Special Proceedings Recent Digested Cases
(2010-2011)
CONTENTS:
1. Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person
a. Probate of the will in the foreign country where the
alien deceased resides condition sine qua non for
Reprobate of the will in the Philippines
IN RE: In the Matter of the Petition to approve the
will of Ruperta Palaganas with prayer for the
appointment of Special Administrator, Manuel Miguel
Palaganas and Benjamin Palaganas vs. Ernesto
Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011
2. Guardianship
a. Guardianship of Minor
Cabales vs. Court of Appeal, G.R. No. 162421,
August 31, 2007
b.
Appointment of a Guardian: Court Authority Required
People vs. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, August 25,
2010
c. Fiduciary Funds Shall Remain With Court
Posted January 31, 2011; By Anna Katrina M.
Martinez (SC Website)
3.
Legal Guardian: When one of the spouse is
incapacitated – Sole Administration
Jose Uy vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 109557,
November 29, 2000
a.
Guardian over Incompetent Person: Who is an
incompetent person
Hernandez, et.al. vs. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos.
166470 and 169217, August 7, 2009
a.
Escheat Proceeding: Proper Party and Citizenship of the
owner of the property to be escheated.
Balais-Mabanag vs. Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City, G.R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010
5. Adoption
a. Validity of Adoption when the Surviving Spouse
remarries
IN RE: Petition for Adoption OF Michael Jude P. Lim,
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
b.
Adoption under Article 33, New Civil Code and SC Cir.
No.12: decree of Adoption cannot be made solely by
case study reports made by a social welfare officer of the court
DSWD vs. Judge Antonio M. Belen, A.M. No.
RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997
c.
Penalty for a public officer for simulating birth
certificate: Application of the Civil Service Rules
Anonymous vs. Emma Curamen, A.M. No.
P-08-2549, June 18, 2010
6. Habeas Corpus
a. Grant of Writ of Habeas Corpus ancillary to a Criminal
Case: Dismissal of the latter rendered moot and
academic of the former
So vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., G.R. No. 190108, 19
October 2010
b.
Writ of Habeas Corpus: Not proper pending Special Civil
Action for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals 7th
Division.
In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA: ROBERTO RAFAEL
PULIDO vs. Gen. EFREN ABU, et al., G.R. No. 170924,
July 4, 2007
c.
A detention previously invalid becomes valid upon the
application, issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus
denied. (Section 4 of Rule 102)
Ampatuan vs. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, G.R. No.
182497, 29 June 2010
7.
Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data:
a. Command Responsibility
b. Amparo: Not applied to those instances other than right
to life, liberty or security (i.e. personal property)
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo
and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas,
G. R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010
8.
Rule 103: Change of Name: Jurisdiction and
Sufficiency of Evidence
Republic vs. Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante a.k.a.
MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE, G.R. No. 160597,
July 20, 2006
9. Rule 108
a. Authority of the trial courts to make judicial
corrections of entries in the civil registry.
RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT
CONDUCTED AT THE RTC BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC,
A.M.No.06-7-414-RTC, October 19, 2007
b.
When civil status affects the changes in the entry
in civil registry, adversarial proceedings applied –
Jurisdictional and Notice are essential
Republic vs. Julian Edward Emerson
Coseteng-Magpayo (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011
c.
Change of Status: Alien Spouse failed to comply
on the Jurisdictional Requirement
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11,
2010
10.
RULE 103, 108 and RA 9048: Distinguished
Republic vs. Mercadera, G.R. No. 186027, December
A. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED
PERSON
Probate of the will in the foreign country where the alien
deceased resides condition sine qua non for Reprobate of
the will in the Philippines
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS VS. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011
FACTS:
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it
The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
HELD:
Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and
2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.
B. GUARDIANSHIP
Guardianship of Minor: AM. No. 03-02-05-SC
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIANO FELIANO
G.R. No. 162421, August 31, 2007 Puno, C.J.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte to his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora, and Rito. On 1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the property to Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior to the redemption of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson, herein petitioner.
Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and their mother, in lieu of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido. Subsequently, Saturnina, and her four children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to Spouses Feliano. It was provided in the deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito, being minor at the time of the sale, will be held in trust by the vendee and will paid upon them reaching the age of 21.
In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his share from the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson learned of the sale from his uncle, Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed a complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spouses averred that the petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already received his share; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the redemption price.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was no longer entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the death of his father, Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina, being his legal guardian at the time of the sale was properly vested with the right to alienate the same.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in behalf of the minors were binding upon them.
HELD:
With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid. Under Section 1, Rule 96 “A guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only. x x x” Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito was unenforceable. However, when he received the proceeds of the sale, he effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians; rather it was his mother who if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his share in the property. Consequently, petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in the said property. However, Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano.
Appointment of Guardian: Court authority required
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA
FACTS:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4pm to 2am for six days a week.
In February 1999 at around 9:30 pm, AAA then 11 yrs old, was sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. The following day, at around the same time and while BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast.
Two weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife, then appellant was able to penetrate her. Two days after, appellant again raped her. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least 3 times a week at the same time until October 15, 2002, when she was 14 yrs. old.
RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape.CA affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant, but did so only on 2 counts and consider the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even without court authority
Whether that the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of relationship is applicable. HELD:
To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender.
Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People vs. Dela Cruz which held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on Civil Procedure.
The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. The appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by RA 7659.Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA 7659, since he does not fit into that category.
Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Information. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the “adopting father” of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.
Fiduciary Funds Shall Remain With Court
Posted January 31 , 2011; By Anna Katrina M. Martinez
The deposit of the Judiciary’s Fiduciary Funds, amounting to more than PhP4.8 billion, and all subsequent collections of trust and other receipts with the Bureau of Treasury “has no legal basis,” and the remittance of interests of the Fiduciary Funds to the national government “is erroneous and must be discontinued.”
Thus said the Supreme Court as it ruled that Fiduciary Funds in custodialegis shall remain under the custody and control of the courts, to be deposited and disposed of as the courts may direct in the exercise of their judicial functions, while Fiduciary Funds deposited with the Court in its administrative capacity, and not in custodialegis, shall be remitted to the National Treasury.
In its 2008 Annual Audit Report, the COA recommended that the Court deposit the amount of P4,838,976,011.86 “and all subsequent collections of trust and other receipts with the Bureau of Treasury” in conformity with Executive Order 338 (EO 338), Sections 7 and 8 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (2008 GAA), and COA-DOF-DBM Joint Circular No. 1-97.
EO 338 directs government offices and agencies to immediately transfer all public moneys deposited with depository banks and other institutions to the Bureau of Treasury, regardless of income source, while the 2008 GAA directs government agencies to book trust and other receipts “which have been received as guaranty for the fulfilment of an obligation” with the National Treasury. Joint Circular No. 1-97, on the other hand, requires that all National Government cash balances be deposited with the National Treasury.
In an En Banc Resolution, the Supreme Court clarified whether the deposits in its Fiduciary Funds and in those of the lower courts as well as the Philippine Mediation Center should be remitted to the National Treasury, as suggested by COA.
The Court said while funds that properly accrue to the General Fund must be turned over to the Bureau of Treasury, which is under the Executive branch, the custody and disposition of any fund of whatever nature that is in custodia legis (custody of the law) is under the exclusive control of the courts in the exercise of their judicial functions.
“The control of funds in custodia legis is an exercise of judicial power, and under the Constitution, ‘[T]he judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law,’” said the Court. “Neither the Executive nor Legislative branch can encroach on the power of the courts to control custody or disposition of funds in custodia legis,” adding that upon termination of the case, or earlier as the courts may direct, the funds in custodia legis will be returned to their rightful owners, subject to a service fee of 10% per annum of the interests earned, which shall accrue to the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
The High Court said that while Batas Pambansa Blg. 325 provides that, unless otherwise provided, all collections from fees and charges of government agencies, including the Supreme Court, shall accrue to the General Fund of the National Government, an exemption is provided under Presidential Decree No. 1949 (PD 1949), which established the JDF “for the benefit of the members and personnel of the Judiciary to help ensure and guarantee the independence of the Judiciary.”
