in the Federal Republic of Germany Author(s): Kathleen Bawn
Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Jul., 1999), pp. 487-505 Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/194147 Accessed: 07/03/2010 06:04
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B.J.Pol.S. 29, 487-505 ? 1999 Cambridge University Press Printed in the United Kingdom
Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity:
Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and
Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany
KATHLEEN BAWN*
In order to understand how electoral rules affect political outcomes, we need to know whether and how voters react to them. The ability of voters to react strategically to electoral rules may be limited in cases where the electoral rules are complex. In this article, I look for evidence of rational reactions to a moderately complex electoral system, that used in the Federal Republic of Germany. By examining district-level election results, I find substantial evidence that voters do react rationally, despite the complexity of the two-vote system. The rational reactions by voters lead to excess first votes for incumbents, for candidates of the major party expected to be in government, to major-party candidates in close races and to major-party candidates in districts with significant minority-party support. The findings support both the general claim that voters can react strategically to complex electoral rules, and more specific claims about the value of the two-vote ballot in Germany.
Electoral rules are critical to the success of representative democracy. By determining how votes translate into seats, electoral rules have a direct effect on political outcomes. Equally important, however, are the indirect effects that come about as voters and politicians react to the incentives created by electoral rules. The nature of the electoral system not only determines the way votes are counted, but also influences the way they are cast.
In his famous discussion of the impact of plurality-type electoral systems on political parties, Maurice Duverger described these direct and indirect effects as 'mechanical' and 'psychological'.1 In the case Duverger was concerned with, both effects worked to the disadvantage of small parties. Specifically, the mechanical effect of plurality is such that any party unable to win the highest vote share in any district will be excluded from the legislature entirely. The mechanical effect implies that small parties do worse under plurality than under proportional representation (PR), even if voters behave the same way in each system. The psychological effect posits that, in fact, they are likely to behave differently. A voter who would vote for a small party under PR may choose not to do so under a plurality system, because a vote for a candidate who has no chance of winning a plurality is 'wasted'.
* Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles. The author would like to thank Gary Cox, Jeff Frieden, Skip Lupia, Brian McCuen, Ron Rogowski, Mike Thies and George Tsebelis for comments on this project, and the Hoover Institution for research support. '
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1954).
B.J.Pol.S. 29, 487-505 ? 1999 Cambridge University Press
Printed in the United Kingdom
Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity:
Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and
Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany
KATHLEEN BAWN*
In order to understand how electoral rules affect political outcomes, we need to know whether and how voters react to them. The ability of voters to react strategically to electoral rules may be limited in cases where the electoral rules are complex. In this article, I look for evidence of rational reactions to a moderately complex electoral system, that used in the Federal Republic of Germany. By examining district-level election results, I find substantial evidence that voters do react rationally, despite the complexity of the two-vote system. The rational reactions by voters lead to excess first votes for incumbents, for candidates of the major party expected to be in government, to major-party candidates in close races and to major-party candidates in districts with significant minority-party support. The findings support both the general claim that voters can react strategically to complex electoral rules, and more specific claims about the value of the two-vote ballot in Germany.
Electoral rules are critical to the success of representative democracy. By determining how votes translate into seats, electoral rules have a direct effect on political outcomes. Equally important, however, are the indirect effects that come about as voters and politicians react to the incentives created by electoral rules. The nature of the electoral system not only determines the way votes are counted, but also influences the way they are cast.
In his famous discussion of the impact of plurality-type electoral systems on political parties, Maurice Duverger described these direct and indirect effects as 'mechanical' and 'psychological'.1 In the case Duverger was concerned with, both effects worked to the disadvantage of small parties. Specifically, the mechanical effect of plurality is such that any party unable to win the highest vote share in any district will be excluded from the legislature entirely. The mechanical effect implies that small parties do worse under plurality than under proportional representation (PR), even if voters behave the same way in each system. The psychological effect posits that, in fact, they are likely to behave differently. A voter who would vote for a small party under PR may choose not to do so under a plurality system, because a vote for a candidate who has no chance of winning a plurality is 'wasted'.
* Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles. The author would like to thank Gary Cox, Jeff Frieden, Skip Lupia, Brian McCuen, Ron Rogowski, Mike Thies and George Tsebelis for comments on this project, and the Hoover Institution for research support. '
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1954).
