28redevelopment.pdf

28 Carolina planning

Redevelopment

After

The

Storm:

Hazard

Mitigation

Opportunities

and

Obstacles

in

the Post-Disaster Setting

Jane

L.

Hegenbarth

and David

J.

Brower

JaneL.Hegenbarthreceived herMasterofCityand Re-gional Planning from the University ofNorthCarolina

atChapel Hill in1984. She

iscurrentlyworkingasa Re-searchAssociateatthe

Cen-terforUrban and Regional StudiesinChapel Hill.

In theircogentanalysis ofthree coastal

communities

devastated by hurricanes,

Hegenbarth

and Brower

detailthe obstacles

and

consequences of

development

management

planning in disaster-prone areas.

The

summary

of findings presentedin thisarticle offerssurprisinginsight into the disincentives for "preemptive storm planning". Notably, severestorms can provide uniqueopportunities for developers

and

public recrea-tion offices incases

where

landhasbeen "naturally cleared"

and

thereby

made

available for

new

uses. These

case studies also illustratethe organizationalproblems

which

face

many

communities

in theirpost-disaster

response efforts.

DavidJ.Broweristhe

Asso-ciateDirector of theCenter for Urban and Regional Studies in Chapel Hill.

Browerhas extensive experi-enceincoastalplanningand

is currently President of Coastal Resources

Collabora-tive,a coastalplanning

con-sulting firm.

a lack of preparation

learningfromexperience

Over

600

communities on

theAtlantic

and

Gulf

coasts arevulnerable to the devastatingimpacts of severe hurricanes.

While

there are

many

communi-tiesatrisk, relatively

few

have experiencedthe

ma-jorrecovery

and

reconstruction processthatfollows a

major

storm.

Many

communities

areunprepared

for thepressing issues that willface a

community

afteradisaster. Thislack ofpre-stormplanning can

affecta

community's

abilitytorecoverquickly

and

smoothly shouldacoastal disaster occur.

With more

readilypredicted

community

disasters, suchas river-ine flooding, decision-makers can build

on

their

community'spast experiencetoplanfor

and

mitigate the impacts of future occurrences. Hurricanes,

on

the otherhand, have a

low

probability of striking

particular

communities

in

any

given year.

As

a re-sult, they

do

not provide a

good

base

from which

local officials

and

policymakers can"learn

from

ex-perience."

The

severityof ahurricane'seconomic

and

psychologicalimpact, furthermore,

demands

an

ex-aminationof thepost-disaster

and

reconstruction ef-fortsofhurricanestricken

communities from which

disaster planning techniques can be developed. Severe hurricanes destroy existing

development

soeffectivelythat they have beencalled"the purest

form

ofurbanrenewal."

Communities

oftenuse hur-ricanedemolition as a

means

ofaltering their

pre-storm developmentpatterns.

Development

is

moved

away

from hazardousareastoreduceprivateproperty

loss

and

tominimizethe

amount

ofpublic infrastruc-ture atrisk.

A

community

may

havetheopportunity

to acquire

prime

waterfront property

and

thereby

expand

itspublicbeachareas, alterundesirable

de-velopmenttrends

and

reconstruct severely

damaged

areas in

more

attractive

and

less vulnerable

ways

thanexisted previously.

While

adisaster

may

present opportunities for changing

development

patterns,

italsocreatesa

number

of pressures

on

the

commu-nity

which

may

work

against theenactmentof

de-velopment

management

policychanges. Inaneffort to betterunderstand thesepressures

and

obstacles

inthepost-storm reconstructionprocess, three

com-munities heavilyimpacted

by

recenthurricaneswere

studied as cases of

development

management.

The

threecommunitiesincluded:HarrisonCounty, Missis-sippi (Hurricane Camille, 1969); Gulf Shores,

Ala-bama

(HurricaneFredrick, 1979);

and

theGalveston

Bay

area(HurricaneAlicia, 1983).This article will brieflydiscusstheredevelopment

and

reconstruction trends observed in these communities.

Harrison County, Mississippi

HurricaneCamille,

which

battered theGulfcoast

in

August

1969, is

one

of

two

"category 5" storms

on

theSaffir-Simpsonscale everrecordedto strike theUnitedStates(category5 isthe

most

severe).

The

Thisarticleisbased

on

informationcollectedunder

NSF

Grant No.

CEE-8217U5,

Hurricane

Hazard

Re-duction through

Development Management.