PD 1949 provides that the Chief Justice shall administer and allocate the JDF and shall have the sole exclusive power and duty to approve the authorized disbursement and expenditures of the Fund. “Thus, the JDF, although derived from legal fees and charges, does not accrue to the General Fund by express provision of PD 1949,” said the Court.
The High Court added that Fiduciary Funds also do not accrue to the General Fund as these are not “collections from fees and charges” but are funds that are deposited in court which are held in trust for the parties and litigants.
The Court also ruled that its own practice of remitting the interests of the Fiduciary Funds to the national government is erroneous and must be discontinued.
“Following the right of accession conferred on the owner of the property under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the interests on these fiduciary funds also belong to the parties who own the principal amount. Upon termination of the case, the interests should be returned to the parties together with the principal. The interests should not accrue to the General Fund because it is tantamount to taking private property for public use without just compensation,” the Court held. It added that interests on deposits of the JDF accrue to the JDF for the benefit of the members and personnel of the Judiciary.
The Court, however, ruled that forfeited cash deposits made to guarantee undertakings in favor of the government, and the interests thereon, are income of the government and shall be remitted to the National Treasury and that unclaimed fiduciary funds of private parties, including interests, shall remain with the courts until a law is passed authorizing the escheat or forfeiture of such unclaimed funds in favor of the State.
Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the amounts it previously remitted to the National Treasury representing interest earned on the Fiduciary Fund and forfeited/confiscated bonds covering the period from 2004 to 2007, under the staggered payments proposed by retired Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno to the COA in 2009, shall be credited to whatever amounts the Court is required to remit to the National Treasury. (Min. Res., AM No. 05-3-35-SC, Re: Audit Observation Memorandum; Min. Res., AM No. 10-8-3-SC, Re: Fiduciary Fund Deposits Not Remitted to the Bureau of Treasury, January 18, 2011)
Legal Guardian: When one of the spouse is incapacitated –
Sole Administration
Jose Uy vs. Court of Appeals and Teodoro Jardeleza
GR No. 109557. November 29, 2000 Facts:
Dr. Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose and depriving him of his mental and physical capability to act. Upon learning that the real property he
owned is about to be sold, Teodoro filed a petition for the issuance of the letter of guardianship of his father. In the petition, he prayed for the issuance of the letters of guardianship in favor of his mother and petitioner, Gilda.
Days later, Gilda filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of Dr. Jardeleza, administration of conjugal properties, and authority of sell the same. In the said petition, she prayed for such reliefs because of the increasing hospital bills due to the fact that Dr. Jardeleza is confined in an intensive care unit (ICU).
Upon the finding of the petition to be in form, the RTC issued a notice for hearing, which happened few days after. On the same date of the hearing, the RTC, upon hearing the witnesses presented by Gilda, granted such petition. Teodoro filed an Opposition contending that he was unaware that the case was already decided. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the proper remedy in the case is not the petition filed by his mother, but the petition for guardianship proceedings. As such, the case cannot be heard under the rules of summary proceedings as contemplated in Article 253 of the Family Code. He also noted that the provisions on summary proceedings, found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code, comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” which contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one spouse is “comatose without motor and mental faculties,” the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
Issue: Whether the provision of Article 124 of the Family Code applies in this case when one of the spose is incapacitated to give his consent?
Held:
No. Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
“ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
“In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a).”
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and
with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Guardianship over Incompetent Person: Who is an
Incompetent Person?
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE and NATIVIDADCRUZ-HERNANDEZ vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS
G.R. No. 166470 and G.R. No. 169217 August 7, 2009 FACTS:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan. On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, herein petitioners. Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family. In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various “projects” involving Lulu’s real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulu’s properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400. In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners’ home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication.
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by
a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same. Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulu’s competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage. They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of executing an SPA.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health. Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulu’s intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lulu is an incompetent and the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property is necessary.
HELD:
YES. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulu’s legal guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.
