fisher,2012;
Sommervilleetal.,2009).Thereisstrongempiricalevidencethat
materialinterestsandmoralsentimentsareinseparableandthat
crowding-out(andin)occursbecauseeconomicincentivesaffect
individuals’moralframingofasituation(Bowles,2008;Freyand
Jegen,2001),ascantheinstitutionalfeaturesoftheseincentives (Falk and Szech, 2013). Of particular relevance to equity, the
psychologicalconditionsthatfostercrowding-out includethose
whereaninterventionisperceivedtobeunfair,suchaswhereitis
domineeringandunderminesself-determination(FreyandJegen,
2001)or where itallows free-riders toprosper(Bowles,2008).
Moreover,thecorrelatemayalsobetrue,thatintrinsicmotivations
mightbecrowded-inwhereaninterventionisperceivedtosupport
localcontrolandself-determination(FreyandJegen,2001).
WeprovidehereevidencethatthePESdidindeedchangethe
motivesunderlyingobservedbehavioralchange.Thekeyfindingis
that whilst the project as a whole led to similar conservation
outcomesin both experimentaland control cells, therewasan
important difference in how people perceived their behavioral
changeleadingtosuchoutcomes.Tolinkthis differencetothe
theory of crowding-in and -out is admittedly rather more
speculativeat this moment,butwe think promisingenoughto
warrant some discussion. Respondents in experimental cells
increasingly agreed that participation in decision-making was
themainreasonforreducingillegalactivitiesinthepark(Table3).
Incontrastcontrolcellshavebecomelesslikelytoattributethe
reductioninillegalactivitiestoparticipationandenvironmental
educationandmorelikelytoattributeittolawenforcement.
We used qualitative data to further explore how the PES
changedmotives.Wecoded357responsestoanopenquestion
aboutwhy humanactivityin theparkhadreduced (TableA2).
Three answers dominated, with65% (n=481 of 744) of coded
responses stating (i) enforcement by park management, (ii)
education about the park’s ecological importance and rules, or
(iii)thePESscheme.Wethenselectedoutonlythoseresponses
thatwerepremisedbywordstotheeffectthat‘thisisthemain
reasonforsuchbehavioralchange’.Thisyielded86observations,
where 66% (n=29 of 44) of control respondents identified
enforcementasthemainreason,comparedto21%(n=9 of42)
of participant respondents(Table A3). Fifty-fivepercent of the
respondentsfromexperimentalcellscitedthePESschemeasthe
maincauseofchangewiththeirstatementssuggestingthatthe
non-pecuniaryaspectsofthePES(participation,education)arejust
asimportantasthemoney.Whatwetakewithconfidencefrom
these findingsis that the PES changedlocal perceptionsof the
motivationsforparkprotection,awayfromfearofrule
enforce-mentandtowardthePES schemeitself,whichisassociatednot
only with monetary benefits but also increased participation
(Table3,questionb).
Thesedifferencesinperceptionarehardlytrivialintermsofthe
experience oflocalpeople andtheimplicationsfor longer-term
conservationpractice.Incontrolcells,respondentsareveryclear
thattheyarechangingbehaviorinresponsetofearsthatparkstaff
will fine and beat them, and even shoot them. Examples of
statementsmadeduringinterviewsgivea senseofhowserious
thisdifferenceis:
‘Thecorereasonwhyhumanactivitieshavedecreasedinour
cellisthereinforcementofthelawalongwithheavy
punish-ments.Threepeoplehavebeenkilledwhencaughtinthepark.’
(Rukorecell)
‘IllegalactivitiesintheparkhavereducedbecauseORTPN[RDB]
increaseditseffort inprotectingtheparkand sensitisingthe
population.Also,therehavebeenpeoplewhowereshotand
died,andthismadepeoplefear.’(Kiyabocell)
We have found the contrast with statements made in
participatingcellstobenotable,forexample:
‘The illegal activities in the park reduced because we were
sensitisedandgivensomemoneyfromReDirectwhichweused
tosustainourhouseholds.’(Shabacell)
‘ThecommunitywassensitisedbyReDirectontheconservation
ofNyungweandgivenpayments,whichmanypeoplebought
rabbitswith—onemaleandonefemale.Insteadofgoinginto
theparkformeat,theycouldeattheirownrabbits.’(Gahurizo
cell)
Moregenerally,oursurveysfoundthatthoseincellswithPES
aremorelikelytoperceivebenefitsoflivingadjacenttothepark,to
say that the park authorities are sensitive to their needs and
opinions, and that they benefit from the presence of park
authorities. We alsosee significantly moretree-planting inPES
1Distribution of payments to nearly 4000 households required that all
householdshadsavingsaccountsthatalloweddirectcashtransfersfromabank. Whilstitwasgovernmentpolicyforallhouseholdstohavesuch‘SACCO’accounts, celllevelofficialsstillhadtoworkhardtoget100%coverageandthereweresome inevitableteethingproblems.
cells, as a longer term way to find substitutes for park-based resources.
