DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND
THE DOHA ROUND OF MULITLATERAL TRADENEGOTIATIONS
Dilip K. Das
CSGR Working Paper 207/06
Development, Developing Economies and the Doha Round
of Mulitlateral Trade Negotiations
Dilip K. Das
CSGR Working Paper 207/06 May 2006
Abstract:
The Global community’s commitment to the goals of economic growth and poverty alleviation is an old one. Over the last half century, several United Nations (UN)
commissions have committed themselves to promotion of growth and development. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the newest manifestation of the same worthy and noble objective. Trade expansion has a strong correlation with growth. Although the WTO is not a development institution, its operations have definite
development relevance. There are certain facets of its mandate that decisively influence developmental endeavors of countries. The system of ruled-based conduct provided by the WTO reduces uncertainties in the multilateral trade arena, which in turn helps in promoting multilateral trade and domestic investment at lower risk. As the Doha Round is intended to be a development round, development concerns have remained an integral part of the Doha Round. The Group-of-Twenty (G-20) developing economies, which was born in Cancún, played a consequential role in the MTNs. No doubt a successful
culmination of the Doha Round can help in poverty alleviation and achieving the first MDG. This article provides a detailed analysis of the growing participation of the
developing economies in the evolving multilateral trading system. Their expectation is to integrate with the global economy and in the process accelerate growth. However, so far the task has seemed arduous, progress has been slow and the road appears to be long. That being said, a small sub-group of developing economies has managed to integrate well with the multilateral trade regime as well as the global economy.
Keywords:
Trade, WTO, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Growth, Globalization, Doha Round
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Contents:
1. Global Commitment to Economic Growth
2. Macroeconomic Policy and the Trade-Growth Nexus 3. Development Relevance of the Multilateral Trade Regime 4. A Developmental Round: Abiding by the Basic Principles 5. Special and Differential Treatment
5.1. Beneficiaries of Special and Different Treatment 5.2. Special and Differential Treatment in the Doha Round 5.3. The July Framework Agreement and the SDT
6. Hierarchies of Beneficiaries and Preferential Market Access 7. Small Developing Countries in the Doha Round
DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND THE DOHA
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
One of the most important achievements of the last ten years has been the enhanced integration of developing countries into the WTO system. Never before have so many been such active participants in the global trading system and the development focus of the Doha Round is an appropriate reflection of this. …The development dimension can no longer be an after thought or an add-on, a sort of pisco you add to the main dishes of market opening. Exceptions and derogations have their place, but they can too easily lock developing countries into the status quo and put a ceiling on their future possibilities.
—Pascal Lamy. 2006a
1. Global Commitment to Economic Growth
The commitment and dedication of the global community to the goals of
economic growth and poverty alleviation is an old one. Over the last half century,
several United Nations (UN) commissions committed themselves to the
promotion of growth and development. Two of the notable commissions were
headed by Lester B. Pearson and Raul Prebisch. Both developing and industrial
economies were part of these commitments to global economic development.
The final outcomes of many of these Commissions were creations of worthy
development institutions like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The most
recent endeavor of this kind is the enthusiastic accord of the global community
on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which also it to an expanded
vision of global development. While many of the targets were first set out by
international conferences and summits held in the 1990s, they were eventually
adopted as the MDGs.
The global community appreciates the moral imperative and development
rationale of achieving the MDGs, particularly the first one that aims at reducing
income poverty. Favorable global growth environment helped sustain global
expansion, low interest rates and strong growth performance in the industrial
economies helped low- and middle-income developing economies grow at an
average rate of under 5 percent in 2005, which was well above their historic rates
(WB, 2006). Macroeconomic indicators in these country groups were markedly
superior in 2005 than they were over the 1990s, albeit the gains were uneven.
Much of the improvement was focused in East and South Asia and in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia. During 2000-2005, GDP growth rates in the
middle-income economies have been higher and less volatile than those in the
low-income ones. They also grew more resilient to external shocks. To be sure,
there is a great deal of room for improvement.
Advancing the agenda of growth and poverty alleviation within the framework of
multilateral trade regime, within the mandate of the on-going Doha Round of
multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs), is in the commercial and development
interests of both developing and industrial economies. Failure of the Doha Round
will indeed risk the near-term prospects for growth in the low- and middle-income
economies noted above, in the process impairing the global income-poverty
reduction endeavors. Conversely, a successful conclusion of the Doha Round
would bolster growth and income-poverty alleviation endeavors. Its successful
conclusion would also provide a reliable engine of trade-led growth for the global
economy. However, the MTNs have neither been progressing briskly nor
smoothly. The major trading powers missed the deadline of April 30, 2006, for
putting in order an agreement on farm and industrial goods. Failure of the
Cancún Ministerial Conference of the WTO, lack of any substantive realization in
the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, and subsequently missing the April 30
strategic deadline by the major trading economies in the MTNs have engendered
skepticism regarding a successful conclusion of the Doha Round.
Can an improved climate for external trade and multilateral trade regime, in
agreement with domestic trade policy of the WTO member countries, make any
expansion accelerate economic growth in the developing economies? Essentially
due to its high policy relevance, the latter subject has been extensively
researched by economists during the preceding quarter century. A library full of
research is available on this issue. The saving grace is that the large empirical
literature that was produced around this theme has led both policy mandarins
and neoclassical economists to generally accept the view that trade expansion,
together with improvement in human capital, is a key driver of growth and poverty
alleviation, although there is a question mark on causality.1
Like the MDGs, the global community needs to adopt the policy objectives of
economic growth and poverty alleviation by means of an ambitious program of
trade policy reforms. To be sure, such a reform program will need to have an
ambitious vision and necessarily encompass decoupling of agricultural support,
including abolition of export subsidies, significant tariff slashing on the
most-favored nation (MFN)-basis on labor-intensive products, which are of interest to
the exporting firms from the developing economies. This comprehensive reform
program could cover all the WTO members, both developing and industrial
economies. Such a reform program has immense potential to become a source
of welfare gains to the developing economies, and the absolute poor in it.
2. Macroeconomic Policy and the Trade-Growth Nexus
Because of its immense policy implications, this nexus has been paid a great
deal of attention by researchers. This subject is not without its contentious
aspects. While there are sound empirical and theoretical reasons supporting a
1
While there are numerous literature surveys, one of the most recent and eminently readable one
is Trade, Growth and Poverty: Selective Survey, by A. Berg and A.O. Krueger (2003). Giles and
move to a more liberalized trade regime, there are equally sound theoretical
arguments that support protection from international competition for some
domestic industrial sectors, at least in the initial stages of industrialization.
