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SB34: Event Logs Don t Lie: Step-by-Step Security. Rick Simonds, Sage Data Security

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SB34: Event Logs Don’t Lie:

Step-by-Step Security

(2)

AGENDA

1. Learn best practices for event and audit log review.

2. Learn which devices to track and monitor.

3. Learn how to determine what information you need to review, and how

often to review it.

4. Learn the benefits of collecting, aggregating, and correlating event data to

help identify breaches and attacks as well as create a baseline for ‘normal’

activity.

5. Learn how to balance security compliance objectives and staff/resource

limitations.

(3)

The Threats

It’s no secret that information security is critical to business success. Even

the best networks are at risk.

Malicious attacks from unknown/unauthorized sources.

Unauthorized access to or against your systems from either internal or

external locations. These are not nuisance attacks. They are bonafide

criminal activity.

Malicious attacks from known/authorized sources. A significant

number of attacks are generated by “insiders”—authorized users, business

partners, and third-party service providers. Unfortunately, not all of these

individuals are trustworthy.

(4)

The Threats – Continued

Proxy attack scenarios. It is very common for an attacker to use

computers distributed throughout the world as “weapons”. This process is

transparent to the system owner. No one wants to have their computer

systems used this way. Having your computer systems used as part of a

larger threat certainly flies in the face of good corporate citizenry and can

cause major reputational damage.

Unintended breaches created from human error. Not all

threatening activity is malicious – sometimes, people just make mistakes

or are fooled into taking action.

Privacy and regulatory compliance violations. Many organizations

have a legal and a fiduciary obligation to safeguard protected information.

Violations however unintentional can have serious ramifications.

(5)

Logs Don’t Lie

Mining and monitoring the information generated by the logs of your network and

technology devices offers a wealth of information to help protect your organization. Each

log offers clues about hacking attempts or attacks as well as on innocent activities that

have unexpected - and possibly harmful - consequences.

Factual.

Event and audit logs created by network devices are accurate and unbiased.

Reliable.

Logs don’t take holidays or sick days.

Standard.

Logs report events and activity in a consistent manner.

Timely.

Logs document activity as they happen.

When properly implemented and analyzed, event and audit logs provide the information

and insight needed for proactive risk management.

(6)

Prioritization

An organization should define its requirements and goals for performing

logging and monitoring logs to include applicable laws, regulations, and

existing organizational policies.

Determining which devices are critical, and which information is

significant, is not a one-size-fits-all proposition.

Note: organizations should conduct an impact assessment of its network prior to establishing a log-capture

and -review program. Other considerations include: type of information to be logged, storage collection and

archiving storage requirements, analysis technique, and oversight responsibilities.

Minimum Security Log Device Category Recommendations:

Border Devices

such as firewalls, routers, IDS

Authentication Servers

such as Windows Active Directory Domain Controller,

Novell NDS Servers, Radius Servers

(7)

What to Look for?

Clues, Hints, and Observations

Firewalls

Unusual pattern or volume of internal and external “Common” traffic Unexpected types of traffic

Firewall administrator logons Firewall rule set changes

Firewall bandwidth and utilization

Authentication Server

User Activity: Invalid passwords, password changes, account lockouts, activity outside of normal times User Management: New accounts, changes to system rights and privileges

Group Management: Creation or deletion of groups, addition of users to high security groups

Computer Management: Policy changes (inc. audit policies), clearing audit logs, adding computer accounts, service resets, reboots

Web Servers

Entries that result in errors: i.e. 404 Page not Found, 403 Forbidden, 500 internal server error Hacking tools

Directory traversals SQL injection attempts Site mirroring

(8)

Log Output

Firewall

2007-07-24 07:00:15 Daemon.Notice 192.168.162.2 firewall.domain.com kernel [1304] 20166: Sending ICMP unreachable, IP Code=Unreachable (port), Source IP=71.19.166.11, Destination IP=64.69.119.75, IP Code=UDP, Source Port=32857, Destination Port=53, Interface=eth1 2007-07-24 07:00:15 Daemon.Error 192.168.162.2 firewall.domain.com Authentication [1447] 40463: An invalid user tried to login to the system using the SSH service. Original syslog message: [Firewall sshd[29132]: Failed password for invalid user admin from 222.68.195.14 port 36243 ssh2]2007-07-24 07:00:15 Daemon.Notice 192.168.162.2 firewall.domain.com kernel [1304] 20166: Sending ICMP unreachable, IP Code=Unreachable (host prohibited), Source IP=192.168.162.3, Destination IP=192.168.162.1, IP Code=UDP, Source Port=123, Destination Port=123, Interface=eth2

