Property Case Digest

TUMALAD V. VICENCIO TUMALAD V. VICENCIO

41 SCRA 143 41 SCRA 143 FACTS:

FACTS: Vicencio and SimVicencio and Simeon executed a chateon executed a chattel mortgtel mortgage in favorage in favor of plaintiff

of plaintiffs s Tumalad oveTumalad over their house, r their house, which was which was being rented bybeing rented by Madrigal and

Madrigal and company. company. This was executed This was executed to guarantee a to guarantee a loan,loan, payable

payable in in one one year year with with a a 12% 12% per per annum annum interest. interest. The The mortgagemortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure

was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay to pay the loan. the loan. The houseThe house was sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. was sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. A

A corresponding corresponding certificertificate cate of of sale sale was was issued. issued. Thereafter, Thereafter, thethe plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the defendants, praying plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners.

that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners. ISSUE:

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOWHETHER OR NOT THE T THE SUBJECT MATTER OF SUBJECT MATTER OF THE MORTGAGE, ATHE MORTGAGE, A HOUSE OF STRONG MATERIALS, BE THE OBKECT OF A CHATTEL HOUSE OF STRONG MATERIALS, BE THE OBKECT OF A CHATTEL MORTGAGE?

MORTGAGE? HELD:

HELD: Certain deviationCertain deviations have been s have been allowed from allowed from the generalthe general doctrine

doctrine that buildings are that buildings are immovable property such immovable property such as when as when throughthrough stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those by

by their their nature nature would would be be real real property. property. This This is is partly partly based based on on thethe principle of estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements principle of estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by

by the the owner owner declaring declaring his his house house as as chattel, chattel, a a conduct conduct that that maymay conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise. conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise. In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a

transferring a property through property through chattel chattel mortgage could mortgage could only haveonly have meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least, meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least,

intended to treat the same as

intended to treat the same as

such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.

inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.

PRUDENTIAL BANK V. PANIS PRUDENTIAL BANK V. PANIS

153 SCRA 390 153 SCRA 390 FACTS:

FACTS: Spouses Magcale secured Spouses Magcale secured a loan from a loan from Prudential Bank. Prudential Bank. ToTo secure payment, they executed a real estate mortgage over a secure payment, they executed a real estate mortgage over a residential building.

residential building. The mortgage included The mortgage included also the right also the right to occupy to occupy thethe lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the

spouses for the lot to which the lot to which the building stood. building stood. After securing the firstAfter securing the first loan,

loan, the the spouses spouses secured secured another another from from the the same same bank. bank. ToTo secure

secure payment, payment, another another real real estate estate mortgage mortgage was was executed executed over over thethe

same properties.

same properties.

The Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent The Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later on mortgaged to the bank. The spouses over the land which was later on mortgaged to the bank. The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the REM was extrajudicially then failed to pay for the loan and the REM was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses.

spouses. The respondent court The respondent court held that the held that the REM was null REM was null and void.and void. ISSUES: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEEDS OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE ISSUES: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEEDS OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE ARE VALID; AND

ARE VALID; AND

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPERVENING ISSUANCE IN FAVOR OF 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPERVENING ISSUANCE IN FAVOR OF

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OF MISCELLANEOUS SALES PATENT NO. 4776 PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OF MISCELLANEOUS SALES PATENT NO. 4776 ON APRIL 24, 1972

ON APRIL 24, 1972 UNDER ACT NO. 730 AND THE COVERING ORIGINALUNDER ACT NO. 730 AND THE COVERING ORIGINAL CERTIFICAT

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE E OF TITLE NO. P-2554 ON MAY NO. P-2554 ON MAY 15,1972 HAVE THE EFFECT15,1972 HAVE THE EFFECT OF INVALIDATING THE DEEDS OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE.

OF INVALIDATING THE DEEDS OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE. HELD:

HELD:

A real estate

A real estate mortgage can be constituted on mortgage can be constituted on the building the building erected onerected on the land belonging to another.

the land belonging to another.

The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the

property. property.