B.J.Pol.S. 29, 487-505 ? 1999 Cambridge University Press
Printed in the United Kingdom
Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity:
Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and
Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany
KATHLEEN BAWN*
In order to understand how electoral rules affect political outcomes, we need to know whether and how voters react to them. The ability of voters to react strategically to electoral rules may be limited in cases where the electoral rules are complex. In this article, I look for evidence of rational reactions to a moderately complex electoral system, that used in the Federal Republic of Germany. By examining district-level election results, I find substantial evidence that voters do react rationally, despite the complexity of the two-vote system. The rational reactions by voters lead to excess first votes for incumbents, for candidates of the major party expected to be in government, to major-party candidates in close races and to major-party candidates in districts with significant minority-party support. The findings support both the general claim that voters can react strategically to complex electoral rules, and more specific claims about the value of the two-vote ballot in Germany.
Electoral rules are critical to the success of representative democracy. By determining how votes translate into seats, electoral rules have a direct effect on political outcomes. Equally important, however, are the indirect effects that come about as voters and politicians react to the incentives created by electoral rules. The nature of the electoral system not only determines the way votes are counted, but also influences the way they are cast.
In his famous discussion of the impact of plurality-type electoral systems on political parties, Maurice Duverger described these direct and indirect effects as 'mechanical' and 'psychological'.1 In the case Duverger was concerned with, both effects worked to the disadvantage of small parties. Specifically, the mechanical effect of plurality is such that any party unable to win the highest vote share in any district will be excluded from the legislature entirely. The mechanical effect implies that small parties do worse under plurality than under proportional representation (PR), even if voters behave the same way in each system. The psychological effect posits that, in fact, they are likely to behave differently. A voter who would vote for a small party under PR may choose not to do so under a plurality system, because a vote for a candidate who has no chance of winning a plurality is 'wasted'.
* Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles. The author would like to thank Gary Cox, Jeff Frieden, Skip Lupia, Brian McCuen, Ron Rogowski, Mike Thies and George Tsebelis for comments on this project, and the Hoover Institution for research support. '
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1954).
Scholars today are more likely to use words like 'strategic' or 'rational', rather than 'psychological', to describe effects that arise when voters consider how their vote is likely to matter when deciding how to cast it, and these are the words I will use here.2
Whatever terminology we use, Duverger's notion generalizes beyond the plurality/PR example.3 If we fail to consider how voters might rationally react to electoral rules, we underestimate the impact of the rules on political outcomes.
Moreover, if voters react, so will the politicians they elect. The electoral incentives crucial to the logic of representation will be shaped by both mechanical and strategic consequences of electoral rules. However, if we simply assume that voters take advantage of every strategic opportunity available to them, we may overestimate, or misunderstand, the impact of electoral rules. In particular, electoral systems that are complex arguably make it more difficult for voters to react in coherent ways. The question of whether and when voters react to electoral rules is one that can only be answered empirically.
This article tests for rational reactions by voters to one prominent electoral system that has been criticized for being over-complex: that used to elect the German Bundestag.4 The German electoral system is of particular interest because variants of it have been adopted by a number of old and new democracies in the last decade.5 At the same time, Eckhard Jesse has proposed electoral reform in Germany on the basis of the claim that the current system is 'deceptive', i.e., that it is too complex for voters to react rationally.6
The complexity arises because voters cast two votes, one for a candidate in a single-member district, and one for a party list. The overall outcome is that seat shares are proportional to vote shares. The mechanical consequences of this system are thus essentially identical to those of much more straightforward PR systems. But the opportunity to cast two separate votes (which will be counted in two separate ways) creates potential strategic effects not present with
2 In this article I use the word 'strategic' in a relatively broad way. A voter reacts strategically if she votes in a way that brings about the outcome she regards as best. This would include strategic voting in the narrowest sense, that is, voting for candidate A even though she prefers B in order to avoid the worst outcome C. But strategic reactions also include considering factors other than policy agreement (e.g., effectiveness, impact on coalition) in deciding what candidate to vote for.
3 Gary Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 29-33; and Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1989), pp. 142-55.
4 The empirical question of whether Duverger' s psychological effect occurs is addressed by Andr6 Blais and R. K. Carty, 'The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 79-93.
5 New Zealand and Albania have adopted close variants of the German system. Japan, Russia and Italy have adopted systems that are not proportional but involve a similar mix of single-member districts and list mandates.