C. ESCHEAT
Escheat Proceeding: Proper Party and Citizenship of the
owner of the real property to be escheated
CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG v. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPTION D. ALCARAZ AND RAMONA ALCARAZ
G.R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010 Facts:
The Coronel brothers executed a document entitled “Receipt of Down payment” in favor of Ramona Alcaraz upon the receiving P50,000.00 as a down payment for the sale of their inherited house and lot in Quezon City. In the agreement with Ramona, they will execute a deed of absolute sale immediately upon the transfer of the TCT to the name of the brothers Coronel because the same was named to their father. On Feb.18, 1985, they sold the same property to petitioner herein for a higher contract price than that of Ramona. For this reason, Coronel rescinded the first agreement with Ramona by depositing to her the down payment of P50, 000.00. Consequently, respondents filed a case for specific performance and caused the annotation of lis pendens over the property. On June 5, 1985, TCT 351382 was issued in the name of petitioner herein.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein ordering the cancellation of the TCT in the name of petitioner. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the registration by the Registry of Deeds of the DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE despite the lack of indication of citizenship of the buyer.
Ruling:
The High Court ruled that it should be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge Ramona’s qualification to acquire land. Only the Government through the Solicitor General has the personality to file the case challenging the capacity of person to acquire or own land based on non-citizenship. The limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State and not against individual. And that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or individual. It will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner, instead the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State according to BP Blg. 185.
D.ADOPTION
Validity of Adoption in case the surviving spouse
remarries
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 CARPIO, J.:
Facts
On 23 June 1974, Petitioner Monina P. Lim married Primo Lim. They were childless. Subsequently, minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, Monina and Primo registered the children to make it appear that they were the
children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario, an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael, who was already 25 years old and already married and 18 years and seven months, before the trial court.
Michelle, together with her husband and Michael, gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Monina’s husband Angel likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. On the ground that since petitioner having remarried, should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Monina Lim, who has remarried, can singly adopt. Held:
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Angel Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that
he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Angel Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contention that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority is untenable.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
Joint adoption of the husband and wife may not be dispensed. Adoption has, thus, the following effects:
(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Angel Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Angel Olario is of no moment. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Angel Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
Adoption under Article 33, New Civil Code and SC Cir.
No.12: Decree of Adoption cannot be made solely by
casestudy reports made by a social welfare officer of the court DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT vs. JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362, July 18, 1997 FACTS:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings
and recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña.
However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption.
ISSUE:
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social welfare officer of the court?
RULING:
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should be denied.
Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:
(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;
(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . . xxx xxx xxx
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. . . .
The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should
never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act.
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.
Simulation of Birth: Penalty of a public officer who
registers a child to the Civil Registry not of the child’s
biological parents.
Sec. 21, Article VII of Domestic Adoption Act: Rules on
Civil Service Applied
Anonymous vs. Emma Curamen
A.M. No. P-08-2549, June 18, 2010 Facts:
This is an administrative case against Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I in the Municipal Trial Court of Rizal in Nueva Ecija, for dishonesty and falsification of a public document.
On 6 March 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous complaint charging respondent with falsification of a public document and simulation of birth.
The complaint alleged that respondent registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen in the local civil registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Complainant submitted the child’s purported birth certificate to show respondent misrepresented that she was the child’s biological mother and her husband, Ricardo Curamen, was the biological father. Complainant claimed respondent was, in fact, the child’s maternal grandmother. Complainant submitted the child’s original birth certificate to show that the child’s real name was Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and that her parents were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen Aquino and Jun Aquino. According to complainant, respondent included the child as additional dependent in her income tax declaration.
In his Report, Executive Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24) of Cabanatuan City verified that Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen were the same child. Judge Caspillo confirmed that the child was, in fact, respondent’s granddaughter. The child’s real mother, Olga, was one of respondent’s children.
Judge Caspillo verified that on 31 March 2006, respondent executed an affidavit for delayed registration of the alleged birth of her child. Respondent claimed that her supposed child, Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen, was born on 30 November 2005. Respondent’s application was given due course and the supposed birth of Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen was registered in the Civil Registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2006-507. This second birth certificate of the child indicated that the child’s parents were respondent and her husband.