Bob andJanetHelm, right, face offagainstCarolandNancy Cash inagameof cardsat theevacuation centersetup at WestBrunswick HighSchool

storm

had

asevenmile

wide

stormcenter,

winds

of

over 200 miles per hour,

and

a storm surge that

ranged

from

17-23feet inthe coastal

communities

ofHarrison County, Mississippi.Whileolderstately

homes

in the shelteredhigher areas

on

thecoast

sur-vived thestorm, almostallconstructioninthelower

lyinglands

was

destroyed.This included a "hurricane proof"house

which

was

totallydestroyed, killing the

owner and

the friends

who

had

sought shelterwith him.

Fourofthecommunities

most

severlyhit

by

Hur-ricane Camillewere in Harrison County. Gulfport andBiloxiare sizabletownsofalmost 50,000residents;

Long

Beach

and

Pass Christian are considerably smallerwith only6,000

and

3,000residents, respec-tively. These

communities

have been plagued

by

storm

damages

since theirfounding. After a

hurri-cane causedextensive

damage

tothebeach

highway

in1915, aseawall

was

constructedalongthe entire

length ofHarrison County's 26mileshoreline. Sub-sequent coastal storms

and

hurricanes caused the shorelineto erodedramatically. In 1951,

construc-tion

began

on

an artificial sand beach to act as a protective barrierfortheseawall

highway

and

low-lying development. Today, a costly annual beach nourishment

program

sustains the beach.

The

NationalFloodInsurance

Program

was

insti-tutedoneyear beforeHurricane Camillehit theGulf Coast. Unfortunately, at that time, therewere

no

communitiesyetparticipatingintheprogram.After the storm, the

Governor

ofMississippi established a

12-member

commission

—

the Governor's Emer-gencyCouncil

(GEO —

toactasatemporaryoverseer of long range regional development of the impacted

coastline. Thisrole

was

laterexpandedtoincludethe

coordination of Federal Disaster Relief efforts

when

President

Nixon

designated the

GEC

as the single

contactfor federalaid.Despitetheequal representa-tionof coastal residents

and

federaladministrators

on

the

GEC,

itspolicies

were

subjectto frequent

at-tack

and condemnation by

residents of these

ex-tremely conservative coastal communities.

The

lack of adequate flood insurance

was

a

pri-mary

factor in the slow reconstruction process of

hurricane-proofhomes

10 Carolina planning

community condemnation

a reluctanceto

redevelop

Seawall atGalvestonBay

Harrison County.

Many

property

owners

did not

everrebuild. Accordingtointerviewsconducted with

local realtorsduringthe

summer

of1984, landprices

fell dramatically after the storm. For

many

years

prices remained depressed. In the period

immedi-atelyfollowing the storm, development

was

concen-trated in the rural, upland area of the county.

To

this day, developers

and

local realtors admit that

theyareconsciousof thedangersofbuildinginthe

most

low-lyinglands.

There

has

been

ageneral

re-luctance to redevelop along the shoreline.

Biloxi

and

Gulfport

had

both adoptedabuilding

codea

number

ofyears before Camille.

As

part of the requirement for acceptance into the National FloodInsuranceProgram,theseBuilding

Codes

were strengthened

and

extended county-wide. General

confusionresulted

from

awaiverofthebuilding

per-mit procedures immediately following the storm,

severalroundsofrevisionstothe

new

code,

and

lack of compliance

on

the part of lending institutions

suchasFarmers

Home

Administration.

The

endresult

was

thatalarge(but

unknown)

number

ofbuildings

severely

damaged

by

thestorm throughout Harrison

County

werereconstructedwithoutconformingtothe

more

restrictive building code standards.

With

theinfluxof federal disasterrelief,thelarger

towns

usedthestormasan opportunityfor

down-town

revitalization.

The

most

severely

damaged

areas

were

rezonedfor

more

intenseuses. Forty-six

properties in the Biloxi

downtown

waterfront area

which

were completelydestroyed

by

thestormwere acquired

by

thetown.

The

land

was

usedfor a

sub-stantialurban renewal development.

Hazard

mitiga-tion

was

not, however,the

community

goalbehind

this post-storm property acquisition.

The

smaller

communities

of

Long Beach and

Pass Christiandidnot recoveraswellas their larger

coun-terparts. Biloxi

and

Gulfport

were

betterequipped

to handle thedisaster

and were

more

successful in

applying for grants to aid in their redevelopment. Today, hurricane hazard mitigationisa

primary

concern of planners in the Harrison

County

area.