6 Eckhard Jesse, 'The West German Electoral System: The Case for Reform, 1949-87', Western European Politics, 10 (1987), 434-48, and 'Split-voting in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis of Federal Elections from 1953 to 1987', Electoral Studies, 7 (1988), 109-24.
Scholars today are more likely to use words like 'strategic' or 'rational', rather than 'psychological', to describe effects that arise when voters consider how their vote is likely to matter when deciding how to cast it, and these are the words I will use here.2
Whatever terminology we use, Duverger's notion generalizes beyond the plurality/PR example.3 If we fail to consider how voters might rationally react to electoral rules, we underestimate the impact of the rules on political outcomes.
Moreover, if voters react, so will the politicians they elect. The electoral incentives crucial to the logic of representation will be shaped by both mechanical and strategic consequences of electoral rules. However, if we simply assume that voters take advantage of every strategic opportunity available to them, we may overestimate, or misunderstand, the impact of electoral rules. In particular, electoral systems that are complex arguably make it more difficult for voters to react in coherent ways. The question of whether and when voters react to electoral rules is one that can only be answered empirically.
This article tests for rational reactions by voters to one prominent electoral system that has been criticized for being over-complex: that used to elect the German Bundestag.4 The German electoral system is of particular interest because variants of it have been adopted by a number of old and new democracies in the last decade.5 At the same time, Eckhard Jesse has proposed electoral reform in Germany on the basis of the claim that the current system is 'deceptive', i.e., that it is too complex for voters to react rationally.6
The complexity arises because voters cast two votes, one for a candidate in a single-member district, and one for a party list. The overall outcome is that seat shares are proportional to vote shares. The mechanical consequences of this system are thus essentially identical to those of much more straightforward PR systems. But the opportunity to cast two separate votes (which will be counted in two separate ways) creates potential strategic effects not present with
2 In this article I use the word 'strategic' in a relatively broad way. A voter reacts strategically if she votes in a way that brings about the outcome she regards as best. This would include strategic voting in the narrowest sense, that is, voting for candidate A even though she prefers B in order to avoid the worst outcome C. But strategic reactions also include considering factors other than policy agreement (e.g., effectiveness, impact on coalition) in deciding what candidate to vote for.
3 Gary Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 29-33; and Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1989), pp. 142-55.
4 The empirical question of whether Duverger' s psychological effect occurs is addressed by Andr6 Blais and R. K. Carty, 'The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 79-93.
5 New Zealand and Albania have adopted close variants of the German system. Japan, Russia and Italy have adopted systems that are not proportional but involve a similar mix of single-member districts and list mandates.
6 Eckhard Jesse, 'The West German Electoral System: The Case for Reform, 1949-87', Western European Politics, 10 (1987), 434-48, and 'Split-voting in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis of Federal Elections from 1953 to 1987', Electoral Studies, 7 (1988), 109-24.
Scholars today are more likely to use words like 'strategic' or 'rational', rather than 'psychological', to describe effects that arise when voters consider how their vote is likely to matter when deciding how to cast it, and these are the words I will use here.2
Whatever terminology we use, Duverger's notion generalizes beyond the plurality/PR example.3 If we fail to consider how voters might rationally react to electoral rules, we underestimate the impact of the rules on political outcomes.
Moreover, if voters react, so will the politicians they elect. The electoral incentives crucial to the logic of representation will be shaped by both mechanical and strategic consequences of electoral rules. However, if we simply assume that voters take advantage of every strategic opportunity available to them, we may overestimate, or misunderstand, the impact of electoral rules. In particular, electoral systems that are complex arguably make it more difficult for voters to react in coherent ways. The question of whether and when voters react to electoral rules is one that can only be answered empirically.
This article tests for rational reactions by voters to one prominent electoral system that has been criticized for being over-complex: that used to elect the German Bundestag.4 The German electoral system is of particular interest because variants of it have been adopted by a number of old and new democracies in the last decade.5 At the same time, Eckhard Jesse has proposed electoral reform in Germany on the basis of the claim that the current system is 'deceptive', i.e., that it is too complex for voters to react rationally.6
The complexity arises because voters cast two votes, one for a candidate in a single-member district, and one for a party list. The overall outcome is that seat shares are proportional to vote shares. The mechanical consequences of this system are thus essentially identical to those of much more straightforward PR systems. But the opportunity to cast two separate votes (which will be counted in two separate ways) creates potential strategic effects not present with
2 In this article I use the word 'strategic' in a relatively broad way. A voter reacts strategically if she votes in a way that brings about the outcome she regards as best. This would include strategic voting in the narrowest sense, that is, voting for candidate A even though she prefers B in order to avoid the worst outcome C. But strategic reactions also include considering factors other than policy agreement (e.g., effectiveness, impact on coalition) in deciding what candidate to vote for.
