Special
Forces
David
Miller
§
PUBLISHED
BY S \I \ M \\ 1)1 R l((i(JK SLIMITED
I ii\DO
NA Salamander Book
Published by Salamander Books Limited
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THE AUTHOR
David Miller is a former British Army officer,who spent most ofhis service in the Far East,Central Europe,and the Falkland Islands.He subsequently worked as a freelance author and then spent three years as a journalist with Jane's Information Group,where he was a staffer on International Defense Review,before producing the first edition ofJane's Major Surface Warships. He is now a freelance author once again,writing on a wide variety of defense subjects.He has contributed to
many international military journals and has had some 35 books published.
ADDITIONAL CAPTIONS
Jacket front: USArmy Ranger, a member ofan elite unit trained to conduct a Page I:Black-clad specialforces with respirator masks typify the deliberately variety ofmissions in arctic,mountain,jungle,urban, and amphibiouswarfare. formidable appearance ofsuch international units on a counter-terrorist
training mission.
Jacket back:Top,Land Rover Multi-RoleCombatVehicle,specially designed for
rapid-reaction forces. Bottom left,amember ofSpain's Grupo Especial de Pages 2-3:Soldiers ofthe French Army ler RPIMA (Regiment de Parachutistes Operaciones (GEO) preparing tofire during abseiling.Bottomright, French d'lnfantene de Marine) storm a houseduring training for hostage rescue, special forces trooper armed withsilenced sub-machine gun. Pages 4-5:Members of Canada's 300-strongJointTask Force 2
counter-terrorist unit. Endpapers: Dutch Marines race ashore underrealistic-looking fire during a
training exercise. This elite unit is an important element ofNATO's amphibious
Foreword
Page
6
Introduction
Page
8
Part
I:
Special
Forces
Page
14
Part
2:
Operations
Page 74
Part
3:
Weapons
&
Equipment
Page
I10
Foreword
This
is not the firstbook
that hasbeen
writtenabout
the elite forces that exist in variouscountries
throughout
the world.However,
thishighly
researched
and
authoritativevolume
iscertainly
one
of themost
definitive of its kindwritten to date,
and
most
likely will remain so forthe foreseeable future.
The
authors havecompiled
an extensive presentation oforganizationsthat have
often
been
exaggerated,misunderstood
or
misrepresented.
The
establishment of elite forces has greatlyincreased since the
end
ofWorld
War
II-
a factrecognized
and
documented
bythisbook,There
aremany
reasonsfor thisgrowth,among
them:
•
Improvements
in the sophisticationand
lethality of
weapons
and
thequantum jump
inthe
complete
spectrum
ofconducting
conventional warfare,
concomitant
with theincreased costs required to
man
and
equipsizable
modern
forces.•The
recognition bymany
nations that a highlytrained, truly professional force,
committed
in atimely
and
judicious manner, could possiblydeter an aggressor. This has the
added
benefitof preventing the
commitment
ofmuch
largerconventional forces at a latertime.
• Recognitionthat a
requirement
existsto haveahighly trained organization that can rapidly
respond
to terroristthreatsor
acts.Many
nationsrecognize therequirement
to form,organize, equip, train
and
support
elite or specialoperations forces in
peacetime
so that they canoperate,
when
directed todo
so,inall phases ofpre-conflict
and
conflict.They
must
be prepared toconduct
operationsduring this period of"violentpeace,"
and
theymust
also be ready to
conduct
theirwartime
missionswithout
having to take the time for extensivetraining after conflict starts,as
was
the case duringWorld
War
II.Many
of the requirements are discussed in thisbook
which
differentiate elite forcesfrom
conventional forces. This is as it should be since
selection
and
training are so criticallyimportant
tothe successful
performance
ofany
elite unit.Personnel in these units are for the
most
partvolunteers
who
undergo
some
form
of selectionprocess
which
greatly tests individual physical ability,stamina
and
the capabilityto planand
operateunder
great mental
and
physical strain,In
most
organizations, this selection processserves as an
assessment
system
which
helpsdetermine
whether
individualsmeasure up
to thestandards of the organization.Infact,it isduringthis
initial selection process thatthose
who
aren't likelyto
meet
those standards are separatedfrom
theunit.
Some
organizations,when
not selecting certain individuals within their ranks (forwhatever
reason)return
them
to their parent unit or toanother
organization, usuallya
support
type,with high praiseand
asmuch good
will as possible.This isdone
toensure
that non-acceptable volunteersdo
not
poison the recruiting well
throughout
the regularformations.
Those
who
do
go forward
are language-trained,area-oriented forces capable of providing sustained
assistance to individual countries.This isvital to any
nation
whose
national policy it is to assist inobtaining
or
preservingfreedom.
Many
nations control their elite forces at thehighest national levels, and,
when
committing
them
externally,they call
upon
them
toperform
strategic missions.Some
forcesare controlledand
supported
by operational
commanders,
while othersmay
becommitted independent
of the conventional force chain ofcommand.
Whatever
themode
ofcommitment,
thereexistsin all phases of special operations the
need
forextensive planning so that psychological
and
deception operations are an integral part of the
overall operation
whenever
possible. I believe thatsome
ofthemost
important factors in planningand
conducting these kinds of operations are the
need
fortimely,accurate intelligence
and
good
security.The
authors havedone
exceptional researchon
the various elite forces.
While
some
information isreadily available
from
open
sources in theWestern
countries,the
Communist
nations have notbeen
asopen
with information in this area. Despite thislimitation, the authors have
produced
awork
thatshould be indispensable for the practitioner
and
student of elite forces
and
special operationsorganizations,
I predict that
anyone
associated with specialoperations, terrorism
or
counterterrorism
willwelcome
thisbook
and
use it as a referencemany
times.
by
Robert
C. Kingston,
General Kingston enlisted in the
US
Army
in 1948 and hascommanded
aplatoon,acompany,abattalion,
two
brigadesandspecialoperations forcesintwo
conflicts.
He
wears 16 battle stars and also earned theCombat
Infantry Badge (twoawards); theMasterParachutistBadge(US);RangerTab; Gliderman Badge;Korean ParachutistBadge;Parachute
Wing
(UK);Cambodian
Parachutist Badge;Vietnamese jumpmaster Badge;Vietnamese RangerBadge;and 12 overseasbars.
His special operations experience includes atour in Korea as
commanding
officer, Far EastCommand
Special Mission Group.He
was
executive officer ofthe Ranger Mountain
Camp,
Dahlonega, Georgia (1954-55). In 1960-1961, heserved as the exchange airborne officer with the 16th Independent Parachute
Group, UK.
General Kingston
was
also senior advisor to the Vietnamese RangerCommand
(1966)andcommander
ofthe 3rdSpecial ForcesGroup
(Airborne),1stSpecial Forces,Fort Bragg,North Carolina.
InJanuary 1973,General Kingston assumed
command
ofthejoint Casualty Resolution Center,Nakhon
Phanom,Thailand,InOctober
1975,hebecame
commander
oftheUS
Army
John F.Kennedy
Center for MilitaryAssistanceand the
US Army
Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg,The
general pinned on his fourth starand assumedcommand
ofthe United States CentralCommand,
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida,on I January, 1983.He
retired fromSpecial Forces
INTRODUCTION
Above:The traditional image of terrorist attacks is a hijacked
airliner burning on a Middle East airfield.Constant vigilance
and firm action by governments and airlines has reduced the prevalence ofsuch attacks but the threat is ever-present.