Despite thisconcern, localdecision-makers remain

unsatisfiedwithpublicevacuationplans

and

public

education programs.

Long

range comprehensive planning has few supportersin thesecommunities.

Most

ofthecities'current

development

regulations, forexample,

were

federally

mandated

forinclusion

inthe NationalFlood Insurance

Program.

Thereis littlelocalinitiative tobolsterhazardmitigation pol-icies (Leyden 1985).

Gulf Shores,

Alabama

HurricaneFredrick,a category 4storm

on

the

Saf-fir-Simpson scale, struck the

Alabama

coastlinein

September

1979.Itsustained

winds

of130miles per

hour

and

caused an estimated $1.7 billion in

property

damage.

In Gulf Shores, about 30 miles

from

thestorm'slandfall,thefirst

two

tiersof water-front

development were

almost entirely destroyed

or so severely

damaged

that they could not be

re-paired.

The

main

beach

highway

was

breached in

a

number

of sections.

The

water

and

sewerlines

run-ning alongside the

highway

were

extensively

damaged.

Compared

to

many

coastal areas, Gulf Shores and

the surrounding

Baldwin

County

area

were

rela-tively

undeveloped

in 1979.

The

town had

only 2,000

permanent

residents, although this swelled

manyfold

inthe

summer

months.

The

Gulf Shores

area

had

beengrowing throughthe1960s

and

1970s

it

had

afewsmallmotels

and two

condominium

de-velopments. Singlefamily vacation

homes and

rental cottageswerethemost

common

typeof construction.

The

town

joined the regularphaseof theNational Flood Insurance

Program

in 1971. In that year a buildingcode

was

adoptedto

comply

withthe

mini-mum

program

requirements. Buildingsbuiltbefore 1971, however, were notbuiltto

any

minimum

ele-vationorstructuralrequirements. Stateorlocal

reg-ulation of shoreline

development

was

non-existent

and

many

buildingsweresitedtooclosetotheshore

tobe adequatelyprotectedeven

from

long-term ero-sion.

The

lack of a professionalplanningstaff

and

an unwieldy

zoning ordinance

compounded

the town's disaster preparedness problems.

After the storm, sixteen counties in the

Mobile

Bay and

FloridaPanhandleareaweredeclared a

Fed-eralDisasterArea.

FEMA

set

up

local disaster

assis-tance centers tocoordinatedisasterrelief activities. In Gulf Shores, federal funds

were

used fordebris

cleanup

and

removal,

and

for the restoration

and

repair of

damaged

public facilities. Eligible public

expenses includedpublicwater

and

sewerservices, roads, recreation

and

parkfacilities,

and

other

dam-aged public property such as public buildings.

The

community's

abilitytorecoverquickly

from

the storm's severeimpact

was

clearly relatedto the

generouslevel of financial

and

technical assistance

provided

by

FEMA.

There

were

frustrations ex-pressed, however, overthelack ofeffective

commu-nication

between

federal

and

local officials. Local

officialslackedthe

knowledge

and

experiencetodeal

withstrict, oftenunwieldyfederal regulations

and

federal bureaucratic channels.

The

firstaction thecitytookafterthestorm

was

to place a building

moratorium on

reconstruction

inthebeachareas.

The moratorium

lasteduntil

pub-licfacilitieswererestoredtothearea.

Minor

repairs

were

allowedwithout apermit, but

new

construc-tion

and

repairs to heavily

damaged

structures

needed building permits. Large

numbers

of

resi-dences built prior to the

minimum

elevation

and

buildingcode requirementswereheavily

damaged.

As

nonconforming

structures, they

were

required

to berebuilt to

FEMA

standards ifthe

damage

re-quired

improvements

offiftypercentor

more

than

theirpre-stormvalue.

As

might beexpected, inspec-torswere underconsiderable pressureto

underesti-mate

the

damages

to these structures, particularly

iftheir

owners

didnot have insurance tocover the

losses.

FEMA

used1362 fundstoacquirefivebeachfront parcelsadjacenttothetown's publicbeach

and

trans-ferred

them

to thecity. In addition,

FEMA

funded

the preparation of a supplemental building code

which

detailedappropriate construction techniques

forhigh hazardcoastalareas.