3 Gary Cox, Making Votes Count (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 29-33; and Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1989), pp. 142-55.
4 The empirical question of whether Duverger' s psychological effect occurs is addressed by Andr6 Blais and R. K. Carty, 'The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 79-93.
5 New Zealand and Albania have adopted close variants of the German system. Japan, Russia and Italy have adopted systems that are not proportional but involve a similar mix of single-member districts and list mandates.
6 Eckhard Jesse, 'The West German Electoral System: The Case for Reform, 1949-87', Western European Politics, 10 (1987), 434-48, and 'Split-voting in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis of Federal Elections from 1953 to 1987', Electoral Studies, 7 (1988), 109-24.
Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity 'normal' closed list PR. The question is: do voters react rationally to the presence of single-member districts in a proportional system?
I analyse patterns of voting in six elections to demonstrate that voters do indeed react rationally to the two-vote mixed system. Not only do they avoid wasting their district votes as Duverger predicted, they are more likely to give district votes to incumbents and to candidates from parties that are expected to be in power. The district races affect the behaviour of voters, even if they do not affect aggregate seat shares. This means that district candidates face electoral incentives different from their list counterparts and similar to those faced by legislators in pure plurality systems.
The article proceeds as follows. First, Germany's electoral system is described and its mechanical and strategic effects discussed. In the following section testable hypotheses are derived from the premise that voters react rationally to the two-vote mixed system. The hypotheses are then tested using data from the 6th- lth Bundestag elections (1969-1987). A discussion of an alternative interpretation of voter reactions to the two-vote system follows, before the concluding section.
MECHANICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF GERMANY'S
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Germany uses an electoral system that mixes key features of single-member districts and proportional representation. Roughly half of the members of the Bundestag win their seats by gaining a plurality of votes in a district; the other half are elected from a party list. Overall, seat shares are proportional to vote shares, subject to a 5 per cent threshold.
The system works as follows. Each voter cast two votes. The first votes (Erststimmen) are totalled at the district level (Wahlkreis) so that the candidate with a plurality of first votes wins a seat. The second votes (Zweitstimmen) are totalled at the state (Land) level. In each state, each party that received at least 5 per cent of second votes nationwide receives a fraction of seats proportional to its second-vote share. The winners of the district races fill some of the seats allocated to their parties and the remainder of the proportionally-allocated seats are filled from the lists.7 Winning a large number of districts thus does not generally increase a party's seat share beyond its proportional allocation, so that the mechanical effect of district races is wiped out.8
7 The district candidates are nominated by the district party organizations, the lists are put together at the state level. This article's data is from the pre-reunification period, when the Federal Republic consisted of ten states. Districts are drawn so as to be roughly equivalent in population. The number of districts per state varied from five (Bremen) to seventy-three (Nordrhein-Westfalen); the total nationwide was 248.
8 The exception is when a party wins more district seats than its overall vote share would allow.
In this case the party is able to keep all of its district seats. This provision has resulted in a small number of extra seats (Ueberhangmandaten) in several legislative periods. In the period studied in this article, no more than two extra seats were won in this manner.
'normal' closed list PR. The question is: do voters react rationally to the presence of single-member districts in a proportional system?
I analyse patterns of voting in six elections to demonstrate that voters do indeed react rationally to the two-vote mixed system. Not only do they avoid wasting their district votes as Duverger predicted, they are more likely to give district votes to incumbents and to candidates from parties that are expected to be in power. The district races affect the behaviour of voters, even if they do not affect aggregate seat shares. This means that district candidates face electoral incentives different from their list counterparts and similar to those faced by legislators in pure plurality systems.
The article proceeds as follows. First, Germany's electoral system is described and its mechanical and strategic effects discussed. In the following section testable hypotheses are derived from the premise that voters react rationally to the two-vote mixed system. The hypotheses are then tested using data from the 6th- lth Bundestag elections (1969-1987). A discussion of an alternative interpretation of voter reactions to the two-vote system follows, before the concluding section.
MECHANICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF GERMANY'S
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Germany uses an electoral system that mixes key features of single-member districts and proportional representation. Roughly half of the members of the Bundestag win their seats by gaining a plurality of votes in a district; the other half are elected from a party list. Overall, seat shares are proportional to vote shares, subject to a 5 per cent threshold.
The system works as follows. Each voter cast two votes. The first votes (Erststimmen) are totalled at the district level (Wahlkreis) so that the candidate with a plurality of first votes wins a seat. The second votes (Zweitstimmen) are totalled at the state (Land) level. In each state, each party that received at least 5 per cent of second votes nationwide receives a fraction of seats proportional to its second-vote share. The winners of the district races fill some of the seats allocated to their parties and the remainder of the proportionally-allocated seats are filled from the lists.7 Winning a large number of districts thus does not generally increase a party's seat share beyond its proportional allocation, so that the mechanical effect of district races is wiped out.8
7 The district candidates are nominated by the district party organizations, the lists are put together at the state level. This article's data is from the pre-reunification period, when the Federal Republic consisted of ten states. Districts are drawn so as to be roughly equivalent in population. The number of districts per state varied from five (Bremen) to seventy-three (Nordrhein-Westfalen); the total nationwide was 248.
8 The exception is when a party wins more district seats than its overall vote share would allow.
In this case the party is able to keep all of its district seats. This provision has resulted in a small number of extra seats (Ueberhangmandaten) in several legislative periods. In the period studied in this article, no more than two extra seats were won in this manner.
'normal' closed list PR. The question is: do voters react rationally to the presence of single-member districts in a proportional system?
I analyse patterns of voting in six elections to demonstrate that voters do indeed react rationally to the two-vote mixed system. Not only do they avoid wasting their district votes as Duverger predicted, they are more likely to give district votes to incumbents and to candidates from parties that are expected to be in power. The district races affect the behaviour of voters, even if they do not affect aggregate seat shares. This means that district candidates face electoral incentives different from their list counterparts and similar to those faced by legislators in pure plurality systems.
The article proceeds as follows. First, Germany's electoral system is described and its mechanical and strategic effects discussed. In the following section testable hypotheses are derived from the premise that voters react rationally to the two-vote mixed system. The hypotheses are then tested using data from the 6th- lth Bundestag elections (1969-1987). A discussion of an alternative interpretation of voter reactions to the two-vote system follows, before the concluding section.
MECHANICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF GERMANY'S
ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Germany uses an electoral system that mixes key features of single-member districts and proportional representation. Roughly half of the members of the Bundestag win their seats by gaining a plurality of votes in a district; the other half are elected from a party list. Overall, seat shares are proportional to vote shares, subject to a 5 per cent threshold.
The system works as follows. Each voter cast two votes. The first votes (Erststimmen) are totalled at the district level (Wahlkreis) so that the candidate with a plurality of first votes wins a seat. The second votes (Zweitstimmen) are totalled at the state (Land) level. In each state, each party that received at least 5 per cent of second votes nationwide receives a fraction of seats proportional to its second-vote share. The winners of the district races fill some of the seats allocated to their parties and the remainder of the proportionally-allocated seats are filled from the lists.7 Winning a large number of districts thus does not generally increase a party's seat share beyond its proportional allocation, so that the mechanical effect of district races is wiped out.8
7 The district candidates are nominated by the district party organizations, the lists are put together at the state level. This article's data is from the pre-reunification period, when the Federal Republic consisted of ten states. Districts are drawn so as to be roughly equivalent in population. The number of districts per state varied from five (Bremen) to seventy-three (Nordrhein-Westfalen); the total nationwide was 248.
8 The exception is when a party wins more district seats than its overall vote share would allow.
In this case the party is able to keep all of its district seats. This provision has resulted in a small number of extra seats (Ueberhangmandaten) in several legislative periods. In the period studied in this article, no more than two extra seats were won in this manner.
489 489 489
For example, in 1983 Schleswig-Holstein had twenty-one total seats - eleven districts and ten list seats. In this election, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) received 46.5 per cent of second votes, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) received 41.7 per cent, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) received 6.3 per cent, and the Greens 5.2 per cent. This entitled the CDU to ten of Schleswig-Holstein's twenty-one total seats, the SPD to nine, and the FDP and Greens to one each. The CDU won nine of the districts, the SPD won the other two. The CDU's district winners filled nine of its ten total seats, and the tenth was drawn from the party list. The SPD's two district winners filled two of its nine seats, the other seven were drawn from the party list. And the FDP and the Greens each filled their single seat from their lists.