Economic theory does not decry infant industry protection. The large body of
empirical literature, based on comparable methodological approaches, which
largely entail exploring cross-country evidence at the macroeconomic level, came
up with conclusions that were far from uniform. Numerous multi-country case
studies were conducted in the past, which also utilized similar analytical
frameworks, also came up with results that were not harmonious.2 These
empirical and statistical studies subsequently became the target of criticism for
methodological weaknesses.
Intense evaluation by the economics profession of the trade-growth nexus
brought them to the inference that that in a liberal multilateral trade regime,
countries that trade more grow faster. The liberalized multilateral trade regime
and domestic policies are positively correlated with growth. While this was the
leitmotif of numerous empirical studies conducted over a long period, there was
no certainty regarding the direction of causality. In addition, this empirical
evidence of a relationship was not without its controversies. There were
fundamental problems that permeated them, casting a shadow of doubt over the
validity of their estimates. For instance, endogeneity bias and omitted variables
were among the most serious problems with these earlier studies. Due to these
statistical flaws, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique commonly
used in the early empirical studies tended to yield biased estimates of the
coefficient of interest, that is, impact of openness on the GDP growth. Also, mere
examination of correlation coefficients could not identify the direction of causation
between trade and growth.
2
Frankel and Romer (1999) suggested a remedy to address the methodological
weaknesses. Their innovation was to take a size-weighted distance measure
between countries. Dollar and Kraay (2002) reconstructed this instrument for
their sample economies and found that there is a highly significant positive effect
of trade expansion on the per capital income of a developing economy. This
methodological improvement not only confirmed the results of Frankel and
Romer (1999) but also yielded larger coefficient than OLS regression analysis.
Making an inter-temporal distinction, Dollar and Kraay (2002) also inferred that
trade expansion plays a larger role in the short run on growth than does
institutional development, which has a greater effect in the longer run.
The improvements in the theory of edogenous growth which took place in the
latter half of 1980s and early 1990s made a decisive contribution to this debate.3
The new growth theory was partially based on the relationship between trade and
growth. Improvements in theory and availability of more comprehensive data
made it possible to launch more sophisticated cross-country economic analyses
relating to various measures of “outwardness”, or “outer-orientation” or
“openness” to the growth rate of GDP and total factor productivity (TFP). These
studies found a strong positive relationship between outward-looking policies and
growth. Cross-country evidence at macroeconomic level was once again
positive.4 Some of these studies further improved the methodology by using
measures of trade intensity instead of measures of trade policy as the relevant
variable determining GDP growth. This measure captured more than just the
influence of policy-induced trade barriers like tariffs and non-tariff barriers
(NTBs). Like the earlier empirical studies, this sub set of studies also found that
more open developing economies grow at a faster GDP growth rate. Like the
earlier studies, they also did not go unchallenged. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001)
3
Reference here is to the well known researches of Paul Romer (1986), Robert Lucas (1988) and Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991).
4
not only questioned the robustness of their results but also regarded the “search
for such a relationship futile”.
Dollar and Kraay (2004) examined the effect of liberalization, trade expansion
and globalization on growth, inequality and poverty. Over half the developing
country population presently lives in globalizing economies that have seen large
increases in trade and significant declines in policy-induced trade barriers, both
at the domestic and multilateral levels. These developing economies are catching
up with the industrial countries, while the rest of the developing world is falling
farther behind. Second, they examined the effects on the poor. The increase in
growth rates leads on average to proportionate increases in incomes of the poor.
The evidence from individual cases and cross-country analysis supports the view
that promotion of trade and globalization leads to faster growth and poverty
reduction in poor countries.
Following the post-war performance of the Japanese economy, the four East
Asian dragon economies (Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan) and Southeast Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand) turned to the traded goods sector to function as an engine of
growth. Adoption of outward-orientation helped these economies achieve stellar
economic performances, which turned Asia into the most dynamic region of the
global economy (Das, 2005). The hopeful showcase of the Asian economies has
been analyzed endlessly. From the Asian scenario, lessons were sought for the
other developing economies. Thinking in the academe and policy-making
institutions like the Bretton Woods twins and the WTO markedly shifted in favor
of an outer-orientated growth strategy and liberal global trade regime.
Disagreements among the researchers apart, a number of cross-country studies
have supported the trade-growth nexus. It is increasingly believed in the
policy-making community that protectionist environment promotes and perpetuates
inefficient industries in the developing economies. Also, protectionist policies
exchange rates. South Asian and Latin American developing economies testify to
these facts. Trade does not stimulate growth in developing economies with
excessive regulations (Bolaky and Freund, 2004). While the strategy of
inward-oriented or import-substituting industrialization can stimulate domestic
production, it suffers from obvious and severe export, labor and
anti-agriculture biases. Consequently, developing economies that adopt this growth
strategy were deterred from specializing in accordance with their perceived
comparative advantage.
Both static and dynamic effects of trade expansion on the domestic economy are
well known. The static effects work through efficiency in resource allocation in the
domestic economy, while the dynamic ones work by transporting
growth-enhancing factors like technological advances and knowledge. The dynamic
effects are divided into the following five categories, namely, spillover effects,
scale-economies effects, competition generated effects, imitation effects and
increased variety of intermediation (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). Little wonder
that efficiency gains are directly correlated with the liberalization of trade policy in
the developing economies and liberalizing multilateral trading environment and
that TFP gains are regarded as one of the standard outcomes of trade expansion
(Bernard and Jensen. 1999).
3. Development Relevance of the Multilateral Trade Regime
The definitions of the multilateral trade regime and the WTO clarify that it is not a
development institution. The GATT/WTO system was originally not designed for
economic development. That being said, efforts to enhance the development
relevance of the WTO have constantly been made. There are certain facets of its
mandate that decisively influence developmental endeavors of countries
consciously striving to climb the ladder of growth, development and
industrialization. The two quintessential functions of the WTO regime are: (i)
negotiating commitments for improving market access, and (ii) establishing a
multilateral trade. These are two critically important dimensions and the
developing economies can benefit from both of them. First, as noted above,
domestic policy stance of openness is associated with brisk growth and poverty
alleviation. If the WTO ensures greater market access for the developing
economies, the ones that have reformed and liberalized their domestic policies
and put a compensatory policy structure in place are sure to experience
acceleration in their growth performance. Tariffs and NTBs work as a tax on
development. This observation applies to both developing and industrial
economies (Das, 2001).5 Secondly, the majority of the developing economies are
relatively weaker players in the multilateral trading system. By conceiving,
designing and establishing a rule-based multilateral trade regime the WTO
protects the interests of developing economies, particularly the smaller traders,
that have little ability to influence the policies of the dominant players in the world
trade arena.