While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence

absence of stipulaof stipulation of the tion of the improvements theimprovements thereon, buildingreon, buildings, stills, still a

a building building in itself may in itself may be mortgaged be mortgaged by itself by itself apart from apart from the land the land onon which it is

which it is built. built. Such a Such a mortgage would still be considered as mortgage would still be considered as a REMa REM for the building would

for the building would

still be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately still be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.

and apart from the land.

The original mortgage on the building and right to occupancy of the The original mortgage on the building and right to occupancy of the land

land was executed was executed before the before the issuance of issuance of the sales the sales patent andpatent and before the

before the government was divested of government was divested of title to the land. title to the land. UnderUnder the foreg

the foregoing, oing, it is it is evident evident that that the mthe mortgage ortgage executed by executed by privateprivate respondent on his own

respondent on his own buildin

building was g was a valid mortgage.a valid mortgage.

As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was issued and thus prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act. issued and thus prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act.

SERGS

SERGS PRODUCTS PRODUCTS AND AND GOQUIOLAY GOQUIOLAY V. V. PCI PCI LEASING LEASING AND AND FINANCEFINANCE 338 SCRA 499

338 SCRA 499 FACTS:

FACTS: PCI filed PCI filed a case for a case for collecticollection of a sum on of a sum of money as of money as wellwell as a writ of

as a writ of replevin foreplevin for the seizur the seizure of mre of machineries, achineries, subject of asubject of a chattel

chattel mortgage executed by mortgage executed by petitioner in petitioner in favor of favor of PCI.PCI.

Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion

motion for for special protective special protective order. order. It It asserts asserts that that the the machineriemachineriess were real property and could not be subject of a chattel mortgage. were real property and could not be subject of a chattel mortgage.

The Issue The Issue

A. Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by SERGS became real property by virtue of immobilization.

HELD:

The machineries in question have become immobilized by

destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in nature.

Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be

considered as personal. After agreement, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.

TSAI V. COURT OF APPEALS 336 SCRA 324

FACTS: EVERTEX secured a loan from PBC, guaranteed by a real estate and chattel mortgage over a parcel of land where the factory stands, and the chattels located therein, as included in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract. Another loan was obtained secured by a chattel mortgage over properties with similar descriptions listed in the first schedule. During the date of execution of the second mortgage, EVERTEX purchased machineries and equipment.

Due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed for insolvency

proceedings. It failed to pay its obligation and thus, PBC initiated extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. PBC was the highest bidder in the public auctions, making it the owner of the properties. It then leased the factory premises

to Tsai. Afterwards, EVERTEX sought the annulment of the sale and conveyance of the properties to PBC as it was allegedly a violation of the INSOLVENCY LAW.

The RTC held that the lease and sale were irregular as it involved properties not included in the schedule of the mortgage contract.

HELD:

While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of REM and CM executed by the parties gives a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the trial and

appellate courts show that the intention was to treat the machineries as movables or

personal property.

Assuming that the properties were considered immovables,

nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.

Sec. of DENR vs. yap g.r. no. 167707

Facts: Respondents-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being

classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island.

Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of  PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are

inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of  imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

Issue: Is PGMA's presidential proclaimation no. 1064 classifying boracay island into 400 hectares of reserved and forest land and 628 hectares of  agricultural land (alienable and disposable) valid and constitutional?

Ruling: In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of  the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.

Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President.

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of 

Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to

existing vested rights.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.

Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess

grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,

Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties

inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of  Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in

administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community

Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the

alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.

G. R. NO. 158449 October 22, 2004

LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES IGTIBEN, JOSE DEL ROSARIO IGTIBEN, JR. and THERESA TOPACIO MEDINA, petitioners, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

petitioners filed with the trial court an application for registration of  land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, covering a parcel of land. Petitioners alleged that they acquired the Subject Property by

purchase, and that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in actual, continuous,

uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner for more that 30 years.3

the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to petitioners, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.7

The history of possession of the Subject Property, was supported by tax declarations in the name of petitioners and their

predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to 1998.8

, the trial court rendered a decision approving petitioners application for registration of the Subject Property. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the

decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court erred in approving the application for registration despite petitioners failure to prove

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Subject Property since 12 June 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073. Moreover, petitioners

also failed to produce monuments of title to tack their possession to those of their predecessors-in-interest in compliance with the

prescriptive period required by law.9

On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finding the appeal meritorious, setting aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissing the application for registration of petitioners.10 The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its resolution dated 22 May 2003.11Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari

Issue: 1) Whether petitioners have complied with the period of  possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act? Held:

(1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940, which provides for a prescriptive period of thirty (30) years

possession, applies only to applications for free patents;

(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Property covered by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act; and

(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial

confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title the continuous possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or earlier, which

G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria

Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no

mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the

muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not

constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name,

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.