Looked at in completely mechanical terms, then, the German system is essentially equivalent to 'regular' proportional representation with a 5 per cent hurdle. If neither voters nor candidates react to the incentives generated by the electoral rules, then the German system is simply a more complicated way of getting the same basic PR outcome. This observation is the key to Jesse's argument in favour of consolidating the two votes.
The normative logic behind the two-vote system depends critically on voters reacting rationally, thereby creating different electoral incentives for the district and list candidates. If they do, the system would be an improvement over - or at least different from - straight list PR because the district-elected members would represent local individuals and groups in ways that list members would not.
Looked at in terms of strategic effects, the German electoral system seems more logical. Both plurality and list PR create some potentially bad electoral incentives. List PR, for example, creates an incentive for legislators to over-respond to party leaders (who determine list position) and to ignore the needs of individual voters. By contrast, plurality creates an incentive for legislators to over-respond to individual constituents, and to try to get direct credit for solving problems rather than working to prevent their occurrence.9 PR leads legislators to over-respond to interests that are powerful and organized enough to influence party organizations at the state and national level,10 but single-member districts create an incentive to over-respond to local interests, and to ignore policy consequences that occur outside the district. 1 The German mixture of the two systems would seem to serve the Madisonian goal of pitting ambition against ambition because the district members of the Bundestag (MBt's) face different electoral incentives from those confronting the list
9 Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976); and Roger Noll and Morris Fiorina, 'Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators', Journal of Public Economics, 9 (1979), 239-54.
10 Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 139 (1983), 377-404.
11 Barry Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle and Christopher Johnsen, 'The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (1981), 642-64.
For example, in 1983 Schleswig-Holstein had twenty-one total seats - eleven districts and ten list seats. In this election, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) received 46.5 per cent of second votes, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) received 41.7 per cent, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) received 6.3 per cent, and the Greens 5.2 per cent. This entitled the CDU to ten of Schleswig-Holstein's twenty-one total seats, the SPD to nine, and the FDP and Greens to one each. The CDU won nine of the districts, the SPD won the other two. The CDU's district winners filled nine of its ten total seats, and the tenth was drawn from the party list. The SPD's two district winners filled two of its nine seats, the other seven were drawn from the party list. And the FDP and the Greens each filled their single seat from their lists.
Looked at in completely mechanical terms, then, the German system is essentially equivalent to 'regular' proportional representation with a 5 per cent hurdle. If neither voters nor candidates react to the incentives generated by the electoral rules, then the German system is simply a more complicated way of getting the same basic PR outcome. This observation is the key to Jesse's argument in favour of consolidating the two votes.
The normative logic behind the two-vote system depends critically on voters reacting rationally, thereby creating different electoral incentives for the district and list candidates. If they do, the system would be an improvement over - or at least different from - straight list PR because the district-elected members would represent local individuals and groups in ways that list members would not.
Looked at in terms of strategic effects, the German electoral system seems more logical. Both plurality and list PR create some potentially bad electoral incentives. List PR, for example, creates an incentive for legislators to over-respond to party leaders (who determine list position) and to ignore the needs of individual voters. By contrast, plurality creates an incentive for legislators to over-respond to individual constituents, and to try to get direct credit for solving problems rather than working to prevent their occurrence.9 PR leads legislators to over-respond to interests that are powerful and organized enough to influence party organizations at the state and national level,10 but single-member districts create an incentive to over-respond to local interests, and to ignore policy consequences that occur outside the district. 1 The German mixture of the two systems would seem to serve the Madisonian goal of pitting ambition against ambition because the district members of the Bundestag (MBt's) face different electoral incentives from those confronting the list
9 Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976); and Roger Noll and Morris Fiorina, 'Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators', Journal of Public Economics, 9 (1979), 239-54.
10 Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 139 (1983), 377-404.
11 Barry Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle and Christopher Johnsen, 'The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (1981), 642-64.