FEMA

also provided fundsfor aland use plan.

The

consultant hired to

prepare the plan, however,

worked

instead

on

the

more

immediate

problem

of revising the outdated zoningordinance.

Over two

yearsofreconstruction

and

development tookplace before these

became

ef-fective. Finally, in 1981, theBuilding

Code

supple-ment

was

passedand, in1982, thezoning ordinance

was approved

with revisions.

The

town's

economy and

municipal budget

recov-eredquicklyfrom thestorm."Freddy,"as the residents refer tothestorm, ispartly creditedwith initiatinga lucrative

development

boom

which began

while

re-construction

was

stillunderway.Localrealtors

sug-gest that

development

pressure

had

been

growing

in theGulf Shoresarea

and

that thestorm created

an excellent opportunityfor developers to acquire

beachfrontproperty withtheolder structures con-veniently removed.

Numerous

property owners,

many

who

werereceivingflood insurance

payments

for theirdestroyedbuildings, apparently couldnot

resist offers for their vacant land at ten to twenty

times itsoriginal value. Inthe

two

years following the storm, the

town

issued 77 permits for

multi-family developments.

Many

of the units were

lo-cated in the Gulf front area.

The

paceof

development

sparkedpublic protest

over the lack ofaesthetic

and

environmental

con-trols assigned to beachfront building.

Minimum

sideyardsetbackregulations, forexample, were suc-cessfully

added

tothezoning ordinance

when

it

be-came

increasinglyapparent that continuedlot-line to lot-line building

was

blocking the

view

of the

Gulf.Despitetheirdisdainfor privateproperty

regu-lations, Gulf Shores decision-makers

became

in-creasingly receptive to

development

management

measures as the pace

and

density of

development

reached overbearing levels. Recent

problems

with

poor

waterquality

and

aninabilitytoprovidewater

serviceata rateequalto

demand

has

added

tolocal interest in

development management.

Galveston Bay, Texas

Galveston, Texas is located

on

a barrier island twenty-eight mileslong

and

one-half tothreemiles

wide. Itisimmediately southofGalveston

Bay

and

revisions tothe code

disaster-inspiredurban renewal

unwieldy bureaucracy

32 Carolinaplanning

a malignedhistory

comprehensive intergovernmental approaches

non-structural mitigation techniques

increasingevacuation awareness

the

Houston

Metropolitanarea.

The

cityhasa long

history of storm disasters. In 1900, a very severe

stormkilled

more

than 6,000people.Followingthis

storm, the

town

was

rebuilt, elevatedwith fill,

and

a massive seawall

was

constructed in front of the

cityforprotection against future storms. After

suc-cessivestorms,

and

as thecityexpanded, theseawall

was

strengthened

and

extended to its current 9.7 mile length

and

fifteen footheight. Inthiscentury, hurricanes have struck theTexas coast an average

ofevery

two and

a half years. GalvestonIsland, in particular, hasbeenhit

by

eight severe storms

pre-ceedingAlicia (1900, 1915, 1919, 1933, 1942, 1961, 1967,

and

1970).

Giventhecity'smalignedhistory, itisnot

surpris-ingthattheareahasahighdegree of hurricane haz-ard awareness. Unfortunately,

government

response

to these storm hazards has been oriented to im-proved barriers

and improved

evacuation plans

rather than loss prevention efforts.

The

state is

known

foritslargestructural protection

works and

its

comprehensive

hurricaneevacuation

and

educa-tionprogram.

The

useofplanningtechniquesto

re-duce the

amount

of property at risk

from

storm

damage,

however,

has not

been

seriously

considered.

HurricaneAliciastrucktheTexas coast

on

August

17, 1983.

The

eye of thestorm passedjustsouthof

GalvestonIsland. It

was

a

medium

sizestormwith

winds

up

to 115miles per hour,

and

a stormsurge of 6 to 10feet.

The

land protected

by

the seawall

was

theonlyarea

on

theislandthatescaped

flood-ing.

The

structuresbehinditsufferedonlymoderate

wind

and

rain

damage.

Low

lyingareasdid not en-joy such protection, however. In thenorth

end

of the bay, a twelvefoot storm surge

from

Galveston

Bay

destroyed300

homes

inthe

Brownwood

subdi-vision of

Bay

town.

Throughout

the island, over 1000singlefamily

homes

weredestroyed

and

an

ad-ditional6,700received

major

damage

(McCloy and

Huffman

1985).