As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of  May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court,

Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision "is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the

evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the

subject lots which would warrant their registration under  (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

Issue: whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.

public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as

alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of  the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible

evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.15

respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land

applied for as alienable and disposable.

declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the government.21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and

continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22

Director of Forestry v. Villareal

[G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]

En Banc, Cruz (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part.

Facts: Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several persons, including the Director of Foresty on  behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was

approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of  Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a  petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: _{Whether or not the land in dispute was forestal in nature and}

not subject to private appropriation?

HELD: The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of  Appeals and dismissed the application for registration of title of  Villareal,

4. Administrative Code of 1917; Mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of the country

Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared that

mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on 1 October 1917, providing in Section 1820 of said code that ³for the  purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and

mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." The legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised

Administrative Code of 1917, remains unamended up to now, provides that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of  the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

E_DUBIGIS GOR _DUL_{A, C}ELSO _{V. F}ERN_AN_DEZ_{, J}R _{., C}ELSO _A.

FERN_AN_DEZ_, NOR _A ELLEN ESTRELL_ADO_{, D}E_VELOP_MENT B_ANK  O_F THE PHILIPPINES_{, J.F. F}ESTE_JO _AN_{D C}O_., IN_C.

AN_D REGISTER  O_{F D}EE_DS O_F L_AGUN_{A, Petitioner s, vs.} THE HONOR _ABLE _COURT O_{F A}PPE_ALS _and REPUBLI_C O_F THE PHILIPPINES _{(represented by the} N_ational P_{ower Corporation),}

 Respond ents. D E _C I S I O N

former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 573[3] withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside as permanent forest reserves, subject to private rights, certain parcels of the public domain which included Parcel No. 9 - Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve.

They were primarily for use as watershed area.

the parcel of land subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners' explicit admission,[4] within Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve. virtualawlibrary

 petitioner Edubigis Gordula filed with the Bureau of Lands, an

Application[5] for a Free Patent over the land. Manuel Fernandez and several others also filed free patent applications covering other parcels of land in the area.

Mr. Antonio Aquino, Jr., the Civil Security Officer of the Cavinti

reservoir complex, sent a Memorandum to the President of the Napocor  informing him of the fences and roads being constructed in the saddle area, more particularly, in the lots sold by petitioner Fernandez to

 petitioner Estrellado. virtualawlibrary

Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, filed against petitioners a Complaint for Annulment of Free Patent and Cancellation of Titles and Reversion with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.[8]

the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.

Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. virtualawlibrary

On June 20, 1996, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled against  petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcel of lands are non-disposable and inalienable public land?

HELD: the two (2) parcels of land were public disposable and alienable lands before the issuance, by the former President, of Proclamation No. 573, on June 26, 196[9]. x x x The property was, however, later 

reserved, under Proclamation No. 573, as a permanent forest, on June 26, 196[9]. Since then, the property became non-disposable and

inalienable public land. By their very nature[13] or by executive or  statutory fiat, they are outside the commerce of man, unsusceptible of   private appropriation in any form,[14] and inconvertible into any

character less than of inalienable public domain, regardless of their  actual state, for as long as the reservation subsists and is not revoked by a subsequent valid declassification.[15] virtualawlibrary

Petitioners do not contest the nature of the land in the case at bar. It is admitted that it lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable and indisposable.

 No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state.[17] The facts show that petitioner  Gordula, did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of 

Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good. virtualawlibrary

Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses PEDRO and CRISANTA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. FEDERICO

ARLOS, MARY ARLOS, TEOFILO OJERIO and BELLA OJERIO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J .:

Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and  disposable lands of the public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer  ownership or possessory rights. A suit for the reversion of such property to the State may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The Facts

Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for 

registration, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their titles [to] three parcels of land, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan,.

³Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos opposed the application for 

registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the

government through sales patents.

³The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application,

contending that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately

 preceding the filing of the application; and that the parcels of land

applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to comply with the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants and cultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of petitioners, which were ³incongruous with reality,´ bolstered the ³finding that [they had] never occupied, cultivated or made improvements on the property.´

The Issues

ISSUE: Whther or not (1) the registration of respondents¶ title under the Public Land Act is proper?

HELD:

Respondents¶ application for registration of title to the three parcels of  land that were once part of the public domain is governed by the Public Land Act,

a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073 clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US military reservation that had been turned over to the Philippine

government in 1965, was declared disposable and alienable only in 1971.

Second , respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the subject property from 1947 until 1971 when the land was

declared alienable and disposable, because it was a military reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry or settlement. We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in 1971; hence, respondents have not satisfied the thirty-year requirement under the Public Land Act. Moreover, they could not have occupied the property for thirty years, because it formed part of a military reservation. Clearly then, their application for the registration of their titles was erroneously granted by the appellate and the trial courts.

G.R. No. L-10510

LEON_CIO Z_AR _ATE_{, applicant-appellant,}

vs.

THE _DIRE_CTOR  O_F L_AN_DS_, ET _AL_{., objectors-appellees.}

 Aurelio Cecilio for appellant.

 Attorney-General  Avanceña in behalf of Director of Lands. Moreland, J  _.:

FACTS:This is a proceeding to register the title to lands described in the  petition. The Government of the Philippine Islands interposed an

objection to the registration of title on the ground "that said parcel of  land was part of the public domain and is occupied by Apolonio Gamido and Bibiana Olivite by virtue of applications made by them for 

homesteads Nos. 2061 and 5626, respectively. Registration of title to that portion of the land found to be occupied by the persons and highway named was denied; and from that judgment the applicant appealed.

the lands in question belong to the applicant who has shown by a strong  preponderance of the evidence that he is the owner thereof. The land in

question not being public and, the Government of the Philippine Islands had no authority to declare it open for homesteads; and as a necessary

consequence, whatever concessions the Government has made with respect to such land are without force and effect, except as to the

homestead of Apolonio Gamido who, prior to the commencement of this  proceeding, appears to have received his homestead patent from the

Government. Under Act No. 926 a patent issued under the Homestead Law has all the force and effect of a Torrens title acquired under Act No. 496; and that being the case, and no question having been raised here or  in the court below as to the validity of that Act in connection with the  proceedings for homesteads mentioned in this case, we must respect the

title so secured, provided it be a fact that a patent has been secured in any of said homestead proceedings.

IT clearly appears that the applicant and his predecessors in interest were the owners of and had a good title thereto. In our judgment the evidence falls far short of showing abandonment, the record discloses no acts of  the owners on which abandonment can be cased. Nor is there any claim of title by adverse possession.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPLICANT HAS THE RIGHT TO REGISTER THE TITLE DESCRIBED IN THE APPLICATION? HELD: it is declared that the applicant has the right to register title to all of the lands described in the application, with the exception of that

 portion claimed as a homestead by Apolonio Gamido, which homestead shall be excluded from registration by the applicant provided the Court of Land Registration shall find that said Apolonio Gamido has obtained a patent for said land; but if the Court of Land Registration finds that said Gamido has not yet obtained a patent therefor, then the court shall register title in favor of the applicant to all the lands described in the application.

G_.R _. N_{o. 163766 June 22, 2006}

REPUBLI_C O_F THE PHILIPPINES_{, Petitioner,}

CAN_{DY MA}KER _, IN_{C., as represented by its} P_resident, ONG _YEE SEE_,*

Respondent

D E C I S I O N

Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, about 900 meters away from the Laguna de Bay,

The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Antipolo City filed on August 18, 1999 his Report8 declaring that

"[t]he land falls within the Alienable and Disposable Zone, On the other  hand, the LRA, in its September 21, 1999 Report,9 recommended the exclusion of Lot No. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable.

On September 30, 1999, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) approved Resolution No. 113, Series of 1993, providing that untitled shoreland areas may be leased subject to conditions enumerated therein.