There
HASalways been afascination with the exploits ofuniformed warriorswho
dashdeep into
enemy
territory,create utter havoc and, having successfully completed themission,return to
camp
to prepare foryetanother foray. It isthe stufffrom which legendsprings.
Even so, these warriors
—
usuallymembers
of special or unconventional militaryformations
—
areviewedwithskepticalambivalence.When
they are successful,acertainauraofglamor attaches to that success;
when
they are not—
particularlywhen
the failure ispublicized
—
opprobriumcomes
all too swiftly.Make
nomistakeaboutit:thereisan inherentdistrustof secretor "special" operationsandthose associated withthem,particularlyinopen and democratic societies.Itisadistrust
thatrunsdeep and whichcauses the fortunes ofeliteorspecial forces to
wax
andwane."Elite" and "special" are simply ways to describe unconventional or supreme and
paramilitary formations.
Other
labels that have been applied,with various relevance, arecommando,
paratrooper, irregular, guerrilla, even "cowboy," or simply—
and perhapsmore
embracing
—
special operations forces.Whatever
the choice of designation,however, theseforces have always had an importantrole toplay in their nations' defenseforces,and their historical legacy is particularlyrich.
The
Roman
legions,forexample,were
denied success byirregularAfrican forces usingcamels and arrows.
They
were
also thwarted in Great Britain by the guerrilla tactics ofafemale warrior
named
Boedicia. In America the sharpshootingMinutemen
played an undeniably significant role in theoutcome
of the Revolutionary War. GeneralGeorge
Washington'sfamous crossing of the Delawareon Christmas Evejustpriorto theBattle of
Trenton
was
a specialoperation.And
inBritain,what
we now know
astheSpecialAir Service(SAS) had its genesis in
North
Africa in 1941,where
it performed daring raids behindGerman
linesduringWorld
War
II.Thatundeniablyelite andspecialforce performedjustasspectacularfeatstowardtheendofthe 20th Century, notably alongsideAmerican Deltaand
otherspecialforces intheIraqi desertin 1991,and,undoubtedly,inthe trouble-tornBalkans.
Todayitisinfluentialinthetraining,actualandby example,of
many
eliteunitstheworldover.Without a war, the argument went, there was no mission. Marry to that the distrust of special forces, as well asthe uneasytolerance accorded
them
by the regular forces,and it'seasy tosee
why
eliteforcesseemed
to be approachingtheir nadir.But the missionfor specialforces can nevertrulygo awayforoneverybasicreason.They
areand mustbe an integral part ofany nation's defense forcesand,as such,will always have
arole in defending the sovereign.These forces are
now
stronger than they ever were,and the reasonsfor this are both practical and historical.In the 1960s,a netherworld existed in which a state ofneither "true peace" nor "true
war" developed. Itfeatured so-called "wars of national liberation" characterized by conflict
inwhichthepostwarprocessofdecolonization playeditselfout.Bythe 1970s,thesepostwar
spasms
were
over inAfrica,East Asia,and the Middle Eastand hands previously atthe tillerofrevolutionary
movements were
now
firmly onthe reinsofpower.But that did not
mean
thatthe use of upheaval and instability had been abandoned. Farfrom it. In fact, the distorted and grotesque outrages of terrorism, state-sponsored and
otherwise, plagued theglobe.Asaninstrumentof nationalwill,this highlydangeroussituation
represented a
more
deliberatetype of conflictwith severeconsequencesforthesecurityofmany
nations, largeand small.In the past 30 years, conflict in one form or another has led to violent changes of
government in
many
countries.Duringthe ColdWar
therewere
many
conflicts—
some
ofthem,like theVietnam War, on a large scale
—
but the need to avoid global conflictresultedinavarietyofpressures to localizetheirimpact.
With
the endingofthe Cold War,however,and,in particular,with the demise ofthe Soviet Union and the emergence ofthe United
Statesas the only
—
andfrequentlyreluctant—
Superpower,suchconstraints havebeen liftedand conflictsofonesort oranothercontinue unabated.
In the
words
ofone observer, "WorldWar
III has already begun and...is comprised of brush-fireconflicts,assassinations,terroristbombings, coups,revolutions,andcivil strife."The
prophetic views of
George
Orwellcome
pretty closeto the mark.War
may
not be peace, he claimed, but the peace of our time has assumedsome
unmistakably warlikeAbove left:In the never-ending
war againstterrorists,the consequences of lapses of
vigilance are severe and
instantaneous,as the United
States discovered when its Beirut
Embassy was seriously damaged
by a lorry-bomb in 1983.
Above: Typically clad Beirut street fighters man a barricade, wearing USwebbing but carrying Russian Kalashnikov
Special Forces
Below:Virtually every country
now hasits special operations
forces.These are from Argentina's Halcon, formed in
1986.Like a numberofsuch
forces, it isa police unit,
answering directly tothe police chiefin BuonesAyres.It is responsible forcounter-terrorist duties andVIPprotection.
Thatisunlikelytochange inthe nearfuture. Just as intheGulfin 1991,and in Kosova in
1999,the early decades ofthe 21st Century
seem
certain to bearwitness to an increasingnumber
ofsituations requiring responses short offull mobilization to address.There is noclean and easy
way
to categorize these crises and the types of conflict they represent.However,it isclearthatterrorism and whathas beendubbed "lowintensity conflict"(along
with its I940s-style disgraceful "ethnic cleansing" characteristics), and special operations
need to be consideredtogether.
Nobody
has devised a universallyappropriatedefinitionof"low intensity conflict," although an understanding of
what
it represents is critical to understandingspecial and eliteforces and their roles.One
definition claims that low intensity conflict is a political-military confrontationbewteen contending states or groups below the level ofconventional
war
and above theroutine, peaceful competition
among
states. It involves protracted struggles ofcompetingprinciplesand ideologiesand rangesfrom subversion to the use of
armed
force. Itiswaged
by a combination of
means
employing political, economic, informational, and militaryinstruments.Such conflictsare often local in nature,but contain regional andglobalsecurity implications.Acceptingthis definition,imperfectthoughit
may
be, at leastprovidesaworkingframework
inwhich toputlow intensityconflict.The
spectrumofpotential conflictrangesfromterrorismthrough mid-and high-intensityconflict,readilyrecognizedsince theyinvolvetheapplicationofconventional militarypower, to strategicnuclear warfare.Terrorism,properlyidentified as aform of warfare,cuts across the entirespectrum.So,too,can eliteand specialforces be employed anywhereacross the spectrum.
But even the
most
eliteofspecialforcescandealwith onlya smallportionofthethreatsposedby subversion,internationalcriminality,and terrorism. Thisis
why more
ofthese forceshave
come
into being;itiswhy
nationsarecooperatinginframingstrategiestodealwith theproblems of conflict; it is
why
there is increasing recognition that terrorism is a form ofconflict thatmust be
met
by forcesspeciallytrained forthe counter-terrorist mission.There are literally hundreds ofspecial and elite formations in existence
—
some
with atheir missions,are relatively easy to identify, explain,and describe in
some
detail.Most
oftheseunitsoperateinopensocieties
—
theFrench ForeignLegion,andtheSpecialAir Serviceunitsin Britain,Australia,and
New
Zealand areexamples.In
some
cases,the mission of an eliteforce isstrictly military in character—
liketheUS
Army
Rangers,andtheiroperation inGrenadain 1983.Inothercases,the mission isstrictlycounter-terrorist,such as that ofthe
German
GSG
9 and the FrenchGIGN.
