12fearandloathing.pdf

(1)

Fear

and

Loathing

in

the

Planning

Profession:

Ten

Comments

on

the

Political

Factor

Charles

G. Pattison

Based on

the author's experiences with

local

and

state

land

use

planning

programs

in

North

Carolina,

Florida,

and

Virginia, this article

concludes

that

the

value

_of

technical

planning

skills

must

be

considered

secondary

to the

more

significant

and

unpredictable

world of

politicalreality.

To

integrate politics into

the

planning

process,

the

planner

must have

the determination

to

see the

job

through,

more

than a passing awareness of

public

relations,

and

the

abilityto

project

fairness

above

allelse.

Politics isthekeytosuccessfully

making

a differencein

the planning field. Several situations involving serious

political players,

who

also

happened

tobeina position to

make

orbreak long term planningefforts,have colored

my

thinking. I

hope

my

comments

are challenged, argued,

and

debated.

Outrage

and agreement

are also

welcome.

More

than anything else, I

want

to see the political process

identified

and

studiedas akey to planningsuccesses

and

failures. Ihatepolitics. Ilovepolitics. Icangoeither way.

You

have heardthephilosophical question:

Does

a tree

make

noise

when

itfallsinaforestwith

no one around

to

hearit? Plannersshouldbe askingasimilarquestion:

Does

planning

make

an impactin therealworld,ifthroughthe

politicalprocess,solutions

and

plansarenever

adopted

or

implemented?

Isay no. Planning

must

be anintegralpart

ofthepoliticalprocess.

And

althoughI

do

not

recommend

thatall plannerscarrysnakebitekits tocounterpolitical

venom,

ithasalways

worked

forme.

Fourteenyearsasaprofessionalplannerisalotoftime

in

which

to

make

mistakes.Ihave foundseveral things that

would

have helped

me

accomplish

more

and

gain better

understanding

from

my

experiences.

Ten

of

my

observa-tionsarediscussedbelow.

ONE

Do

not take

any

credit for

developing a land use

plan.

Until

it

has

been adopted

and

implemented

in

the

political

arena,

you have

not

done

very

much.

Your

realjob

began

once

thelastpublichearing

was

held

and

yourelectedofficialsadopted a

comprehensive

plan.

Implementationisihecritical

component

ofthe solution,

whatevertheissue.

There

are

many

examples ofsuccessful

strategies

and major

effortstocreatestateorlocalenabling

legislation,

and

similar

examples

ofdifficult, tedious

and

time

consuming

effortsto getplanning

programs

adopted, but few examples that result in

implementation

that ad-dresses the

problems

athand.

The

planningtriadis

made

up

thisway:technical competence,.05 percent;necessary

legal

framework

(local, state,regionalorfederal), .05

per-cent;

and

implementation,99.9 percent.

Why

should

any-one

besatisfiedwith anythinglessthanthe resolutionofthe

problem

at

hand?

Itcertainlyiseasierthisway,

and

there are

more

examples ofsuccessatthefirst

two

levelsthanthe

last.

Maybe

itisbecause

we

arenotwillingtolookat

what

we

do

in the

comprehensive

way

that

we

preach.

More

likely,itconcernstherelativestate

and

statusofthe

plan-ningprofession generally:

we

are

where

themedical profes-sion

was

when

bleedingthe patient

and

using leeches

were

everydayevents.

Are

we

advanced

in solving

problems

if solutions are

never

implemented

because politically they could never

work?

Why

should

anyone

getcredit forsuchsolutions?

Plannersarestillbanging rocks togetheras toolswhilethe

politicalsystem has discoveredmetal. Untilthe

responsi-bilityforunderstanding,evaluating

and

participatinginthe

political process of

implementation

is accepted,

we

are relegatedtothepath oflittlereal effectiveness.

The

planningprofession givesitselftoo

much

credit for

Charles Pattison receivedhismaster's degreein

regionalplan-ning

from

theUniversityof North Carolinaat

Chapel

Hillin

1976.