Intermsofcrowdinginandout,whatwethinkweareseeingis
thatthePESintroducesnewmotivesforcaringfortheforest(based
oneconomic benefitsandopportunitiesfor betterrelationships
withauthorities),whilstnotcrowdingoutolder,intrinsicmotives.
Thinkingaboutthisfromtheperspectiveofmotivationcrowding
theory(FreyandJegen,2001),weproposethatthetakingonof
new, positive motives is aided by perceptions of the equitable
design of this PES scheme (participatory, egalitarian), i.e. that
perceptions of equity, such as perceived progress toward
self-determination, have served as antecedents of developing new
motives.Theabsenceofcrowdingoutislargelyconcludedbecause
respondentshaveneverhighlightedtouspriorintrinsic
motiva-tionsforparkprotection.Wehaveexploredthisabsencethrough
focusgroupsanditseemsthatsuchmotivationswerecrowdedout
muchearlierthroughprogressivefearofauthoritysinceNyungwe
wasfirstgazettedinthe1930s(Martinetal.,2014).
6. Discussion
We have foundthatit is possibletodesignan effectivePES
schemetosupportprotectionofapark.However,whilstthePES
was effective at reducing threats to the park’s biodiversity,
comparedto changes in thepark asa whole, it wasnot more
effectivethanourcontrols.Becausecontrolswerenotblinded,they
in fact turned out not to be true controls but an alternative
treatmentbasedonadditionalmonitoringactivityintheabsence
offinancialincentives.We foundthatthisalternativetreatment
hadasmuchofanimpactonourmeasuresofhumanactivityinthe
parkasdidthePES.Theequitydimensionwasevaluatedinrelation
topro-poordistributionofmaterialbenefits,findingthatpoorer
groupswereaslikelytobenefitasthewealthierones,andlittle
evidenceofthedistributionalinequityobservedinsomeotherPES
schemes(Corbera,2012;Mahantyetal.,2013),thoughnotall(Li
etal.,2011).Equitywasalsoevaluatedinsocialterms,considering
whether the PES is considered to dominate and exclude
non-economicvalues and, connectedtothis, whether itcrowds-out
non-economic motivation for park protection. We found that
crowding-outisamootpointinthispartofRwanda,becausethe
erosionofculturallyparticularwaysofvaluingnaturewasalready
faradvanced.Wedidhoweverfindsomeevidencetoproposethat
crowding-inmightbea morerelevantphenomenon,withsome
evidencethatperceptionsofproceduralequityinparticularmight
help to foster the psychological conditions conducive to the
development of non-fear based conservation motives. This
suggestedrole for perceivedproceduralequitybroadly concurs
with what is already known about the contexts that foster
crowding-in over crowding-out (d’Adda, 2011; Frey and Jegen,
2001).
Ifoneremovesequityasahighorderobjective,thePESwasnot
efficient(intheshortterm)becausetheenvironmentalobjective
couldhavebeenachievedatlowereconomiccost,bringinggreater
aggregateexpectedwelfare gains tocurrentand future people.
However,wethinkthatequitymightactuallyhavebeenthemost
important impact of this particular PES. There is a normative
reasonforthinkingthis–quitesimply,wethinkthatprojectsthat
areperceivedasequitablearepreferabletothosethatarenot.But
there is also an instrumental reason for thinking this – that
inequitycanundermineefficiencyinthelongrunduetoconflict
(CollierandHoeffler,2004;EstebanandRay,2011;Ibarraetal., 2011;Redpathetal.,2013;Robbinsetal.,2009;Toetal.,2012),and
more positively, that equity might serve to ‘crowd-in’ more
sustainablemotivesforconservation,suchasthepositivebenefits
thatcanflowfromaforest,thatwillserveitsefficiencyinthelong
term.The latterremains quitespeculative and requiresfurther
researcheffort.