For example, in 1983 Schleswig-Holstein had twenty-one total seats - eleven districts and ten list seats. In this election, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) received 46.5 per cent of second votes, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) received 41.7 per cent, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) received 6.3 per cent, and the Greens 5.2 per cent. This entitled the CDU to ten of Schleswig-Holstein's twenty-one total seats, the SPD to nine, and the FDP and Greens to one each. The CDU won nine of the districts, the SPD won the other two. The CDU's district winners filled nine of its ten total seats, and the tenth was drawn from the party list. The SPD's two district winners filled two of its nine seats, the other seven were drawn from the party list. And the FDP and the Greens each filled their single seat from their lists.
Looked at in completely mechanical terms, then, the German system is essentially equivalent to 'regular' proportional representation with a 5 per cent hurdle. If neither voters nor candidates react to the incentives generated by the electoral rules, then the German system is simply a more complicated way of getting the same basic PR outcome. This observation is the key to Jesse's argument in favour of consolidating the two votes.
The normative logic behind the two-vote system depends critically on voters reacting rationally, thereby creating different electoral incentives for the district and list candidates. If they do, the system would be an improvement over - or at least different from - straight list PR because the district-elected members would represent local individuals and groups in ways that list members would not.
Looked at in terms of strategic effects, the German electoral system seems more logical. Both plurality and list PR create some potentially bad electoral incentives. List PR, for example, creates an incentive for legislators to over-respond to party leaders (who determine list position) and to ignore the needs of individual voters. By contrast, plurality creates an incentive for legislators to over-respond to individual constituents, and to try to get direct credit for solving problems rather than working to prevent their occurrence.9 PR leads legislators to over-respond to interests that are powerful and organized enough to influence party organizations at the state and national level,10 but single-member districts create an incentive to over-respond to local interests, and to ignore policy consequences that occur outside the district. 1 The German mixture of the two systems would seem to serve the Madisonian goal of pitting ambition against ambition because the district members of the Bundestag (MBt's) face different electoral incentives from those confronting the list
9 Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976); and Roger Noll and Morris Fiorina, 'Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators', Journal of Public Economics, 9 (1979), 239-54.
10 Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 139 (1983), 377-404.
11 Barry Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle and Christopher Johnsen, 'The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (1981), 642-64.
Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity MBt's.12 Indeed, this sort of argument was made in favour of the mixed system when it was adopted in 1949.13
These countervailing electoral incentives only exist, however, if the electorate is sophisticated enough to enforce them. Specifically, at least some voters need to be able to evaluate district candidates separately from their parties and to express those evaluations through their two votes. Does this happen?
Does the existence of districts lead to strategic effects? In particular, do voters react to the district races in ways that create different electoral incentives for the district and list MBt's?
PERSONAL VOTES AND RATIONAL TICKET SPLITTING: SOME HYPOTHESES
If voters react to district races, some will cast split tickets, giving their second vote to a different party from their first. We can examine split voting at the district level by defining candidate vote gap as the district candidate's share of first votes minus her party' s share of the second vote. A negative vote gap means that the candidate did worse than her party, and a positive vote gap means that the candidate did better. Note that a candidate can have a negative vote gap and still win the seat (or a positive one and still lose).
Candidates with positive vote gaps may be winning 'personal votes' on the basis of their personal qualities and activities, as opposed to their partisan affiliation. Personal votes can arise because incumbents actively cultivate them through constituency service or by bringing government-funded projects to the district.14 There is evidence that German district representatives do engage in these kinds of personal vote-building activities.15 Personal votes may also arise if the candidate is simply exceptionally appropriate for the district, in terms of personal style, background, policy positions and priorities.
Personal votes are usually studied in countries where votes are cast for
12 Thomas Lancaster and W. David Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag', Comparative Political Studies, 22 (1990), 458-77; and Kathleen Bawn, 'Checks and Balances Without Gridlock?' in Bruce Cain and Roger Noll, eds, Constitutional Reform in California (Berkeley, Calif.: IGS Press 1995), pp. 129-62.
13 On the adoption of the electoral law, see James K. Pollock, German Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1958); U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Kathleen Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preferences:
German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89.
14 Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
15 Henry Bretton, 'Germany Today', in James K. Pollock, Germany Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 111-39; Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German System (Ithaca, NY: Corell University Press, 1967); Lancaster and Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics'; and Stephen Porter, 'First-Ballot Voting in Germany: Is There a Personal Vote?' (paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
MBt's.12 Indeed, this sort of argument was made in favour of the mixed system when it was adopted in 1949.13
These countervailing electoral incentives only exist, however, if the electorate is sophisticated enough to enforce them. Specifically, at least some voters need to be able to evaluate district candidates separately from their parties and to express those evaluations through their two votes. Does this happen?