He

currently servesasfieldrepresentative forthe Vir-giniaEastern Shore Megasite/VirginiaCoast Reserve of The Nature Conservancy. Mr.Pattisonisformerexecutivedirector

ofthe

Monroe

County

Land

Authority,

Key

West, Florida,

and

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preparing

and

presentingsolutions thatwillnotbe imple-mented. Insteadoflookingat this alltoo

common

result pessimistically,

implementation

failures

must

be

consid-eredin relativeterms. Planningfailureonly occurs

when

plannersdivorcethemselves

from

thepoliticalprocess

and

give up. This is easy to

do

with solutions that are too

technical,timeconsuming,expensive,

and

politically tenu-ous.

The

answer

ismaintainingsufficientfortitude

and

de-terminationtoregroup

and

tryagainafterthefirst,second,

third,fourth

and

following setbacks.

You

havetobethere

tohaveachance.

The

stateofFloridadesignatedtheFloridaKeys

an

Area

of

CriticalState

Concern

in 1975. Ittook elevenyears, until

1986,togeta comprehensive landuseplan adoptedlocally that

met

stateplanning standards

and

land development

regulations.

Many

differentlocal

and

state politicians,

ap-pointed officials

and

variouscitizen groupsparticipated in

more

than1

_00formal

publichearings.Allofthis

was

theeasy

part. The planning

program

willhavefailedunlessthe real

objective—protectingthe_{unique environment of}theKeyswhile

providingfor appropriate

economic

growth-is implemented.

TWO

Make

sure

you speak

to

the elected

official(s) last

when

policy issues

are

being

decided.

Regardless of the promises

made,

it is convenient for politicianstobeaffected

most

bythepersongettinginthe

lastword. Thisusuallyrelates

more

toprivateratherthan

publicconversations, unless the decisionisalready locked.

Make

sureany

commitment

you

get is

made

as close as

possibletothe

upcoming

decisiondate. Ifatallpossible,

get the official's personal calendar for that last, critical

week.

Know

who

elseis

making

contact,anticipatetheir

comments, and

havea responseready.

Afterspending a considerable

amount

of time with the

swingvotecommissioner on

an

upcoming

subdivision vari-ance,Ileftconvincedthat I

had

thenecessaryassurancethat

thevote

would

be 3-2in

my

favor. Igotthevoteright,butthe

wrong

result. I discoveredlaterthat theowners ofthe

subdi-vision

had

lunch with thecommissioner one

hour

priortothe

publicvote,

and

managed

todiscountalloftheargumentsI

had

made. I learnednottoleavesuchpoliticiansunattended,

especiallyimmediatelybeforecriticalvotes.

THREE

Environmental

rationale carries

less

weight

than

economic

reality

for

the

politician.

This should also be true for the planner,but for

some

reason,planners havetheimpressionthatsubjective

argu-ments

about environmental quality

do

not have to be countered byobjective

measures

of

economic

gain. Isee

frequentfailures based

on

this concept,

and

limited suc-cesses

when

economic

factors are appropriately consid-ered. I also see abuses of

economic

information

when

plannersare eitheruntrained or

unaware

of

what

is

avail-ableto

them

orareunabletoobjectivelyevaluate

what

has

been

"cooked up"

bya project applicant. Unfortunately,

thisisa briarpatch

no

matter

which

way

you

turn. Environ-mental

and

economic

informationisfrequentlysubjective,

althoughthereisalways

some

objective information.

The

plannershouldbeina position to

know

therelativemerits

of the information presented in order to develop

and

presentthe

most

informed opinion.

The

Avtex PlantinFrontRoyal,Virginia,

was

closedin!989

afterit

had

dumped

PCBs

into the

Shenandoah

River for severalyearsin violationof

numerous

state

and

federalwater

qualitystandards. It

was

thesoleproductionsource in the

United States of carbonized rayon filament rocket

motor

nozzles for military

and

civilian applications. Wlien the

federal

government

learned oftheproblem, the Environ-mentalProtection

Agency

did nothing,

and

didnotpass along

what

it did

know

to state agencies, which were seemingly incapableof

making

suchdeterminations.

Not

onlydid thestate

do

nothing,

one

ofitsU.S. Senators

helpedobtainfederalfundstokeeptheplantinoperation. The

plant contributed

400

jobstothelocaleconomy. Only a year

earlier, it

employed

1,300people, but other environmental

transgressionscaused

employment

to decline.Afterthe

news-papers describedtheplant'soperations, thingsbegantocharige.