The applicant filed its Amended Application10 on December 15, 1999 for the confirmation of its alleged title on Lot No. 3138,

On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its Opposition17 to the Amended Application in which it alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and

disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended. the municipal court hereby rendered judgment confirming title of the applicants over the real property

On appeal to the CA, the petitioner contended that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the application for registration since the actual copies of the Official Gazette (O.G.) where the notice of hearing was  published were not adduced in evidence; the applicant likewise failed to

establish exclusive ownership over the subject property in the manner   prescribed by law.

The applicant averred in its Appellee¶s Brief 54 that Sec. 14, par. 1 of  P.D. 1529 is inapplicable since it speaks of possession and occupation of  alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Instead, par. 4 of  the same section55 should govern because the subject parcels of land are lands of private ownership, having being acquired through purchase from its predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, inherited the same from their parents.

the appellate court rendered judgment which dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC,56:

The issues in this case are the following: (2) whether the property

subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and, if so, (3) whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its ownership over the property under  Section 14 of P.D. 1529.

The petition is meritorious.

On the second and third issues, we find and so rule that the property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public

agricultural land until July 18, 1966. However, respondent failed to  prove that it possesses registerable title over the property.

the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73278 is SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court of 

Taytay, Rizal is DIRECTED to dismiss the application for registration of  respondent Candymaker, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. 99-0031.

U_{sero v Court of Appeals,} G_.R _. N_{o. 152115, 26 January 2005}

Corona (J.)

This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of the Court of  Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the private respondent are registered

owners of neighboring parcels of land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of land with stagnant body of water. Whenever there is a

storm or heavy rain, the water therein would flood thereby causing damage to houses of the Polinars prompting them to build a concrete wall on the bank of the strip of land about 3meters from their house and riprapped the soil in that portion. The Useros claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the halt of the construction but the Polinars never 

heeded believing that the strip is part of a creek. However, the Polinars offered to pay for the land. As the parties still failed to settle, both filed separate complaints for forcible entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the regional trial court reversed and ordered the dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the existence of  the creek between the lots.

 I _{ssue: Whether or not the disput ed st r ip of land is par t of the creek} 

hence par t of public domain Ruling:

Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil Code provides for properties which are part of public domain. A creek is included in the phrase "and others of similar character". A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of a river  is a property belonging to the public domain, therefore not susceptible of   private ownership. Being a public water, it cannot be registered under 

the Torrens system under the name of any individual.

JOSE MENCHAVEZ, JUAN MENCHAVEZ JR., SIMEON

MENCHAVEZ,

RODOLFO

MENCHAVEZ,

CESAR 

MENCHAVEZ,

REYNALDO,

MENCHAVEZ,

ALMA

MENCHAVEZ, ELMA MENCHAVEZ, CHARITO M.

MAGA, FE M. POTOT, THELMA M. REROMA, MYRNA

M. YBAÑEZ, and SARAH M. VILLABER,

 petitioners

,

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,

_:

A void contract is deemed legally nonexistent. It

produces no legal effect. As a general rule, courts leave

parties to such a contract as they are, because they are

in pari delicto

or equally at fault. Neither party is entitled

to legal protection.

T

he Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, assailing the February 28, 2001

Decision[2] and the April 16, 2002 Resolution[3] of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 51144.

he

challenged Decision disposed as follows:

³W

HEREFORE

,

the

assailed

decision

is

hereby

MODIFIED

, as follows:

 ³

1.

Ordering [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay

the [respondent] the amount of P128,074.40 as actual

damages, and P50,000.00 as liquidated damages;

 ³

2.

Dismissing the third party complaint against the

third party defendants;

 ³

3.

Upholding the counterclaims of the third party

defendants against the [petitioners. Petitioners] are

hereby required to pay [the] third party defendants the

sum of P30,000.00 as moral damages for the clearly

unfounded suit;

 ³

4.

Requiring the [petitioners] to reimburse the third

party defendants the sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of 

attorney¶s fees and appearance fees of P300.00 per

appearance;

 ³

5.

Requiring the [petitioners] to reimburse the third

party defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary

damages pro bono publico and litigation expenses

including costs, in the sum of P5,000.00.´[4]

T

he assailed Resolution denied petitioners¶ Motion for

Reconsideration.