Intheaftermathof thestorm, a1362 acquisition project

was

suggested

by

the

FEMA

Interagency

Hazard

Mitigation

Team

fortheGalveston

Bay

area

(FEMA

1983a).

The

teams

were

establishedto

pro-mote

acomprehensive,intergovernmentalapproach

tofloodhazardmitigationduringthepost-flood

re-coveryprocess.

Under

theguidelinesof theprogram,

the

FEMA

regional director appoints a

team

of

FEMA

experts, keyfederal agencyrepresentatives,

and

state

and

localrepresentativestostudy

mitiga-tion strategiesforlocalareas. Specifically, the team's

recommendations

are to emphasizenon-structural mitigationmeasures,

and

tobetter ensure that the variousfederalagenciesinvolvedinpost-disaster aid

emphasize

mitigation of future flood damages. In

arecentarticle

on

DisasterRecovery

and Hazard

Mi-tigation,

Rubin

(1985) indicatedthattheteamshave

had

asignificant effect

on

theidentification

and

im-plementationofmitigationmeasuresatthe city

and

county levels after a

major

flood-related disaster.

The

Team

issues

two

reports: (1) theInteragency

Flood

Hazard

Mitigation Report,

which

isreleased

fifteendaysafterthe disasterwithitssuggestionsfor

post-flood mitigation measures,

and

(2) the

Inter-agencyPost-FloodRecovery Progress Report, released

90 daysafter the disaster which details progress

on

eachofthe originalmitigation proposals(see

FEMA

1983a, 1983b).

The

Hazard

Mitigation

Team

follow-ing Aliciasuggested a

number

ofnon-structural

mi-tigation techniques, including a land acquisition project for the

Brownwood

area.

For Galveston Island, the report suggested that

thecity prepare a comprehensive land use plan to

guide

development

on

the largely vacant west

end

of the island. It

was

argued that this plan should

takeaccountof theenvironmental needsof the

bar-rierislandsystem

by

using carrying capacity

prin-ciples.

Those

long rangeplanning

recommendations

were

thesuggestions ofhazardmitigationplanning

experts

who

observedtherecovery process

and

vol-unteered asparticipants

on

the

Hazard

Mitigation Team.

The

remaining

recommendations

forthe

Gal-veston area centered

on improvements

tothe build-ing code, increasbuild-inglocalevacuation awareness,

and

holdingseminarsfor localbuilders

on

hurricane re-sistentconstruction.

The

Hazard

MitigationTeam's

recommendations

wereadvisory,

and had no

financ-ingorenforcement power.Accordingtosection406

of the Disaster Relief Act

which

authorized the teams, longtermimplementationofthe team's sug-gestionsare the responsibility of the affectedstates.

Another change

in federal policy since1980

in-volvesthesizeofthereimbursement allowance

from

FederalDisasterRelief.Today, the

FDR

willreimburse

localcommunitiesforonlyseventy-five percent oftheir eligible expenses; local or state government are

re-sponsible for theremainder. Thispolicy

was

espe-cially

burdensome

fortheCity ofGalvestonbecause ofa locally

mandated

cap

on

budget increases

and

thelargeproportionoftax-exempt property within

the city.

After the storm, Galvestonadopteda three

week

west

end

oftheisland.

The

prohibitiondid not ap-plytostructuresthat onlyneeded

minor

repairsor

forstructures

landward

of the

main

beach highway.

The

moratorium

was

extended for

two

more

weeks

forproperty that

was between

the beach

highway

and

the Gulf

which

included

most

of the

V

zones

where

the

damage

was

heaviest.

The

storm

had

erodedthebeachfrontpropertyandshiftedthe vege-tation line as

much

as 200 feet landward.

The

ex-tendedmoratorium

was

requestedbythe Statebecause theTexas

Open

BeachesActstipulatesthatthe

pub-licbeachextends

from

the water'sedgetothe

vegeta-tionline. Afterthislarge

landward

shift,

hundreds

of

homes

weresituated

on

property

which

theState

AttorneyGeneralclaimed

was

public,

and

rebuilding

was

prohibitedifstructures

were

more

than50 per-cent

damaged.

Inaddition tothebuildingmoratorium, the city

created aRecovery TaskForce.

The

TaskForce

was

comprisedof a

number

of subcommitteescovering a range of concerns

from

insurance

problems

to

building code modifications.

The

subcommittees were mainlystaffed

by

community

leaders

and

citi-zens

who

volunteeredtheirexpertisetohelp the

re-covery process.

The

work

of the Task Forceseems

tohaveserved a

number

ofimportantfunctions: 1)

itdiverted pressure

away

from

the

overworked

city

council; 2) itprovided anexcellent

mechanism

for

channellinglocalexpertise(suchas architects, build-ers, mental health experts) into the policy-making

arena;

and

3) it provided the

community

with a

much

needed sense that their issues

and

concerns were being addressed

and

thatthecity

government

was

responsive

and

organizeddespitethe post-disas-ter confusion.

The

most

effective subcommittees

were

those thataddressedimmediaterecovery con-cerns such as insurance problems, or short term housing needs.

The

longer-range subcommittees

(suchas

one

forredevelopment of the west

end

of theisland)werelesseffective inproducing

substan-tiverecommendations;

members

indicated that inter-est flaggedinthe

months

followingthestormasthe

most

pressing

community

issues

were

resolved. Sixteen

months

afterHurricaneAlicia, thestorm

was

creditedwithinitiating

economic

revitalization

of theseawall-tourist area.

Many

of the hotelsalong

thestrip

were

badlyinneedofremodeling,

and

the

conventionbusiness

had

beendecreasing in recent

years.

Although

protected

from

thestormsurge

by

the seawall,

most

ofthemotels

and

hotelsreceived extensive

wind and

rain

damage.

Insurance

pay-ments provided remodeling

and

refurbishingcapital.

Galveston, in a continued attempt to bolster its

property taxbase, is

now

encouraginghigher

den-sity

developments

on

the west

end

of the island

through tax-increment financing.

The

financing

scheme

uses the increasedpropertytaxes

which

re-sult

from

the

new

developmenttofinance the

devel-opment'sinfrastructurecosts. Thereareninezones

inGalveston: seveninareasunprotectedbythecity's

seawall;

two on

theeast

end

of theisland, inan ac-cretingbeachareainfront oftheprotectiveseawall;

and

five

on

thelow-lyingwestendof theisland

(He-genbarth 1985b).

the value of task force

decision-making

ChipTaylor of CarolinaBeachhashisdaughter,Kelli, allwrapped

upastheywait tosee ifthey can return home.

'..] _{Carolinaplanning}

economic revitalization

reduce future vunerability

returningto normalcy

lenientdamage

assessment

Discussion

Each

of the

community

experiences discussed

above

isa unique situation.

The

cities are of vary-ingsizes, indifferentstates, withdifferent

economic

trends

and

community

values.

The

recovery

and

re-construction experiences

were

heavily influenced

by

the current

forms

of federal disaster assistance. In thismanner, the

communities

represent a

chrono-logicalsketch ofchangingfederaldisasterrelief

pol-icy:before the

NFIP

and

FEMA;

withthe

NFIP

and

early

FEMA;

and

with the NFIP,

FEMA,

and

the

new

Interagency

Hazard

Mitigation

Team.

Never-theless, therearea

number

of reconstruction trends

and

similarities within these communities.

One

of the

most

obviousisthedesireof the

com-munity

torecover

and

reconstructasquickly as

pos-sible inan attempt to return tonormalcy.

Haas

et al(1977), inthe

landmark

pieceReconstruction

Fol-lowingDisaster, statesthatduringthereconstruction period, "[t]hecentral issues

and

decisions arevalue choicesthat givevarying emphasis totheearly

re-turntonormalcy, thereductionoffuture

vulnerabil-ity, or to opportunities for

improved

efficiency, equity,

and

amenity." After a storm,

some

repairs willbegin immediately,suchasthoseto publicwater

and

sewer, electricity,

and

theroadsystem. Unless plans have been

made

preceding thestorm to relo-cateor redesign thesefacilities, thesenseofurgency

toreplacethese

may

precludehazardmitigation

op-portunities, asevidencedinGulfShores.Thissense of urgency also affects residential reconstruction.

Homeowners

living in

temporary

housing

want

to repair their

homes

and

move

backinas

soon

as

pos-sible.

Haas mentions

that the strongest pressure of

allfora

prompt

returnto

normalcy

comes from

the existence of impacted

and

displaced families

and

businesses,

and

addsthatthesepressures

do

not cre-ateapositiveenvironmentfor orderly,well-planned

reconstruction processes.