In yet othercases,however, the
two
missions are combined in one force,such aswith the BritishSAS
andAmericanDelta.
Units such as Italy's
COMSUBIN
are charged with military responsibilities first andcounter-terroristactivitysecond
—
unless that mission is reversed inthe national interest.Itwould beblatantlypresumptuoustoclaim thatone has
come
upwithacomprehensiveguide to elite and special forces.To begin with,there is no accepted definition of
what
aneliteforcetrulyisbeyondthefactthat
—
generally—
ithasaquite differentmissionfromthatofa conventional force. Moreover,these units are constantly beingformed, disbanded,and
realigned to
meet
individual circumstances. Bulking large in the overall equation is thesecurity factor; for
some
time questions aboutAmerica's premiercounter-terroristspecial force.Delta,received thestandardreply,"Deltaisanairline,"and becausewhat
was
probablythe
most
famous BritishSAS
operation,the IranianEmbassySiegein 1980,wasplayedoutinfrontofthe world's
TV
cameras,itis quite understandablethatthere hasbeen areluctanceon the part of the authorities to provide information to the media lest future special
operations
become
compromised.This
book
isdivided intothreemainsections,whichdescribe, respectively,thespecialandeliteforces,
some
ofthe majoroperationsinwhichthey have beeninvolved,and aselection of their weapons. It must be appreciated that this coverage cannot, by definition, becomprehensive.
Some
elite units are so secret that even their very existence is totallyunknown
to the general public,whileanumber
of operations, even by acknowledged units,remain highlyclassified.Similarly,
some weapons
andtechniques are secret in orderthatanelite unitcan achievetactical surpriseoverits opponents.
Fourmajorpoints
emerge
fromthisstudy.The
firstisthat,astheGulfWar
conclusivelydemonstrated, special forces have a firm place in conventional war. In such conflicts,their
ability to operate clandestinely in the enemy's rear enables
them
to attack targets whichAbove:An Italian COMSUBIN
trooper with the highly specialized H&K PII underwater
pistol.The 5-round weapon is
electrically operated, with power
provided bytwo 24-volt
batteries.Out ofwater the
weapon has asimilar effect to
Special Forces
I
I
1
r
Above:A defining moment in
counter-terrorist warfare was the
British SAS attack on the Iranian Embassyin Londonto
rescue hostages;only one
terrorist survivedto tell the
tale.This eventwas widely
shown on TV,serving notice that
terrorists wouldbe treated with the same violencethat they
meted outto their victims.
cannotbe reached by any othermeans,and to exert an influence outofall proportion to
theactual
numbers
deployed.Secondly,elite forces involved in the counter-terrorist missionface a unique challenge.
Their successes dissuadetheir opponents fromtrying again, leadingto long periodswithout
action, making it harder to maintain the essential high degree oftraining and readiness. In
addition,protracted periodsofapparentinactivityresultingovernmentfinanciers startingto question the large expenditure necessary,sometimes even resulting in cutbacks.It is then
thattheterrorists strike again,often using
some
totallynew
technique.Thirdly,thereisa highdegreeoflateral cooperationbetweenspecialforces,rangingfrom
exchanging information,through conducting jointexercises and the exchange ofpersonnel
to takingpartineach other'soperations.
Finally,the great majority ofspecialforcestraditionallyfindtheirrecruitsfrom elsewhere
in their country's
armed
forces.This ensures that their operators have experience of thearmed
forces asa whole andare aknown
quantitywhen
they startthe selection process.However,therapiddown-sizing of
most
militaryforcessincetheend oftheColdWar
means
thatthesize ofthe pool from whichsuch volunteers can befound isalso diminishing.
As
thisbook
will show,elite units have a very important taskinmodern
society,theirvalue lying not just in their capability in conventional warfare, but also in the clandestine
world ofcounter-terrorism,
where
they must be ready tomeet
any threatat anytime. Inaddition,while
most
counter-terrorist forcesareconfined totheirnational homelands,some
others, like those of the
USA,
UK,
France,and Israel,may
be committed anywhere in the world.Itisadauntingchallenge.12
Special
Forces
inthe
Balkan
War, 1999
SpecialForcesoftheNATOAlliancecountrieswerecalled intoactionin early 1999 as war erupted in the Balkans in Europe, when
Serbian forcespursueda two-prongedcampaignof forcinghundreds
ofthousandsof ethnicAlbanians fromthe neighboring province of
Kosovo and engagingina brutaloffensiveagainsttherebel Kosovo
LiberationArmy(KLA).
Serbia's hard-manPresident Slobodan Milosevicignored NATO's
repeated threats thatitwoulduse forceifSerbiafailed tocomplywith United Nations' requirements for internal self-government for the ethnic-Albanian provinceofKosovo andtoagreetothedeploymentof
an international, NATO-provided monitoring force to supervize implementation.TheBalkanWar (NATOdesignation-OperationAllied Force)waslaunchedduringMarch,with NATOairforcesandmissiles strikingSerbianairdefenseassets,includingmissilebases,radars,and command/control centers. NATO's political leaders proclaimed that
theirintentionwastoconductthecampaignentirelyfromtheair,and
thrustthousands offighter,ground attack, bomber, reconnaissance,
and electronicwarfare aircraftintotheconflict.Cruisemissileswere
alsolaunchedfromUSaircraftandsurfacewarships,and fromBritish
andUSsubmarines.
Theairstrikeshadconsiderableinitialeffect,butitrapidlybecame
clearthatairpoweralonewould notsuffice.Thecapabilities ofthe attackaircraftwerelimitedbyanumberof factors.First,sinceaircrew
safety was considered vital, there was a need to avoid
shoulder-launchedairdefensemissileswhichtheSerbswereknownto possess,
which meantthat they had to bomb fromover 10,000ft (3,000m).
However,the RulesofEngagement(RoE) stipulated thatpilotshadto identify targets positively, a factor which assumed even greater
importance when it was realized thata massive exodus of
ethnic-Albanian refugees was under way. This problem was further complicated by thebad weather over the Balkans,especiallyclouds,
whichmadetarget acquisitionandactualattacksdifficultor,attimes,
even impossible.Then, even when the weatherwas clear, the hilly
terrainoverlarge partsofKosovomadetarget acquisitiondifficult.
So,ashad happenedinthe GulfWar, itquicklybecameapparent
thatspecialoperations forceswereessentialtothe resolution ofsome
of these problems and it was not long before it was publicly
acknowledged that, although their activities had been shrouded in
secrecy, special forces had actually deployed,
some of them almost certainly inside Kosovo.
Such forceswere based in neighboring Albania
and the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of
Macedonia,withfurtherbasesacross the Adriatic
inItaly.
Amongthefirstspecialforcestobeemployed
werepersonnelandaircraftoftheUSAirForce's 1stSpecialOperationsWing(1 SOW)which had deployed beforethe start ofthe operation and wereabletoswing intoactionwhena USAF F-117A
"
stealth"fighterbomberwasshotdownby
SAMsover Bosniaearlyinthecampaign. Among
those involved in the totally successful pilot
rescue operationwere HH-53H PaveLow III and
MH-60Khelicopters,bothspecificallydesignedfor
such missions.