A system of common rules and mutually agreed codes of conduct among the
WTO members can reduce uncertainties among trading partners by placing
boundaries on the policies adopted by members. This in turn helps in promoting
domestic investment at lower risk. It has been observed that the private sector
shies away from investing if a rule-based trade discipline and commensurate
domestic reforms are in doubt because investors perceive it as a high-risk
environment. A framework of multilateral agreements renders the domestic policy
measure more credible. Such a framework also renders domestic policy reversal
or backsliding impossible because for all appearances they are locked in with a
multilateral agreement.
Although not the naissance, the evolution of the multilateral trade regime took
place in an oblique and prejudiced manner during the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) era. During this period, the developing economies were
not significant traders and did not actively participate in the MTNs. Therefore, the
5
multilateral trade regime evolved to reflect the perceived interest of the industrial
economies. Many early GATT rules reflected the practices that were being
followed in the industrial economies. Heavily subsidized production and export of
agriculture in the industrial economies and distortion in trade in agricultural
products was considered acceptable because it suited the interests of the
industrial economies. The same logic applies to binding of trade in textiles and
apparels in quotas, an anathema according to the GATT rules.
This was not only true of the past practices but has also persisted until the
present. Many recent laws adopted under the new WTO regime still reflect the
interests of and practices followed in the industrial economies. For instance, the
WTO rules on the protection of intellectual property rights are the very same laws
that are followed in the industrial economies. This implies that while the
developing economies are obliged to create a new regulatory framework on
intellectual property rights, the status quo continues in the industrial economies.
No changes are required by the WTO in their intellectual property rights
regulations.6
During the early rounds of MTNs, developing economies did not participate
actively. They were minor trading economies and watched the negotiations from
the sidelines rather than participating in them proactively. During the mid-1980s,
many developing economies, particularly the large ones, began implementing
far-reaching macroeconomic reform and restructuring programs. Their principal
objective was to increase and diversify their exports and economies. This was
regarded as an instrument for integrating into the global economy. These reforms
began showing tangible results in several developing economies, which were
visible in rising export volumes. Therefore, the Uruguay Round (1986-94) saw a
radical change in the mindset of policy-makers in the developing economies. The
old GATT mindset was transformed. During and after the Uruguay Round the
developing economies became proactive participants in the MTNs. An increasing
6
number of them pari passu became more proactively involved in multilateral
trade.
During the decade of 1990s, developing economies recorded an average
merchandise export growth rate which was one-third higher than that of the
industrial economies. In the space of one decade, the average trade-to-GDP
ratio for the developing economies soared from 29 percent to 43 percent (Ingco
and Nash, 2004). The year 2004 saw a marked increase in the share of
developing economies in world trade to 31 percent, the highest ever. This was
essentially due to increases in their share of the export of manufactures. In 2004,
they accounted for 28 percent of world exports of manufactures. Considering the
fact that this share was only 22 percent in 1995, this was a significant
achievement. Some developing economies like China and several Asian
economies have made successful niches in the global trade scenario. In 2004
China overtook the US as the world's largest exporter of advanced-technology
products like laptop computers, information technology products, cellular phones
and digital cameras. In 2003, the US was the global leader in this category with
exports of $137 billion, followed by China with $123 billion. In 2004, China
notched up another first. It exported $180 billion worth of high-technology
equipment in 2004, compared to the US exports of $149 billion, making China
the leading global economy in the exports of high-technology products (Das,
2006).
While this group of developing economies gave reason to be optimistic about
their future, the fact remains that still only a small number of them have so far
benefited from the expansion in trade. The 50 least developed countries (LDCs)
account for about 1 percent of world trade. The share of sub-Saharan countries
was 2 percent in 2005. The developing economies that benefited from the
multilateral trading system and have integrated into the global economy are
those that pursued sound macroeconomic policies, including open trade and
Thus viewed, over the last decade several developing economies have emerged
as important trading economies. With the progressive involvement of the
developing economies, a new goal needed to become part of the WTO
deliberations and negotiations, namely economic growth and development. The
implications of the new WTO rules are to be carefully evaluated. They should be
so designed that they proactively lead a member developing economy to the new
growth target. Economic growth is indeed a difficult metaprocess, which inter alia
requires active, and educated involvement of the developing economies in the
multilateral trading system.
In the recent past, the developing economies have been more successful in
exporting manufactured goods than agricultural products. This is partly due to the
idiosyncrasies of the multilateral trade regime. During the two decades ending in
2001, multilateral trade growth in agriculture and manufacturing trade took place
at similar paces. Table 1 shows that exports of agricultural products from
developing economies rose in the 1990s, so did the growth rate of manufacturing
products. However, these statistics conceal an important difference. During the
period under consideration, developing countries’ exports of agricultural products
to other developing economies more than doubled, while those to industrial
economies stagnated. Consequently, the share of developing countries’
agricultural exports to other developing countries increased from 9.5 percent to
13.4 percent during the 1980-2001 period. Over the same period, their share of
agricultural exports to industrial economies declined from 25.8 percent to 22.9
percent. Conversely, their share of manufactured goods exports to industrial
economies soared from 12.7 percent in 1980-81 to 15.2 percent in 1990-91, and
further to 21.1 percent in 2000-01. This set of simple statistics portend to the fact
that trade barriers have been more effective in stifling agricultural exports from
the developing economies than manufacturing exports. This trend in turn reflects
the idiosyncratic nature of the present multilateral trade regime.
Export Growth Rates in Constant (1995) Dollars
(In percent)
World Export Developing Countries
Growth Rates Export Growth Rates
1980-1990 1990-2001 1980-1990 1990-2001
Agriculture 4.5 3.6 3.5 4.8
Manufacturing 5.9 4.8 7.6 8.9
________________________________________________________________
Source: Computed by Ingco and Nash (2004) from COMTRADE date tapes.