These

pressures

were

particularly felt

by

those

members

ofthe

community

who

were

inpositions

to either speed ordelay the reconstruction period. Building Inspectors in both Galveston

and

Gulf Shoresfelt strong pressuresto belenientin issuing buildingpermitstoallowrebuilding.This

was most

intense

when

thebuilding

was non-conforming

to

currentcodes,

and

heavily

damaged.

InGulfShores, structures

damaged more

than 50 percent

by law

had

to

conform

tothe

new

buildingcode

and

NFIP

elevation requirements,

which

could have

added

substantiallyto the reconstruction costs of a

non-conforming

building. Particularly

when

the

home-owner

did not have insurance to cover the losses,

much

lessthecost ofrebuildingtohigher standards,

officialsfeltseverepressuretobelenientwith

neigh-bors

who

had

"suffered

enough

already." InTexas, the

Open

Beaches Act prohibiting reconstruction

was

onlyappliedtostructures

more

than50percent

damaged,

but sympatheticlocalinspectorsgenerally issued rebuilding permits to structures

which had

any

exterior walls remaining. Policies set in place before adisasterregardingthesedecisions

and

specify-ingexplicit criteria

would

help easethediscretionary pressure felt

by

local officials. In addition, bringing

intemporary inspectionofficials

would

helpreduce themassive

workload

increase,

and

non-members

of the

community would

beableto

make

politically difficult decisions

more

objectively.

In addition to thepsychological stressescreated

duringtheinitialrecovery

and

reconstructionperiod

which

may

work

against

new

hazard reducing

de-velopment

policies, the storm

may

also produce

some

long-term

community

perceptions that could

work

asobstacles to the enactment of

new

hazard

mitigation policies.

A

post-storm perception

ex-pressedinall three

communities

was

that

damages

were

a function of substandard construction.

In-deed, allthe

communities

had

large

numbers

of

se-verely

damaged homes

which

wereconstructed prior

tobuildingcode

and

elevationrequirements. Build-ingcodes, elevationrequirements,

and

hurricane re-sistentconstructionwill, of course, helpreducethe

level of

damages

but asthe hurricane-proofhouse

in Harrison

County

dramatically illustrated, they

shouldnotbe regardedasapanaceaforsafe

shore-line development.

InGalveston

and

Gulf Shores, itispossible that thenewerrequirementsforbuildingcodes

and

mini-mum

elevationsareperceivedashaving

had

a signif-icant effect

on

reducingstorm damages. Attitudes expressedininterviews, however, indicate thatthese

may

have

had

the detrimental effectoflulling the

communitiesintoafalsesenseofsecurityregarding

their abilitytosurviveanother

major

storm without

sustaining

heavy

damages.Policy

makers

concerned withhazard mitigation

may

haveto

overcome

this

community

perception before other

development

management

techniques

become

politically viable.

Well-publicizedevacuationplans

and

procedures canalso

add

toafalsesenseof

community

security.

People

may

belesslikely toactivelysupport

hurri-cane-hazardmitigationpoliciesifthey perceivethat

limited access, thiswill

become

increasingly

impor-tantasthepopulationsizeatriskincreases

beyond

theevacuationcapacityoftheroadsystem. In

Gal-veston, the evacuation

demand

is already greater

thanthecurrentevacuationcapacity,

and

evacuating residents could be placed in severe danger during

afullscaleevacuationof the island. Residents,

how-ever,

seem

to express an attitude that if there is a stormthreat, "theywilljustget

up and

leave the

is-land," not taking into account that the rest of the local population has similar plans.

Another

community

perception evident in both Galveston

and

Gulf Shores

was

that the hurricane

had

assistedinproducinganeconomicrevitalization

and

development

boom.

Aftera storm, the large in-flux ofnon-local funds

from

federal

and

insurance sourcesseemstocreatea heady, almost

"boomtown"

atmosphere.

With

thestress

and

tension of the im-mediate recovery period behind them, the

post-stormimpressionsof

community

inhabitantsseemed

toconcentrate

on

positiveeconomic impactsthatthe

storminitiated. EveninHarrison County,

which

did not experiencea significant

development

boom

fol-lowing Camille, there

was

a "renewed spirit in the

communitiesto buildback bigger

and

strongerthan before" (Leyden 1985).

The mayor

of Gulf Shores

commented

that, for his

community,

there

was

"a definite silver lining to the storm."