Otherspecialforcesdeployed includedunits
»
of varying sizes and capabilities from France,Germany, Norway, and the UK, although there
maywellhavebeenothers.Frenchspecialforces
intheBalkans includedelementsof13thAirborne
Dragoon Regiment, Marine Infantry, and parachutists, while the
Britishsentinelementsofthe SAS.
Itwas reported that British and American special forces were working undercoverin Kosovowith theKosovo LiberationArmyto
identifySerbian targetsforNATObombingraids.SASsoldiersfluentin
AlbanianandSerbianweresaid tohaveskirtedminefieldsandSerbian
patrols around the devastated villages along Kosovo's borderswith Albaniaand Macedoniato entertheKosovo provinceonsurveillance missions. TheirmissionwassaidtobetolocateandreportonSerbian
tanks, command posts, and patrols hidden in the villages. One
unconfirmedreportstated that80SASsoldiershad beensentdeepinto
KosovototargetSerbian"deathsquads."
Apart from observation, surveillance, and rescuing downed
aircrew, a primary role of the special forces in the region was as forward air controllers (FAC) using the latest range of laser target markers,someofthemspecificallydesignedforuse byspecial forces.
Oneparticular role(again,asinthe GulfWar)wastolocateanddestroy Serb ground communicationssystems, particularlythose using metal cables or fiber optics, which cannot be intercepted by signals
intelligencemeans.
As this was being written, Milosevic had capitulated to NATO
pressure and,afterprotracted negotiation, pulledhisSerb forces outof
Kosovo. NATO forces under K-FOR entered Kosovo to return the province to orderandtosafeguard the returningKosovoAlbanians.The
role ofthe special forces remained crucial, andtheir mission could
include:
• snatching warcriminals, including Milosevicand the Bosnian-Serb "General" RadkoMlavic,whowasidentified inKosovo in
April 1999, and possibly also thevillainous Zeljko Raznatovic
(also knownas "Arkan") whohad formeda paramilitary unit calledthe "Tigers" which hadreportedlybeen involved inthe
most murderousethnic cleansing operations against theMuslims
in Bosnia and Croatia in 1991/92, and who was said to be
preparing tobecomeinvolvedinKosovoin1999;
•rescue ofNATOpersonneland any hostagestaken by the Serbs;
• direct action,andadvisoryroles,byNATOspecialforceswith the
KosovoLiberationArmy.
AsNATOforcesweretrying to keepthe retreating Serbsandthe
KLAapart,attemptingtodisarm thelatter,andsystematically clearing the province of unexploded munitions, Serb-laid mines, and booby
traps, there taskwillbedifficultandtheirdeployment,andthatofthe
special forces,couldlastfordecades.
Men of the US Army's Special Operations Forces undergo rigorous training
to be ready for all-terrain,all-weather operations worldwide.It has been
reported that US S0F,together with otherNATO special forces,have operated in Serbia and Kosovo.
Special Forces
Part
1i
I
Special
Forces
Most
countries have at least one "elite" unit in theirarmed
forces, although there are various types of elite.
Some
are selected andtrained foraspecial role,forwhich conventional troopsdo not have either the special
weapons
or training needed.Other
elites are given a special designation earned by a particularlymeritorious performance in battle and are then expected to set an
example which other elements should follow; thus, for example, the
designation "guards" used by the British and Russian armies,
among
others.
Other
elitesare formed onan ethnic ortribal basis,ofwhich the bestknown
are the Gurkhas.Two
well-known elites are formed byunitsofforeigners:theFrench Foreign Legionand the Spanish Legion.
However,itisworth notingthatbothcontainasubstantial proportion
ofFrenchmen and Spaniards, respectively.
The
majority of special units are, however, associated with counteringmodern
terrorism, and there have beentwo
events of great significance in this area,both ofwhich attracted hugepublicity. Firstwas
the 1972 Munich OlympicGames
when
terroristskidnappedsome
members
of the Israeli team and then forced theGerman
authoritiesto provide
them
withtransport toanearbyairfieldwhere
a rescue attempt by the
German
police and troops resulted inconsiderable loss of-life.This gave the public the impression that terrorists would,
one
way
or another, achieve their goal,but it alsospurredgovernments,
armed
forcesandpolice intoseeking ananswertothis increasinglypowerful threat.This resulted in the settingup of
a
number
oftotallynew
eliteforces(eg,theGerman
GSG
9) orinthere-rolingofexisting units(eg,theBritishSAS).Itshouldbenoted,also,
that
some
countries decided toplacethis roleon theircivilianforces,ratheron their military forces.
The
secondsignificanteventwas
the Britishassaultby theSAS
ontheterroristsoccupying theIranian EmbassyinLondon.Thisalso took
place in thefullglare ofpublicity but, unlike
many
earlieroperations,it
was
totally successful, thus not only demonstrating the value ofspecial units but also givinggovernments and the public
some
hopethat terroristscould bebeaten.
Many
special forces, particularly those with a counter-terroristrole, are shrouded in secrecy and little is
known
aboutsome
unitsexcept that they exist: indeed, there must be other units
whose
existence istotallyunknown.This isfor security reasons ifno other,
andto maintain theirsurpriseand shock elementsoftheir actions.
An assault team ofthe BrazilianArmy's 1stSpecial Forces Battalion about torush a building during a training exercise.In the absence ofactual emergencies,it is amajor task ofall
special forces to keep theirunits trained in operations and use ofweapons so that they will
Special Forces
Argentina
Brigada
Especial
Operativa
Halcon
©
m
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Australia
Above:Australian SAS trooper
comingin toland usinga
Ram-Air parachute which enables
silentand extremely precise
landings to bemade. Note pack
under his feet.
Argentina's
principal anti-terrorist unit is the Brigada Especial Operativa Halcon (=Special Operations Brigade - Falcon),which
was
formed in 1986. It is a police unitanswering directly to the
commander
ofthe police in the national capital, BuonesAyres.Apartfrom counter-terroristduties,it isalso responsibleforVIPprotection.
BrigadaHalcon hasa strength of75 men,
who
are organizedintofive 15-manteams.The
teams are identically organized, with 8 troopers and 7 specialists: communications - I;
explosives- I;intelligence- I;negotiator- I;medical
-
I;and snipers-2.The
unitwears locally manufactured uniforms and protective gear.Weapons
are mostlyforeignand includeGlock 17 andthe Franchi SPAS 12shotgun.
The
snipers use theHeckler&
KochHK
G3
GS/I.Special Air
Service
Regiment
Australian
troopsplayeda significantroleinthe MalayanEmergency,thefightagainsttheCommunist
insurgents which lasted from 1949 to 1961. During that campaign theBritish re-formed their SpecialAir Service (it had been disbanded after
World
War
II) fordeep-jungleoperationsandtheAustralian
Army
usedthisasamodelwhen
itformeditsfirstspecialforcesunit, 1stSpecialAir Service
Company,
onJuly I 1957.With
the termination ofthe Malayan campaign,however, the
SAS
Company
was
absorbed into the regular infantry(RoyalAustralianRegiment[RAR]), but separatedagainin 1964 and expandedto
become
theSpecial Air Service Regiment (SASR) with three "Sabre" squadrons. Sub-units of the
SASR
took part in Indonesia's Konfrontasi (= confrontation) campaign in Borneo, Brunei, and
Sarawak in the early 1960s,and then also took part, with otherAustralian troops,in the
Vietnam War,between 1966and 1971.