Participation of the developing economies in the multilateral forum is
progressively becoming more consequential. The Group-of-twenty (G-20) which
was born during the Cancún Ministerial Conference, not only played a
consequential role in Cancún Ministerial Conference but also at the WTO
meeting in Geneva, held in the last week of July 2004, which put together the
July Package or the July Framework Agreement.7 For the members of the G-20,
one lesson learned at Cancún was that to avoid later frustrations they need to
approach future ministerial conferences, MTNs and other important WTO
meetings with well beefed-up teams of trade economists and better preparations
for negotiations. For the most meaningful and salutary outcomes, their degree of
7
preparations for the future MTNs should be on the lines of the delegations of the
Quadrilateral (or Quad) countries.8
4. A Developmental Round: Abiding by the Basic Principles
The Doha Round of MTNs was christened the development round by the WTO
secretariat. Lamy (2006b) noted that this was done in recognition of the fact that
“there remains, in today’s multilateral trading system’s rules and disciplines,
imbalances that penalize developing economies—and this must be corrected.”
The intention in naming it a development round was to try to improve the
multilateral disciplines and commitment by all members of the WTO in such a
manner that they “establish a more level playing field and provide developing
countries with better conditions to enable them to reap the benefits of trade
liberalization.” It is safe and fair to assume that it was expected that the final
outcome of this round will have development implications. Developmental
concerns formed an integral part not only of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
(December 2001) but also of the subsequent July Package (July 31, 2004) or the
framework agreement.
The General Council rededicated the WTO members to fulfilling the development
dimension of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), which places the needs and
interests of developing and least-developed countries (LDCs) at the heart of the
Doha Work Program.9 The General Council reiterated the “important role that
8
Canada, the European Union (EU), Japan and the United States (US) are the four Quadrilateral (or Quad) countries
9
enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed
technical assistance and capacity building programs can play in the economic
development of these countries” (WTO, 2004) . The ninth round under the aegis
of the GATT/WTO system, the Doha Round, promises a new direction to the
MTNs and calls for a new mindset among negotiators from both industrial and
developing economies. It is time to banish the ghosts of mercantilism and set
these negotiations firmly on the path of shared global economic growth.
For the developing economies, gains from trade integration are acknowledged to
be far larger than any probable increase in external assistance flows. A
pro-development outcome of the Doha Round is sure to provide developing
economies an opportunity and incentive to use trade integration proactively as a
growth lever. It will also go a long way in establishing the development credibility
of the present trade regime in general as well as the WTO in particular. To
ensure that the Development Round remains a Development Round, the WTO
members need to run some checks and balances over what is currently
transpiring in the MTNs. Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) devised four litmus tests of
whether the negotiations, agreements and decisions are pro-development or not.
These four principles are: (i) the agreement’s future impact on development
should be assessed objectively. If there are possibilities of it being negative, then
it is unfit for inclusion in the DDA, (ii) the agreement should be fair (iii) fairly
arrived at, and (iv) the agreement should be confined to trade-related and
development-friendly areas, and not venture outside into non-trade-related areas
on the pretext that they have an indirect bearing on trade.
Little economic analysis was done in the past for the potential impact of individual
WTO agreements on member country or country groups. Analytical studies that
were attempted did not penetrate into the core of negotiations, which largely
remained based on prevailing orthodoxies. They were also influenced by
lobbying from strong interest groups. For quantifying the potential impact of each
agreement, computable general equilibrium (CGE) exercises can indeed be
useful. They are an excellent tool for quantifying the potential impact. Modeling
frameworks like the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) and its variations have
been in frequent use by scholars and professional economists for the purpose of
reckoning the impact. The GTAP project is coordinated by the Center for Global
Trade Analysis, which is housed in the Department of Agricultural Economics,
Purdue University. The Center for Global Trade Analysis undertakes applied
general equilibrium (AGE) modeling, and provides services to other AGE
modelers as well as supranational organizations using AGE-based analysis. The
objective of GTAP is to improve the quality of quantitative analysis of global
economic issues within an economy-wide framework. Since its inception in 1993,
GTAP has rapidly become a common “language” for many of those conducting
global economic analysis. Economists at the University of Michigan and Perdue
University have a great deal of experience, spanning over a decade, in running
these comprehensive simulation exercises. Given the availability of this
technique, the WTO Secretariat could be assigned the responsibility of
conducting general equilibrium incidence analyses, which they can produce with
the help of academic scholars in this area. These empirical studies can quantify
the impact of different proposals on different countries or country groups.
However, it should be ensured that the CGE and AGE models used remain
sensitive to this differentiation.
Fairness of agreements is as important as it is problematical and conflict-ridden.
It is basically a tricky concept. Economic circumstances of each one of the 150
WTO members are different, therefore, each WTO agreement impacts upon
each of the members in a different manner.10 In terms of net gains measured as
10
percentage of GDP, if any agreement that hurts one country group and benefits
the other, it is considered unfair by the one that is hurt. Fairness also has an
element of progressiveness, that is, the largest benefits of an agreement should
accrue to the poorest group of member developing countries. So defined,
fairness has not been a part of the multilateral trading regime thus far. This
concept of fairness applies to the entire package of WTO agreements, not to
individual agreements. The package has to be viewed and adjudged in its
entirety. In case of individual agreements, there necessarily has to be some
leeway in making give and take. This effect of the WTO agreements is inevitable,
therefore, one needs to look at the bottom line in this regard and reckon which
country, or country group, is benefiting or losing on balance.
Procedural fairness or justice is the principle that deals with the transparency of
the negotiations process. Historically, transparency was not part of the culture of
the GATT system, which was known for its lack of transparency, reflected in the
Green Room process. Its lack of transparency became one of the destructive
features during the Seattle Ministerial Conference. It is apparent that setting an
agenda will have a large bearing over the final outcome of the MTNs. Therefore,
participating members having a say in the mapping of agenda is essential. As
many opinions and stances as possible need to be taken into account before the
agenda of an MTN is finalized. In the past, a lack of transparency often allowed
the large and powerful trading economies to ride rough shod over the system.
After the debacle at Seattle, the issue of transparency in the WTO system made
visible and impressive strides. The “July Package”, also known as the July
Framework Agreement, which was finalized on the 31 of July 2004, was posted
on the website of the WTO immediately after finalization.
The fourth litmus test relates to defining and limiting the policy space to
trade-related areas during the MTNs. Over the last two decades, particularly during the
Uruguay Round, there was a strong tendency to expand the mandate of the
WTO to include all kinds of assorted areas, ranging from intellectual property
international issue which was not formerly covered by any other supranational
organizations was considered right for the WTO. Attempts were made to include
in the ambit of the WTO even those issues for which there were specialized or
United Nations organizations, like environment and labor issues. Stiglitz and
Charlton (2005) contended that policy makers employed the prefix “trade related
aspects of” liberally and excessively in the past.
The WTO deals with a difficult and important area of multilateral economic life. It
cannot possibly be made into a negotiating forum and enforcement mechanism
for all and sundry issues. There is a high price for expanding the policy space of
the WTO. First, inclusion of many tangential issues tends to confuse and
overload the WTO system, which has expanded considerably following the
Uruguay Round and thereafter. Second, it also stretches the analytical and
negotiating resources of the member developing economies. Third, the industrial
economies negotiate from a higher platform in the WTO system. Expansion of
the WTO boundaries gives them an opportunity to use their superior bargaining
strength in trade negotiations to exploit the developing economies over a larger
range of issues. The inclusion of the so-called Singapore issues in the Fifth
Ministerial Conference at Cancún is a case in point. Therefore, expansion of the
WTO mandate should strictly follow the principle of conservativism, and not
include issues that do not have a direct relevance to multilateral trade flows.11
5. Special and Differential Treatment
The WTO does not have a definition of developing economies, although some
supranational institutions, like the World Bank, not only provide a closely worded
definition of developing economies but also of their various sub-groups among
them. A WTO member decides and declares its status itself. Over the decades,
the traditional approach of the developing economies has been to seek benefits
under special and differential treatment (SDT). The term SDT captures the WTO
provisions that grant preferential access to markets to certain subsets of
developing economies and gives them exemptions from certain WTO rules, or
11
gives them extra time periods to comply with. The History of SDT is as old as the
GATT/WTO system itself. It not only existed since the inception of the GATT but
also had a significant history in the multilateral trading system.
Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer were the intellectual fathers of the concept of
SDT. They argued that the exports of the developing economies were
concentrated in the area of primary products and commodities, which were
characterized by volatile prices and deteriorating terms-of-trade. Therefore, they
(along with Ragnar Nurkse) propounded the strategy of import-substituting
industrialization (ISI) in the 1950s, supported by high rates of protection for the
developing economies. Although the infant industry argument is accepted by
economic theory, this group of economists applied it a little too comprehensively.
Consequently, in the economies that followed the ISI strategy, the infant
industries remained infants for decades—until many of them touched their middle
ages. This strategy was avidly followed by South Asian and Latin American
economies in the 1950s and beyond. They also promoted the notion of
preferential market access for developing economies in the industrial country
markets through instruments like SDT.
In the initial stages SDT was limited to the provisions of Article XVIII of
GATT-1947, which allowed developing economies to void or renegotiate their
commitments.12 The second defining moment in SDT came during the Kennedy
Round (1962-67), when Part IV on the benefits to and obligations of the
developing economies was introduced in the Articles of Agreements of the
GATT-1947. Article XXXVI of Part IV acknowledged the wide income disparities
between the developing and industrial economies and emphasized the need for
12
rapid economic advancement in the developing economies by means of “a rapid
and sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less-developed contracting
parties.”
The third important period in the life of SDT came during the Tokyo Round
(1973-79), when the Enabling Clause was introduced, which established that the
developing economies were exempted from Article I {the most-favored-nations
(MFN) clause} of the GATT-1947.13 The Enabling Clause meant that the
developing countries should receive more favorable treatment without having to
reciprocate to the other signing contracting parties (CPs). The reciprocity was
limited to levels “consistent with development needs” and the developing
economies were provided with greater freedom to use trade policies than would
otherwise be permitted under the GATT rules.
These objectives are covered by Article XVIII of GATT-1947, and subsequently
GATT-1994. Article XVIII not only permits the developing economies to use their
trade policies in pursuit of economic development and industrialization but also
imposes a weaker discipline on them than on the industrial economies in several
areas of GATT/WTO regulations. It also exhorts the industrial countries to take
into account the interests of the developing economies in the application of the
GATT discipline. The Enabling Clause made SDT a central element of the GATT
system. With prescience, the Enabling Clause also required that, as economic
development gathers momentum, the developing economies would try and
improve their capacity to gradually reciprocate concessions. This was christened
the process of “graduation”. Subsequently, several preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) were created under the Enabling Clause.14
13
Although most-favored nation (MFN) sounds like a contradiction, implying some kind of special treatment to a particular trade partner, in the WTO jargon it means non-discrimination. That is, treating all trade partners under the WTO regime equally. Each WTO member treats all the WTO members as “most-favored” trading partner. If any country improves the market benefits to one trading partner, it is obliged to give the same best treatment to all the other WTO members so that they all remain “most-favored”. However, historically MFN did not mean equal treatment.
14
The SDT is a system of preferences, which by definition are discriminatory.
Historically, efforts to operationalize SDT centered on preferential market access
through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). To maximize the benefits
of WTO membership, developing economies sought to expand the reach of SDT.
The benefits of SDT span three important areas, namely, (i) preferential access
to the industrial economies’ markets without reciprocation, (ii) exemption from
some WTO obligations, many of which are transitory and some permanent and
(iii) technical assistance and help in institution building so that the WTO
obligations can be fulfilled and negotiated decisions are implemented.
There has been a long standing trend of unilateral discriminatory liberalization, or
offering tariff- and quota-free market access for the small and poor LDCs. If it is
fully implemented, it could certainly make the SDT more effective than it was in
the past. This kind of unilateral market access cannot be offered to the
developing economies that do not fall under the LDC category, because it is a
political impossibility in the industrial economies. Therefore, the absolute poor of
the global economy cannot benefit from it because a large proportion of them live
in South Asia and Sub-Saran Africa. While all of these economies come under
the category of developing economies, not all of them are LDCs. This means that
the absolute poor can only benefit if trade liberalization is made multilateral and
non-discriminatory. To be sure, such reforms leading to wider and deeper market
access would allow the developing economies to exploit their comparative
advantage. Besides, many benefits of free trade accrue to the exporting
economy through the reform of the domestic macroeconomic framework. That
being said, as expected by the Enabling Clause, consistent with their
development needs the middle-income—both lower and upper—developing
countries should explore the feasibility of exchanging reciprocal concessions with
the industrial economies under the WTO framework, and promote the normal
trade liberalization process.15
5.1. Beneficiaries of Special and Different Treatment
The SDT operated for small, low-income developing economies for so many
decades. Theoretically this concept is unarguably meaningful and significant, but
in reality it did not engender substantial benefits to the developing economies.