While

the hurricanes did not produce the

eco-nomic

boom

that occurred afterwards, the storms appear to havestimulated theprocesses

and

short-ened thetimespan over

which development

might haveotherwise takenplace.

The

coastal disaster

cre-atedexcellent opportunitiesfordeveloperstoacquire

cheapland,

and

toapproach

numerous

land

owners

who

might be

more

receptive to selling their land

aftertheir

homes

were

severely

damaged

and

after

they

had

receivedinsurance payments. Policymakers

will have to consider these

economic development

forcesfor

two

reasons. First, thestrongerthe

devel-opment

forces in the privatemarketplace, the

more

likely thatthese forces

may

work

against innovative mitigationefforts, particularlynon-structural

flood-hazardmitigationefforts (seeRubin1985). Second,

and

more

subtly, itappearsthatthe

economic

boom

and

financial benefits

which

residentsenjoyasa

per-ceivedresultof thestorm,

may

tendto

overshadow

and

downplay

the

damaging

andpainfuleffects that

the severestorms

produced

in the

community.

This

may

lessen the

community-based

support

and

inter-est for hazard mitigation

and

pre-storm disaster

planning.

While

each coastal

community

will respond

and

react to different forces following a severe storm, planners

and

policymakersinhurricaneprone

com-munities need to

acknowledge

underlying

percep-tions

and

trends

which

may

act as obstacles to

enactinghazard mitigationpolicies.

The

communi-tiesdiscussed herewereallGulfcoastcommunities:

traditionallyveryconservative regarding regulation of privateproperty,

and

nothistoricallyinnovative

inplanningtechniques. Inareassimilarto these, the greatest success for theadoption of hazard

mitiga-tionregulationsappearstooccur

when

theproposed

regulationswillfurther other

community

objectives

which

arecapableofarousingsufficient

community

support to

overcome

the obstacles to their

enact-ment.

Examples

of

community

goals

which

might

receivea broader based support are aesthetics, or

open

space

and

beach acquisition.

Where

development

interestsare strong

and

the localitiesconservative, thefewcoastaldevelopment

continued on page 43

a falsesense of security

a boomtownatmosphere

Summer 1985, vol. 11, no. 1 43

continuedfrom page 35

regulations existing have been state or federally

mandated.State

and

federal

programs

needto

con-tinuetoprovidemusclefor theadoption ofhazard

mitigationpolicies,

and

shouldperhapsbeassessed

to insure that existing

programs

are not providing anyadditionalincentivesforunwisecoastal

develop-ment.

REFERENCES

FederalEmergency

Management

Agency. 1983a.

Inter-agency Flood

Hazard

Mitigation Report. Prepared

by the Region 6 Interagency

Hazard

Mitigation

Team.

September.

Federal

Emergency

Management

Agency. 1983b.

In-teragencyPost-FloodRecovery Progress Report.

Prepared

by

the Region 6 Interagency

Hazard

Mitigation

Team. December.

Haas, Eugene, Robert Kates,

and

Martyn Bowden

(eds.) 1977. Reconstruction Following Disaster.

MIT

Press.

Hegenbarth, JaneL. 1985a. GulfShores,

Alabama,

from

1979to 1984: Its

Redevelopment

Following Hurricane Fredrick. Center for

Urban

and

Re-gional Studies, University of

North

Carolinaat

Chapel

Hill.

March.

Hegenbarth, JaneL. 1985b. GalvestonBay'sRecovery

and

Reconstruction Following Hurricane Alicia.

Centerfor

Urban

andRegionalStudies, University

of

North

Carolina at

Chapel

Hill. April.

Leyden, Kathleen. 1985. Recovering

from

Camille:

Hazard

Mitigation

and

Post-Disaster

Reconstruc-tion inHarrison County, Mississippi. Centerfor

Urban and

RegionalStudies, Universityof

North

Carolina at Chapel Hill. April.

McCloy, James

M.

and

Steven N.

Huffman.

1985.

"HurricaneAlicia

and

theGalveston Experience" presentedattheCities

on

the Beach Conference.

Land and Water

Policy Center, University of

Massachusetts. January.

Rubin, ClaireB.

and

DanielG. Barbee. 1985. "Disas-terRecovery

and Hazard

Mitigation: Bridgingthe

Intergovernmental

Gap"

inPublicAdministration

Review

45, Special Issue, pp. 57-63.

Consultants

Index

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