Does the existence of districts lead to strategic effects? In particular, do voters react to the district races in ways that create different electoral incentives for the district and list MBt's?
PERSONAL VOTES AND RATIONAL TICKET SPLITTING: SOME HYPOTHESES
If voters react to district races, some will cast split tickets, giving their second vote to a different party from their first. We can examine split voting at the district level by defining candidate vote gap as the district candidate's share of first votes minus her party' s share of the second vote. A negative vote gap means that the candidate did worse than her party, and a positive vote gap means that the candidate did better. Note that a candidate can have a negative vote gap and still win the seat (or a positive one and still lose).
Candidates with positive vote gaps may be winning 'personal votes' on the basis of their personal qualities and activities, as opposed to their partisan affiliation. Personal votes can arise because incumbents actively cultivate them through constituency service or by bringing government-funded projects to the district.14 There is evidence that German district representatives do engage in these kinds of personal vote-building activities.15 Personal votes may also arise if the candidate is simply exceptionally appropriate for the district, in terms of personal style, background, policy positions and priorities.
Personal votes are usually studied in countries where votes are cast for
12 Thomas Lancaster and W. David Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag', Comparative Political Studies, 22 (1990), 458-77; and Kathleen Bawn, 'Checks and Balances Without Gridlock?' in Bruce Cain and Roger Noll, eds, Constitutional Reform in California (Berkeley, Calif.: IGS Press 1995), pp. 129-62.
13 On the adoption of the electoral law, see James K. Pollock, German Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1958); U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Kathleen Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preferences:
German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89.
14 Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
15 Henry Bretton, 'Germany Today', in James K. Pollock, Germany Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 111-39; Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German System (Ithaca, NY: Corell University Press, 1967); Lancaster and Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics'; and Stephen Porter, 'First-Ballot Voting in Germany: Is There a Personal Vote?' (paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
MBt's.12 Indeed, this sort of argument was made in favour of the mixed system when it was adopted in 1949.13
These countervailing electoral incentives only exist, however, if the electorate is sophisticated enough to enforce them. Specifically, at least some voters need to be able to evaluate district candidates separately from their parties and to express those evaluations through their two votes. Does this happen?
Does the existence of districts lead to strategic effects? In particular, do voters react to the district races in ways that create different electoral incentives for the district and list MBt's?
PERSONAL VOTES AND RATIONAL TICKET SPLITTING: SOME HYPOTHESES
If voters react to district races, some will cast split tickets, giving their second vote to a different party from their first. We can examine split voting at the district level by defining candidate vote gap as the district candidate's share of first votes minus her party' s share of the second vote. A negative vote gap means that the candidate did worse than her party, and a positive vote gap means that the candidate did better. Note that a candidate can have a negative vote gap and still win the seat (or a positive one and still lose).
Candidates with positive vote gaps may be winning 'personal votes' on the basis of their personal qualities and activities, as opposed to their partisan affiliation. Personal votes can arise because incumbents actively cultivate them through constituency service or by bringing government-funded projects to the district.14 There is evidence that German district representatives do engage in these kinds of personal vote-building activities.15 Personal votes may also arise if the candidate is simply exceptionally appropriate for the district, in terms of personal style, background, policy positions and priorities.
Personal votes are usually studied in countries where votes are cast for
12 Thomas Lancaster and W. David Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag', Comparative Political Studies, 22 (1990), 458-77; and Kathleen Bawn, 'Checks and Balances Without Gridlock?' in Bruce Cain and Roger Noll, eds, Constitutional Reform in California (Berkeley, Calif.: IGS Press 1995), pp. 129-62.
13 On the adoption of the electoral law, see James K. Pollock, German Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1958); U. W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Peter Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); and Kathleen Bawn, 'The Logic of Institutional Preferences:
German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89.
14 Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
15 Henry Bretton, 'Germany Today', in James K. Pollock, Germany Democracy at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 111-39; Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German System (Ithaca, NY: Corell University Press, 1967); Lancaster and Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics'; and Stephen Porter, 'First-Ballot Voting in Germany: Is There a Personal Vote?' (paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
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