Following disengagementfromVietnam one squadron ofthe
SASR was
disbanded, butaterrorist
bomb
attackontheSydney Hiltonon February 13 1978showed
thatAustraliawasnot
immune
to such activities and on February 23 theSASR was
formally designated thenationalcounter-terroristunit.To help
meet
thenew
tasksthethirdsquadronwas
reformedin 1982andsincethen,whileotherelementsoftheAustralianDefense Forces havebeencut
back,the
SASR
has remained virtuallyuntouched.Recent operations have included the Gulf
War
when
oneSASR
squadron (110men)
deployed to Kuwait in February-May 1991
where
it joined with 23men
from theNew
Zealand
SAS
toformtheANZAC
SAS
Squadron,whichwaspart ofajointforcewith Britishand
US
specialforces.Another deploymentwas
to Somalia,where
a 10-manclose-protectiongroupfrom the
SASR
formed partofthe 67-strong Australian Contingent.As
of 1999Australian special forcescomprised:• SpecialAir Service Regiment (SASR), consisting of 1,2,and 3 "Sabre" Squadrons, 152
(SASR) SignalSquadron.
• 1st
Commando
Regiment (ICdo
Regt),consisting of I and 2Commandos
and 126(Commando)
Signal Squadron.These are reserve units,consistingofmainly reservistswith asmall regular cadre.
•4th Royal Australian Regiment,
Commando
(4RAR
Cdo)
(fourcompanies),includingan airplatoon.
•
Navy
ClearanceDivingBranch
(two regularandone
reserve clearancediver teams).In addition,eachstate andthe capitalterritory(Canberra) hasa counter-terroristforce,
known
variously as "specialoperationsgroups"or"emergency response teams."Organization
SASR
is approximately 550 strong,with its main base at Campbell Barracks,Swanbourne,Western
Australia,and comprises a Regimental Headquarters(RHQ)
and six squadrons.There are three "Sabre" squadrons, which operate a thee-year training/operational cycle,
startingwith a work-upyear, duringwhich volunteers are inducted and
more
experiencedsoldiers attend advanced courses.
The
second year sees the squadron training for overtcommitments,including special operations in a conventional war,while in the third year it
trains for clandestine tasks, and forms the counter-terroristTacticalAssault
Group
(TAG)(see below). BaseSquadron providesadministrative and logisticsupport, while Operational
Support Squadron is responsible for specialist training and trials of
new
techniques andequipment.
The
highly specialized communications needed by such aforce are provided bym
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Z
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Tasks
In peace-time the SASR's main task is counter-terrorism, which is being given special
emphasis in the run-up toand during theOlympic
Games,
beingheld in Sydneyin theyear2000.Prime responsibilityforcounter-terrorism lieswith theTacticalAssault
Group
(ie.the"Sabre" squadron in the third year of its operational cycle).
The
enemy
could include assassins, bombers, hijackers, kidnappers, or snipers.Tasks to be performed against suchtargets couldinclude the neutralization and/or capture ofindividuals orgroupsonthe land
orat sea;the neutralization ofhostile aircraft or ships;the safe recovery of hostages;and
evicting terrorists from buildings, installations, ships or aircraft which they
may
have captured.Such tasks could take placeanywhere in continentalAustraliaor overseaswhere
an Australian interestis involved.
Counter-terrorismtraining includesCloseQuarterBattle
(CQB)
tactics,explosiveentryusing frame orwater charges,tubular assaults as in vehicles, buses,trains,aircraftand high
rise structures, and
room
and building clearance operations.The
OffshoreAssaultTeam
(OAT) ispartofthe
TAG
and is responsiblefor similar tasks,butat sea,where
theterroristincident could involve ships, or gas/oil platforms, ofwhich there are appreciable
numbers
aroundthe Australian coastline.
The
SASR
istrained incounter-insurgencyoperationswhich providestroopers with theskills necessary to recruitindigenous people in wartimesuchas the
SASR
did inBorneo
tohelp
them
gather information abouttheenemy
orto helpthem
fighttheenemy.TheSASR
istrained inSoutheast Asian languages,customs andtraditionsandhas
many
Southeast Asian experts in the regiment.Inconventionalwar,
most
oftheSASR'staskswill beintheenemy's rear areas,andwouldinclude reconnaissance and surveillance, as well asambushes,sabotage,raids on important
targets (eg,
HQs,
airfields,communicationscenters),and targetdesignation forair strikes.The
SASR works
and trains in close liaison with US, British,andNew
Zealand special forces. Since 1992 there has also been considerable, and politicallymore
controversial,contact with the Indonesian special forces, Kopassus, which has included annual special forces'exercises intheother's country.
Uniforms
and
Equipment
SASR
parade,workingand fielduniforms are thesame
as thoseofthe AustralianArmy,but with asand-colored beret,cap-badge and wings similarto thoseworn
by the British SAS.Special uniforms (eg,black coveralls)are
worn
according to thetactical situation.Equipmentincludes thewhole range ofnormalAustralian
weapons
and equipment,butwith
some
specialistequipmentaccording to the role.Forexamplethenormal rifleiseitherthe
M
16A3
orthe F88Austeyr (locally manufactured version ofthe SteyrAUG),
but couldinclude Ta'as 7.62Galil,
H&K
PSG
I,Parker Hale 82,FinnishTikka Finlander.223,Mauser SP66,or
SR98
AccuracyInternationalAW-F
sniperrifles,orBeretta orRemington shotguns.For road transportspeciallymodifiedNissanPatrol4-wheel drive vehiclesareused,while
mostairinsertionsaredonebyhelicopter, usually naval
UH-60
SeaHawks
orCH-3
Seakings,or
Army UH-60
BlackHawks
orCH-47
Chinooks.Above:An SASR trooperadopts a nonchalant pose,as he pauses
for a drink atop a pmnade in
the Australian Stirling Range; getting the laden pack up must
have been quite a struggle.Note the 7.62mm Self-Loading Rifle (SLR).
Top;All special forces' selection
courses are rigorous, butfew
more so than for these aspiring
members ofAustralia's tough
SpecialAir Service Regiment
Special Forces
Austria
</>H
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r-£
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50 ftAbove:GEK operatorwith Steyr
SSG69 5.56mm rifle, an Austrian
weapon provingvery popular with
specialforces aroundthe world.
Belgium
Below: Belgian ESI troopers storm a bus duringa hostage-rescue exerciseat an "anti-terrorist workshop"hosted by
Italy'sGIS (see p.34).Asthe
fireteam (right) brings the bus
underfire,the assault team
(left) comes into action from a
Range Rover,with ladders being extracted for use inentering the target vehicle.