Even

then,thepublicityprobably

would

not have

amounted

to

much

except for these revelations takingplace during a re-centlyconcludedgubernatorialrace

and

thefact thatanother

facility

was coming on

linein Tennessee.

FOUR

Know

your

elected

and

appointed

officials'

constituencies,

and

anticipate

which

ones

may

address

them

on

a

given

issue.

Your

support base

should

be

broad

enough

to

include

one

representative

of

each.

Your

abilitytoinfluence decisions isdirectlyrelatedto

the

number

of constituencies supporting your position.

Without

a majority,

you

do

not reallyhaveapositionthat

means

anything. Intheabsence ofcredible constituencies,

you

shouldbeina

good

positionto directlyinfluence the decisionmakers.

Not

enough

useis

made

ofpublicopinion

polls as a basis for understanding

community

thinking.

These

are invaluable in targeting policy areas for public

workshops and

education.

The

planning

community

is not doing

enough

to help defineissues;itistooconcerned with presentingsolutions.

We

are in the business of selling ourselves,

and

selling

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rela-tions. Itistakenforgrantedthatplannerseitherintuitively

know

such things or that this is notpart of our concern. Support

from

constituenciesisrarelygiven;itisgainedby

hard,

time-consuming

outreach work. Short

term

results

from

sucheffortsarerare,but thatshould notbethe focus

anyway.

A

well-informed public is the best chance for

gaining constituents

and

influencingpolicy.

The initial efforts to adopta performance-basedgrowth

management

planforthe FloridaKeys were

made

with

no

constituencyin mind. Planningconceptsof environmental

protection, adequatepublicfacilities,

and

appropriate

eco-nomic

development weresoldlocallyto

no

oneinparticular.

Progress

was

made

onlyafter the politicalforcesaffecting the

five-member county

commissionwere

identified. That under-standing alteredthe approach

and

time spent with various commissioners,

and

led toacorrect

judgment

thatthe

wrong

commissioner

had

beenidentifiedasthecriticalthirdvote.

FIVE

Understand

the

dynamics

of

your

local political situation

as

itrelatesto regional, state

and

federal interests.

Political forcesin your

community

may

or

may

not be

locallybased.

When

stateorfederal

programs

are involved, thereisa highprobability thatoutside interests willbe a

factor.

A

state

program

will usually have the broadest support base outside of a local area, especially if it is

implementing

controversiallegislation.

Although

outspo-kenlocaloppositionislikelytoinfluence thelocal political situation,itseffectoutsidethosepoliticalboundarieswill

belimited.

When

astrong

commitment

existsatthestate level tocarryout

what

isperceivedlocally tobe

controver-sial, there

must

be a significant political constituency at

work.

It

comes

down

to the

number

ofvotes affected locally

versus the

number

outsidethe

same

jurisdiction. Sinceitis

likelythat

some

localsupportwill exist forsuchprograms, even in the face ofvocal protests

from

the majority of

electedofficials, theplanner has to perform the delicate

and

diplomatic balancingact to staythe course.

Remember

thatalthoughpublic

pronouncements

ofoutrage

may

play welllocally,theywillhavelittleeffectelsewhere.

And

more

than anythingelse,thiswill limityour

maneuvering

room

which

isalways

needed

politically.

Powerfulpoliticalforces outsidetheKeys

community

influ-encedFloridaofficials inthe approval

and

acceptance of a Keys land use plan. Controversialgovernment actions

in-volvedonevoteoftheFlorida Cabinet,

an

interveningruling

ofthe Florida

Supreme

Court,

and

a law ofthe Florida Legislature designatingtheFloridaKeys

an

Area

ofCritical

StateConcern. Withonly20,

000

registeredvotersintheKeys,

abouthalfof

whom

supportedastate roleinlocallanduse planning,it

was

apparentthatstate politicalleaders

had

little

tolose insupportingsuchefforts. Infact,giventhe

power

of

several statewideenvironmentalgroups,itis

good

politicsto

support

and

defendthe state

imposed

landuseplanning

pro-gram. Itisalsoimportantthat thelargestnewspaperinthe statestronglysupports

good

environmental planningforthe Keys. Itsposition always

demands

the attention of any noteworthypolitical figures.

