Jennifer Ruth Wilkinson D. Litt et Phil Philosophy Department University of South Africa
In order to practice an ethic of care within the nursing profession, that is, in order to care for those for whom the nurse is responsible, caring for others needs to be distinguished from merely carrying out one’s obligations by follow
ing rules. This article by using the method of philosophical analysis argues that caring is an emotion-like state fitting within a general explanation of the emo
tions as concern based construals and therefore as unified experiences of beliefs, desires and feelings. By clarifying the concept of care, it tries to lay a foundation for inculcating a culture of caring into the practitioners of the caring profession. Since caring involves care-specific beliefs and desires caring re
quires acquiring the appropriate beliefs and desires which constitute the expe
rience of caring for others.
By clarifying the concept of care, it tries to lay a founda
tion for inculcating a culture of caring into the practitioners of the caring profession
Ten einde ‘n versorgsetiek in die verpleging toe te pas, d.w.s ten einde te kan sorg vir diegene vir wie die verpleegster verantwoordelik is, moet versorging onderskei word van ‘n blote uitvoering van pligte deur ‘n nakoming van reels.
Deur middel van die metode van filosofiese analise, voer hierdie artikel aan dat versorging ‘n soort emosietoestand is wat pas binne ‘n algemene verduideliking van emosies as bemoeienis-gebaseerde konstruele en dus as verenigende ervarings van oortuigings, begeertes en gevoelens. Deur ‘n opheldering van die konsep “sorg”, probeer dit ‘n grondslag vir die inskerping van ‘n versorgingskultuur by die beoefenaars van die versorgingsprofessie te bepaal. Aangesien versorging sorg-spesifieke oortuigings en begeertes behels, vereis versorging dat die toepaslike oortuigings en begeertes wat die ervaring van sorg aan ander konstitueer, verwerf word.
Philosophical discourse
W hen we talk of nursing as the “ car
ing profession” we tend to assum e that everyone understands w hat this means. C aring fo r o n e ’s patients, we think, obviously involves looking af
ter those entrusted to o n e ’s keeping.
But the use of “care” in this context is not so clear when the notion o f w hat it m eans to care is analysed. A nd if the aim is to shift from a scientifically slanted approach in m edicine (which has tended increasingly to view pa
tients not so m uch as persons but rather as the recipients o f treatm ent) to a m ore hum ane one w hich takes the essential hum anity of others as central, then nurses and others in like professions need to care in the fu ll
est sense of the term.
Because this virtue m ust form part of the training of our nurses - especially new recruits - it is essential th a t those w ho do this training as well as those w ho are still undergo ing it know how to care and th is in volves kn o w in g w hat it m eans to care. It is at this fu n dam ental point that a p h ilosop hical analysis o f the c o n ce p t o f “ ca re ” can be useful by providing a fram ew ork fo r th o se re s p o n s ib le fo r th e w e ll
being of the sick to put into practice this crucial aspect of their profession.
The aim of this paper then is by using the m ethods o f philosop hical analy
sis to clarify the co n ce p t of care and thus to indicate som e distinctions and som e boundaries as well as rem ove som e m isperceptions in the hope that those w hose jo b it is to care and to show others how they to o can care m ight be m ade a little easier.
We use the term s “ care” in its various gram m atical form s in several situa
tions such as taking care w hen driv
ing, caring fo r o n e ’s elderly parents, caring a bout w hat happens in the fu ture, being careful about o n e ’s a p p e a ra n c e a n d s o o n . G iv e n th e present co n te xt of a d is c u s s io n of care as it relates to the nursing pro fession and w hat is often seen as the need fo r nurses to care fo r th e ir pa
tients, obviously the relevant use here is caring in the sense of invo lvin g other persons fo r w hose w elfare one is responsible.
This brings in certain m oral co n n o ta tions which m ay be absent from other situations in w h ich we care. M uch d e b a te a b o u t c a re h a s c e n tre d around the m oral issues and, in phi
losophy, has largely concerned the
merits of an ethic o f care as o p p o se d to the m ore traditional rule-governed ethic.1)
The form er can be said to involve our intim ate concern fo r others; the latter can be seen as no m ore than the mere recognition of ou r oblig a tio n s to them . F o llo w in g an e th ica l rule such as Kant's categorical im perative w hich focuses on the m otive fo r a c tion and requires th a t we treat others as ends and not as means, o r M ill’s utilitarian G reatest H appiness Princi
ple, invo lve s a d h e re n c e to fo rm a l principles (albeit o f different kinds), and hence no c o m m itm e n t to any particular person.2) In analysing the co n ce p t o f care, I hop e to be able to d ra w s o m e im p o rta n t d is tin c tio n s between just recognising o bligatio ns and behaving m orally by fo llo w in g a principle, and caring.
I therefore w ant to show that there is a difference betw een ju st learning the rules and becom ing part of a particular kind of re
lationship with another person. However, al
th o u g h I shall m e n tio n th e e th ic a l is sues and w hat I say w ill h a ve s p e c ia l s ig n ific a n c e fo r them , I shall not be c o n c e n tra tin g on care as an ethical notion p e r se but ra th e r o n w h a t it m eans to care for others at all.
This is because our understanding o f the term in a m ore funda
m ental w ay dep e n d s on how we understand w h a t it m e a n s to c a re within the field of ethics and therefore on w hat is involved in an ethic of care. So in a sense w hat I plan to d o is investigate the notion of care but with the hope that on the way I can m ake som e co n trib u tio n to the ethical debate as well and, in this way, also to the profession of nursing.
My concern is th a t little attention in the literature has been paid to un
packing w hat it m eans to care and a great deal on a pplying the unclarified concept in various areas. There does seem to be som e im p licit agreem ent though (even if not spelled out) that care is an em otion of som e kind o r is
at least like an em otion (although this agreem ent seem s to be based on in
tuition rather than sound p h ilo s o p h i
cal principles).
However, the problem is th a t there is n o t m u ch a g re e m e n t on w h a t an em otion itself is.
N ot only does a sim ple exercise of trying to list all those m ental states we call em otions in everyday contexts b e c o m e e x tra o rd in a rily c o m p le x w hen we consider every candida te from say, sorrow, love and g rie f to anxiety, depression and fear and then try to list w hat it is that m akes them all fit under one label, but excursion into the p h ilo so p h ica l literature re
veals confusion rather than co n se n sus.
T h e o rie s a b o u t th e e m o tio n s vary from sensation, physiological, behav
io u ra l, e va lu a tive to c o g n itiv e a c counts, each e m phasising one as
pect above another.3) It is not sur
prising then th a t Bach (1988:
362) fo r exam ple, ta lks of the e m otions as a “ m otley crew ” and concludes that they “ are a m essy s u b je c t” . W hat I w ant to do in a very short tim e is, because of the a p p a r
ent sim ilarities, to a na
ly s e th e c o n c e p t o f care within w hat I take to be the co rre ct ac
count of the em otions ( c o r r e c t o n th e g ro u n d s o f s u p p o r t from a range o f exam ples plus analysis of the concept) with the aim of giving a sounder con ce p tual foundation to the idea of nursing as a caring p ro fession.41
This of course c a n n o t be seen in isolation from ethical im plications.
First then, w hat is an em otion? As al
ready indicated, even philosop hers are not in agreem ent, varying in their explanation from identifying em otions w ith feelings (sensation accounts) to a rguing that they are co m p le x c o m binations of beliefs and desires (co g nitive theories).
Given the w ide variety o f em otions th a t can be identified and their c o m plexity, B ach’s exasperation is only one expression o f the d ifficulty expe
rienced in trying to classify em otions
...ask
what a person is afraid
o f ...
or even to draw the boundary around the general class o f mental states we call em otions.
My ow n view w hich will becom e evi
dent below, is that em otions are co m p le x c o g n itiv e sta te s an d th a t a l
th o u g h we do indeed feel em otions, it w ould be a m istake to assum e that em otions are just feelings. Em otions, I shall argue, are also essentially c o g nitive a lth o u g h , b e ca u se th e y are co m p o u n d s of feelings, beliefs and desires (or desire-like states) - are not only cognitive.
It is because of their cognitive co m ponents, that is, the beliefs and d e sires included in them , that em otions are always directed at or about som e
thing external to them . Phrased dif
ferently, b e cause e m o tio n s are al
w ays a bout som ething or som eone, they are cognitive. The best d e m o n stration o f and su p p o rt fo r this point is the use o f exam ples.
For instance, when we are afraid there is always som ething w hich we fear, when w e are hap p y we are happy a bout a particular state of affairs and w hen w e are sad th e re is a lw ays som ething a bout w hich w e are sad.
A lthough fear and m any other em o tions m ay also be generalised in the sense that, we can be in a general state of fear, it alw ays m akes sense to ask w hat a person is afraid of or w hat they are happy or sad about and any state of happiness or fear requires that a bout w hich one is happy o r of w hich one is afraid.
If we push the generalised case fur
ther it becom es evident that in m ost if not all cases the o bject of the fear has ju s t not been identified and, in ex
trem e situations, it m ight even take psycho-analysis for the person to rec
ognise w hat it th a t is feared (or w hat
ever the relevant em otion m ay be).
The a b o u tn e ss o r d ire c te d n e s s to w hat is external to them is w hat is know n as their intentionality.5) This notion, w hich I shall argue, in the case o f e m o tio n s d e p e n d s on the beliefs and desires contained in them, is also essential in u n d e rs ta n d in g w hat it m eans to care.
Let us, however, first look at the im plications of it fo r the em otions be
fore seeing if the sam e analysis a p plies to caring and therefore before draw ing any im plications a bout car
ing. A sound m ethod is to begin by
analysing everyday exam ples.61 A lthough em otions are intentional as d e s c rib e d a b o v e , in b e in g a b o u t som ething external to them , there are ce rta in c o n c e p tu a l c o n s tra in ts on w hat any em otion can be a bout or directed at.
O ne is not afraid of or happy or sad a b o u t ju s t anything. This suggests that there m ust be a conceptual rela
tion between our em otions and w hat it is they are about. If we exam ine the com ponents of any em otion we must further con clu d e that this, in turn, is because em otions necessarily involve beliefs and desires. Hence, as I shall try to dem onstrate, these states are the intentional com ponen ts of em o
tions and it is they w hich im pose the conceptual restraints. I shall deal with each in turn by relying on exam ples.
A lthough there are a great num ber of things of w hich one m ay be afraid, about w hich we can be happy or sad, in the first place, that w hich one fears m ust be believed to be harmful, that a bout w hich w e are happy m ust be an event o r a state believed to be beneficial and th a t a bout w hich we are sad must in som e way be believed to have been lost to us- in a broad sense.
So we can be afraid of the snake if we believe that it may harm us, happy about w inning the lottery if we believe th a t it w ill change our lives fo r the better and sad that our cat has died if we believe that it has been lost to us forever. It is easy enough to test this claim by ch a n g in g the belief in an em otion because when we do that we change the em otion itself - as any five- finger exercise on the em otions will dem onstrate.
If, for instance, we d o not believe that the snake will harm us it m akes no sense to be afraid of it, or if we be
lieve - as som e people d o - th a t w in
ning the lottery will dam age ou r per
sonal relationships and so not change o ur lives fo r the better then we m ight regret having w on - or at least be less likely to be happy. Furtherm ore, in cases w here a specific belief is m iss
ing we tend to talk o f m oods rather than em otions.
This is w hy one can be in a sorrow ful m o o d o r a cheerful m o o d w ith o u t being able to identify any o b je ct of o ur m oods and when there is noth
ing particular our sadness or cheer
fulness is about - although even here and debatably, general beliefs about the parlous state of affairs or o n e ’s ong o in g g o o d fortune do seem to be required.
I m entioned, however (and exam ples can show why), that desires or de
sire-like states are also aspects of em otions. If this is the case then the conceptual relation between an em o
tion and w hat it is a bout m ust also depend on this further necessary fea
ture of them. In other w ords, the em o
tion we experience is both d e p e n d ent on the beliefs that we have and on our desires.
W hen, fo r instance, Mary is sad that her cat has died she is not sad just because she believes her cat to have died and therefore to be lost to her forever, but also because she desires the cat to continue to be her com pan
ion and therefore not to be lost to her.
If the cat had been a constant source of irritation to her because it messes her house, destroys her sweaters and keeps her awake at night, however, she m ight in fact be relieved that it has fin a lly d ie d b e cause n ow she does not wish that it will continue to be her com panion but on the contrary desires that it should never return. If Jack fears the snake he not only be
lieves that it m ay harm him but also desires not to be harm ed.
And although m ost of us are afraid of snakes there are those w ho are not - either because they do not believe that they will be harm ed - snake han
dlers fo r instance - or even because there can conceivably be a person w ho decides to co m m it suicide by snakebite and so, instead of w ishing that the snake should not harm him, in fa c t de sire s th a t its bite w ill be deadly. Here again if we change the desire w e change the em otion and we can d o another five-finger exercise to show that if there is no desire at all then there is no em otion.
Beliefs therefore by themselves can not be enough to constitute the
cognitive component of
. an emotion.
The im plication we m ust draw is that em otions have their specific objects (what they are about) because of the nature of the beliefs and desires they include. Many of these beliefs and desires can be about other persons and then our em otions are directed to a person and not a thing such as
desires with our fellows, we are also individuals with our own histories and our own situations, meaning that if we do not all have the same beliefs and desires we will not all experience the same em otions in the same contexts.
It follow s that if we w ant people to change their em otions to those we
But em otional feelings are also not mere adjuncts to the beliefs and de
sire which are the com ponents of an em otion. They are in som e way inter
tw ined with those beliefs and desires into a single unified experience. A pang of remorse, for example, is very different from a non-em otive pang
If we really care we will be prepared to take risks in this relationship because although in the patient/nurse situation, the nurse takes the
responsibility for the other’s well-being...
being angry with John because he did not keep his prom ise or distressed about Sally because of her continu
ing m is fo rtu n e .
But because these beliefs and desires are not universal in the sense that not everyone will have the same beliefs and desires un d e r sim ilar c irc u m stances since they depend on a net
work of further beliefs and desires that the subject has (for example, if I be
lieve that to d a y is S aturday then I m ust also have further beliefs about the days of the week), not all of us e xp e rie n ce or w ill e xp e rie n ce the sam e em otions in the sam e situa
tions.
So although m ost of us fear snakes not all of us do and although m ost of us may be happy to win the lottery there are conceivably those for whom such a win m ight be a burden. This is w hy not all of us are afraid of mice, of heights or of the unknow n and why a lthoug h we are usually all happy a b o u t the sam e or sim ilar events, there are also exceptions.
Once again, we can generalise this point over all of the em otions. The son, for exam ple,w hose beloved fa
ther dies will grieve but we do not rule out the possibility that on the other hand, a son w ho has been system atically beaten may be relieved that he will no longer be at the m ercy of his abusive father and so instead of grief may experience relief, perhaps indifference or even regret if he be
lieves further that there will now never be an opportun ity for a loving rela
tionship with his father and he wishes that there could have been.
Although, as cultural and social be
ings, we do share m any beliefs and
m ight consider more appropriate, we try to get them to change their beliefs and desires.
So we do not as a rule tell Sally to stop being distressed and instead try to reassure her that the situation is not as bad as she believes it is and in this way by getting her to alter her belief so to alleviate or remove her dis
tress. Psychotherapy w orks on this principle.
One of the com plicating factors about em otions is that despite the essential requirem ent for a belief and a desire and therefore although they cannot therefore be identified with feelings, they are also essentially felt. When we experience sorrow or happiness or fear we not only have the a p p ro p ri
ate beliefs and desires for these em o
tions, we also experience feelings of sorrow, happiness and fear.
A lthough feelings, being first person subjective states, cannot have exter
nal criteria fo r an e m otion’s identifi
cation, it is enough fo r my purposes here that we can all tell the difference between our own feelings of anger, jo y and sorrow and that in fact we identify our own em otions with refer
ence to our feelings rather than to our beliefs and desires.
Personal experience also provides the evidence for the claim that when an em otion changes so the feelings change. Think here of being angry because another driver bum ps your car. When you discover that the driver has in fact suffered a heart attack and has lost control of his car, your anger in all likelihood will change to co m passion and the feeling of anger will be replaced by one that we associ
ate with com passion.
such as a pang of indigestio n be
cause in being an em otional feeling, the pang of rem orse is not the o u t
com e of a causal chain of events but is imbued with the beliefs and desires which together make up the remorse.
The fact that a person suffering from a pang of remorse, unlike the person suffering from a pang of indigestion, cannot be relieved by painkillers but o n ly by u n d e rg o in g c o u n s e llin g (which could vary from friendly and concerned questioning and advice to intensive psycholog ical treatm ent), pays testim ony to the difference.
C ounselling, unlike drugs, does not rely on treating a chain of physical causes and effects but is aim ed at getting the person to change their beliefs and desires until the rem orse (or other em otion) disappears. This is why I claim ed that this is how psy
chological therapy works. Remorse, like sadness or fear, being an em o
tional feeling, can therefore be said to be co g nitively penetrable in the sense of being suffused with the be
liefs and desires w hich together with the feeling make up the em otion.
In trying to capture this unity, Roberts has called this an intentional feeling w hich we have about or o f ourselves (1988: 190).
One does not feel a pang of rem orse unless one has with th a t pang re
m orse sp e cific beliefs and desires and one does nothave an ache of sorrow unless one also has sorrow specific beliefs and desires. This unity of the experience can even be ex
pressed linguistically and hence we can talk not only of feeling rem orse
ful and of being rem orseful but even of remorseful, sorrowful and fearful
beliefs and, w ithout to o m uch strain, desires.
Although there are som e differences, care seem s to fit rather well into this brief sketch of the em otions. W hen we care we care a bout som eone or som ething. And caring a bout a per
son or a thing includes having the appropriate beliefs and desires about w hat it is w e care.
Depending on the beliefs and desires w hich w e have, w e can care for an
other person, a hobby, our posses
sions, our pets or about global w arm ing. A nd w hen we d o care a b o u t som eone or som ething we believe the object of that care to be im portant and w hen that o b je ct is a person we de
sire that p e rso n ’s welfare or com fort.
In other w ords, when the o bject of care is another hum an being, we d e sire the w ell-being of w hom it is we care about.
... in caring for others we ourselves can grow emotionally and morally...
But th e p ro b le m is th a t ca rin g fo r som eone is very like recognising that we have an obligatio n tow ards them because the same beliefs and desires can a pply to both. The difference is that, as in the case of the em otions as described, when we care for som e
one these beliefs and desires are im bued with feeling. This is not the case w hen w e sim ply recognise our o b li
gations.
This is also where care seem s to d i
gress from w hat we w ould want to call a full-blow n em otion - seem ing rather to be an em otion -like state because it is difficult to identify w hat we w ould call a specific feeling of care. That we feel fo r th e o th e r person is n o t in d o u b t but this feeling seem s to be m ore like concern than like an em o tive feeling. Perhaps th is is w h y it w ould be m ore accurate to say that care is “ a distinct moral sentim ent - an em otional attitude em bedde d in a re la tio n s h ip w ith a n o th e r p e rs o n ” (Blum 1992, in Becker and Becker).
The “ sentim ent” is the em otive part and the “ m oral” here w hich only ap
plies with d ifficulty to all em otions, refers, I think, to the fact that although care m ay not be the sentim ent we do feel for others, it is the sentim ent we o ught to feel fo r others - especially in circum stances in w hich their welfare is our responsibility.
The specific “ sentim ent” since it is allied to an em otion I think refers to the fact that we care fo r the other as opp o se d to m erely recognising an o bligation to look after them .
The question that can now be asked is why recognising an obligation is not adequate in our relationship with o th ers - especially within a nursing co n text and w hy we o ught to care fo r oth
ers when after all w hat is im portant is w hat we do for others. The answer d e p e n d s on th e s p e c ific nature of w hat it m eans to care.
W hat m akes ca rin g d iffe re n t fro m m any other em otions or em otion-like states is the special im portance of what it is we care about. W hen we care fo r som eone else and w e are responsible fo r their welfare, we do not merely acknow ledge that we have a d u ty to ensure th a t they are a d equately looked after.
Caring essentially involves a relation
ship with the other because although the o b je ct of care is acknow ledged to have w orth in its ow n right, in or
der to care for them we need to un
derstand the needs of the other and to respond to them appropriately. But relationships imply dual needs and re
s p o n s e s . A n d a lth o u g h w h e n we care, the needs of the other will guide what we do, the fulfilm ent of our own needs as moral beings in this relation
ship is also im portant.
If we really care we will be prepared to take risks in this relationship be
cause although in the patient/nurse situation, the nurse takes the respon
sibility fo r the o th e r’s w ell-being, car
ing fo r the other will not rely solely on the depen dence of the other. Taking risks can be seen in the light of what Frankfurt (1982:260) has said of peo
ple w ho care and th a t is th a t they m ake them selves “vulnerable to the losses and susceptible to the ben
efits” because a person w ho cares “ is as it w ere invested in ” the one fo r w hom she o r he cares. If we are in
vested in those fo r w hom we care it
follow s that our own w ell-being must be tied up with theirs and the im pli
cation is that in caring fo r others we ourselves can grow em otionally and morally.
This is w hat M eyeroff (1971: 1) says when he claim s that caring is not to be confused with such m eanings as w ishing well, liking, com forting and m aintaining, or sim ply having an in
terest in w hat happens to another.
Also it is not an isolated feeling or a m om entary relationship, nor is it sim ply a m atter of w anting to care for som e person.
Caring, as helping another to grow and actualize himself, is a process, a w ay of relating to som eone that in
volves developm ent, in the sam e way that frie n d sh ip can only em erge in tim e through mutual trust and a deep
ening and qualitative transform ation o f the relationship.
He goes on to say that in this rela
tionship although I, as the person who cares, d o not care in order to actual- ise m yself (this w ould of course be to have self-centered motives incom pat
ible with caring w hich is essentially directed at the other), because in car
ing I do actualise myself, caring gives m eaning to my life. Therefore those w ho care are also beneficiaries of that caring.
A lth o u g h c a rin g m ig h t in v o lv e a unique relationship with the person fo r w hom we care, ju st as with em o tions, the particular nature of the o b je ct of care and the special im por
tance placed on it, will depend on the b e lie fs a n d d e s ire s th a t w e have about the other.
A n d a lth o u g h th e re m ig h t be no unique feeling called a feeling of care, caring, as opposed to being under an obligation to look after another, is an experience im bued w ith feelings - several of them - especially a feeling of concern.
A parallel can be drawn here with guilt to fill out the point and to further illus
trate w hy caring is different from mere obligation. A person can recognise that she is guilty of com m itting a crime and in that sense acknow led ge her guilt and her obligation to change her behaviour - just as a person can rec
ognise that he has an obligation to look after another and so a cknow l
e dge th a t it is his duty to fulfil that obligation.
The appropriate beliefs and desires are all that are required here. But in order to feel guilty in the sense of ex
periencing the em otion of guilt and so to truly com m it herself to a life free of crime, being guilty m ust m atter to her. And although she m ust take her
self to be guilty in order to feel guilty she m ust also be concerned that she is guilty - in fact she m ust care about being guilty.
This is w hy Roberts calls em otions
“ concern based construals". In order to experience an em otion one must both take oneself to be in the em o
tive specific way by having the right beliefs and desires and this construal or taking m ust be of concern to one.
This is w hy an em otive feeling, as Roberts has argued, is a feeling about or of oneself.
And caring, as we have seen, is not the m ere a cknow led gem ent of the other’s im portance, but because the o th e r’s welfare m ust m atter to one, one m ust take oneself to be part of the caring relationship as explained above and furtherm ore, being part of that relationship m ust also m atter to one. Mattering in other w ords must matter.
Taking oneself in this way is to expe
rience a concern based construal of a special kind. If I am right, caring for others requires this condition in as in
tim ate a way as feeling guilty, or feel
ing jealous or feeling anxious - if anxi
ety is indeed an em otion. And now the condition s under which “ looking after the sick” becomes ”caring for the s ic k ” rather than ju s t “ co m fo rtin g , m aintaining or having an interest in w hat happens to another” becom e clearer.
Understanding w hat it means to care involves understanding that there are appropriate care-specific beliefs and desires and these can be inculcated or acquired.
Furthermore, since caring has moral connota tions and consists in m ore than m erely doing the right thing, car
ing fo r others seems to be desirable.
G iven th e in b u ilt o u g h t in w h a t it m eans to care, it follow s that caring m u st be w o rth w h ile an d th a t we should persuade those w ho do not
care to becom e caring individuals - especially in contexts where the o b je ct of that care is anothe r person whose well-being depends largely on one.
Persuading someone to care, like per
su a d in g so m e o n e to ch a n g e any em otion, therefore involves inculcat
ing care-specific beliefs and desires in those w ho do not have them.
But this in itself is not enough because caring is m ore than ju st having the essential beliefs and desires and just inculcating them may m erely be to persuade such a person to recognise her obligations. This is because we can have these very beliefs and d e sires without actually experiencing the
“ m oral sentim ent” of care.
These beliefs and desires must, as Blum has said, be “ em b e d d e d ” , as Frankfurt has said must be “ invested”
in the person, and, if I am to care, ac
cording to Roberts, m ust be part of a concern based construal of m yself that matters to me and this means that they m ust be part of a feeling that I have about o r of myself.
Scruton (1987: 80) has tried to cap
ture this difficult notion in the follow ing way and, given the present co n text, we can now take the liberty of replacing his use of em otion w hich is what he is really talking about with that of care:
[Caring does] not involve thoughts and desires directed upon the ob
ject only, but also thoughts and desires concerning the subject. [It]
is a kind of bridge between subject and object, and its direction onto the world is also a ‘situating’ of the subject... the self looms large as the bearer of sacred burdens...[and is]... susceptible to important trans
formations as we shift attention from the first person to the second person, and again to the third per
son point of view.
The self engaged is not the same as the self observed...
I think this is w hat is im plicit in the so- called ethic of care and w hat nursing the sick in the m orally right way im plies - as opposed to m erely practis
ing a rule-governed ethic w hich has so often been assum ed to be Suffi
cient in our transactions with others.
But in order to grasp its full signifi
cance and, given the im plicit ought in the notion of a moral sentim ent, to find the right m ethod of ensuring that those w ho do not, do com e to care rather than ju st recognise that they have obligations, it is im perative that w e u n d e rs ta n d w h a t it m eans to care.71
Notes
I
An ethic of care is often taken to be a fem inist ethic.The first system atic exposition of this type of ethic was by Carol G illigan 1982. In a different voice: psychologi
cal theory and w o m en ’s developm ent. I have also re
stricted m y com parison of care w ithin the area of p h ilo sophical ethics to w hat m ay alm ost be called its polar opposite, nam ely rule-centered ethics. This m eans that so-called virtue-centered ethical theories w hich m ay be able to accom m odate the notion of caring, have not as such been included in m y discussion. This is because fem inists and others w ho endorse an ethic of care have specifically reacted to rule-centered accounts.
2
The aim o f K a n t’s C ritiq u e o f p ra c tic a l reaso n (1788) was to ascertain and explain the scope of moral reasoning and, taking m otives as the foundation fo r an ethical principle, has becom e the exam ple p a r excellence of a deonto logical ethic. Mill, on the other hand, w ho in Utilitarianism (1863), argued for the goo d on the basis of the consequences of action, nam ely that the greatest happiness should result, is taken as the prim e advocate of teleological ethics.3
A lthough C alhoun and S olom on (1984) call these the five main approaches, they dem onstrate that there is further confusion by cutting across their own classification and dividing the articles in their volum e into the vari
ous identified m ost intractable problem s the em otions present.
4
See W ilkinson, Emotion and fiction (1992) fo r an ex tensive analysis of the em otions.5
In reaction to the legacy of Descartes and in an at te m p t to distinguish m ental from physical pheno m ena, Brentano (1874) tried to find a positive characteristic of m ind and m ental states. He to o k this to be intentional- ity. There are m any problem s associated with this notion and it has, as a result, received w ide philosophical attention. This attention is often directed at trying to give a more detailed acco u n t of B rentano’s original explanation and to overcom e the problem s inherent in it.
One such problem is the relation between the external (what the m ental state is about) to the internal subject.
See, fo r exam ple Searle, J. 1984. Intentionality. C am bridge: C am bridge University Press. Searle’s argues that intentional m ental states are representational and that representation can be explained in term s of m ore basic notions such as propositional content, direction of fit and cond itio n s of satisfaction.
6
This m ethod, also know n as c o n ce p tu a l analysis, relies on exam ining the use of concepts in everyday contexts and uses ordinary language as the point of d e parture. Bertrand Russell was (arguably) the inspiration fo r it and it reached the height of its popula rity in the m id tw entieth century after being perfected by G ilbert Ryle, inter alia, in the C oncept o f m ind and JL Austin in, inter alia, Sense and sensibilia.Briefly, the rationale behind it is that ordinary language
gives us all the distinctions we need and that since o rd i
nary language can be both our best tool fo r dealing with reality and be deceptive, we need to exam ine and ana
lyse how we use concepts in everyday contexts if we want to understand the meaning of concepts. It is also accepted that such understanding is a prerequisite fo r any sound theorising. A lthough now generally th o u g h t to be lim ited on its own, the m ethod is also recognised for its co n trib u tion to clarity and rigour.
7
This article was first read at a sym posium o f the Unisa H onor Society of Nursing on “ C aring” in A ugust 1996.Bibliography
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