Gendarmerieeinsatzkommando
Cobra
n
the late 1960s and early 1970s therewas
a wave of terrorist incidents,particularly in Europe, with the small,neutral country of Austria beingparticularly badly affected.At thattime Jewish refugeeswere
being allowed to leave the Soviet Union but theywere
not permitted totraveldirecttotheirultimate destinations (usually,eitherIsrael orthe
USA)
and the great majority stagedthrough Austria.Thisled to several Palestinian terrorist operations which resulted in the Austrian
government
ordering the formation in 1973 ofGendarmeriekommando
BadVoslau (BadVoslauwas
thename
oftheunit's base).It
was
puton high alertduringseveral crises,oncewhen
terrorists seized hostages but
were
allowed to leave,and on anotheroccasion
when
the international terrorist, Carlos Sanchez, seized severalOPEC
oilministerswho
were
meetinginVienna, butwaspaid a multi-million dollarransom and givenapassageout of the country.The
Israeli rescue mission at Entebbe and theGerman
GSG
9assault on the airlinerat Mogadishu
showed
that determined actionbywell-trainedand properlyequipped
men
couldovercome
even themost
fanatical terrorists. This led to a restructuring ofGendarmeriekommando
Bad Voslau in 1978 and thenew
unitwas
redesignatedGendarmerieeinsatzkommando (GEK) (= police
commando
unit) "Cobra."The
GEK's firstcommander,
Oberst Pechter, established close ties with other counter-terrorist units,including,
among
others,the Israeli Sayeret Mat'kaland the(then)West
German
GSG
9.Escadron
Special
d'Intervention
(ESI)Like
many
other European nations,Belgiumwas
shocked by theterrorist attack on the1972Munich Olympic
Games
intoformingitsown
counter-terroristunit as partoftheGendarmerie Royale.Atfirst this
was
given the cover-name "Diane" but although thiswas
changed toEscadron Speciald'Intervention (ESI) in l974.The
name
"Diane" continues to beusedunofficially.
ESI'sprimary missioniscounter-terroristoperations, butitisalsoused tofightorganized crime,particularly
where
thecriminalsarearmed, and anti-narcoticswork.VolunteersfortheESI must undergoa
two-week
selection process, followingwhichthey attend athree-monthcourse.
The
ESIalso has an amphibiouscapability.Weapons
used include the Heckler&
KochMP5
sub-machine gun.Remington 12-gauge shotguns and theSakoTRG-21
7.62mm
sniperrifle.Para
Commando
Brigade
The
Belgian Army's elite military unit is thePara-Commando
Brigade.Separate parachuteand
commando
unitswere
formed by the Belgiangovernment-in-exilein Britainduring
World
War
II,and continued in existence afterthe war. In 1952
they
were
amalgamated into thePara-Commando
Regiment,whichcontinued inexistenceuntil 1991
when, in the reorganization and realignment
followingtheendoftheCold War,
new
unitswere
added, enabling the regiment to be upgraded to the
Para-Commando
Brigade.The
brigade, whichhas a peacetime strength of about 3,000,
comprises:
I
NFANTRY
1st
and
3rd Parachute Battalions and the 2ndCommando
Battalion, eachsome
500 strong(despite thedifferenttitlesall three are organized
• Reconnaissance:3rd Lancers Parachutists Battalion
•Artillery:
Para-Commando
FieldArtillery Battery,35thPara-Commando
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery.•Support:Engineer, Logisticsand Medical Companies.
The Para-Commando
Brigade is part of Belgium's contribution toNATO's
Immediateand Rapid Reaction Forces,butalso takespartin national and United Nations missions.
Selection
and
Training
All
members
ofthe brigade are volunteers and afterathorough medical examination theymust attend a five-month
commando
course.On
graduation they are entitled towear thecommando
badge.They
then proceed on aone-month
parachute course, which involvesseven jumps,which must include at least oneballoon jump,one nightjump,one from a
C-130aircraft and one with full equipment.To remain current every
member
ofthe brigademustcarry out fourjumps everyyear.
During
World
War
II the BelgianArmy
raised anSAS
Regiment,which was an integralpart ofthe British
SAS
Brigade.The
BelgianSAS
was reducedto battalionsize until theearlyI950s,
when
it converted to a conventional parachute battalion.The
present 1st ParachuteBattalionis directlydescended from thisunitandwearsthe
SAS
Daggerasitscap-badge, but with the paratroopers' red beret.>
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r-£
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The
Belgian
Navy
he Belgian
Navy
operates a small frogman section,which is believed to be about30-men
strongand similarin organization and trainingtothe British SBS.Brazil
Left:Special forces' troopers of Brazil's/Batalhoode
Forcas Especialsundergoing
training in fightingin built-up
areas.One man is spraying chemical smoke into aman-hole, which provides access to an undergroundsewage system,in
order to flush outterrorists
sheltering there.
1st
Special
Forces
Battalion
The
firstBrazilian counter-terroristgroupwas formed in 1953 but the presentCT
unit, IstSpecial Forces Battalion,wasraised in I983.Incommon
withmany
other such units in otherarmies, / Batalhoo deForcas Especials (1stSpecial Forces Battalion)does notrecruitciviliansdirect,but takes volunteers onlyfrom otherunitsinthe
Army.The
selectionprocessisvery severe and is followed bya I3-weektraining course.
Other
Brazilian special forces units include:Grupo
de Mergulhadores deCombate
(GRUMEC)
(=combat
diversgroup).Comandos
Anfybios(COMANFI)
(=amphibiouscommandos).
Comandos
deReconhecimento
Terrestre(RECONTER)
(= land reconnaissancecommandos).
Grupos
de Operaces Especiais(GOE)
(= specialoperations groups).Special Forces
Canada
s?
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Below:A stick ofparatroopers descend from a Canadian Lockheed C-130,as a marker team awaits their arrival on the ground.The men belong toJoint
Task Force2,a new
organization,which was raised in
the mid-1990s as asuccessor to
the Canadian Airborne Regiment
(CAR),which had been disbanded.
Joint Task
Force
2The
present-dayCanadian
special operations forceis "JointTask Force 2" (JTF2),whichwas
formed inApril 1993. Formost
ofthe past 50 years special operationswere
theprerogative of the "Special Service Force," with counter-terrorist operations being the
responsibilityoftheRoyal Canadian
Mounted
Police's(RCMP)
Special Emergency ResponseTeam
(SERT).During
World
War
II therewere
two
CanadianArmy
airborne units: 1st CanadianParachute Battalion,raised at
Camp
ShilohintheUSA
in 1942;and 2ndParachute Battalion,formed laterin Canada.Following the
war
theCanadianparachuting capabilitywas reducedto cadrelevel until 1968,
when
itwas
expanded andtheCanadianAirborne Regiment(CAR)
was
formed,whichwas
intended to bea light,independent,all-arms unit fordeploymentinlow-intensity operations in jungle, desert or arctic warfare conditions.
The
capabilitywas
later expanded yet again with the formation of the Special Service Force,
whose
"teeth"elements comprised an
armored
battalion,an infantry battalion,theCAR,
plus artilleryandengineerbattalions,and communications andlogisticssupport.It alsoincludedthe Canadian
SAS,whichhad beenformed in 1946asacompany-sizedunit,closelymodeled ontheBritish
SAS.
The
CAR
was
disbandedinthemid-1990sas a resultofanenquiryintoactivitiesofsome
elements duringits participation in the
UN
operation in Somalia,and its threecomponent
companies
were
dispersed to form airborne companies in threeconventional infantry battalions.
JointTask Force 2(JTF2) isacounter-terroristunitonthe lines
of
US
Deltaand BritishSAS, withwhom
it maintainsclose contact.Volunteers can
come
onlyfrom those already within the CanadianForces (CF) andtheir tour lengthisnormally 4-5 years,although it is believed that it
may
also include people from other Canadiangovernment services
-
eg, Canadian Security Intelligence Service(CSIS). It is approximately 300 strong and is
commanded
by a lieutenant-colonel.Volunteer Standards
Volunteer standards are not normally specified,but the Canadian
Forces have
made
their requirements for JTF 2 public(CANFORGEN
078/97Adm(per)
05630I330Z
Jul 97) and theseare summarized below:
• Ranks: Volunteersmust be inthe ranks of:officers - captain only; soldiers - warrant officer, sergeant, master-corporal, corporal,
private.