There were several causes behind this failure. The preferential market access
schedules under SDT were designed voluntarily by the industrial economies,
which chose both the eligible countries and products for their schedules. It was
observed that, for one, the selected countries and products generally lacked
capacity to export and, secondly, countries and products with export potential
were excluded from the schedules. Second, when the market preferences were
granted, the preference schedules were laden with restrictions, product
exclusions and administrative rules. Three, overall coverage of these schedules
was only a tiny part of developing country exports, and the eligible countries were
able to utilize only a small part of the preference granted to them. The exports of
countries that enjoy the GSP under various preferential schemes form a very
small part of the European Union (EU) and United States (US) imports. Over the
preceding three decades, they have ranged between 0.9 percent and 0.4 percent
of total annual imposts of these the EU and US (WB, 2004). Fourth, the
preference schedules were characterized by trade diversion, that is, they diverted
trade with the ineligible developing countries. Finally, the preferential market
access schedules did not benefit the target group called the absolute poor of the
world.16 They could not reach this target group at all.
15
We divide the various groups of developing economies according to the World Bank (2004) definition, which is available in Classification of Economies on the Internet at http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/countryclass.html. Economies are divided according to 2003 per capita gross national income. The groups are: low-income developingcountries have, $765 or less; lower-middle income, $766 - $3,035; upper-middle income, $3,036 - $9,385; and high income, $9,386 or more.
16
While there were a good number of recipients of SDT’s benefits, not all of them
benefited from it. The foremost group to benefit from SDT was a small sub-set of
relatively more advanced developing economies of Asia, which soon acquired
the status of emerging-market economies (EMEs). The supply-side scenario in
this small group was better developed than in the other small, low-income
developing economies, also the rent generated were put to good use by them.
This group not only had the wherewithal to export the products but also met the
administrative requirements of the GSP-granting countries well. Preparation of
the required documents placed by the preference-granting countries was
efficiently met by them. It was observed that liberal rules of origin (ROO) were a
critical factor for eliciting a strong response from the potential beneficiary
economies, particularly in products like textiles and apparel.17
According to the statistics compiled by the World Bank (2004), in 2001 there
were 130 countries that were eligible for the SDT, 10 of them accounted for 77
percent of the US non-oil imports under its GSP. The same 10 countries
accounted for 49 percent of all GSP imports from all the industrial countries that
were providing GSP. Occasionally a small developing country did benefit
substantially from preferential market access where domestic prices were raised
above the world market prices by tariffs, subsidies or other trade distorting
mechanisms. For instance Mauritius, which exports sugar and enjoys preferential
access to the EU markets, benefited a good deal from this opportunity. However,
these benefits to Mauritius came at a high cost to the EU taxpayers and
consumers (WB, 2004).
Recent performance of the GSP beneficiaries again indicated that a small
number of small developing economies that developed their supply side
Most international organizations define the poverty line in an absolute way as the “level of income necessary for people to buy the goods necessary to their survival.” In keeping with this concept, the dollar-a-day line, at 1985 purchasing power parity, is being extensively used (Bourgignon, 1999).
17
capabilities succeed more in exploiting the market access that was provided to
them under the GSP. A comparison of countries that were eligible for the US
GSP, and those that were recently graduated from it, revealed that the latter
category outperformed the former in terms of export performance. Countries that
were no longer on the GSP eligibility list had a higher ratio of export to GDP ratio,
as well as higher export growth rate in real terms. One explanation of the
success of the countries that graduated from the US GSP-eligible list that seems
rational is that it appears that GSP provided a stimulus to their export industries.
Causality must be carefully attributed, but GSP seemingly helped the graduating
countries in engendering supply side capabilities, which strengthened with the
passage of time and turned them into successful trading economies. The flip side
of the coin is that merely GSP cannot turn them into successful exporters.
Reforming their macroeconomic policy structure must have played a decisive role
in this endeavor.
5.2 Special and Differential Treatment in the Doha Round
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) again reaffirmed the importance to the
SDT for the multilateral trade regime and referred to it as “an integral part of the
WTO agreement” in the Doha Communiqué. The SDT figures at several places
in the Doha Communiqué. The objective of the DDA in this area is clearly laid
down in paragraph 2 of the Communiqué as “… we shall continue to make
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and specially the
least-developed among them, secure a share in the world trade commensurate
with the need of their economic development. In this context, enhanced market
access, balanced rules, and well-targeted, sustainably financed technical
assistance and capacity-building programs have important roles to play” (WTO,
2001).
Recognizing that SDT has not succeeded in imparting a lot of benefits to the
target group of beneficiaries, in paragraph 44 participating members called for a
“making them more precise, effective and operational” so that it is able to fulfill its
objectives (WTO, 2001). As noted above, the benefits of SDT are provided
through three different channels. A good case exists for rethinking all the three
channels so that the benefits can be targeted more precisely for the target
groups that need them most. In paragraph 14, the Doha Communiqué provided a
deadline for reestablishing the new modalities of the SDT. The deliberations and
dialogues on this issue continued all through 2002 and 2003, but without a
consensus or an agreement. Members were not only divided on important SDT
matters, but also had opinions that were significantly far apart from each other.
In view of the fact that the SDT did not spawn large benefits for the target groups,
academics and policy makers have debated over what shape the SDT should
take in future so that it is able to meet the expected goals.18 The on-going Doha
Round negotiations give an additional relevance to this debate, because this is
an opportunity to refine the SDT system. There is some degree of agreement
among the researchers on the new shape of STD. Their recommendations are
comprehensive and are summarized as follows. First, the industrial economies
need to slash all MFN tariffs on labor-intensive exports from the developing
economies to 5 percent by 2010, and 10 percent on agricultural exports. The
target year for the MDG is 2015, by which time all tariffs on exports of
manufactured products from the developing economies should be eliminated.
Second, likewise developing economies on their part should reduce their tariff
barriers on the basis of the adopted formula approach. This would be their
reciprocation to the measures taken by the industrial economies.
Third, industrial economies should make binding commitments in trade in
services to expand temporary excess of services providers by a specific amount,
say, one percent of the workforce.
18
Some of the recent studies include Oyejide (2002), Hart and Dymond (2003), Hoekman et al
Fourth, industrial economies need to unilaterally expand market access for
LDCs, along with simplification of the ROO requirements.