T

he Facts

On February 28, 1986, a

Contract of Lease´ was

executed by Jose S. Menchavez, Juan S. Menchavez Sr.,

Juan S. Menchavez Jr., Rodolfo Menchavez, Simeon

Menchavez, Reynaldo Menchavez, Cesar Menchavez,

Charito M. Maga, Fe M. Potot,

helma R. Reroma, Myrna

Ybañez, Sonia S. Menchavez, Sarah Villaver, Alma S.

Menchavez, and Elma S. Menchavez, as lessors; and

Florentino

eves Jr. as lessee Of an area covered by

FISHPOND

APPLICA

ION

No.

VI-1076

of

Juan

Menchavez, Sr., covering an area of 10.0 hectares more

or less located at

abuelan, Cebu;

On June 2, 1988, Cebu R

C Sheriffs Gumersindo

Gimenez and Arturo Cabigon demolished the fishpond

dikes

constructed

by

respondent

and

delivered

possession of the subject property to other parties.[6] As

a result, he filed a Complaint for damages with

petitioners. In his Complaint, he alleged that the lessors

had violated their Contract of Lease,

 ³

As a consequence of these provisions, and the declared

public policy of the State under the Regalian Doctrine,

the lease contract between Florentino

eves, Jr. and Juan

Menchavez Sr. and his family is a patent nullity. Being a

patent nullity, [petitioners] could not give any rights to

Florentino

eves, Jr. under the principle: µNEMO DA

QUOD NON HABE

¶ - meaning ONE CANNO

GIVE WHA

HE DOES NO

HAVE, considering that this property in

litigation belongs to the State and not to [petitioners].

T

herefore, the first issue is resolved in the negative, as

the court declares the contract of lease as invalid and

void ab-initio.

 ³

On the issue of whether [respondent] and [petitioners]

are guilty of mutual fraud, the court rules that the

[respondent] and [petitioners] are in

 pari-delicto

. As a

consequence of this, the court must leave them where

they are found. x x x.

x x x

x x x

x x x

 ³

x x x. Why? Because the defendants ought to have

known that they cannot lease what does not belong to

them for as a matter of fact, they themselves are still

applying for a lease of the same property under litigation

from the government.

 ³

On the other hand, Florentino

eves, being fully aware

that [petitioners were] not yet the owner[s], had

assumed the risks and under the principle of VOLEN

I

NON FI

INJURIA NEQUES DOLUS - He who voluntarily

assumes a risk, does not suffer damage[s] thereby. As a

consequence, when

eves leased the fishpond area from

[petitioners]- who were mere holders or possessors

thereof, he took the risk that it may turn out later that

his application for lease may not be approved.

 ³

After the court has ruled that the contract of lease is

null and void ab-initio, there is no right of the

[respondent] to protect and therefore[,] there is no basis

for questioning the Sheriff¶s authority to demolish the

dikes in order to restore the prevailing party, under the

principle VIDE

UR NEMO QUISQUAM ID CAPERE QUOD EI

NECESSE ES

ALII RES

I

UERE - He will not be

considered as using force who exercise his rights and

proceeds by the force of law.

T

he court hereby renders judgment as follows:

 ³

1.

Dismissing the x x x complaint by the [respondent]

against the [petitioners];

 ³

2.

Dismissing the third party complaint against the

third party defendants;

Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,

where it was docketed as CA-GR CV No. 51144.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

T

he CA disagreed with the R

C¶s finding that petitioners

and respondent were

in pari delicto

. It contended that

while there was negligence on the part of respondent for

failing to verify the ownership of the subject property,

there was no evidence that he had knowledge of 

petitioners¶ lack of ownership.[11]

Hence, this Petition.[15]

T

he Issues

W 

ere the Parties

in Pari Delicto?

T

he Court shall discuss the two issues simultaneously.

In Pari Delicto Rule

on Void Contracts

T

he parties do not dispute the finding of the trial and the

appellate courts that the Contract of Lease was void.[17]

Indeed, the R

C correctly held that it was the State, not

petitioners, that owned the fishpond.

he 1987

Constitution specifically declares that all lands of the

public domain, waters,

isheries

and other natural

resources belong to the State.[18] Included here are

fishponds, which may not be alienated but only

leased.[19] Possession thereof, no matter how long,

cannot ripen into ownership.[20]

Being merely applicants for the lease of the fishponds,

petitioners had no transferable right over them. And

even if the State were to grant their application, the law

expressly disallowed sublease of the fishponds to

respondent.[21] Void are all contracts in which the cause,

object or purpose is contrary to law, public order or

public policy.[22]

F 

inding of 

In Pari Delicto:

 A Question of 

act 

Unquestionably, petitioners leased out a property that did

not belong to them, one that they had no authority to

sublease.

he trial court correctly observed that

petitioners still had a pending lease application with the

State at the time they entered into the Contract with

respondent.[33]

Respondent, on the other hand, claims that petitioners

misled him into executing the Contract.[34] He insists

that he relied on their assertions regarding their

ownership of the property. His own evidence, however,

rebuts his contention that he did not know that they

lacked ownership. At the very least, he had notice of 

their doubtful ownership of the fishpond.

Respondent himself admitted that he was aware that the

petitioners¶ lease application for the fishpond had not yet

been approved.[35]

hus, he knowingly entered into the

Contract with the risk that the application might be

disapproved. Noteworthy is the fact that the existence of 

a fishpond lease application necessarily contradicts a

claim of ownership.

hat respondent did not know of 

petitioners¶ lack of ownership is therefore incredible.

A cursory examination of the Contract suggests that it

was drafted to favor the lessee. It can readily be

presumed that it was he or his counsel who prepared it

--a m--atter supported by petitioners¶ evidence.[39]

he

ambiguity should therefore be resolved against him,

being the one who primarily caused it.[40]

T

he CA erred in finding that petitioners had failed to

prove actual knowledge of respondent of the ownership

status of the property that had been leased to him. it

reveals his fault in entering into a void Contract. As both

parties are equally at fault, neither may recover against

the other.[42]

Since there is no contract, the injured party may only

recover through other sources of obligations such as a

law or a quasi-contract.[47] A party recovering through

these other sources of obligations may not claim

liquidated damages, which is an obligation arising from a

contract.

W

HEREFORE

, the Petition is GRAN

ED and the assailed

Decision and Resolution SE

ASIDE.

he Decision of the

trial court is hereby REINS

A

ED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CH_AVEZ _V. PUBLI_C EST_ATES _AUTHORIT_Y

384 S_CR _{A 152}

FACTS:

President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the development, improvement, and

acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal

Road and Reclamation Project.

Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the

development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a  joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the

Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This

 prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the legality of  the JVA.

Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties.

ISSUE:

W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

HEL_D:

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are owned by the State and except for 

alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare reclamation project have been

reclaimed, and the rest of the area are stillsubmerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.

The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters and other natural resources and

consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn¶t convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential

  proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as

alienable and disposable if the law has reserved them for some   public or quasi-public use.

FERN_AN_{DA A}RBI_AS_, PETITIONER _{, V}S_. THE REPUBLI_C O_F THE PHILIPPINES_, RESPON_DENT_.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Jardeleza) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] selling to petitioner, married to Jimmy Arbias (Jimmy), a parcel of unregistered land for the sum of P33,000.00. According to the Deed, the subject property was residential and consisted of 600 square meters, more or less.

 petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Application for Registration of  Title[6] over the subject property,

the respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Notice of Appearance and deputized the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City to appear on its behalf before the RTC in LRC Case No. N-1025. Thereafter, the respondent filed an Opposition

to petitioner's application for registration of the subject property.[12] the RTC ruled on petitioner's application for registration

the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision in which it

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the application for original registration of title is hereby DISMISSED.[21]

It was on the issue of possession, however, that the Court of Appeals digressed from the ruling of the RTC. The appellate court found that other than petitioner's own general statements and tax declarations, no other evidence was presented to prove her possession of the subject  property for the period required by law. Likewise, petitioner failed to

establish the classification of the subject property as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

ISSUES:

Petitioner ascribes error on the part of the Court of Appeals for failing to conclude that she and her predecessor-in-interest possessed the subject  property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and that the

said property had already been classified as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner contends that her documentary and testimonial evidence were sufficient to substantiate the said allegations, as correctly and conclusively pronounced by the RTC. Petitioner 

likewise points out that no third party appeared before the RTC to oppose her application and possession other than respondent.