• General qualifications: At least three years' service and
re-engaged forasecond three-year engagement; no
known
phobias(eg, fear of heights, water or enclosed spaces); a valid civilian
driving license; and a demonstrated wish and ability to learn a
second language.
• Physical requirements:
A
high standard ofmedical fitness and ademonstrated capability of: running 1.5 miles (2.5km) inside I I
minutes;40consecutive push-ups;fiveconsecutiveoverhandgrip,
straight-armpull-ups;40sit-upsin60seconds; 1431b(65kg)bench
press.
•
Commanding
Officer's recommendation:A
statement that thevolunteer has achieved allthe above requirementsplus ageneral
assessment of his suitability for special forces, in areas such as:
maturity,stability lifestyle,and financial.
• Preliminaryscreening: byaqualifiedJTF recruitingteam.
• Phase 3:
Those
passing Phase2 then participate in a three-weekcourse in whichtheir levels ofphysical fitness,
weapons
handling,andconfidence are improved, followingwhichtheyundergoa
one
week
assessmentofsuitabilityfor special forces. Officers have anadditional four-day assessment of their planning and leadership
skills.
Operations
It isnot
known
for certainwhere
andwhen
JTF2may
have been deployed,although press reports suggestthatelementswere
sent to (but not used in) Bosnia,andthat theunitwas
on stand-by for a possible operation in Peru during the Japanese Embassy hostage crisis
Grupo
de
Operaciones
Policiales
Especiales
Grupo
de Operaciones Policiales Especiales(GOPE)(=
Group
for Special PoliceOperations)
was
formedin 1980.Chileanpersonnelwereoriginallytrained byGerman
and Israeli instructorsand theunit is currentlybelievedto be approximately 100 strong.Its
principal task is to undertake military special forces/commando duties but it also has a
commitment
tosupporttheUAT
(seebelow)incounter-terroristoperationsingovernmentand diplomaticbuildings.
UnidadAnti-Terroristes (UAT)(=anti-terroristunit),also
known
as"Cobra," belongs tothe National Police Force. It is approximately 120 strong and is divided into seven-man
teams,each led by an officer.The unit is based justoutsideSantiago. MilitarySpecial Forces comprise
two
groups:BuzosTacticosdel Ejercito
(Army
SFcommandos).
BuzosTacticos de la
Armada
(NavySF commandos).Jaegerkorptset
Chile
Z
S
m
O
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s» SODenmark
Left:An observation post (OP)
manned by men ofthe Danish Jaegerkorptset (RangerCorps).
Faced
with agrowing
threat of international terrorism in the late 1950s,the DanishArmy
sent anumber
of officers to theUS
Ranger School and on attachment to theBritish SpecialAirServicein 1960/61.These officers
were
then used to raise anew
body,theJaegerkorptset(= RangerCorps),whichwastrained forcounter-terroristdutiesin support
oftheDanish police'sAktions-Styrken (Action Force) andforlong-rangepatroland sabotage
duties in conventionalwar.
The
Jaegerkorptset is based atAalborg inNorth
Jutland,andworks
and trains closelywith other special forces, particularly the British SAS. It also receives helicopter support from the British Royal Air Force and
German
Army,since the largest helicopter availablefrom Danish sources is the Hughes
MD-500
Weapons known
to be used include: pistols - SIG P-2107.65mm
"Neuhausen;"SMC
-H&K
MP5,H&K
MP53;rifles-H&K
G4
1;sniperrifle-H&K
PSG-1 7.62 sniper rifle.Froemandskorpset
(Frogman
Corps)
The
Royal Danish Navy's Froemandskorpsetwas
created in 1957 as part ofthe navaldiving school, but it
was
taken away andmade
directly subordinate to navalheadquarters in 1970.
The
unit's tasks include:beach reconnaissance; boarding suspectships;diving;underwaterdemolition;and ship underwater security.
The
unitwas deployed during the GulfWar
aboardships ofthe Royal DanishNavy
Special Forces
Egypt
Si 50n
m
Below:The aftermath ofarescue attempt thatwent wrong.This
EgyptairBoeing 737 was
hijacked to Malta,where it was
assaulted by Egypt's TF 777. Scorch marks show where the engineers blew a hole in the
roof,but they added so much
extra explosive as insurance that
some 20 passengers in the rear cabin were killed.A further 37 passengers were killed in the
mainassault.
Task
Force
777
Faced
with crediblethreatsfrom extremists suchas theAbu
Nidal Organization (which had splitfromthePLO
in 1974),EgyptestablishedTaskForce777in 1977,with an initialstrength ofthreeofficers,four
NCOs,
and40soldiers.They
received anearly baptismoffirein 1978
when
Arab terrorists,claimingto represent the PLO,killed an Egyptian newspapereditorin Nicosia,Cyprus,on February 19 1978,and thenseized 30hostages.TaskForce 777
went
into actionand killed theterroristsbutthen,dueto misunderstandingson the spotinwhichtheCypriots thoughtthe Egyptianswereactuallyreinforcementsfortheterrorists,an
attack by Cypriot National
Guard
and police resulted in the deaths of 15members ofTF
777.
The
incident resulted in a majorrow
between the governments,with the Egyptians accusing the Cypriots ofa lack ofcooperation and killingtheir troops,whilethe Cypriots accused the Egyptians offailing to informthem
of the arrival ofTask Force 777 and ofblatantlydisregardingtheir national sovereignty.
Unfortunately,evenworse
was
to follow in asecond operation inOctober
1985 inthe aftermath of theAchille Lauro hijackingwhen
Palestinians hijacked an Egyptair Boeing 737airliner.Flight648,andforced the pilottolandatLuqain Malta.Egyptpromptlyorderedthe despatch of Task Force777 and this timeensured thatthe Malteseauthorities
knew
thatitwas
on its way.The
operationwas
botched, however, probably due to pressure onthe
commander
ofTF
777 toeffect a very rapid solution.
Although
TF
777 did not haveaplan oftheinternal layoutof theBoeing737,eventhoughit
belonged to Egypt's
own
national airline, it
was
decidedto create a diversion by blowing a hole in the roof
which
would
distract theterrorists' attention, thus enablingthe main attacktogo
in through the doors.
The
explosivesteam got onto the
roof without being detected
by the terrorists.
Unfort-unately,they then added extra explosive to ensure success with the result that the blast
was
so violent thatsome
20passengers in the
rows
immediately beneath
were
killed.At this, the main attack
commenced
but theTF
777men
used high-explosive grenades and fired indiscriminately into the interiorofthecabin,while
some
ofthe passengerswho
did actuallygetoutoftheaircraftwere
then mistakenfor fleeingterroristsbyTF
777snipers outside theaircraftand severalwere
shot.The
resultofall these errors
was
that57 hostageswere
killed,making it oneofthemost
costly rescueoperations everundertaken.
Despite the failure of these
two
missions, however, itwas
clear that the Egyptianauthorities
were
determined to takeimmediate and forcefulaction against terroristsand itshould benoted thatthere hasbeenno majorairlinerhijackingincident since.Nevertheless, Task Force 777 has been kept busy by Egypt's internal
war
against the "Brotherhood" inwhichthey have undertaken
numerous
actionsand lostseveral men.Weapons
and
Equipment
Likeall such units,Task Force777 maintainsa"rapid reaction force" atvery short notice to
move,with furtherelementsatlongernotice.
The
unitissupportedbyanumber
ofdedicatedWestland
Commando
troop-carrying helicoptersat similardegrees ofnotice.Task Force 777 is
known
to have received trainingfromUS
special operations forces (Deltaand SEALs)as well asfrom Europeanforces, includingtheBritishSAS,FrenchGIGN,
FRANCE
HAS TRADITIONALLY createdelite groups within its
armed
forces and over the past 50 years thetwo
leading groups have been the Legion Etrangere (Foreign Legion) and /es paras
(the "paratroops"). There are also a
number
of"marine"units,whichdespitetheir
name
are not amphibious troopsas understood inAmerican and British
usage, but are elite units which in the
19th Century
were
raised specificallyfor overseas land service.
One
exampleis 6
er
Regiment de Parachutistes
d'lnfanterie de Marine (6th Parachute
Regiment of the Marine Infantry).
The
French
Armed
Forces are beingreducedinsizeand reorganizedaccording to Plan 2002.While this will have
some
effect onthesize ofthe Foreign Legion and the Paras,theywillbeaffected lessthan other parts ofthe army.The
French police counter-terrorist unit is the Groupe d'Intervention de la GendarmerieNationale (GIGN),
whose most
recent successwas
the rescueofhostages from a hijackedairlineratMarseille-Marignane airport in
December
1994.French military special forcesare underthe
command
ofCommandement
des Operations Speciales(COS)
(= Special OperationsCommand),
whichwas
formed afterthe 1991 GulfWar,andcomprisesunitsfrom Army,Navy,andAir Force.Itisanswerabledirectto the Chief
oftheJointStaff.
The
primaryArmy
special force is the Premier Regiment de Parachutistes d'lnfanterie deMarine (I
erRPIMa),which
issimilarin
most
respects to theBritishSAS.Thisisnotsurprising, since their traditionsstem from theFrenchSAS
unitsraisedin England duringWorld
War
II.Missions include counter-terrorist operations in conjunction with
GIGN
andRAID
(seebelow) and special operations in conventional war, similar to those conducted by the
US
SOFD-Delta
and the BritishSAS.Naval special forces are designated Groupement des Fusiliers-Marins
Commandos
(GROUFUMACO)(=
NavalCommando
Group) which iscomposed
of fourassault
commandos
(= teams or companies),plus a specialcommando
ofnageurs de combat (- underwater swimmers).Theirmissions andtactical methodologyare similar to those used by
US
SEALs and British SBS,with
whom
they havefrequent exchanges.The
GendarmerieNationale is a national paramilitary policeforce administered by the Ministry of Defense. This organization includesits
own
special forces, Groupement Speciale d'lntervention de laGendarmerie Nationale
(GSIGN)
(Special ActionGroup
of the National Gendarmerie), which has three company-sized components:Grouped'lntervention delaGendarmerieNationale (GIGN).
With
astrength of 87, the
GIGN
iscommanded
by acommandant
(major).
Groupe de Securite du Presidentde la Republique (GSPR) which is
responsiblefor thepersonal safety ofthepresident.
Escadron Parachuttste d'lntervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale
(EPIGN).
Above:Members ofthe French
GIGN attack asimulated target
in a specially adapted training house.A grenade hasbeen thrown into an understair cup-board by the man in the center,
while his two colleagues cover the doorway, ready to arrest or shoot anyone emerging. GIGN, part ofFrance's Gendarmerie
Nationale,is one ofthe most
professional ofall
counter-terrorist units,its mostrecent
known success being the rescue
of hostagesfrom a French
airliner at Marseille in 1994.
RAID
RAID
is a highly secretive group,formed in 1985, and appears to counter the generalpractice
among
elitecounter-terrorist forcesby recruitingdirectfrom thepublic,rather thanfromalready-trained soldiersorpolice.The
unithasastrengthof 60:headquartersandsupport- 10;special taskgroup(negotiators,explosivesdisposal, etc)- 10;fourassaultteams - 10 each.
The
normal operational uniform is a black coverall andmask
(hence theirnickname"BlackPanthers") andtheoperators are permitted to
make
personal selectionsofweaponry,either foreign or French.
The
selection testsarevery severeand arefollowed byanine-month training course.
Above:Marines of the French naval special forces
GROUFUMACO (Groupement de Fusiliers-Manns Commandos) coming ashore in an inflatable
dinghy.These men have similar roles to the US SEALs and
British SBS, with which they conduct frequent training.
Special Forces
Legion
Etrangere
n
The
Legion Etrangere (= Foreign Legion) forms a solid core of highly professionalsoldiers at the center of the French Army. In March 1988 the French government
announced the
outcome
of a thorough review of the nation's defense requirements,as aresultofwhich the
Army
isbeing reduced from 200,000to I36,000 (-47 percent).Of
this,however, the Legion's share of the cut isonly from 8,300 to 7,500 (-10percent),although Legion units will withdraw from
many
overseas bases.The
Legion continues to attract recruits,and according to current statistics the national origins of itsmanpower
can beroughlydividedinto:EasternEurope -one-third;Franceitself
-
one-third;andtherestoftheworld (103nations) -one-third.
Below: Foreign Legionnaires at
range practice with their
5.56mm FA MAS assault rifles.
The MAS is unusual in that itis normally fired using the built-in
bipod,which compels the firer to adopt a rather higher firing
position than with otherrifles.
Note the flash suppressorat the endof the barrel and the long carrying handle/sight protector, with the prominent cocking handle beneath.
Training
the
Legion
The
Legion is responsible for itsown
administration, including recruiting, recruit training,specialisttraining (eg,radio operators),
NCO
training,career management, and discharges.Toachievethis,there are
two
regiments:l
er
Regiment Etranger (IRE) (1st Foreign Legion Regiment). Located atCaserneVienot in
Aubagne, I
RE
isresponsibleforthe administrationofthewholeLegion.Italsoruns thebandandthe
museum,
and administers thelargetrainingcamp.Of
even greater importance, IREisthe seniorregiment of the Legionandthecustodian oftheLegion's traditionsand keeper
ofits relics.For the individual legionnaire,his servicebegins and endsatAubagne.
4erRegimentEtranger (4th Foreign Legion Regiment [4RE]).
4RE
is based atCastelnaudary,where
it isresponsiblefor recruitandNCO
training.The
Combat
Units
There arefive major
combat
units:2erRegimentEtrangerd'lnfanterie(2REI)(2nd Foreign Legion InfantryRegiment). Stationedat
Nimes, in France,2REI has had a very busy time. It
was
raised in 1841 and has served invirtuallyevery
one
ofFrance's colonial campaigns since then.3erRegimentEtrangerd'lnfanterie(3REI) (3rdForeign Legion Infantry Regiment) isstationed
at
Kourou
in French Guyana.Itspecializes injunglewarfare andconsists offour companies, although it is normally reinforced by a fifthcompany
from another Legion unit. 3REI iscomposed
oftwo
infantrycompanies,whose
basic responsibilityisthatofthesecurityofthe French missilelaunching site,plus an air defensecompany
and an administrativecompany.I er
RegimentEtrangerde Cavalerie (IREC) (1stForeign Legion Cavalry Regiment) is one of the