Issue: Whether Curamen is liable for simulation of birth by falsification. Held:
With respect to the alleged falsification of the child’s birth certificate, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty and falsification of a public document. A birth certificate, being a public document, serves as prima facie evidence of filiation. The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public document.
Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to conceal the identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation to the child’s prejudice. When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth the document proclaims.
However, the extreme penalty of dismissal is not automatically imposed, especially where mitigating circumstances exist. Although under the schedule of penalties adopted by the Civil Service, dishonesty and falsification of a public document are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal, the fact that this is respondent’s first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in her favor. The law requires that the mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded by the proper party. But in the interest of substantial justice, we may appreciate the mitigating circumstance in the imposition of penalty, even if not raised by respondent.
We thus impose on respondent the penalty next lower in degree, which is suspension for six months and one day without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
E. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS:
Grant of Writ of Habeas Corpus ancillary to a Criminal
Case: Dismissal of the latter rendered moot and academic
of the former
DAVID E. SO v. HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR.
NACHURA, J.: FACTS:
Petitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a non-bailable offense.
The case arose from the following facts. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla which states that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge". Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft. Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that she was ready for trial.
Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement and the present petition for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo.
The court granted the Motion for Relief. On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, the court resolved to issue a joint writ of habeas corpus and amparo and refer the petition to the Court of Appeals for decision. Meanwhile, NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report according to which, Guisande is competent to stand the rigors of court trial.
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to the incident before this Court. Public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case for Qualified Theft against Guisande. In view of such dismissal, Judge Tacla contends that the cases for issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo and the petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC
HELD:
The petition should be dismissed. The petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos daughter, Guisande.
There is no affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via
some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial.
Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."
Writ of Habeas Corpus: Not proper pending Special Civil
Action for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals 7th
Division.
In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA:
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO vs. Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and GEN. ERNESTO DE LEON, in his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, respondents.
G.R. No. 170924, July 4, 2007 Facts:
In line with their participation in the “Oakwood Mutiny” that led to Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s issuance of Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country to be under a "state of rebellion” and General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and the PNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and quell the "rebellion.", petitioners were taken into custody by their Service Commander. Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of the Articles of War. They were, however, among the soldiers charged before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, with the crime of Coup D’etat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. They were consequently detained in Fort Bonifacio under the custody of the Philippine Marines. A petition for bail was filed by the accused soldiers which the RTC subsequently granted. Despite of the order and the service thereof, petitioners were not released. As a response, the People of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration of the order granting bail. With the denial of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed with the Court of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Moreover, since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by petitioner Pulido on their behalf. In response, Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 July 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of Appeals and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before its 7th Division. Thus, we have this case.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus was proper despite of the pending special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals 7th Division. Held:
No. That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari case is beyond doubt as they involve two sides of the same coin. The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the release of Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower court’s grant of bail. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed in behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to secure their immediate release because the order granting bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement through a petition for habeas corpus the provisional release from detention that the lower court has ordered. The question this immediately raises is: can this be done through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the grant of bail and the release under bail are live questions before another Division of this Court?
We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is precisely the reason why the rule against forum shopping has been put in place. The remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i.e., the release of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured through separately-filed cases where issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with one another. To be sure, we clearly heard the petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the effectiveness of our ruling in this petition will depend on the nature and tenor of the ruling in the certiorari case; there is no basis for a release on habeas corpus if this same Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of bail is improper. For this very same reason, we should not entertain the present petition as the matter before us is already before another co-equal body whose ruling will be finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales’ and Mesa’s release. The Decision of the Seventh Division of this Court, heretofore footnoted, ordering the release on bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this point.
XXX XXX XXX
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question. Where the issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value. This Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.
Writ of Habeas Corpus: Section 4 of Rule 102
A detention previously invalid becomes valid upon the
application, issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus denied.
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG
G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010 PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his
Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended
that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.
On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL.
HELD:
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers
