Starting From Scratch: St. John's,Newfoundland as a Case Study in Second World War Naval Base Development
Submitted By: ©Paul William Collins
MUN#0075 19952 29 June 2011
This Thesis is Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Department of History Memorial University of Newfoundland St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador
Abstrac t
Sta rtingFro mScratc h :St.John's, New found landas a CaseStudyin Second World WarNavalBaseDevelopm en t Contrary topopular belief, St.John's,Newfoundland,rather thanHalifax, Nova Scotia,was Canada'smajor convoy escortbaseduringWorld War II.Thisis significantforanumberofreasons.Chiefamongthemisthat Newfoundlandwas a separatedomini on,and thebase-commissionedHMCS Avalon-wasbuiltand operated bytheRoyal CanadianNavy(RCN)butowned by theBritishAdmiralty. Furthermore, theRCNmanagedto createamajo r navalfacilityin theheartof a capitalcitywitha civilian population of 40,000whenAmericanandCanadianarmy forces already occupied mostof the availablevacant land.
Historianshavesugges ted thatthe establishmentoftheNewfoundlandEscort Forcein May 1941 was a milestoneinCanadian navalhistory and thatitscreation elevated theRCNinto a majorcombatant.They argue thattheimportance ofthe navalbase can hardlybeexaggerated and that itwas actua lly thekeytothe western defence system. Yet relativelylittle hasbeenwritten on howthisbasearose from whatoriginallywasmerely a defendedharbour.
While much hasappeared on the ships and men involvedin theBattle of the Atlantic, the various bases from whichthey operated havereceivedscant attention. Thisisasignificant oversightbecausehowtheforces faredatsea was oftenbound up inextricablywith theoperation of the facilities ashore. This was especially so forthe RCNduetoitsrapid expansion duringthe war.Itsdefence ofthe convoyswas a directreflection of theefficiency,maintenance and trainin g capabi litiesof the shore establishments.For theNewfoundl andEscort Force/Mid-Ocea nEscortForcethiswas
HMCSAvalon located atSt. John ' s,Newfoundland.Yet both contemporariesand histori ansrememb er the presence oftheUS army morethantheRCNdespitethefact thatthousandsofsailors and hundredsof warshipswerestationedinSt. Joh n'sduring thewar. This maybeduetothelongevi ty ofthe American presenceinNewfoundland and thehastewith whichtheCanadianfacilitieswere dismantl edat theendof the hostilit ies. Or perhapsit is ahangover fromNewfoundland's stillcontentiousdecision tojoinCanada in 1949.Thestoryofhow St. John's evolved fromadefendedharbour toamajor Alliedescort base makes asignificant cont ributi ontoCanadian, Newf oundl and and navalhistoriograph y.
Ack now ledgements
First and foremost[ thankmyparents, EileenM,andthelate James1.Collins, fortheirtremendous support throughoutmyuniversitycareer,andalsomytwo children,Caitlinand Ryan,fortheirlove andsupport. [wouldliketo acknowledge thefriendship,guidance, andsupportofmysupervisor, Dr. Lewis"Skip"Fischer, over the pasttenyears aswell asthat ofDrs.Kurt Korneski,MikeO'Brien and Jeff Webb, who were alwaysavailabletoansweranyof mymanyquestions and to offer sound advice.Iwouldliketothankthe Departmentof History and the Schoolof GraduateStudies at Memorial Universityfor financialsupport duringmy graduate program.
Dr. MarcMilnerof the UniversityofNew Brunswick and Dr. Roger Sartyof WilfridLaurierUniversity havealsobeen veryhelpfulover the years, supplying documents, answering questions andofferingadvice.I wouldalso like to acknow ledgethefinancial supportof theJohnson FamilyFoundationandtheMichael Harrington Foundation.
TitlePage.... Abstraet... Acknowledgements Table ofContents .. List of Abbreviations.. ... Maps .
Introducti on .
Chapter1. Literatur eReview...
Ta ble ofContents .... .... ...i . ii . iv . vi ...xi . xiii . 1
Chapter2.Cry "Havoc!"andLetSlip theDogs ofWar. 60 Chapter3.HumbleBeginnings:September 1939-May1941... .. 99 Chapter4.Into theBreech:June1941-Ma y1942.... . .. 122 Chapter 5. Holdin gtheLine:June1942-May1943.. . ... ... .192 Chapter6.All OverBut theShouting:June1943-May1945... .. .... .. 257
Conclusion 297
A/ AA A/Capt ACNS ADM AMC A/N CSO AND AOC ARO A/S A/SO(CO) NT BAD BATM BDO BPC CAMS Capt.(D) CAS CCCS CCNF CCO Cdr Cdr.(D) Cdre. CGS CHOP Line C-in-C C-in-C,A and WI C-in-C,CNA CINC LANT CNEC CNES CN MO CNO CNP CNS CNW CO COAC COMINC H Comma nder(D)
ABBREVIAT IONS Acting
Anti-Aircraft ActingCaptain
AssistantChiefof theNavalStaff Admiralty Docum ent Armed Merchant Cruise r ActingNavalControlService Office r AdmiraltyNetDefence AirOfficerComma nding Admiralty Record Office Anti-Submarine
ActingStaff Officer (CombinedOperat ions) Anti-Torpedo
British Admiralty Delegation British AdmiraltyTechnica l Mission BoomDefence Officer BasePlannin g Committee Catapult AircraftMerch ant Ships Captain (Destro yers) Ch iefofthe AirStaff
Captain (later Commodore)CommandingCanadianShipsand Establishments in the UnitedKingdom
CommodoreCommanding Newfoundl and Force Communications,CodingandCipher ingArrangements Commander
Commander(Destroye rs) Commodore CanadianGovernment Ship
Change ofOperationalControlLine near 47th Meridiandivided theBritishandCanadianareasofresponsibilit y Commander inChief
Commander inChief,Atlanticand WestIndies Station Commander inChief,CanadianNorthwestAtlantic Commander inChief,USAtlantic Fleet Chief ofNaval EngineeringandConstruction Chief of Naval EquipmentandSupply Canadian NavalMission Overseas Canadian NavalOrder Chie fofNava l Personnel Chiefof theNavalStaff CanadianNaval WarPlan Commanding Officer Commanding Officer AtlanticCoast Commander inChief,US Fleet Commander(Destroye rs)
Comm.ofCusto ms COP CPO CSC
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rr
cwsr
D.A/S DIC DICD DCNP DCNS DIDEMS OEMS DG DIG DHD DNI DNIand P DNI and T DNO DNOT DNP DNS DNT DODoof P
DofT DO DPD DSD DSR DTDo
WRCN S DWS DWT EA EAM/BMO EAS TOMP EG E-in-CE
RA
ER Ratings FEO FONF FRComm issio nerof Customs Commande rofPort; Captain of Port Chief PettyOfficer ChiefsofStaffCommittee CommanderTask Force Com manderWesternSeaFrontier Director of Anti-submar ine Depth Charge DepthCharge Driller Deput y ChiefofNavalPersonnel Deput y Chiefof the NavalStaff
DirectorofDefensively Equippe d Merchant Ships Defensively Equipped Merch ant Ships DegaussingGear
Degaussing Director of HarbourDefence Director ofNava l Intelligence Director of Naval Intelligence and Plans Director of Naval Intelligence andTrade Director of Naval Ordnance Director of NavalOperati ons andTraining Director of Naval Personnel Director of NavalStores Director of NavalTraining Director ofOperationsDivision Director ofPlans Director of Trade DominionsOffice Director of PlansDivision DesirableSailin gDate Director of Ship Repairs Director of Trade Division
Director ofWomen 'sRoyalCanadia nNavalService Director ofWomen's Service
Director ofWarfare andTraining;Director of Weapons and Tactics
ElectricalArtificer
ElectricalAnti-miningBaseMaintenanceOfficer Eastern OceanMeetin gPoint
EscortGroup Engineer inChief EngineRoom Artificer Engine RoomRatings FleetEngineerOfficer FlagOfficer,NewfoundlandForce Fishermen' sReserve
(G) GN Gunne r(T) I-IF/OF I-IMCS HMS EMT HMRT HQ IE LARC LCT Lieut. LN LST LTO MAC Mand S MA/S TU MCI MGB M/L MO MOEF MOMP MIT MTB MWT NCSO NEF NET NL NOB NOIC NRC NSHQ NSO OlC ON ONS 00 0 PANL PDO PJBD PMO PO Gunnery
Govern mentof NewfoundlandDocument TorpedoGunner
HighFrequencyDirection Finding His Majesty's CanadianShip HisMajesty' sShip His Majesty' sTransport HisMajesty'sRescu eTug Headquarters IncreasedEndurance Libraryand Archives Canada Landing CraftTank Lieutenant Quebec-La bradorconvoy LandingShipTank LeadingTorpedoman Merchant ShipAircraftCarrier MunitionsandSupply Mobil e ASDIC TrainingUnit Mercant ile Convoy Instructions Motor Gun Boat MotorLaunch Medic alOfficer Mid-Ocean Escort Force Mid-OceanMeetin gPoint MotorTransport MotorTorpedoBoat (British) MinistryofWarTransport Naval ControlServiceOfficer Newfoundl and Escort Force Night Escort Trainer Labr ador-Queb ecconvo y NavalOperatin gBase NavalOfficerinCharge Nati onalResearch Council Naval Service Headqu arters Nava l StoresOfficer Operat ional Intelligence Centre UnitedKingdo m-NorthAmericaconvoy United Kingdom-North Americaslowconvoy OfficeroftheDeck
PublicArch ivesof Newfoundlandand Labrador PortDefenceOfficer
PermanentJoint Boardon Defence Principal MedicalOfficer Petty Officer
PRO QS RA3rd13S RCA RCA F RCMP RCN RCNI3 RCNR RCNVR RDF RDFO RG RN RNR RNVR RJT SI3D SI3T SC SCFO(0 ) SCNO SID SOl SNO SO SOE SO (CO) SO (I) SO(0) SO(P) SQ SSI3 ST STO TF TGM
TNA
TTC UG UK USCG USN USNR USO VCNSPublicRecordsOffice Quebec -Sydn eyconvoy Rear AdmiralThird l3attle Squad ron Royal CanadianArtillery RoyalCanadian AirForce Royal CanadianMountedPolice Royal Canadian Navy Royal Canadi an Naval Barracks RoyalCanadian Naval Reserve RoyalCanadian NavalVolunt eerReserve Radio Direction Finding(later Radar) Radi o DirectionFindingOfficer Record Group
Royal Navy RoyalNaval Reserve RoyalNavalVolunteerReserve Radio Telepho ny Superintendentofl3oomDefence Submarinel3ubble Target New York (Halifax,Sydney)-U.Koconvoy Senior Canadian Flag Officer (Overseas) SeniorCanadia nNavalOfficer Submarine Detector Submarine DetectorInstructor Senior Naval Officer Senior Officer;SignalOfficer SeniorOfficerEscorts StaffOfficer(CombinedOperations) Staff Officer (Inte lligence) StaffOfficer (Operations) Staff Officer (Plans) Sydney-Quebecconvoy Superi ntende ntof Shipbuilding SeamanTorpedoman SquadronTorpedoOfficer Task Force Torpedo Gunner'sMate TheNationa lArchives (UK) TacticalTrainingCentre UnitedStates-Gibra ltarconvoy UnitedKingdom UnitedStates Coast Guard United States Navy UnitedStates Naval Reserve UnitedServiceOrganiza tion ViceChief ofthe NavalStaff
VLR VIS WACI WEST OMP WEF WO WRe NS WRN S WSF WIT XB XDO XO Vcry LongRange VisualSignalling
Western Approac hesConvoy Instructions Western OceanMeetingPoint WesternEscort Force Watch Officer
Women's Royal CanadianNavalService Women'sRoyal NavalService(Wrens) WesternSupport Force WirelessTelegraph y Halif ax-B oston Convoy Extended Defence Officer ExecutiveOfficer
Introduction
Sta r ting fromSc ratch:St. John's, Newfound la nd asaCas eStudyin Second World
w»
Nav al BaseDev elopm ent Contra ryto popularbelief,St. John's, ewfoundland-notHalifax, NovaScotia -was Canada'smajor convoyescortbase duringWorldWarII.Indeed,themyth that Halifax- basedwarshipsescortedthevitalconvoy sacrossthe Atlanticisconstantl y repeated.IThat itwas St.John'sandnotHalifax is significa nt for anumber of reasons. Chief amo ngthemisthatNewfoundlandwas a separatedominion at thetime,and the base-commissioned HMCSAvalon-wasbuiltandoperated bytheRoyal Canadian Navy(RCN) butactuallyowned bytheBritishAdmiralty.Further, theRCNmanaged to createsuchamajornavalfacilityin theheart ofa capitalcitywithacivilian populationof 40,000atatime when Amer icanandCanadianArmyforces already occupied most oftheavailable vacant land.Thisthesishastwogoals.Thefirstisto chroniclethedevelopment ofSt. John's from merelya poorlydefended portinSeptember 1939intoCanada's maintr ans-Atlanticescortbase,with part icular attention tothecrucialMay1941/May1943 period. Seco nd,theRCN confronted manychallengesbothatseaandashoreduringtheBattle ofthe Atlantic.Many ofthosehavebeen well documentedby such notedCanadian historians asMarcMilner,MichaelHadley,David Zimmermanand RichardMayne?
'WilliamD.Naftel,Halifax at War:Searchlights, SquadronsandSubmarines,1939-1945 (Ha lifax:FonnacPublishing, 2008), 71.
2MarcMilner,North AtlanticRun:TheRoy alCanadianNavy and theBattle/orthe Convoys. (To ronto:Universityof TorontoPress,1985),MichaelL.Hadley,V-Boats againstCanada:German SubmarinesinCanadian Waters (Kingston:McG ill-Queen's University Press,1985),TheGreatNaval Battle of Ottawa:How Admirals,Scientists,and Politicians ImpededtheDevelopment0/High Technologyin Canada'sWartimeNavy(Toronto:Unive rsityof TorontoPress,1989),Richard O. Mayne,Betrayed:Scandal,Politics,andCanadianNaval Leadership(Vanco uver:USC Press,2006). xiii
Similarly,theRCNfacedmany obstacles in developin gliMCSAvalon including ulteriormoti ves, oppos ing interests andconflictingpersonalities.Often,theforcesthat dictated the developmentandopera tionof the base atSt..Iohn's were compl etely outof the controlof the Flag Officer, NewfoundlandForce(FONF) orevenNavalService Headqu art ers (NSHQ).This thesisdemonstratesthatI-IMCSAvalon,nevertheless, accomplishedall it wasdesignedto do.ItassertedCanada'sspecialinterest in Newfoundland while atthe same timehighli ghtingthe country' scontributiontothe Allied wareffort. TheRCN acco mplished thisdespiteinter-governm ental tensions,a convoluted command structure,labour difficulties, enemyaction,andeven the weather. Even moreimportant,theRCN and HMCSAvalon facilit atedthe safeand timely arrivalofover25,000ships in the United Kingdom and in the wordsof AdmiralSir PercyNobl e, C-in-C,Northwes tApproaches,"solvedthe problem ofthe Atlantic convoys."?Thisstudyexplainshowthechallenges weremet andovercomebythe various parties, and demonstratesthatdespite these difficult ies,HMCSAvalon was ultimately afully funct ioning,reasonably efficie nt,wartimenavalfaci lity ofstrategic importan ce.
Marc Milner sugges ts that"the establishme ntofthe NewfoundlandEscortForce (NEF)in May1941was amilestoneinCanadian navalhistory.?'MichaelHadley points out thatthe creationof theNEF elevatedthe RCN fromaminor role incoastal
lMarcMilne r,Canada'sNavy:The FirstCentury (Toronto:Universityof Toronto Press,1999), 92.
4Jbid.,89-90.
defenceto a major participa nt inoceanoperations.?The RCN'stwo officialhistorian s, GilbertTucker and JosephSchull,arguerespectively that the importanceofSt. John' s as a navalbase "can hardly beexaggerated" and wasactually"the keyto thewestern defence system.?"Yet relative ly little has beenwrittenonhowan escortbase of strategicimportance arosefrom whatoriginallywasmerely a defendedharbour. Thisis really not surprising.While muchhas appearedon the shipsand men invo lvedinthe Battle of the Atlantic, the various bases from whichthey operated havereceivedscant attention.Eve n inSt. John ' s,boththe histori ograph y and popularconsciousness rememb erthepresenc eoft heAmerican army more sothantheRCN ,despitethe fact that thousand sofsailorsand hundredsof warship s werestationed thereduringthewar.' This maybeduetothelongevit y of theAmeri canresid encyin Newfoundl and andthe haste with which the Canadianfacilities weredism antl ed at the endofhostilities.Or perhaps it is alingeringhangoverfromNewfoundland'sstillcontentiousdecisionto join Canada in1949.8
Regardl ess, an in-depth studyofthe evolutionofSt.John's from
SHad ley,U-Boats against Canada, 29.
6G ilbert Tucke r,The Naval Servi ce of Canada,(2 vols.,Ottawa :King ' sPrinter , 1952) ,11, 203 ; and Joseph Schu ll,FarDistant Ships:An OfficialAccountofCanadianNaval Operationsin WorldWar II(Ottawa:Edmo ndCloutier, 1950 ;2"ded.,Toronto: Stodd artPubli sh ing,19 87), 68.
71n hishistory o f St.John 's,Paul O'Neill devoted oneanda hal fp agestothe Americanarmy presencein the city while assign ing lessthantwoparagraph sto all three Canad ianservices.See Pau l O'Neill,TheOldestCity:TheStorya/St.John's,Newfoundland(Erin,ON:PressPorcepic,1975),1 10-112.Similarly,KevinMajor alloca tedonly threeparagr aph stothe Canadianoccupationcom pared to almost five pages abo ut theAmericans.Indeed,Major cont end sthattheAmer icansmade amorelastin g impressionon theresident s ofSt. John' sthan either the Canad iansor theBritish.SeeKevinMajor,As NeartoHeavenby Sea:AHistory ofNewfoundlandandLabrador(Toro nto: PenguinBooks, 2001), 371-377.Forme rSt. John ' sFire Comm issioner John Cardo lis has wr itte n two bookson the Ame rican tenure inNewfound landand Labr ad or. SeeJohn N.Cardo lis,AFriendly Invasion:TheAmericanMilitaryin Newfoundland, 1940-1990 (St. John 's:Breakwa ter Books,1990);andCardolis,A FriendlyInvasionII:A Personal Touch(St. John 's,NL:Crea tive Publishers,1993).
SThemostrecen tmater ial onNewfound land's decisionto joinCanadain 1949 is foundin Sean T.Cadigan,Newf oundlandand Labrador:A History(Toronto:Universityof TorontoPress,2009), 235-xv
a defended harbour-similar tohundredsof othersin the NorthAtlantic- to amajor Alliedescort basenot only makes an important contribution to theCanadianand Newfoundland historio gra phybutalsoour understandin g of Allied naval base developm entduringthe SecondWorldWar.
The creationof the NEF atS1. John' sin May1941 facilitated the continuous escortof Britain' svital convoysacross the Atlantic Ocean.Previously, convoyshad been escorted byHalifax -or Sydn ey-basedwarship s onlyasfar astheWesternOcean Meetin gPoint(WESTOMP)northeastof theGrandBanks.Pastthispoint,until they mettheirRoyal Navy(RN) protectorsat theEastern OceanMeetingPoint(EASTOMP ) just south of Iceland ,convoys were basicall y on their own. As aresult of the establishment of HMCS Avalon,thename given to thebase at St.John' s,"convoys were escorted to the Mid-OceanMeeting Point(MOMP)southwes t ofIceland ,where theywere picked up byships of the British WesternApproaches Command(WAC) basedin Liverpool. From the Canadian perspective,the establishmentof an RCN escort baseat St. John's enabled Canada toassert its presenc eon theintern ational scene, forcing the UnitedStates and Britain to recognizeits importantcontribution to thewar effort.Equally significant,it allowed Canada to press its nationalinterestin
240.JeffWebbdevot edanentirecha pteron thebroadcastdebatesin his recent book onthe Broadcasting Corporationof Newf oundland.SeeJeffA.Webb,TheVoice of Newfoundland:A SocialHistory of the Broadcas tingCorporationof Newfoundland, 1939-1949 (To ronto:Univers ityofTorontoPress,2008), 142-169.Thestandardwork on the Comm issionof Governmentyearsand thedeb ate surrounding Newfoundland'sentry intocon federatio n withCanada isPeter Neary,Newfoundlandin theNorth Atlantic World,1929-1949 (Montrea l:McGill-Queen ' s University Press,1988; 2nded., Montreal: McGill-Qu een ' s University Press,1996), especially 278-345.
9ltis actua lly the barracks complex thatis commissioned, notthebaseitself.However,forthe purpose ofthisstu dytheentire navalbasewill bereferenced asHMCSAvalon.Thiswillalso bethe case for allothe rCanadian naval faciliti esdiscussed. Consequently, HMCSStadaconareferstothe whole Hali faxnavalbaserather thanjustthebarra ckscomplex.
Newfound land.As the American presenceinNewfound landgrew, thanksto the 1940 "des troyers for bases"deal givingtheUnited Statesthe right to establishbases on British-controlledtcrritory.l"Canada becameanxious that it mightfind an American protectorate011its frontdoorstepby war's end.Conseq uent ly,theestab lishmentof the NEFwas as importa ntto Canadapolitica llyas it wasto the prosecutio nof the war in the Atlantic.
WhyHMCSAvalon was esta blished is adequa telyaddresse d in theliteratur e,II but howthiswasdon eisnot.Indeed,howanyNorth Atlanticbase-AlliedorAxis -wasput in placeandoperatedhasnotbeenwidely explore d.12Mostoftenhistorians
IOSteve n High , BaseColoniesinthe WesternHemisph ere,1940-1 967(NewYork:Palgrave Macmill an, 2009), 17-42;Neary, Newfoundlandinthe North AtlanticWorld, 135-153; David MacKenzie, "A North Americ an Outpost:The AmericanMilitary in Newfoundland,1941-1945," War& Society,XXII, No.2(October2004),51-74: Peter Neary,"Newfoundlandand theAnglo-American LeasedBasesAgreem ent of27March1941," Canad ian Historical Review ,LXVII,No.4(1986), 491-519;Stetso nConn, Rose C. Enge lmanand Byron Fairchild.Guardingthe UnitedStates andIts Outposts (Washington,DC:Office ofthe ChiefofMilitaryHistory, 1964;reprint,Washington,DC:US Government Printing Office,2000), 354-408;and PhilipGoodhart,Fifty Shipsthat SavedtheWorld:The FoundationoftheAnglo-AmericanAlliance(NewYork:Doubleday andCo.,1965).
IIW.A.B.Douglas, et al.,NoHigherPurpose:The Official History of theRoyal Canadian Navy in the Second WorldWar,1939-1943(St. Catharines:VanwellPublishing,2002), II,PartI,183-189; MarcMilner, NorthAtlanticRun: TheRoy al CanadianNavy and the BattlefortheConvoy s(Toronto: Universityof Toronto Press,(98 5), 32-34;Tucker,NavalServiceof Canada,II,186-208;andSchull, FarDistantShips,65-69.
12Wha t has been published on the various Allied and Axisbaseshasbeenpreoccupied withU-Boatbunkers on the Germa nsideandoperationson theAllied side.Steve n High recentlyeditedasocial history ofwartim eSt.John's and also examinedthesocial impact, especiallyinNewfoundland,ofthe Americanbasesleased from theBritish in theWesternHemi sphereduringWWII.Brian Tennysonand RogerSartyhav eperhapsmost closelyexam ined Alliednavalbasedevelopmentin theirwork onSydney, Cape Breton, although thatbasewasmostlya convo y assemblypoint andlocal escort baseduringthe SecondWorldWar.SeeIligh (ed.),Occup iedSf.John' s: A Social //is toryof a CityatWar,1939-1945 (Mo ntrea l:McGill-Queen' sUniversityPress, 20 10);and High,BaseColonies.See alsoJakP.Mallmann Showe ll,//itler 's U'-Boat Bases(Stroud:SultonPress, 2007);Gordo n Williamson,UiBoatBasesand Bunkers,1941-45 (Oxford:Osprey Publishing, 2003); Rand olfBradh am ,Hitler 's V-BoatFortresses (Westport,CT:PraegerPress, 2003);Stetson,Enge lmanand Fairchild,GuardingtheUnitedStates and ItsOutposts;Brian Tennyso nand Roger Sarty,Guardianof theGulf: Sydney,Cape Breton,and the AtlanticWars (Toronto:Uni vers ityof Toronto Press, 2000); and Roger Sarty,TheMaritimeDef enceof Canada (Toronto:CanadianInst itute of StrategicStudies,1996).
simplystate itasafait accompli-wharveswere built,oiltank sinstall ed,ships repaired, etc.-without anyexplanationof how thisoccurred.Question sastohow the land forthe wharves wasprocured,howlongit took for theoiltanksto be fabricated and whatwas usedin the meantime,orhowships were repaired and bywhomhave seldom beenposedandeven less frequentlyanswered .Allthemyriad detailsof how something was accomplished are conspicuousbytheirabsenceinthe literature. Thisis importantbecause how theforces fared atsea wasoftenbound up inextricablywiththe creation and operationof the facilitiesashore.Thiswas especiallyso for the RCN as a resultof itstremendousexpansionduringthe waryears.Its performa nce in defenceof theconvoynetwork was adirectreflection of theefficiency,maintenan ce and training capabilitiesofthe shoreestablishments .Thiswas certainlythecase with lIMCS Avalon; thus,itis oddtha tCanadian historians tendgenera llyto describethefacilities atSt.John'sin disparagin gterm s.Theysugges t thatthe port"had little to offer the EscortForce,,13and thatthebasehadthe appea ranceof a "travellingtentshow"with thenaval staffworkingoutof roomsat the Newfoundland Hotel andwarships tiedupat
"rickety SouthSide wharves.,,14Even Marc Milner,who has worked hardto dispel the RCN's"sheepdognavy"persona,perpetuates the impressio n thatHMCSAvalonwas a "seat ofthepants"operation.ISItalmos tseemsas ifthesehistorians, consciouslyornot,
I3TonyGerman,TheSeaisat OurGates:TheHistory0/the CanadianNavy(Toronto: McClellandandStewart,1990),93.
"JamesB.Lamb,The CorvetteNavy: True Stories / romCanada's AtlanticWar(Toronto: MacmillanofCanada,1977;2"d ed.,Toronto : Fitzhenryand Whiteside,2000), 91;and Lamb ,On the TriangleRun (Toronto:Macmillan of Canada,1986),13.Seealso Bernard Ransom,"Canada's 'Newfyjohn'Tenancy:TheRoyalCanadianNavy in51.John' s,1941-1945,"Acadiensis,XXIII,No. 2 (Spring1994),pp.58-81.
15Milner,North Atlantic Run,43 and215.
are presentingthebase asamitigatingfactor intheRCN' sperformance inthefirst yearsof theBattleoftheAtlantic.While the RCNdidhavetorelyheavily on the availablefacilitiesatSt.John's inthe firstyear,bythesummer of 1942,theFlag Officer,NewfoundlandForcehadmoved intothe new combined RCN/RCAF administrationbuilding,theRCNhospitalwasfullyoperational, asweretheRCN Dockyard and barracks,and thewharfingalongthe SouthSidewasup tonaval standards. I-IMCS Avalon wasbornout of crisis,and FONFwascontinuallyforcedto play catch-up bythe ever-changingwar atseaand decisionsmadeinArgentia,Ottawa, Washingtonand London,oftenwithoutanyconsultation.Regardless,despite tremendouschallenges,I-IMCSAvalonwas a reasonably efficient,well-runoperation, not the ad hocarrangementsuggested by theliterature.
Establishingand developingHMCSAvalonwascertainlyproblematic,and there weremanycomplicationsto its evolution andoperation.For one,threeseparate governments wereinvolved:Great Britain,Canada and Newfoundland.The N ewfound-land government was very suspicious of the Canadians,and not without reason.l" Moreover,both preferredto bypass each other and to deal directlywith theBritish. Furthermore,the basewasbuiltin a relativelysmall harbour with limited facilitiesthat werealreadyfullyutilizedand congestedwith mercantileinterests.Theprocurement of thisprimewaterfront land tended to be convolutedandinvolvedtheco-operation ofall threegovernments and thelandownersthemselves,whofor themostpart,justwanted
16From 1934to1949, Newfoundland was governed byaComm issionofsix London-app ointed bureaucrats,threeBritishand three New foundlanders, headedbythe Gove rnor. Therehadbeentensions betweenNewfo llnd landa ndCa nadaover tradea nd fishingrights datingbacktothe nineteenthcen tllry. The Canadiansexacerbatedthesebymakingcontingencyplansfor Newfou nd land with theAmericansin xix
tobeleftalone,war orno war.Inmanycases, facilities were rented for $l!year plus improvem ent s andsha redwith the owners.How didthis work?In addition, almostall materials and most ofthe skilledlabour requ iredto build thebase' s facilities -barrac ks, administratio n buildings,dockyard,hospit al,wireless stations,etc.- were importedfromCanadaortheUnitedStatesthroughU-boat-infestedwaters.Howwas this acco mplished? Howwasthenecessarypersonnelhoused,fed andentertained?It wasreallyquite anaccomplishmentonall levelsthatthebasewasbuilt. Thatitalso functionedinareasonabl y efficient mannerandallowedthe RCN-notwithstandingthe criticisms levelled at it-to holdthelineduringthedarkestdays oftheBattle ofthe Atlanticis atrulyremark able story.
MythesisexploreshowHMCSAvalonwasestablishedand howitoperated, and itexamines themany challenges itfaced bothatseaand ashoreduringthe Second WorldWar.From LibraryandArchivesCanada(LARC),Iexamined the Flag Officer, NewfoundlandForcefiles and reli edheavily onthe monthlyreportsofthevarious levels of the NewfoundlandCommand of theRoyal CanadianNavy,from the Flag Officer Com ma nd ingtothe NavalChaplain, andall points in between. AtTheNational Archives(TNA) in London,Iexamined Admiralty,DominionOffice,PrimeMinister' s Office,WarOffice, andCabinet documentstounderstandhowthe British viewed the importance and developm entof HMCSAvalonaswell astheirhandlin g ofthe negotiation swith the Canadian and Newfoundl andgovernments.Documentsclearly indicatemistru stbetwe enthe lattertwo partiesandthe Admiralty' sfrustration at the
1940withoutconsultingtheNewfoundlandgovernment.SeeCad igan,Newfound landandLabrador, 209-234. See alsoWebb , Voice of Newfou ndland ;andNeary,Newfoundla nd in the North AtlanticWorld. xx
delaysthat ensued,aswellastheir attemptsto appeaseboth andget theprojectstarted. Manyissues seemtohavebeensettled throughdirect contac t betw eentheDomin ions OfficeandGovernor HumphreyWalwynand includedsuchimportant matters asland ownership,defenceof the island,compensationfor thosedisplacedbymilitary installations and thesupplyofskilledlabour.TheDomini onsOfficefileswere particularly valua blebecau sethey contained GovernorWalwyn ' squarterlyreports.In thesereports,herecountsthemilitary situationinNewfoundland,part icularly St. John's,andalsooffersinsightsintopersonality conflicts,volunteerefforts,viewsheld bythe St. John's elite, difficulti es enco unteredandovercome,andgeneralimpressions oflife in the colony.ThePublic ArchivesofNewfo undlandand Labrador (PANL) provided NewfoundlandCommissionof Governmentfiles whichrevealedhow the Commissio nviewe d the esta blishmentof thebase and interacted with the Canadian Governmentand military. Ofspecial importance were the DepartmentofJustice and Defencefiles as CommissionerL.E.Emersonwasthecomm issioner most evolvedwith civil defence andthevariousarmed forces.Unfortunately, thereisnot much documentation offon na lcommunication between commissioners,particularly Emerson andSir WilfridWoods,the CommissionersofPublicUtilities,even thoughthe Minutes oftheMeetings ofthe CommissionofGovernmentwereexamined.Unfortunately, thesedocument s only reportdecisionsmade,legislationpassed,and record correspondence requir ed orexchanged.Ialso examin edthe Cityof St. John 's archives, but unfortun atelymost of thefilesfromthewarperiodhavebeendestroyed.Ifound one file,however,whic h dealt with thetensionsbetweenthe cityadministratio nandthe
various militarycommandsovertaxes,feesand dama geto roads causedby military vehicles and traffic. Both the Americanand CanadianGovernment sfelt they were exempt from anypropertytaxes and/orfeesandacce pted no liabilityfor the damageto the localroad system.In theend,both offered lump-sum payments to helpdefray the costof roadrepairs.The St. John'sEveningTelegramfor the years1939 to1945 was alsoexamined.Although theNewfoundlandGovernmentimposedstrict censorship on localmilitarynews (something theTelegram'seditorcriticizedonanumber of occasions),new spaper articles revealedthe attitudesofthelocalpopul ationtowardsthe occupying forces,thcdifficul ties encounteredas a resultof measur es suchas the blackout and rationin g,socialand recreational activitiesand interactionsbetweenthe people ofSt. John ' s andthevarious forces, andoutsideviews of Newfoundlandand its importance tothe wareffort.
Evenafter the subjec tofthe ownershipofthe base was agreed, thedifficulties in actually buildingitseemed insurmountable. UnliketheAmerica ns,who developedtheir facilities in uninhabit ed orsparsely popul ated areas,the RCN attempted to constructa maj ornaval facility in themiddleof adenselypopul atedurban centre.Most ofthe skilled labour ,buildingmaterials and equipmenthadtobeimported, although opera tions hadtobeginimmed iately. Consequently, theRCNinitiallyreliedheavily on thepopulation and faciliti esofSt.John ' s.Thatbothwere alreadyseverely taxedbythe Canadian and Americanpresencedid not seem to concernNavalServicesHeadquarters (NSHQ)inOttawa . Regardless,relations and co-op erati onbetweenthe various forces,
governments and thelocalpopulationwereingeneral remarkablysmooth.Unlike Halifax,therewereno VEDayriotsin St.John's at war' s end.
Warstendtofollowa seasonalcycle.Offensives generallystartin the spring, and hostilitiestake a hiatusduringthewinter,recommencing with the onsetof fine weatherthefollowing spring. Despitebeingaglobalconflict, the SecondWorldWar and theBattle oftheAtlanticfollowedasimilarmodel.The"PhonyWar" endedinMay 1940 with theinvasionand defeatof Franceandthe LowCountries,giving U-boatchief AdmiralKarl Donitzbases ontheFrenchAtlanticcoast.Asa result,fullend-to-end convoy escortcommencedin June1941to counterthesubsequentwestwardexpansion ofthe U-boatwar.With the Americanentry into thewarin December1941,Donitz pulledhisforcesoutofthemid-Atlanticandassignedthemto the poorly defended easternseaboardof theUnitedStatesand the Caribbean.TheUnitedStatesNavy (USN) finally halted theresulting haemorrhage ofshipping(with unacknowledgedhelpfrom the RCN)17byJune1942,and the U-boatsonce moremovedbackinto the mi d-Atlantic. Itwasherethatthe"clashoftitans,"so to speak,tookplacein the winterof 1943,resultinginthestrategic defeat ofthe U-boats thatMay.With the U-boat threat nowcontained,the Allies were able toincreasethebuild-up offorces andsuppliesin Britain,and in June1944, American,British andCanadianforcesassaultedFortress Europe.Theresultingdefeatof German forces inNormandycompelledDonitzto abandon his FrenchAtlantic basesandretreat to Norway.Ultimately,the Battleof the Atlanticendedwith the war inEuropeinMay1945.
17Marc Milner, "RoyalCanad ianNavy Participationinthe Battle of theAtlanticCrisisof1943," in Jam esA.Boutilier(ed.),TheRCN in Retrospect,1910-1 968(Van couv er:University of British Columbia Press,1982) ,166-167.
As operationsand thedevelopmentofIIMCSAvalon reflectedeventsatsea,it seemedonlylogicalforthechronology of mythesisto followthe sameMay/June axis. Chapter I begin s withabrief acco untofthe creationoftheRCN and its earlyyears. This is followe d by areview of therelevantliteraturepublished ontheRCN over the pasttwent y-five years, including theearlierofficial histories. Chapter2 setsthecontext of mythesis,examining Newfoundland' searlyhistory aswellas thewaryears, plusthe mainplayersinthe BattleoftheAtlantic.Followingthe chronologymentionedearlier, Chapter 3deals withSt. John' satthestart of hostilitiesinSeptember 1939 and the Newfoundlandgovernment'sattemptstoacquir esomemeans of defencefromboth the British andCanadia ngovernme nts.Italso examin esthe arrivalof the Americans in Newfoundlandaspart ofthe Anglo-American"destroyersforbases"dealand the appea ranceoftheRCNin May1941.Themaincomp onent of Chapter 4 isthe actual establishmentofHMCSAvalon.Escortoperations startedeven before Admira l Murray, the Com modo reCommanding,NewfoundlandForce(CCNF),arrivedin June1941. Howthis wasdon e even beforethefirstnailforthebase washammered was an amazingacco m plishme nt in itself. Thischapteralsoexamines the Amer icanentryinto the war in Decemb er1941 and the startof U'-boatoperations inCanadianandAmerican watersin thewinter of1942.Chapter5deals with whatmanyhistor ians consider the critica l year oftheBattl e ofthe Atlantic. With theAmeric ansincontro lof their eastern seaboard by spring1942and theestabli shment ofescorted convoysin theCaribbean, the Ll-boa ts movedbackin the NorthAtlantic bythe fallof 1942ingreater numbers than ever before.Theyexactedtremendous losseson the Allies,especia llyagainst
RCN-escor ted convoys.Whileacknow ledging thattheRCNhad sustained themajority of U-boatattacks butatthesametime blaming poorlead ershipandtrainingforthe losses, theAdmiraltypulledtheRCN out of theNorthAtlantic for retrainingand mod erni zati on.Consequently,Canadian forcesdidnotsubstantially participateinthe strateg ic defeat of the U-boats in May1943.Regardless,the U-boatswerestilla threat andconvoysstillhadtobe escorted. TheRCN acceptedmore and moreresponsibility asBritishandAmer icanforceswereconcentratedelsewhere.Chapter 6 examinesthe lasttwoyears of the Atlanticwar. Shiprepair became critical duringthisper iod asboth navaland merchant shippingoverwhelmedavailable facilitie s. TheCanadian government hadbeenderelict in con centrating all itsvesselrepairfacilitiesincentral Canadawhileignorin gthoseon the eastcoast until the ship repairproblemhadreached cris isproportions.Unfortunately,bythen,most of thelocal skilled labourhadmovedto thelargercent resor joinedthe military, andshipyardsandassociated industries needed timetorestartand retool.l"Nevertheless,repair capaci tyatSt. John' swasexpanded and improvedbythe acquisi tionof afloatingdrydockand thedevelopmentofan overflowfaci lityat BayBulls,andHMCS Avalondiditsbesttomeetthedemand.In fact, activitiesat thebase settledintoanalmos t peacetim e routine.Convoyswerestill escorted,and menandships trained,butother thanthe veryreal threatoflonewolf attacksin coastalwaters,thedays ofthe epicconvoy battleswere over.
Ultima tely, theBattleof the Atlanticended withGermany' s defeat. That itwas won bythe Alliedsidewasduein no small measuretotheRCN and itsbaseatSt.
18Ernes tR. Forbes,"ConsolidatingDisparity:TheMaritimes and theIndustrializationof Canada duringtheSeco nd World War,"Acadiensis,XV, No.2(Sp ring 198 6),3-27.See also MichaelWhitby,
John's, Newfoundland. Thatthe contributionof thelatterhas remained relatively unknownis a seriousgap in the wartimehistoryof the RCN.Thisthesis attempts to rectify thisomissionin two ways.Thefirstistochroniclehow St. John'sdeveloped from merelya defendedharbour intoamajornavalbasein the space of only acouple of years. When the RCNarrivedin May1941,the porthad only "the leanestof facilities" toofferthenewlyformed NEF.19
However,by the time Hitler'sU-boats surfaced and raisedtheirblackflagsof surrender inMay1945,over500 warshipsandthousandsof navalpersonnelhadpassed throughSt. John' s.Overall, theseforces were wellserved byHMCSAvalon,but not without difficulty.The evolving war in the Atlanticand decisions madeinArgentia, Ottawa,Washington and London all impactedthe development andoperationofHMCSAvalon.This thesis also demonstrates that the base atSt. John's accomplishedall thatitsetout todo. Theestablishmentofthebase asserted Canada'sspecial interestinNewfoundlandwhileat the sametime highlighting the country'scontribution tothe wareffort.Further,the RCN accomplishedthisdespite tensions betweenthevariousgovernments,a convolutedcommandstructure,labour difficulties,enemyactionandeventheweather.Aswell,theRCN' s successinkeeping thetrans-Atlanticlines ofcommunication open duringthe Second World Warcannotbe determinedby the number of U-boatssunk but ratherbythe safeand timely arrivalof thethousands of merchant shipssafelyconvoyed acrossthe NorthAtlanticby St. John's-b ased escorts.Consequently, if theRCN solved theproblemofthe convoys, thenHMCSAvalonwas instrumental in makingthispossible.
"lnstrumentsof Security:The RoyalCanadian Navy'sProcurementofthe Tribal-ClassDestroyers, 1938-1943,"The Northern Mariner/LeMarin du nord,II,No.3(July 1992),1- 15.
19To nyGerman,TheSeais at Our Gates: TheHistoryofthe CanadianNavy (To ronto: xxvi
McClelland and Slewart,1 990),93.
Cha pte r 1
Literature Revi ew
Whentheideathat Canadamight form itsownnavy surfaced in theearly partofthe twent iethcentur y,few voicesdissented.Ameri canpoaching inCanadia n waters,arisin g senseof nati onalism,loyaltytotheEmpireand, moreimmediately, the Anglo-Ge rman navalarmsraceall pointed totheneedforCanada tohaveits ownnavy.Recognizingthelooming German threat,in1909 Conservative MPSir GeorgeFostersubmittedaresolutioncalling forim mediatefinancialsupportforthe RoyalNavy (RN) .LiberalPrimeMinisterSirWilfridLaurier acceptedthisideain principlebutamendedittoproposethatCanadabuild its own navy.' Themotion passedunanimouslybecause allparties,and most Canadians,supportedtheidea. Initially,mostagreed thatCanadashouldretaincontro lofitsnavalforces,butasthe naval crisisescalated fissur es started toappear.TheAdmiraltyinLondonwas unenthusedwith theidea ofthe dominionshavingtheir own navies, andsupported insteadthenotion of "oneempire,one navy."TheCanadianConservative Party under Sir Rob ertBord enproposedthat Canada follow NewZealandandoffer interi mfinancia lsupport totheRNwhileagreeing that anyCanadiannavalforce wouldautomatically come underthecontrolofthe Admiralty in timeof crisis. French-Canadia nLiberalsinQuebecunderHenriBourassacould notcountenance this,andevenBorden'sownQuebecwing protested thegrantingofanysubsidy to theRN.Laurierremainedsteadfast thatthere would beno financialsubsidyandthat a Canadiannavywould remainunderthecontro lof theCanadiangovernme nt. In
'Richard A. Preston,Canadaand"Imperial Defense"A Studyof the Originsof theBritish Commonwealth'sDefenseOrganization,1867-1919 (Durha m,NC:Duke UniversityPress,1967), 389.
1910, the NavalService Act created the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Unfortunately,the dissensioncreated bythedebate over thisbill,combinedwith subsequentevents,contributedto alack of anyclearlong-termnavalpolicy, someth ingthatwoulddogtheRCN well into the Seco nd WorldWar. Consequently, asthe RCN'sperform anceduringtheBattl e ofthe Atlantic waspredicated on what happ enedduringthe 19 10-1939period,areviewof thathistory isinorder.
Whilemost historiesdatethe creationoftheRCNto theNavalServ iceAct of191 0,its roots actuallystarted themid-1 800s when theImperial Navywas unable,or unwilling,topreventAmericanpoachingonCanadi anfishinggrounds.In viewofthis,the Canadiangovernmentcreated theMarin ePolice withaforce of six schooners in 1870.Theydisbandedit ayear later at the signingofthe Treaty of Washin gton,whichsuppose dlysettledall disput esbetween Great Britain andthe UnitedStates .TheUSabrogationofthetreaty in 188 5,againforced Canadato protect itsfishi ngrights in the absenceof actionfrom themother country.Canada negot iated anew agreementwith the USbut it wasnever ratifiedbytheUS Senate. Whiletheagreement did form the basis forCanad ian-A merica nfisher iesrelatio ns on the eastcoastforthe nextseveral decades,the Fisher ies Patrol Service(FPS) becameapermanent force under the Department ofMarin e andFisheries.The Department ofMarin e andFisherieswasresponsible forfar morethan just fisheries protection ,with dutiesrangingfrominstallin g and maintainin gbeacons,buoys and lighth ous estothe establishme nt,regulation and maint enan ce of marineand seamen'shospit als.In 1904,the governmentadded to this loadbymakingthe departmentresponsib lefor theSt. Lawrenceshipcha nneland forexercising
sovereignty over theCanadianArctic.Toaccomplishtheseduties,as wellas to meetthedepartment'smyriadothermaritime respon sibilities,the minister incharge, Raymond Prefontain e,hadat hisdisposaleightarmed cruisers,sixicebreakersand some eightee nothervesselsin excess of eightyfeet?
In the meantime,Germany arose asacha llengetotheRN.KaiserWilhelmII yearned tobe oneof theleadin g figures inEuro peand, taking a cuefrom his Eng lishcousins, hebelievedthata modernnaval forcewasjustthethingtomake everybodysit upand takenotice.Thiswas justone more cha llenge thatfacedthe Admiralty in London.Britain still worried about itstraditional enem ies, France and Russia ,and now a new giant was awakening in theeast-Japan.At the 190 2 Imperial Conference in Lond on ,which was attend edby all thedominionlead ers,the Admiralty pointed out therespon sibiliti esof thedominionsin protectingthe em pire. The Britishfelt that thebestwayto do this wasthroughdirectsubs idies to theRN and the assignme ntof militaryunitsto Imperialdefenc e.PrimeMinisterLauri er reje ctedthis sugges tion but didoffer to assum emoreresp onsib ilit yforcoastal defencein orderto free up thoseimperialforces thenpostedinCanada .3
One sugges tion wastoconve rt the FPS into a bona fide navalforce.
Afteracouple of false starts, the new FPSappeared in 1904 with two new patrolvessels ,theheavily armedCGSCanada and the unarmed CGSVigilant.
2MarcMilner ,Canada'sNavy:The FirstCentury (Toront o:University of Toront oPress, 1999),7-11.See also NigelBrodeur,"L.P.Brodeurand the Origins of theRoyal Canadian Navy,"in JamesA.Boutil ier (ed.),The RCN in Retrospect,1910-1968 (Vanco uver:Universityof British Columbia Press,1982. ),15-17.
3GraemeR. Tweed ie, "The Rootsof theRoyal Canadia nNavy:Sovereigntyversus Nationalism, 18 12- 1910,"in MichaelL Hadle y,RobHuebert andFred W.Crickard(eds.),A Nation 'sNavy:In Quest01aCanadian Naval Identity(Mo ntrea l:McGill-Qu een's UniversityPress, 1996), 97-98.
Crewsworenaval-styleunifo rmsand underwentnavaltraining.At thesametime, AdmiralSir John"Jackie" Fisherbecarn ethe FirstSeaLord of the Admiralty. Fisherfelt that themostimmediatethreatto theEm pire came from Europe, particularlyfrom Germany,whic hwasbuildingdreadnoughtbattleshipsfasterthan the Admiraltywould have liked.To concentrateBritishassetson the most immediatethreatwhile retaining"adequate" forcesin other strategicareas,suchas the Medite rranea nandEastAsia,Fisher introdu ced far-reac hing reform s. These incl uded disb and ing the Pacifi c sq uadro nbasedatEsquima lt, British Colum bia,and relocatin gtheHalifax-basedAmerican squadron backtothe UK.The Canadian go vernme nt tookoverthebases atEsquima ltand Halifax and mannedthem with memb er s of the Canad ian militia.
At the1907 confere nce, the Admiraltystill pushedthedominionstoprovide fundstobuild Dreadn ou ght -cl assbattl eship s astheircontribution sto the defen ce of theem pire.Minister ofMarin e andFisheriesLouis-Phi lippe Brodeurbristled atthe lack of recogniti on accor ded to Canada's cont ributi ontoImperi aldefen ce.4Brodeur point ed out that Canada'sassumptionof its owncoastal defence andassociated comm itme nts,and its acce ptanceofresponsibilit yfortheform erRN bases at Esquima ltand Hali fax,werebothtangibl e andvaluablecontributions tothedefence of the em pire.First Lord of theAdmiraltyLordTweedrn outh subse quently issued
"SiobhanJ.McNaught,"TheRise ofProto-National ism:Sir Wilfred Laurierandthe FoundingoftheNavalServiceof Canada,1902-19 10,"in Had ley,Huebert andCrickard(cds.),A Nation'sNavy, 106.
an apologyof sortsandgrudginglyconcede dthe valueofthe localsquad rons.iThis concili ator yattitude,however, soonchanged.
In March1909,theImperialgovernme nt warn edthattheRN ' s superiority overtheGermannavywasnarrowingandad vocated more navalspending. The Conservativeoppos itioneven more alarmist,claimed thatevenwithan increasein expendi tures, the Germa ny navy wouldactuallyoutrank the RNby one modern battl eshipby1912 .A monthlatertheBritish governmentinv ited represent ati ves from all the dominions to Britainfor a conferenc eon dominionrelation sand the defen ce of theempire.Uponarrival,theCanadian delega tio n-whic hincludedthe MinisterofMilitia andDefence,SirFrede rickBorden;the Ministerof Marine and Fisheries ,Louis-PhilippeBrodeur;theChiefofthe GeneralStaf f,Major-G ener alSir Percy Lake;and Admira lCharlesEKingsmill,the Director of MarineServices -was greeted by a comp leteturnaround in Admiralty policy.TheAdmiralty now wanted the dominio ns to raisenotonly local squadro ns,so grudging lysanctioned justtwo yearsearlier,butalso full-fledgednavies com pletewith battle-cruisers, cruisers,destroyers andsubmarines.Londonwas not onlyconcerned withthethreat in Britishhome waters butalsowiththe potential menace presentedbyJapan,which was filling the voidleft bythe decrea sein Britishforces inEast Asia.Wherethe Admiralty waspreviouslyunwillingto grant thedominionsgreater autonomyin defence, Londo n now deemedit desirable.Aust ra lia,whichwasmost endange red by thenewJapanese threat,proceeded immediately with the Admira ltyplan;New Zealand ,Australia' sdiminutive neighbour,chose to provide thecost ofone
dreadn ought for theRN; andCanadaagreed toanincrease innavalforces offour cruisersandsixdestroyers ."
Immediatelyupon arriving backinthe country, the governme ntof Sir WilfredLauri er drafted legislati ontocreate a CanadianNavalService. Whenthe government introdu cedthe bill inJanuary1910,however,theLeader of the Opposition,RobertBorden, objec tedsinceit failedto provide emergencyaid inthe eventthatwarbroke outbefor etheships were fully operational. Hepressedthe governmentforan interim subsidy toBritaintocoverthe costoftwodreadnoughts. Borden alsocomplained thatthe government's legislationdid notallowfor sufficiently closeintegrati on with theRN.Canadian forceswouldbeplacedunder Britishcontro l by theCanadiangovernmentonly ifthegovernment itsel f determin edthat thesecurity of Great Britainwasactually threatened.Borden believedthatCanadianforces shouldautomatica lly passtothe Admira ltyinthe eventof a crisisbecauseofthespeedatwhichsuchan emergencymight occur. PrimeMinister Laurierand hisministersheld firm,however, and the NavalService Billwaspassed111 to70on May4,1910.7
Canada finallyhaditsnavy. The"Act Respectin gthe NavalServiceof Canada"createdthe Department ofNavalServicewhichalso took overthe Departm ent ofMarin e andFisheriesall underitsformerministerLou is-PhilippeBrodeur .Thebillcalled for anavalreserve and volunteerreserve,navalcollege and the acquisitionof two obso lescent British cruisers,laternamedlIMeS Niobeand IIMCSRainbow,for trainingpersonnel. The CanadianGovernmentalso opened negotiations with British shipbuildingfirmsto
6/bid.,106- 108. 7/bid.,108.
establishfacilitiesinCanada to buildthe proposed fleetof cruisersand destroyers. But thispromising startsoon cametonought astheLaurier governmentfell the following year,in partas aresultofFrench- CanadianfearsthataCanadian navy wouldeventua lly be drawn intothevariousconflictsinwhich Britain became embroiled throughouttheworld.Ultimately, EnglishCanadafeltthatthecountry wasnotdoin g enough for imperial de fence, whileFrenchCanadafelt that it was doingtoomuch . The newPrim eMinister,RobertBorden, failedin his attempt to provide a $35-millionsubsidy toBritainforbattleship construction,andalthough he didnot revo ke the NavalServices Actaspromi sedduringthe election,hedidlet the twocruisersobtained from RN fallinto disrepair alongs ideat Esquimaltand Halifax.When warbroke our in August1914,theRCNconsisted oftwo derelict cruiserswithout enoughpersonn eltomanthem.
Considering theRCN 'sdismal showing in World WarI,and itsnear extinction in theensuing decades,it is smallwonder that littlehasbeenwritten on Canada's navyduring thisperiod.Thefirstreal accounting of the pre-SecondWorld War Canadian navy appeared in the first volume ofGilbert Tucker's1952work, The Naval ServiceofCanada.Gilbert argued that oneof thechief stumbling blocks to imperialdefencewasthe issue of central controlof dominionforces.Naval defenc eof theempirecould notbe decided solely,oras Gilbertstresse d,not even mainly,on naval strategyandorganization.He sugg es ted that thedeterminingfactor was actuallytheattitudeoftheself-governing dominions,including Canada.Each
could dec ide whetheritwantedto contribute totheRN,createits own navy ordo nothin g at al1.8
Canada had actually tried todo allthree.
Marc Milnerhas suggested thatTucker said allthatwasneeded aboutthis "co lourlessperi od" in thehistory of theRCN.9
On the other hand,some historians have grumbledabout thescholarshipofTheNaval Serviceof Canada.Nigel Brodeur,for example,complainedthat Tucker attributedstateme nts to Louis-Phil ippe Brod eurthat didnot reflect whathe actuallysaidat theImperial Conference of1909,10and Michael Hadleyand RogerSarty haveaccused Tuckerof not consultingunpublished Germansources andofgivingonly"cursorytreatment" totheRCN' s anti-submarineeffortsin 1918.11P.WilletBrock has chargedthat Tucker erroneo uslystated thatCommanderNixonwasthefirstCommandantof the Royal NavalCollegeofCanada whereasitwas actuallyCommanderEdwardH. Martin withNixon ashisFirst Lieutenant.12
Regardless,TheNavalServiceof Canadarema ined the state of the artfor thenextthreedecades.Asidefromafew passagesin Donald Goodspeed'sThe ArmedForces of Canada,1867-1967and James Eayrs 'sIn Def enceof Canada,13itwas not untilJamesBout ilier organi zeda
8Gilbert Tucker,TheNavalServiceof Canada(2vols.,Otta wa:King ' sPrinter,19 52) ,l,78. 9MarcMilner, "T heHistoriography of theCanadianNavy : TheState oftheArt,"in Hadley, Huebert andCricka rd(eds.),A Nation'sNavy, 28.
IOBro deur,"L.P.Brodeur," 26.
"MichaelHadley and RogerSarty,TinPots and Pirate Ships:CanadianNaval Forces and German SeaRaiders1880-1918(Mo ntreal:McGill -Queen ' sUn iversityPress,1991),ix.
12p.WilletBrock , "CommanderE.A.E.Nixon and theRoyalCollegeofCanada,"in Bouti lier(ed.),RCN inRetrospect,36.
I3DonaldGoodspee d(cd.),The ArmedForces of Canada,1867-1967:A Century of Achievement(Ottawa:Quee n's Printer,1967);and Jam es Eayrs,InDefence of Canada (3 vols., Toront o:Unive rs ityof Toronto,1965).
naval history conferenceatRoyalRoadsMilitary Colleg ein Victoria,BC,thatthe topic of the originsandearlyyearsof the RCN was exhumed.TheRCNin Retrosp ect,191 0-1985,thevolumeresultingfromthat conference,containedessays by both scholars and form ersenior RCN officers. Severalexamined the circumstancessurroundingthe formationand fortunesof theRCNin the years befor etheSecondWorldWar.
OneofTucker' scritics,NigelBrodeur, examined"L.P.Brodeurand the OriginsoftheRoyalCanadianNavy."LouisPhilippe Brodeurwas Canada'sfirst MinisteroftheNavalService,serving from June1910 toAugust 1914.Since1906, however,asMinisterofMarineandFisheries-thedepartment amalgamatedwith theDepartment of NavalServicein 1910 - Brodeur wasinvolved in the militarizationofthe FPSandattendedanumber ofImperi al conferenceson defence. Hedirectedthetran sform ation oftheFPSintotheRCN .Nigel Brodeursugges ted that the NavalService Actof1910wasnot really thebeginningoftheRCN but rath er"the end of thebeginnin g."Hecontendedthatthe FPSwasthe forerunn er of theRCN and thatthe NavalAct reallyjustmade itCanada's official navy.Brodeur suggested three contentious issuescould haveledtotheRCNbeing stillborn in 1910-theflag,jurisdiction, and bilingualism.Hecont endedthat itwasunfortu nate thattheeffortstoward s adistinctive ensign, greaterautonomy from theRN,anda partialform ofbilin gualismdid not succee d, astheimpression wascreated thatthe RCNwasmoreBritishthan Canadian,preventingmorenati onal supportforthe navy fromdeveloping.l"
Atruly Canad ian navy was what Laur ierintendedin 1910 , and thejewel of the Nava lServiceActwasthe creationof the Royal NavalCollegeof Canada (RNCC). Previously,Canadians interested inbecoming naval officersweretrained in Britain and became officers in theRoyal Navy.With the creationof theRCN,the Laurier gove rnment wantedits officers to be trained at home. Cadetsstillspenta year with the RN training squadro n,butatleasttheirinitialtrainin g was Canadia n. Thiswasleft inthe handsofCommanderEdwardAtcherlyEckersa llNixon,RCN. P.Willet Brock was a cadetat RNCCunder Nixonfrom 1917to1920andenjoyeda longcareer with theRNuntil retiringasa Rear Admiral in 1957.Brock' s contribution to The RCN inRetrospectwasmorethereminiscence of a former pupil than a scholarlyexaminationofthe College ' s short career(1910- 1922).All the same,hedidcontributesomeinsight into the routineandcurriculumof thecollege, as wellasthepersonalitiesthereduringhis term. Intheabsenceof anofficial history oftheRNCC,andonlythe bare essentialspresentedin Tucker'sVolume1, Brock ' s essay gave atleastsome detailaboutthetrainingundertakenby whatwould betheRCN ' sprofessional officer corps in WorldWar11.15
In"T he Roadto Wash ington:CanadaandEmpireNaval Defence19 18-1921,"BarryHuntcontendedthata commonEmpire-Commonwealth foreignpolicy wasimpossiblefromthe start. He argued thatthis wasnot as aresultof the various domini ons'questforstatuswithin the Commo nwea lth but moreduetotheneedfor closerImperi alrelation s with the UnitedStates . Bytheendofthe war, tensions werehighbetweenBritain and the US oversuch thingsas blocka des,neut rals' rightsduring wartime,and the Americanambition to buildanavy "secondto none."
Canada wasinstrumental incasingthese tensions,finally culm inating in the WashingtonNavalTreat ywhich setthe limitsfor the world'slargestfleet s.Hunt sugges ted that thistreaty ac tua lly increasedtheneed foran Imperial Fleet, orat least for the centralizationof plannin gand operationalcontrol.Instead,Canadauseditas anexcuse to reduce itspost-warforce to two destro yer sand a few trawlers.l "
Inorder to cover whatit consideredto beitsmain theatre-Europeanwaters -the RNhadto denudeitsPacific Oceanassets,leavingjust a tokenforce at Hong Kon g. Thissitua tio n ledthe Admira lty todecideto pressonce again for a "unified, centrally direct ed,and highl ymobil eimperialnavy."Th is prop osal wasnothin g new,but as Borden perc epti vely observedafter the 190 9 Imperi alDefence Conference,suc hco-operationentitled the contributingdom inions to a voicein draftingthe Em pire's foreign policy.Huntalsoexamined theJelli coe Naval Mission1
?and itsrecomm end ati on s as wellasthenegotiations andvariousschemes putforwa rd bet weenthe endofthe warandtheearly 192 0s, concl udingwiththe Washin gtonNavalLimitat ion s Treaty,or the Five-Powe r-Pac t,in 192 2.Hunt' s assessme nt thatJapan won most ofthe adva ntagesat theWashi ngton conference seems toignor ethefactthattheJapanese viewe d thefinaltreaty as a "Cadillac, Cadillac,Dod ge"dealinfavourof the US and Britain,and ultimatel yrepudi atedit in 1936.18
Regardl ess,Hunt isdoubtl ess correct thatthe Canadi angovernmen tchose
16I3arryD.Hunt, "T heRoadtoWashin gton:CanadaandEmpire NavalDefence,191 8-1921 ," in I3outilier (ed .),RCNinRetrospect,44-61.
'7Sho rtlyafter WorldWarI, Admira lof theFleetViscount Jellicoe of Scapa travell ed to the various dom inion sto investigateandadviseon how theycou ldorganizethe ir naval forcesto both protect local interestsandhelpdefendtheEm pire. Seeibid.,49-52.
18For an in-depthexamin ationof the Washin gtonTreat y and itsafiermath, see Stephen W. Roskill,Naval PolicybetweentheWars,Vol.I: ThePeriod ofAnglo-American Antagonism,
1919-to look at the treaty' sprovisionsnotas a meansofstrengthening Imperialdefence but as anexcuse to furthereviscerate the RCN.19
HughPullenalso examined what have been called "thestarvationyears" of the RCN.While the Washin gtonConferencewasunderw ay,the Conservative government of Arthur Meighenfell to LiberalWilliam LyonMacken zieKing.King hadlittle affection for militarymatters,and in theabsenceof popularsupport for nationa ldefenc e,he usedtheWashingtonNavalDisarmamentTreatyasapretextto slash naval expenditurefrom$2.5to $1.5 million.TheRoyalNavalCollegeof Canadawasclosed and theRCNreducedto 402 officersand men as ofJuly1922. By1928 ,theRCN consistedof only three shipsoneachcoast.Thiswas along, difficult periodfortheRCN.Pullen examined theselean years anddiscussedin great detailperhapsthe savinggracefortheRCN-thenaval reserves.Faced with near extinc tion,seniorofficersatNavalServiceHeadq uarters (NSHQ) inOttawa realizedthat something needed to be doneto bringthenavy into the publicdomain. Theanswe rwas theestablishmentoftheRoyal CanadianNaval Reserve (RCNR) and theRoyal CanadianNavalVolunteer Reserve (RCNV R).Notonlydid this measur eprom otethenavyinareas far fromthe sea suc hasthePrairiesbutit also helpedin nation alist Quebec . WhilethereservesdidprovidetheRCN witha cadre of some3700officersandratings bythe startof the Second WorldWar,Pullen's assertion thatthisconstituted "aneffectivefighting force" is abitof an overstatement. Bythetime Canadaofficially declared war on 10Septem ber 1939,
1929 (Londo n:Collins,1968),300-355.See alsoSamue lEliotMorison,History ojUnited States NavalOperationsin WorldWar11.Vo1.3:TheRisingSun in thePacific,1931-April1942(Boston: Lillie,BrownandCo.,1948;reprint,Urbana:University ofIllinoisPress, 2002), 8-10.
and theseforces were mobilized,the country'ssupplyof trained naval personnel wasexhausted?O
JamesKnox's essay,"AnEngineer's OutlineofRCNHistory :PartI," examined the historyof the RCNusingthechronologyofshipacquisition.Most historieslook at the events and personalitiesthatcreated andsustained theRCN beforeWorld WarIIandmentionspecificships astheyrelatetothese eventsand people.CaptainKnox,on theotherhand, examined theRCNthroughits ships. Knox tracedthe RCNfrom thecruisers NiobeandRainbowthroughWorld WarI. liethenlookedat theinter-war years, whentheacquisitionof thefirstm ade-to-order Canadian destroyers,Saguenay andSkeena, tookplace, throughthe tremendous expansion during WorldWar IIand into theimmediatepost-warperiod whenCanadaoperatedits firstfleet aircraft carrierandconstructed its firstwarship builtto NorthAmericanstandards,I-1MCSLabrador.As with manyhistoriesof the RCN,Knox's review gavelittle attentionto thefirst coupleof decades subsequent to theNavalServiceAct,and he expendedmostofhis effort on theRCN after 1930. Consequently,thisessayreally does not shedmuchnewlight onthefoundationsof theRCNbeyond thatwhich had already been published."
On balance, The RCN in Retrosp ectwashardly ascholarlytour-de-force, and infact many ofthe essaysreliedheavily onTucker'sTheNavalServiceof Canada,whichin itselfwast1awed.Regardless,becausetheliteratureissolimited in this area the collection does add totheRCN' s pre-SecondWorld War
2°HughFrancisPu llen,"TheRoyalCanadianNavy betweenthe Wars,1922-39,"in Bouti lier(ed.),RCNin Retrosp ect,63.
2110hn H.W .Knox,"A nEng ineer' sOutline ofRCNHist ory:PartI," in Boutili er (ed.),RCN in Retrosp ect,96- 116.
histo riograph y.Two of thearticles,"The RoadtoWashin gton: Canada andEmpire Naval Defenc e1918 -1921 " and"L.P. Brodeur and the Orig insoftheRoyal CanadianNavy," utilizedunpublished archiva lsources,but overall,TheRCNin Retrosp ect"marked a watershedin RCNhistoriograph y.rfThisbecamevery evidentsixyea rs laterwith the publication of the collection of essaysedited by Alec Douglas,TheRCNin Transition,1910-1985.23
TheRCNinTransition resultedfrom a1985 conferenceorgani zedby Douglas at the DirectorateofHistory and Heritage,DepartmentofNational Defence,to marktheseventy-fifthanniversaryofthe found ingof theRCN.Douglas invitedmainl y academiccontributors,and the resulting publicati on contained the first seriousscholarshipon the early RCNsince Tucker.Thefirstof these essays wasPaulKenn edy ' s"Naval Mastery:TheCanadia nContext"
Whiledealing with the full history of the RCNto1985,Kennedydevoted considerable discussiontothepre-WorldWarIIperiod.He suggeste dthat then- as now -the level of Canadia nseapower wasdetermin ed more by externa lthanby internalforces.TheestablishmentoftheRCN in 19 10 wasclearly anexamp leof thispremi se since itstemmedfromconcernsabout thenaval armsrace between Brita in and Germ any rather thanfrom any realthreat to Canada itsel f. TheUnited States posed about the only realmenacetoCanadia nsovereignty,at least from the British perspective, and Britain decidedlongbefore thatawar with the US was unwinnable.Canadians perceivednosuch threat, and mostfeltthattheylivedina
22Milner,"Historiography."
23W.A.B. Douglas(ed.),TheRCN in Transition,/9/ 0-/ 985 (Vancouver:Universityof BritishColumbiaPress,1988).
"fi repro o f house,far from flammablematerial s."By the1930s,thissitua tion changedwiththe riseof Fasci stGerm any and Italy and the expa ns ion istadve ntures of Japan.While the gove rnme nt of Mac kenzieKingdid notseriously cons ide r the likelihoodof anattac konCa nada byanyofthesenati on s ,it did recognize"as elf-evide nt nationalduty"to cometo theaid of themothercount ryin the eventofwar. As a result,especiallyafterthe1938MunichCris is,Canada builtup itsdest royer forc e tosqua dro nstrengt hwith the additionofl-IMCSsOttawa,Restigouche, Fraser andSt.Laurent,increase d de fen ce estima tes,andagreed to be ahavenforBritish war production and thelocati on oftheBritishAirTraini ngPrograrn.f"
Kenned y correc tlyarg ued thatnavalmastery canno t beprop erlyunderstood solely by exam ini ng navalopera tions.He conte nde dtha t it wasimpor tan tto con sid erthe geographica l,eco no m ic,techni cal andsocio- po litica l cont exts with in whichnavies opera te. He opines that altho ug hCanadawas born outof sea power,it wastheleastthreat en ed of all the dominio ns . Kenn edy contendedtha t upto the SecondWorldWar ,if Canada need edtoparti cipate in the defenceofthe Empire,its resources wouldprob abl y havebeenbett er spenton munition s produc tionandthe army, not on thenavy.25
In drawin gthese concl usio ns, Kenn ed y seeme d to ignore therealit y of theRC NduringWorldWarI.Byprov idin g protec tio n in hom e waters -espec iallywhe nU-boa ts madetheirfor aysin 1918-theRCNreleasedBritish forcesthat wouldothe rwise havehadtobedepl oyed.Britain could not sparethese asset s, and theRCNdealtwith thethreat ade quately,ifnot spectac u larly.Kennedy
24Pau l Ken ned y, "Naval Mastery:The CanadianContext,"in Douglas (ed.),RCN in Transit ion,15-33.
agreed that Canada took amaj or roleinthemastery oftheseasduringWorldWar II. But,he argued,thisagainwasnotin the activedefenceof Canadabutas aresult of externalpressure .One canarguethispoint, as originally PrimeMinister Mackenzie Kingwas very reluctantto release Canada'sdestroyerfleetforduty outsideCanadia nwaters .Ittookthe personal interventionof Winston Churchillto convince KingthatCanada ' s firstlineof defencewas theEnglishChannel. Furthermore,asMarcMilnerhas shown,therewasmore tothe establishmentofthe NewfoundlandEscortForce (NEF) duringWorldWarII thanjustthepreservation of thetrans-Atlanticlines ofco mmunicatio n.26
WhentheRCNwascreated,theRN wasthe greatest navy in the world, although itsmargin of superiority wasnarrowing.WhythenwouldCanada choose toformits own navy?Bar ry Gough has suggestedthat thereasonwasnotjusta desire forautono my butalsoan acceptanceofnew obligationsininternational affairs.He correctlyarguedthat the NavalService Actwas a significantstep in the country 'squestforstatuswithintheEmpireandwasnotsomucha searchfor independencefrom Brita in as anact of co-operatio nwiththeAdmiraltyonCanada's own term s.Gough rightl y concluded thatthe endofPax Britannica andtheorigins oftheRCNresult ed from thesame setofcircumstances.Canada,likeallthe domini ons,form edpart and parcel of the military andnavalreorganizationthat closed the era when"Britannia rule[d]the waves."Thenewintern ationalreality should haveforced Canada to accept more responsibilityfor itsown defence,but
success ivegove rnmentscouldnotdevelopa navalpol icythatwasacceptable to all parties? 7
RogerSalty looked at theRCN'sWorld War Iexperiencein"Hard Luck Flotilla:TheRCN' s AtlanticCoastPatrol,1914 _18.,,28Even thoughBritish and Canadian naval office rs pressedtheCanadiangovernment in the yearsbefore the GreatWartoestablishanappropriate navalorganizat iononthe eastcoast,when threelarge U-boatsencroac hed intoCanadianwatersin 1918therewasverylittle theRCNcoulddo.Sarty laidtheblamesolidlyat the feetof theBorden government and notedtheironythat even whileBorden wasinsistingon nationalcontrolover the Canadian armyinEurope, thesecurity ofCanada'sown waterswasdependent on whateve r meagreresourcesBritain and the UnitedStatescould provide. Regardle ss,Canada'smotleycollect ion of trawlers, submarine chasers and torpedo boatsprovid ed escorts tothemany convoysorganized to counter this threat.Though thefew encounters that theRCN ships did have with the enemywerelessthan satisfactory.i"submarinecasualties werekeptto aminimum.Sartycontende d that theRCN' s contribution tothe wareffortshould notbebasedsolelyon thesuccess of theselocalconvoys butalso that,despitetheRCN' sunpreparedn ess,the Admiraltydid nothaveto divertanymajor forcesfromthecrucia lwatersaround the UK toprotectCanada'seast coast.
27BarryMorton Gough,"The EndofPaxBritannicaandtheOriginsof theRoyalCanad ian Navy:ShiftingStra tegic DemandsofanEmpireat Sea," in Douglas(ed.),RCN inTransition,90.
28RogerSarty, "Hard Luck Flotilla:The RCN 'sAtlantic Coast Pat rol,1914-18," inDouglas (ed.),RCNinTransition,103-125.
29[n theoneinstancewhe nanRCN vessel had theopportunitytoattackasurfacedU-boat,it retreatedrather than engagethesubmarine.[nall faimessto theship'scommandingofficer,attacking theU-boatwould havemostdefinitely beenasuicide mission.
Unlikethoseessayson the pre-WorldWarIl RCN that appea redinTheRCN in Retrospectsix years before, these threeessays,like almostallof thoseinThe RCNin Transition, were writtenby professiona lhistorians.Thisindicatesjusthow far the studyof Canadia n navalhistory adva nced in the few shortyears betweenthe appeara ncesof thetwopublications.Scholarswere undertakingmore researchon theRCN, andeven the early dayswerebeing givenaddedconsideratio n.Thistrend continued, andsoo n wouldculminate in themost comprehens ive history ofthe early RCNsinceTheNaval Service a/Canada.
In 1991, Michael Hadle yand RogerSarty publishedTin Pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian Naval Forcesand German Sea Raiders,1880-1918.30
In the preface,Hadley and Sartyconfessedthatthebookwasreallytheresult of their researchinto the RCN'soperations in the Second World War. But they correctly judgedthat in order to understandthe RCN duringthat periodit wasnecessaryto examine it during WorldWarI.Ironically,theimpressionthatpermeates this monograph isoneofdejaVII.Thesame difficultiesthatplaguedtheRCNduringthe Battle of the Atlantic were presentduring the GreatWar,and forthesame reasons. When World WarI erupted,the RCN,despitethe promises of the NavalService Act,consistedof only two derelict cruisersand 350 men.Theyears subsequent to the Act were filled with political vacillationand back-tr ackin gwith theresultthat Canada had no defencesfor its own territorial waters.When a lone V-boatsanksix ships off Massachusett sin October 1916,initiatinga U-boatscare, theRCNhadto scrambleto com eup with enough resource sto provideprotection for local shipping. While this prompted the government to undertake anavalbuildingprogram, few of
thesevesselswere in commissionwhenU-boatsdidstrike in 1918.Then, asduring World WarII,there were complaintsand recrimin ations over howlittle thenavy wasdoingto protectCanada's coasts andabsolutelyno recognitionforwhatthey had accomplisheddespite thelackof supportand resourc esfrom the government.
Onewouldhavethoughtthat the Canadian government mighthavelearned somelessons fromtheexperi enceof the FirstWorldWar.Canadaneeded a navy, and thenavyneededto be supporte dinpeacetimetobe ableto defendthe country in wartime.Regardl ess,whe nCanada decla red waronGermany inSeptember 1939, theRCNwasin onlymarginallybetter sha pe that it had been twenty-five years previously.l-IadleyandSarty madethis very clearin thisfirst in-depthand truly criticalexamina tionoftheRCN from itsincept ion to theendof WorldWar1.The authors, one of whomisfluentinGerman, usedunpublished Germa nsourcesboth toillustratetheKaiser ' s infatuationwithseapowe rand to explo reGermany's designs onNorthAmerica,which included a surveyof Canadia ncoastal defences. Although theKaiser was anadhere ntof Mahan's theory of sea power,the German navalstaffapprec iated the benefitof"cruiserwarfare"by whichfast,heavily armed warshipsinterdicted maritim etradeand harassed enemyshoreinstallations.With the Canadia ngove rnment's preoccupation witheconomy before thewar, andthe provisionin gofthe CanadianCorps duringthe war,Canada's maritim edefences were totallyinadequat e.Unfortunately,the same would betrue aquarter-century later. Someof thereasonsforthiswere addressedin the nextcollectionof essays to appearonCanadian navalhistory.
A Nation'sNavy:InQuest of aCanadianNaval Identity"resultedfrom the 1993FleetHistoricalConferenceheldinOctoberofthatyear.Published in1996,it conta inedanumberof articleson thepre-Secon dWorldWarRCN, startingwith WilliamGlover's "TheRCN:RoyalColonial orRoyalCanadian Navy?"Glover suggested that theproblems ofnationalpolicy and national identitywere inextricablylinkedandhad beensoeversincethecreationof theRCN.Herightly contended thatthepracticalneedforanavy wascloudedfromthe beginningby partisanpoliticsoverCanada'srelationship withBritain.The Lauriergovernment wanted toevolve theFPSintoaforceto protect Canada' sshores,thusrelievingthe RN of thatresponsibility,whilethe Conservative oppositionlooked to integrating anyforce Canada developedinto the RoyalNavy.Thelatterposition offended FrenchCanadianswho recogn izedthe needfor coastaldefencebutwere againstany sortofBritish contro l.Glovercontended that afterhebecamePrimeMinister, Bordenrealized that Canada'snavaldevelopmentcould have "proceededsmoothly andwith little ornoneof the excitementorcriticism"had it been introducedten yearsbefore.32Thissentimentwasa farcryfromBorden' sview duringthe1910 navaldebate where he was firmlybehindimperialcontrolof the RCN.33
However, inanironic turnof events, Bordendidaccomplish hisgoals of1910.
BystarvingthenascentRCN of funds,Bordeninstigated the formation of navalreserve units whichwas,as Glover pointed out,a two-ed ged sword.Whilethe reserveunitspromoted theRCN in thepublicdomain,especiallyinareas suchas
31Hadley,Huebert andCrickard(eds.),ANation'sNavy.
32Sir RobertBorden, asquotedinWilliam Glover, "The RCN:RoyalColonialor Royal CanadianNavy?"in Hadley,Huebert andCrickard(eds.),ANation's Navy,74.