Windows Server

2007-09-19,2007-0914:31:27,SERVER06,529,16,"serviceacct01||4|Advapi|MICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0|SERVER-06"2007-09-19,2007-09-19 14:57:25,SERVER-15,632,8,"CN=Sam Horn,OU=Staff,DC=THISDOMAIN,DC=internal|%{S-1-5-21-997095950-1628968691-619646970-1081}|Domain Admins|THISDOMAIN|%{S-1-5-21-997095950-1628968691-619646970-512}|adminacct07|THISDOMAIN|(0x0-0x15A15028)|-"2007-09-19,2007-09-19 15:12:08,SERVER 09,529,16,"adminacct03|THISDOMAIN|10|User32|Negotiate|SERVER-09"

2007-09-19,2007-09-19 15:53:43,SERVER-23,576,8,"-|-|(0x0-0xB95337)|SeSecurityPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeEnableDelegationPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege"2007-09-19,2007-09-19

15:54:58,SERVER-16,529,16,"tcruise|OurCompany.com|8|Advapi|Negotiate|SERVER-44"2007-09-19,2007-09-19 16:02:56,SERVER-16,529,16,"tcruise|OurCompany.com|8|Advapi|Negotiate|SERVER-44"2007-09-19,20

Web Server

2007-05-30 01:27:38 192.168.154.5 HEAD /personal-banking/images/VISAgiftcardweb1206_000.jpg - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 406 2007-05-30 01:27:39 192.168.154.5 GET /business-banking/index.asp - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 200 2007-05-30 01:27:39 192.168.154.5 HEAD /business-banking/Images/nophishingwhitetag.gif - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 404 2007-05-30 01:27:39 192.168.154.5 GET /a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9/nonexistentfile.php - 80 - 219.149.232.60 2007-05-30 01:27:39 192.168.154.5 GET /adxmlrpc.php - 80 - 219.149.232.60 - 404 0 64 468 2007-05-30 01:27:40 192.168.154.5 GET /adserver/adxmlrpc.php - 80 - 219.149.232.60 - 404 0 64 468 2007-05-30 01:27:41 192.168.154.5 GET /phpAdsNew/adxmlrpc.php - 80 - 219.149.232.60 - 404 0 64 484 2007-05-30 01:27:41 192.168.154.5 HEAD /images-headers/Header_Business.jpg - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 406 2007-05-30 01:27:41 192.168.154.5 HEAD /business-banking/images/BusinessBankingweb.jpg - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 406

(9)

Raw Log Manipulation

Log parsing is extracting data from a log so that the parsed values can be used as input

for another logging process. A simple example of parsing is reading a text-based log file

that contains 10 comma-separated values per line and extracting the 10 values from each

line.

Event filtering is the suppression of log entries from analysis because their

characteristics indicate that they are unlikely to contain information of interest. For

example, duplicate entries and standard informational entries might be filtered because

they do not provide useful information to log analysts.

In event aggregation, similar entries are consolidated into a single entry containing a

count of the number of occurrences of the event. For example, a thousand entries that

each record part of a scan could be aggregated into a single entry that indicates how many

hosts were scanned.

Log conversion is parsing a log in one format and storing its entries in a second format.

For example, conversion could take data from a log stored in a database and save it in an

XML format in a text file.

In log normalization, each log data field is converted to a particular data representation and

categorized consistently. One of the most common uses of normalization is storing dates and times in a

single format. For example, one log generator might store the event time in a twelve-hour format

(2:34:56 P.M. EDT) categorized as Timestamp, while another log generator might store it in twenty-four

(14:34) format categorized as Event Time, with the time zone stored in different notation (-0400) in a

different field categorized as Time Zone.

(10)

Log Analysis

The meaning of an entry often depends upon the context surrounding it.

Correlation ties individual log entries together based on related information.

Sequencing examines activity based on patterns.

Trend analysis identifies activity over time that in isolation may appear

normal.

Insight

While tools and scripts can be used in the process of preparing, correlating,

sequencing, and trending data, the final step in event and audit log

management requires the human touch.

Attention

Even the best report that synthesizes the most valuable information into a

concise format is worthless unless someone pays attention on a regular,

consistent basis.

(11)

Actionable Intelligence

While event log management is time-consuming, intricate, and challenging, the rewards are

great for those that mine the data and turn analysis into actionable intelligence.

