Software Defined Perimeter

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So#ware Deﬁned Perimeter

A new approach to access control

Junaid Islam, Co Chair

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Before we start, two ideas we believe strongly

• Complexity is the primary reason security systems fail (Junaid said this)

• The ideal security solu?on should just work (what Bob wants)

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4 Fundamental Problem:

DNS

Alice _10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.3

Connec?on-‐oriented protocol

Client connects to server before authen?ca?on

Vulnerability is unauthen?cated connec?vity

AOacks

Server exploita?on

Creden?al the#

Connec?on hijacking

Alice p@ssw0rd IP ad dr o f ﬁ nan ce se rv er ? 10. 0. 0. 1

Who are you? Alice, p@ssw0rd You’re authorized. Hello 10.0.0.1, I’d like some data

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Internet

Connec<vity & Visibility: Not a New Problem

Wall oﬀ the enterprise

Hide the applica?ons

Tightly manage the computers

Alice

Bob

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SaaS

IaaS

479729cec9a2187c914df2b3078e320f

6 Business 2.0: The Perimeter Crumbled

Phishing

Alice

Bob

The world needs a new security model !!!

Enterprise

, BYOD , SaaS , IaaS , Contractors, subject maOer experts, outsourced so#ware and IT, channel partner, ERP professional

Remove connec?vity

Remove visibility

Cloud & BYOD friendly

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How SDP Started: Big companies with BIG problems

Connec?ng 200,000 users to data center-‐cloud apps

Monitoring and upda?ng vehicle so#ware

Enabling "customer controlled" services

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8 Current Connec<vity Model

Connect to

Application

Denial of Service

Provide

Credentials

Creden@al TheA

Server Exploita@on

Multifactor

Token

Connec@on Hijacking

APT/Lateral Movement

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Solu<on Requirements

Insider Threat

No secrets

Mobile Devices

Highly scalable

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10 SoYware Deﬁned Perimeter

Connect to

Applica?on

Provide

Creden?als

Mul?factor

Token

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SDP Architecture

SDP Controller

SDP Gateways

2. User Authen?ca?on & Authoriza?on

Enterprise iden?ty: separa?on of trust SAML IdP integrated with LDAP groups

0. One ?me on-‐boarding

Client root of trust

Digital ar?facts & thin client

3. Dynamically Provisioned Connec?ons

Applica?ons isolated and protected Usability: portal page of applica?ons

3. Dynamic Conne c<on

3. Dynamic Conne_c<on

Hos<ng & IaaS DMZ & Data Center SDP Client Crypto Client Crypto Gateway IP’s

1.  Device Authen?ca?on & Authoriza?on

SPA: an? DDoS, defeats SSL aOacks mTLS & ﬁngerprint: an? creden?al the#

SAML IdP Issuing

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Key SDP Features

• 64 bit id is not secret (can be listed)

• SPA can carry payload for Auto/IoT applica?ons

• AOacks can be detected in the ﬁrst packet

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Defea<ng A^acks on the Extended Enterprise

_{User name}

Password

• Server exploita?on: constant aOacks

Misconﬁgura?ons

Vulnerabili?es

Injec?ons

Denial of Service

• Creden?al the#: ⅔ of Verizon DBIR

Phishing

Keyloggers

Brute force

• Connec?on hijacking: stealthiest

Man-‐in-‐the-‐Middle

Cer?ﬁcate forgery

DNS poisoning

Server Isola<on SPA, Dynamic FW Transparent MFA mTLS, Fingerprint Encryp<on, Pinned Certs, No DNS

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14 SDP Provides Real Time Threat Detec<on

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SDP Cryptography Proﬁle

•  ECDHE-‐RSA-‐AES256-‐GCM-‐SHA384 TLS suite

ECDHE:

Ellip?c Curve Diﬃe–Hellman Ephemeral Ellip?c curve pre-‐master keys

Generate the four symmetric keys of the TLS Ephemeral keys per session

Perfect Forward Secrecy

But not client or server authen?ca?on

RSA:

Public/private key pair with an X.509 cer?ﬁcate Client and server authen?ca?on

Vidder’s implementa?on:

Cer?ﬁcates “pinned” to a trusted root cer?ﬁcate

Not the hundreds of (possibly compromised) roots browsers trust Employs OCSP stapling (RFC 6066)

Forwards the OCSP response with TLS Server hello Reduces the load on the OCSP responder Mi?gates a DoS of the OCSP responder

AES256-‐GCM:

Advanced Encryp?on Standard (NIST FIPS 197) Symmetric key encryp?on

256 bit cipher block size Galois/Counter Mode

Block cipher that simultaneously computes encryp?on and integrity PC’s and servers implement GCM in hardware

Negligible performance impact due to encryp?on of the data

SHA384:

Secure Hash Algorithms (and member of SHA-‐2)

• Single Packet Authoriza?on (SPA)

History:

Invented >10 years ago

Commonly used for super user ssh access to servers Mi?gates aOacks by unauthorized users

Algorithm

Based on RFC 4226, "HOTP” HMAC-‐based One-‐Time Password

Used for hardware/so#ware one ?me password tokens 128-‐bit random number seed

128-‐bit non-‐secret counter

So#ware Deﬁned Perimeter:

SPA occurs before TLS (SSL) connec?on Mi?gates aOacks on TLS by unauthorized users See AOacks on SSL/TLS

SPA = UID, OTP, CTR, GMAC

UID = Universal ID of SDP Client OTP = HMAC[seed | CTR]

GMAC = E client private key [HMAC[UID | OTP | CTR]]

Each client has an id, seed, and counter

Counter is incremented, appended to seed, and hashed UID, OTP, CTR, & and the counter are sent as clear text. The counter is increment to mi?gate playback aOacks. The packet is also signed to provide integrity checking.

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16 A^acks on SSL/TLS

Name Date A^ack Unauthorized Authorized Users

SSLstrip Feb 2009 hOp to hOps SPA No hOp

DigiNotar Sept 2011 MitM forged certs SPA Pinned certs

BEAST Apr 2012 Java Applet oracle SPA Client-‐based

CRIME Sept 2012 MitM SPDY compressing oracle SPA No compression

Lucky 13 Feb 2013 MitM CBC padding oracle SPA GCM

TIME Mar 2013 Browser JavaScript ?ming oracle SPA Client-‐based

RC4 biases Mar 2013 MitM RC4 oracle SPA No cypher nego?a?on

BREACH Aug 2013 Website redirect, compression SPA No redirect or compression goto fail Feb 2014 MitM counterfeit key via coding error SPA Pinned dedicated cert Triple Handshake Mar 2014 Server MitM on client cert SPA Pinned dedicated cert

Heartbleed Apr 2014 OpenSSL bug SPA Not single-‐ended SSL

BERserk Sept 2014 MitM PKCS#1.5 padding SPA Not Mozilla NSS

Poodle Oct 2014 MitM SSLv3 oracle SPA No cypher nego?a?on

Poodle++ Dec 2014 MitM JavaScript ?ming oracle SPA Client-‐based

FREAK Mar 2015 MitM nego?a?on 512 bit key SPA No key nego?a?on

Bar-‐mitzvah Mar 2015 View RC4 SPA No RC4

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Current SDP Workgroup Ac<vi<es

• Suppor?ng DHS contract for Terabit scale DDoS solu?on

• Coordina?ng development eﬀorts of commercial partners

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Typical Denial of Service (DoS) A^acks

• Applica?on layer

SQL statements that DoS the database

Many false posi?ves punish legi?mate users

PrecisionAccess defeats this with no false posi?ves

• User name/password

Compromise or DoS each user

Cannot be stopped with tradi?onal tools

PrecisionAccess defeats this with no users compromised

• SSL nego?a?on

Single laptop can DoS a server

Very expensive to stop with tradi?onal tools

PrecisionAccess defeats this with very liOle eﬀort

• Bandwidth consump?on

> 100’s Gbps

Cannot be stopped by do it yourself tools

SDP’ scale out at AWS mi?gates Tbps

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DoS Protec?on Service DIY: WAF &

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Na<onal Cyber Security Framework

Device Attacks

Internet Attacks

Server Attacks

RAM

Scraping

Data

Theft

Credential

Theft

Connection

Hijacking

of Service

Denial

Threats

Insider

Exploits

Server