SIX

Always

expect

a

politician

to

make

something

other

than

a

rational

decision

when money

is

involved.

No

decision

made

in the political area is

immune

to irrationalthinking. Irrational thinking,however,isa

mis-nomer

forthepoliticalprocess. Itshouldbelabeled

politi-calexpediency. Thiscan

mean

many

things,but

more

and

more, as large

sums

ofpublic funds are involved, it

fre-quently

means

eitherbudgetshiftingortaxincreases.

Both

canbe detrimentalto apolitician's

good

health.

However,

payingfora

program

solution

must

bepartof

theplanningsolution. Feasiblefunding sources

and

meth-ods of

payment

are as

much

a part ofany

answer

as the technical planning

component.

The

easier it is for the electedofficialtowrite

something

offbecause ofcost,the

more

likelyitisthat

you

willfail.

When

infeasiblefunding sourcesare partofthe solution, thereisreally

no

solution

atall.

The performance-based growth

management

planforthe

FloridaKeysisastaff intensive device. Beforeit

was

adopted, it

was

obvious that the lack of

computer

assistance

had

severely

hampered

theexistingstaff's abilitytoaddress

mul-tipleplanningissues.

At

budgettime,it

was

easytodenypleas forassistance,eventhoughthe benefitsof reducedprocessing

time,betterpermittracking,

and

substantiallyimprovedreport writingwerewelldocumented. It

was

always

more

politically

expedienttoappropriatefundsforthingsotherthan

an

expen-sive

mainframe

computer.

During theplan adoption process,

an

astute consultant

funded

by building

permitfees

and

stateassistancegrants. Previously, allsuch

money

simplywentintothegeneral

fund and was

politically

doledout. There never

seemed

tobe

enough

money

forthe

planningdepartment, given thedeveloping animosities over tougherlanduseplanimplementation.

However, oncethespecial taxingdistrictbegancollecting

fundsthatcouldonlybeusedforplanningpurposes,

we

were

abletosecure

unanimous

approvalforthepurchase ofthe

needed

computer

system. This

was done

withthesupportof

the countyadministration, which

saw

the

computer

asthe

basis for developingits

own

system,

and

the localbuilding

(4)

SEVEN

Planners

do

not

have

divine insight into

land use

planning

problems

and

solutions.

For

many

planners,thereis

something

threateningabout

receivingproposalsfrom

anywhere

buttheiroffices,whether

theybe

from

laymen, other planners orpoliticians. It isas

ifanyidea or concept not originating

from

that officeis

somehow

tainted.

There

is

no

single correct solution.

Political reality usually

means

that

what works

in

one

community

will not

work

the

same way

in another.

You

must

beobjective

enough

tolookatanysuggestion,

what-ever the source.

Moreover, you

should be

wary

ofsolutions that have

worked

inother

communities

and

areappliedtoadifferent settingwithlittleattempttomodify

them

inconsideration

oflocalsituations.

By

thetime suchsolutionsarefiltered

through thepolitical reality mill,

complete

change,ifnot

outright rejection,can be expected.

Those

that are not should be suspect-eitherthe decision

maker

does not un-derstand

what

she orheisbeingaskedtoapprove, orthey

simplyhavenotreadit.

Watch

out.

No

matter

what

the

cir-cumstances, solutions

adopted

without insight into the

problem

at

hand

are

doomed

tofailure. Effortstoslip

con-troversialregulationsor poorlyunderstoodpoliciespastan unsuspecting boardare rarelysuccessful inthe longrun,

and

canhurtyourcredibilitytremendously.

The

planning

professional'sjob istoeducatethe elected

and

appointed

officials

on

thepros

and

cons ofa

proposed

solution, with

thefinaldecision,eventhe

"in-correct"one, reserved to

them

alone.

The

planner's privilege

is to

make

an informed

rec-ommendation.

Thecontiguouslotrule,

made

partoftheFloridaKeys

Com-prehensive Plan,

was

poorly understood legally

controver-sial,

and was

transferred

from

a

somewhat

similar regulation

that

was

originallypart ofthe

Sanibel Island Plan.

Discount-ing localprotestations

_from

lay

and

professional people, the politicalleadershipadoptedthe rulewithlittlereal

understand-ingofit. Thiselement of a

con-troversial regulation designed

tolowerresidentialdevelopment

densities in otherwise develo-pable

and

previously platted

and

recorded subdivisions, limited

ownerswithtwolotstobuilding

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Citizens'firstimpressionoftheCoastalAreaManagementAct(CAMA):

Stealingpropertyrights inNorthCarolina

only

one

residence. Althoughthesecondlotcould be usedas

permanent

openspace,anyresaleinvestmentvalue

was

effec-tivelyeliminated

The

rulestoodforthreeyears before being struck

down

inalegalchallenge.

A

greatdealofcredibility,

time

and

effort

was

lost in attempting to implement this

concept.

The

flaw

was

notinthelegalaspectsoftherule,as

questionableasthosemightappear. Itrestswiththe under-standing that theplanners

knew

"best"—

and

besides,it

had

"worked" somewhere

else. It

was

notpubliclyacknowledged

thatthe rule

had

alsofailedasimilarlegalchallengeinthe

otherlocality.

EIGHT

Politicians

have

learned

to

laugh

at

themselves—

they

should.

Planners

take

themselves

too

seriously--we

need

to

learn

from

the

politicians.

The

firsttime

you

are verballyattacked in publicbyan

electedofficial,itishardtobe

amused.

Plannersaresuch

easy targets.

Any

politician usually looks

good

abusing,

criticizing

and

severelyquestioning theplanningstaff.

Many

constituents enjoy this type of entertainment,

and

many

private sector

employees

are willingto accept the

stere-otyped picture of the pencil pushing bureaucrat sitting

behindadesk,doing whateveritisthat

we

do,

knowing

that

we

could notget ajobintherealworld.

You

should notbe concerned about such

commentary.

I find that it usually

comes

from

the less intelligent

segment. Motivation

and

intent are infrequentlyvicious,although

it is always best to

assume

that

barkingdogswillbite. Consider

thesource

and

enjoyitfor

what

it is.

Accept

abasicpublic service

maxim:

praiseisrare,criticismis

constant,

and

work

isnever

end-ing.

In

my

previousposition, I

had

onlybeenintheofficea few months

when

our local senator

and

the

former

representativewerecalling

for

my

dismissal. I

was

being

at-tackedfor designinga land

acqui-sition

program

to benefitwealthy

peopleinsteadofsmalllotowners.

That this

was

completely untrue

had

no

bearingondie matter.These

twogentlemen were determined not

toletthefactsgetinthe way.

Al-though notentertaining for

me

at the time,everyone else

seemed

to

enjoyreadingaboutthis inthe local

(5)

down,

and

thingsgot

back

tonormal,I enjoyedthe realiza-tion that

what

these two

had done was

to solidify local support for

my

efforts.

And

I

was

always sure that the

incidentwasin

no way

related toaprevious episodeinwhich

my

officedeniedthe representative'srequestforasubdivision

and

impactfee exemption.

NINE

Elected

officials

have

every

right to

hear

rational

explanations of various

policy

options

and

make

what any

planner

would

deem

the

wrong

choice.

The

planner's role is to analyze a situation, present

alternatives,

comment

on

advantages

and

disadvantages,

and

make

a

recommendation.

The

lastisa privilegeonly.

Shame

on

those

and

theirprocesses that

do

not

make

or

allow

recommendations.

We

should notbe accordedthe luxuryof presenting the facts without

recommending

a

solution. I

am

comforted, however,thatplanners

do

not havethe final say. Ifa

poor

choiceis

made,

itisnotthe

faultof the electedofficial. It isthe professional'sfault.

Plannerstoooftenhidebehindtheexcusethatpolitics

affectedtheoutcome. Itdid. Italways does. Italwayswill.

The

resultingfailureisbecause ofthe planner'sinability tounderstand,activate,motivate

and

influence the politi-calforces thatcausedthe decision. Thiscanbe toughto do. Vision

and

foresight are hard to

come

by in the

politicalarena. Ostriches,withtheirheads buriedinthe sand,

show

as

much

vision

and

braveryas

many

ofour

electedofficials. Ifaplannerthinksacontrary

outcome

is

likely,she or

he

isobligatedto

make

an

efforttosway those

actors. Thiswillnot

happen

duringthefinalmeeting be-foreapublicaudience.

A

planner

must be

involvedin this

processatseverallevels.

Depending on

yourskill,this

may

or

may

notaffectyourterm ofservice.

The

onlyplacethis

canbe learnedeffectivelyis

on

thejob,but

some

graduate courseworkintheplanning curriculum

would be

a

good

start.

Inorderto alteraprimarysand

dune

underregulations im-plementing North Carolina's Coastal

Area

Management

Act, a variance

was

needed

from

thegubematorialty

ap-pointed Coastal Resources

Commission

(CRC). Itso

hap-pened

that one ofthe

more

diligent localities stopped a

pwminent

contractor

from

completing such

an

alteration

withoutapermit.

The

staff

argument

aboutprecedents being

set iftheregulation were not followed

and

supportingthe localpermitofficercarriedlittleweight.

The

case

was

heard,

and

thevariance

was

granted bya widemargin.

We

blamed

itonpolitics;however,it

was

ourfault thatthecase

was

lost.

We

didnothingtohelpthe

CRC

denythe variance. Infact,

we

made

ithardbyrelying

on

itto

do

the rightthing.

The

right

thing

would

have beenfor ustohavelocal

and

state

testi-mony

opposingthevariance.

We

mistakenly didnotthinkthat

was

ourjob.

TEN

In public

planning

agencies, elected

and

appointed

officials

should

be

involved

and aware

of

personnel

and

administrative

decisions

made

by

planning

managers.

Members

ofplanningcommissions, zoningboards,

and

otherappointed

and

elected bodies,havea vestedinterest in theirplanning operations, especially asthis relates to staffquality

and

continuity.

Management

is

one

ofthe profession's

most

difficult responsibilities,

and

there is

always

room

for

improvement.

Personnel decisions in

particularcanhave a

tremendous

impact

on

staffmorale

and

public perceptions. Icaneasilycountthe

number

of

personnel

management

courses I

had

whileinschool.

No

one

told

me

that running

an

agency of 45

employees

is

something

very different

from

a45-personoffice ina large

statebureaucracy. I

had

no

courses in

employee

motiva-tion,influencepeddling,budgetanalyses,personnel

man-agement,

and

similarbusiness related matters.

And

no one

told

me

thatin

an

agency ofthissize,

more

thanone-third

of

my

time couldbe

consumed

by personnelmatters.

Sug-gestions

on

such itemsareanother area

where

comments

from

theoutsidearetypicallyconsidered intrusions. But

elected

and

appointedofficials usuallyhave

one

or

more

members

withbusiness

backgrounds

thatcanbeeffectively

used to help.

Most

jurisdictionshave policies

and

ordi-nancesthat preventblatant interference.

Be

careful that

you

are not seen as favoring

one

individual's input over anotherif

you choose

thisoption. In

most

cases,

you

willbe

betterservedby going outside your systementirelysothat

any charges offavoritismorinfluencecan

be

handled. /

worked

for

an

agencythat

had

a 75percent turnoverrate in

one

year.

The

three-yearaverageapproached

50

percent. Itsadministrativeoperationsweretotallythe

domain

ofthe executivedirector,except foradoption ofthe

annual

budget.

Althoughstaffpromotions were

announced

toourcouncil, it

had

no

opportunitytoobservetheprocessused to grant, or

deny,such promotions.

No

council

member

ever interviewed forreplacement personnel orspoke with staffchoosing to leave.

The

explanationalwaysgiventhecouncil

was

that

most

oftheturnover involvedentry levelpeople,

and

thatsuch

turn-over

was

tobeexpected.

A

turnoverratethishighshouldbe expectedof

an

agencythat

shows

littleregardforitsemployees.

Italwaysshould beexpected of any agency thatallows

an

executive directortotalcontroloverpersonnelmatters. Whether a board ofdirectors is appointed orelected, it

must

know

enough aboutitschief executiveofficer tomonitor asituation