Fifth, an affirmation by the WTO regarding core disciplines about the use of trade
policy, which should apply equally to all the members.
Sixth, the multilateral trade system needs to explore feasible channels of meeting
the special institutional development needs of small developing economies and
LDCs.
Seventh, there are some WTO agreements that are required to be adopted in
such a manner that they become supportive of development.
Eighth, the industrial economies need to meet the trade-related technical
assistance needs of the small and low-income developing economies.19
Although none of these proposals are novel and revolutionary, these or similar
expansion of SDT have been discussed in the past. However, if they are
deliberated, promoted and adopted during the Doha Round, the final outcome
would indeed be supportive of development in the low-income developing
economies and the LDCs. The name DDA would then ring true. Although
numerous academics have addressed this issue, a Group of Wise Men, like the
famous Leutwilder Group of eminent persons appointed by the GATT in 1985,
can be appointed once again to analyze these issues and provide objective and
functional recommendations that would bring the multilateral trading system
closer to the DDA mandate.
5.3 The July Framework Agreement and the SDT
After the failure of the Fifth Ministerial Conference, the so-called framework
agreement was arrived at during the last week of July 2004. In the framework
agreement the General Council reaffirms that provisions for SDT are an integral
part of the WTO agreements. The Council not only reaffirmed the DDA objective
19
of strengthening them but also recommended making them more precise,
effective and operational. The Committee on Trade and Development (CTD)
reviewed the SDT. The Council instructed the CTD to expeditiously complete the
review of all the outstanding agreement-specific proposals regarding SDT and
report to the General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, by July
2005. The CTD, within the parameters of the Doha mandate, was asked to
address all other outstanding work, including on the cross-cutting issues, the
monitoring mechanism and the incorporation of SDT into the architecture of WTO
rules. However, the CTD after several meetings failed to make concrete
recommendations to the WTO General Council. Members had strong
disagreements on the issues.
The General Council reviewed and recognized the progress that has been made
since the beginning of the negotiations of the Doha Ministerial Conference in
expanding Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) to developing and
low-income countries in transition. In furthering this effort the Council affirms that
such countries, and in particular the LDCs, should be provided with enhanced
TRTA and capacity building, to increase their effective participation in the
negotiations, to facilitate their implementation of WTO rules, and to enable them
to adjust and diversify their economies. In this context the Council welcomed and
further encouraged the improved coordination with other agencies, including
under the Integrated Framework for (IF) TRTA for the LDCs and the Joint
Integrated Technical Assistance Program (JITAP) (WTO, 2004). This gives an
impression that the SDT is being taken up for serious review and at the end of
the Doha Round should emerge stronger than in the past.
6. Hierarchies of Beneficiaries and Preferential Market Access
In the hierarchy of beneficiaries from preferential market access, the most
preferred countries are those that are part of a regional integration agreement
(RIA) with the preference-granting economy. Trade partners in an RIA commonly
have close trade and economic ties. This relationship is usually reciprocal in
come next. Other small developing economies with which the
preference-granting economies have GSP relationships are the last. GSP are unilateral in
nature and are devised for large country groups of beneficiaries in mind. The
GSP status does not provide free market access, but only reductions in tariff
rates to the exporting economy in the GSP arrangement.
Several unilateral preferential market access programs were devised as GSPs by
the industrial economies as well laid out, structured and customized programs
that were intended to be carefully implemented. Each one of them had
characteristic features regarding eligibility criteria, product coverage, and
administrative rules, in important areas like ROO. Together these criteria
determine which developing countries are excluded and which can benefit from
the customized unilateral preferential market access schedule. The programs
devised and implemented by the US include the African Growth Opportunity Act
(AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Andean Trade Promotion Act, as well
as several unilateral and reciprocal trade agreements with Israel and Jordan.
Likewise the principal EU programs include the Cotonou convention which
includes the African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) countries and the
Everything-But-Arms (EBA) initiative targeting the LDCs. The EU has also
entered a large number of unilateral and reciprocal trade agreements with the
North African, Middle Eastern, and the Mediterranean economies.20
The characteristic features of the unilateral and reciprocal trade agreements
differ in several important respects. Several sectors (such as textiles and
apparel, processed foods, etc.) are treated as “sensitive” items and usually
excluded from the GSP. They are designed for a large number of potential
beneficiaries. These sensitive sectors of trade are included in the unilateral and
reciprocal trade agreements. For instance, by 2009, the EBA initiative will cover
all the exports of the target group of countries. All the protectionist measures will
be eliminated for imports into the EU economies from the 50 LDCs. However, an
unseen restriction in this is that the products that matter most to LDCs (rice,
20
sugar and banana) will not be liberalized until after 2006. Their liberalization
would begin in 2007 and end in 2009. Secondly, under the unilateral and
reciprocal trade agreements administrative requirements tend to be more relaxed
in comparison to the more comprehensive GSP schemes, particularly regarding
the ROO.
Despite recent improvements in the implementation of these programs, as
alluded to earlier, the overall imports into the industrial economies under various
preferential schemes have continued to remain diminutive, almost insignificant.
An exception in this regard is the textiles and apparel exports from small African
economies that came under the AGOA to the US, which recorded significant
gains. In 2001, imports by the Quad countries from the GSP beneficiary
economies amounted to $588 billion, of which $298 billion were subject to normal
trade and non-trade restrictions, while $184 billion came under various
preferential trade programs. That is, the coverage of these programs was 38.9
percent of the eligible exports, which in turn received market access preference.
In 1991, this proportion was 51.1 percent. Thus the proportion of coverage of
eligible exports declined during the decade of the 1900s (Inama, 2003). A similar
quantitative study by Haveman and Shatz (2003) produced comparable, although
slightly different, evidence of coverage.
7. Small Developing Countries in the Doha Round
A large number of small and low-income developing countries and LDCs are now
members of the WTO; together they dominate its membership. Although a
majority of them belong to the LDC category, there are some that do not come
under it, such as Kyrgyz Republic, Surinam, Guyana, Tajikistan and the like.
Cambodia is one such country which became the 148th member of the WTO.
With growing number, this category of countries acquired a good deal of
influence in the multilateral trade system and its decision-making process. During
Geneva in July 2004, this group held together as the Group-of-Ninety (G-90) and
was led by Rwanda.
Two interesting characteristics of small and low-income developing countries and
LDCs tend to stand out. First, their economies and trade volume are small, if not
tiny. By definition, each one of them accounts for 0.05 percent, or less, of
multilateral imports of goods and services. Realistically, such a small trader has
little to offer in terms of market access concessions to its trading partners during
the MTNs. This eliminates this group of small developing countries from any
serious reciprocal bargaining, which is considered central to the WTO operations.
Second, the interests and trade-related requirements of this group of WTO
members are imperfectly aligned with the extensive agenda of the multilateral
trade system. In addition, as these small economies enjoy preferential market
access to the industrial country markets, further multilateral liberalization in the
Doha Round would in many cases erode rather than enhance the market access
of these countries. Many of them would reap few benefits from broadening of the
WTO mandate. If anything, they might incur substantial costs.21 Owing to these
two characteristic differences from the principal trading economies, small and
low-income developing economies stand out as an unusual and exclusive group
in the multilateral trading system.
As alluded to in Section 4, the contemporary intellectual and political environment
strongly favors a “fair” Doha Round outcome for this country group. In such a
mise-en-scene, the multilateral trading system is faced with the challenge of
equilibrating two important and seemingly incompatible issues. Accommodating
the interests and needs of this country group on the one hand and ensuring
rapid, efficient and expeditious progress in the Doha Round on the other. Stiglitz
and Charlton, (2005) noted that the primary principle of “the Doha Round should
be to ensure that the agreements promote development in the poor countries. To
make this principle operational the WTO needs to foster a culture of robust
21
economic analysis to identify pro-developmental proposals and promote them to
the top of the agenda. In practice this means establishing a source of impartial
and publicly available analysis of the effects of different initiatives on different
countries. This should be a core responsibility of an expanded WTO Secretariat.”
The other objective of this analysis would be to reveal that if any WTO
agreement “differentially hurts developing countries or provides disproportionate
benefits to developed countries”, it should be regarded as unfair and be
considered inappropriate for and incompatible with the DDA (Stiglitz and
Charlton, 2005). In the final analysis the DDA should promote both de facto and
de jure fairness.
To be sure, MFN liberalization route is considered both efficient and innovative
for the Doha Round (See the following Section), but the multilateral trading
system “faces the classic conflict between efficiency and distribution” (Mattoo
and Subramanian, 2004). If the MFN-based liberalization is the most efficient for
reallocation of global resources, it also leads to adverse distributional effect on
economies that have been granted the benefit of preferential market access. As
the WTO has followed the GATT tradition of arriving at decisions by consensus,
this situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the small, low-income, WTO
member countries in this group have as much say in ensuring the progress of the
Doha Round and creating an efficient multilateral trading system as a large
industrial economy member. Without this say the multilateral trading regime
cannot be egalitarian. To resolve this knotty, if paradoxical, situation Mattoo and
Subramanian (2004) proposed devising a transfer mechanism for compensating
the small and low-income WTO members that stand to lose by further
liberalization of the multilateral trade regime.
A word about consensus in the GATT/WTO system is relevant here. Although the
legal requirement of the Marrakesh Agreement (or the GATT-1994) establishing
the WTO is of two-third or three-fourths majority, depending upon the decision
being made, while some decisions can only be made by consensus, giving the
areas. In the Doha Round negotiations, this de jure power can be exercised by
small and low-income developing countries in some categories of issues, while it
cannot be exercised in others. For instance, it cannot be exercised in issues like
inclusion of the four Singapore issues which requires two-thirds majority,
whereas it can be applied to the issue of deepening the WTO rules, which call for
a consensus. The latter category covers areas like anti-dumping and subsidies
agreements, and strengthening the framework of the GATT-1994 and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
However, these de jure powers can have less influence over further market
access liberalization negotiations. Members that mutually agree can proceed and
exchange market access concessions without countenance or interference from
other members, who are less concerned in these areas. Thus, in a lot of areas in
the DDA agreements can be reached without the apprehension of small
developing countries blocking them. In addition, this country group has come to
acquire de facto powers, which stem from the fact that during the Uruguay Round
they were required to take on numerous obligations, which they subsequently
found demanding, intricate and costly to implement. Delivering on those
commitments seemed beyond the institutional and budgetary capabilities of
these economies. These obligations were in areas like liberalization of trade,
institutional up-gradation and protection of intellectual property rights. The small
and low-income members argue that if they are expected to take on arduous
obligations, they should also have a commensurate influence over the WTO
affairs. Basically, this is fallacious logic because, for one, small developing
economies and the LDCs were not the only economies that were asked to take
on costly obligations, all the participants were. Second, acknowledging their
special set of circumstances they were given significant latitude and more time
than other members for fulfilling demanding and stringent WTO obligations.22
To be sure, a transfer mechanism proposed by Mattoo and Subramanian (2004)
would be difficult to devise. Even if it is devised, it would be politically infeasible
22
to implement. If so, then the system would gravitate towards what is feasible,
albeit less desirable. As regards the question, what is desirable? It is logical to
say that if this country group consents to let the multilateral trading system move
forward with the broad liberalization agenda in the DDA, they would be offered a
quid pro quo in the form of improved non-preferential market access and
increased technical and financial assistance. Both are valuable and have
long-term significance for this country group. At the present time, the favorite systemic
response to this knotty riddle that is emerging is as follows: As the financial
assistance and market access response is seemingly unfeasible, small member
economies are being relieved of WTO obligations which they see as imposition,
in the process eliminating their opposition and antagonism to the continuance of
multilateral trade liberalization under the DDA.
8. The Doha Round and Global Poverty Alleviation
As alluded to earlier, one of expectations of the Doha Round is to achieve the
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of cutting down income poverty by a half
by 2015. It is the first of the eight MDGs, articulated by the United Nations
General assembly in 2000. The long-term trend is that the number of absolute
poor in the world has been rising. During the 19th and the 20th centuries the
number of poverty stricken people in the world constantly rose (Bouguignon and
Morrisson, 2002). There was a small reversal in this trend after 1970, and this
number fell by a tad over 200 million. Measured in 1985 PPP terms, the number
of poor had declined by 350 million (Sala-i-Martin, 2002). Impressive as this
achievement seems, there were still 1.2 billion in the world, or one person in five,
still lived in poverty (Collier and Dollar, 2002).
It should be noted that while the linkage between poverty alleviation and social
sector reforms—like education, health, land reform, micro-credit, infrastructure
development and governance—is direct, trade and poverty alleviation are not
directly linked. However, economic theory suggests that trade can certainly