Intryingtoevaluatetheevidence,thekeyfactbeforeusisthat
both experimental andcontrol cellsachieved broadlythesame
quantitativeconservationoutcome but for qualitativelydifferent
reasons.Incontrolcellsbehavioralchangewasmotivatedbyfearof
parkguardsbut in experimentalcells there wasa greatershift
towardadditionalmotivesbasedonenhancededucationaboutthe
environment, and a greater sense of involvement in park
management which is tied in with perceptions of equity. This
posesachallengetoourworkingdefinitionofefficiencybecause,if
we stickwiththis definition,ourcontrolcells (a ‘moreguards’
intervention)appeartobethemoreefficient.Andyet,motivesand
feelingsaboutmanagementlegitimacyarelikelytodeterminehow
wellbehavioralchangeissustained,andmoregenerally,thelevel
ofcooperationwithparkauthorities.
Weareimplyingherethatinequitymightundermineefficiency
inthelongerrun,andthusthatthetwoarefundamentallylinked.
Onemechanismsuggestedforthisisthatperceptionsofinequity
undermine cooperativebehavior andfoster conflictivebehavior
(Deutsch,2000;Martinetal.,2011).Whilstcompetitiverelations
canfosterefficiencyinthecontextofmarkets,PESschemesrarely
resemblemarkets(Milneand Adams,2012). MostPES schemes,
includingourcasestudy,aremoreaboutpublicgoodsprovision,
and thus require cooperation. To prioritize competition over
cooperation would be a myopic vision of efficiency (Jennings,
2005;Marglin,2010).Bycontrast,ifwelookatefficiencywitha
longertimehorizon,weareabletoseethatnon-costfactorssuch
asequityeffectlonger-termoutcomes(AdhikariandBoag,2013;
FehrandSchmidt,1999;WilkinsonandPickett,2010),andthus
should be constitutive of our vision of both effectiveness and
efficiency.
Insummary,weareofferingpreliminarytheoryandevidenceto
propose that observed efficiency/equity trade-offs might be
resolved by expandingthetime horizon and disciplinaryscope
ofourevaluativeframework.Wecannotbecertainthatinequitable
PESdesignwillleadtoconflict,oreventheextenttowhichany
suchconflictwouldinflatetransactioncosts.Thisisinpartbecause
conflictscanoccurearlyonandtheseschemessimplynevergetoff
theground,makingithardtostudycasesoffailure(Corbera,2012;
Wunderetal.,2008).Butitisalsobecauseconflictcantaketimeto
Table3
Meanvalues(SE)arebasedonaLikertscalewhere1equalsstronglyagreeand5stronglydisagree.(0‘***’,0.001‘**’,and0.01‘*’).
2009 2012 Repeatedmeasures
Themainfactorthatstops peoplefromenteringtheparkis:
Experimental Control Experimental Control Between years
Between yearscelltype
Mean(SE) Mean(SE)
a.Lawenforcement(RDB) 2.23(0.08) 2.13(0.09) 2.14(0.06) 1.68(0.06) F1,332=5.52* F1,332=15.31***
b.Involvementinpark management(participation)
2.28(0.08) 2.31(0.09) 2.16(0.06) 2.60(0.09) F1,343=0.67 F1,343=4.84*
c.Environmentaleducation thattheyreceive
becomeapparentandthereisgrowingcasestudyevidencefrom
someofthelongerrunningPESschemesthatperceivedinequities
inprocedureordistributionarelinkedtoconflicts(Corberaetal.,
2007b,2009;Garcia-Amadoetal.,2011;Locatellietal.,2008).
As a final word, we should reiterate that what passes for
equitablecannot beuniversally prescribed.For example,inthis
particular context of access to a public good, we found that
opportunity cost was not considered an equitable basis for
determiningpaymentdistribution.Butinothercontexts,notably
useofprivatefarmlands,itmaywellbe.Thepointforpolicymakers
then,isthatitisimportanttounderstandequity-in-context.
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge funding from the European
Research Council (Grant No. GA 206994 REDIRECT). Joseph
Munyarukazamadeanimportantcontributiontodatacollection.
Jo Dicks assisted with the development of the statistical
models analyzing human activity data. We also acknowledge
thelarge partplayed by ourpartners in Rwanda: theRwanda
DevelopmentBoard,WildlifeConservation Societyand National
UniversityofRwanda.
AppendixA. Supplementarydata
Supplementarymaterialrelatedtothisarticlecanbefound,in
theonlineversion,atdoi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.07.003.
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