From the 5/30/07 Web Server Log -scripted php scan

A device at 222.68.195.14, on a " ChinaNet Shanghai Province Network " network in China, generated

errors scanning the “domain”, “domain2”, and “domain3” web sites. This traffic appears to be a scan for

php-based vulnerabilities performed between 01:37:39 and 01:37:42 GMT on 05/30/2007

2007-05-30 01:27:38 192.168.154.5 HEAD /personal-banking/images/VISAgiftcardweb1206_000.jpg - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 406 2007-05-30 01:27:39 192.168.154.5 GET /business-banking/index.asp - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 200 2007-05-30 01:27:39 192.168.154.5 HEAD /business-banking/Images/nophishingwhitetag.gif - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 404 2007-05-30 01:27:39 192.168.154.5 GET /a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9/nonexistentfile.php - 80 - 222.68.195.14 2007-05-30 01:27:39 192.168.154.5 GET /adxmlrpc.php - 80 – 22.68.195.14 - 404 0 64 468 2007-05-30 01:27:40 192.168.154.5 GET /adserver/adxmlrpc.php - 80 - 222.68.195.14 - 404 0 64 468 2007-05-30 01:27:41 192.168.154.5 GET /phpAdsNew/adxmlrpc.php - 80 - 222.68.195.14.60 - 404 0 64 484 2007-05-30 01:27:41 192.168.154.5 HEAD /images-headers/Header_Business.jpg - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 406 2007-05-30 01:27:41 192.168.154.5 HEAD /business-banking/images/BusinessBankingweb.jpg - 80 - 66.131.70.243 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) - - 406

(12)

Actionable Intelligence

From the 7/23/07 Windows Log - user & group management activity

Administrative account “adminacct07” created account “Sam Horn”and added account to Security

Enabled Global Group "Domain Admins" on 07/23/2007

2007-07-23,2007-09723:31:27,SERVER06,529,16,"serviceacct01||4|Advapi|MICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0|SERV

ER-06, 2007-07-23, 14:57:25,SERVER-15,632,8

,"CN=Sam

Horn,OU=Staff,DC=THISDOMAIN,DC=internal|%{S-1-5-21-997095950-1628968691-619646970-1081}|Domain

Admins|THISDOMAIN|%{S-1-5-21-997095950-1628968691-619646970-512

}|

adminacct07|THISDOMAIN|(0x0-0x15A15028)|-"2007-09-19,2007-09-19 15:12:08,SERVER

09,529,16,"adminacct03|THISDOMAIN|10|User32|Negotiate|SERVER-09"

2007-07-23, 9 15:53:43,SERVER-23,576,8,"-|-|(0x0-0xB95337)|SeSecurityPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege

SeRestorePrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege

SeImpersonatePrivilege SeEnableDelegationPrivilege SeAuditPrivilege“29, 2007-07-23

15:54:58,SERVER-16,529,16,"tcruise|OurCompany.com|8|Advapi|Negotiate|SERVER-44"2007-07-23

16:02:56,SERVER-16,529,16,"tcruise|OurCompany.com|8|Advapi|Negotiate|SERVER-44"2007-07-23

From the 7/24/07 Firewall Log - brute force attack on SSH

A device at 222.68.195.14, on a “ChinaNet Shanghai Province Network” in China, attempted 1000 SSH

login using the credentials SamHorn against the firewall on 7/24/07. All login attempts failed.

2007-07-24 07:00:15 Daemon.Notice 192.168.162.2 firewall.domain.com kernel [1304] 20166: Sending ICMP

unreachable, IP Code=Unreachable (port), Source IP=71.19.166.11, Destination IP=64.69.119.75, IP Code=UDP, Source

Port=32857, Destination Port=53, Interface=eth1 2007-07-24 07:00:15 Daemon.Error 192.168.162.2 firewall.domain.com

Authentication [1447] 40463: An invalid user tried to login to the system using the SSH service. Original syslog

message: [Firewall sshd[29132]: Failed password for invalid user SamHornfrom 222.68.195.14 port 36243 ssh2]

2007-07-24 07:00:15 Daemon.Notice 192.168.162.2 firewall.domain.com kernel [1304] 20166: Sending ICMP

unreachable, IP Code=Unreachable (host prohibited), Source IP=192.168.162.3, Destination IP=192.168.162.1, IP

Code=UDP, Source Port=123, Destination Port=123, Interface=eth2

(13)

Compliance Requirements

Monitoring and reviewing activity is a

core

component of every

information security regulation and law.

Gramm Leach Bliley (GLBA)

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA)

Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)

Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DDS)

(14)

The Challenge

Time & Resources

Consistency

Complexity

Knowledge base

Customization

Independence

(15)

Demo - Culling Information from

Raw Logs

1. The Raw Log

2. Parsing the Logs

3. Filtering the Events

4. Event Aggregation

5. Log Conversion

6. Log Normalization

(16)

Tools and Methods to Make Log

Review Manageable

1. “Free” resource kit tools

2. Third-party vendor products

3. “In-house” programming

4. Outsourcing

References

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