Respondent, then represented by the City Prosecutor, did not even adduce any evidence before the RTC to rebut petitioner's claims; thus, respondent, presently represented by the OSG, is now estopped from assailing the RTC Decision. Petitioner finally maintains that assuming her possession was indeed not proven under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the trial court for further 

 proceedings, instead of dismissing it outright.

This Court finds the petition plainly without merit. HELD:

the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is

alienable or disposable.[26]

In the case at bar, petitioner miserably failed to discharge the burden of   proof imposed on her by the law.

 F irst , the documentary evidence that petitioner presented before the

RTC did not in any way prove the length and character of her possession and those of her predecessor-in-interest relative to the subject property. Second, neither does the evidence on record establish to our satisfaction that the subject property has been classified as alienable and disposable.  petitioner failed to prove that she had an imperfect title to the subject  property, which could be confirmed by registrationSO OR _DERE_D.

REPUBLI_C O_F THE PHILIPPINES_{, P etitioner , vs. CAY}ET_ANO L_. SERR _ANO_,1_{cralaw and} HEIRS O_{F CA}T_ALINO _{M. A}L_AAN_,

represented by P_AULIT_A P_{. A}L_AAN_{, Respondents.}

D E _C I S I O N

CARPIO _MOR _ALES_, J  _.:

Respondent Cayetano L. Serrano (Cayetano) filed on September 21, 1988 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City an

application for registration,2cralaw Cayetano claimed to have acquired the lot by inheritance from his deceased parents, Simeon Serrano

(Simeon) and Agustina Luz; by virtue of a Deed of Exchange3cralaw dated February 10, 1961; and by a private deed of partition and

Cayetano also claimed to have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot under a claim of ownership before 1917  by himself and through his deceased parentspredecessors-in-interest or 

for more than 70 years.

The Heirs of Catalino Alaan, represented by Paulita Alaan (Paulita),5cralaw intervened and filed an application for 

registration,6cralaw their predecessor-in-interest Catalino Alaan

(Catalino) having purchased7cralaw a 217.45-square meter undivided  portion of the lot from Cayetano on February 27, 1989 during the  pendency of Cayetano's application for registration.

The intervenor-heirs of Catalino, also invoking the provisions of the Property Registration Decree or, alternatively, of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, prayed that their application for  confirmation of title be considered jointly with that of Cayetano's, and that, thereafter, original certificates of title be issued in both their names. Cayetano raised no objection or opposition to the intervenor-Heirs of  Catalino's application for registration.8cralaw

By Decision of November 3, 2003,27cralaw the RTC granted respondents applications,

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of herein petitioner, appealed the RTC decision before the Court of Appeals on the grounds

that respondents failed to present evidence that the property was alienable or that they possessed the same in the manner and duration required by the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.28cralaw By Decision of May 13, 2008,29cralaw the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE: that respondents failed to present evidence that the property was alienable or that they possessed the same in the manner and duration

required by the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.28cralaw raised by petitioner before the appellate court.

HELD:

The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: that the  property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the

applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have  been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation thereof; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.31cralaw

While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V.

Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence  by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement.

It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925.

The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or  registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be  prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably

extended in favor of respondents.

Leonardo clearly established the character of the possession of Cayetano and his predecessors-in-interest over the lot.

The totality of the evidence thus points to the unbroken chain of acts exercised by Cayetano to demonstrate his occupation and possession of  the land in the concept of owner, to the exclusion of all others.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLI_C O_F THE PHILIPPINES_, PETITIONER _{, V}S_. HEIRS O_{F J}U_AN _FABIO_, N_AMEL_Y: _DO_MING_{A C. FA}BIO_, SO_CORRO

D. FABIO_, L_YDI_{A D. FA}BIO_, ROL_AN_DO _{D. FA}BIO_, NOR _{MA D.}

FABIO_, NOR _MA L_{. FA}BIO_{, A}NGELIT_{A FA}BIO_, ROS_ALIE

FABIO_{, DA}NILO _FABIO_, REN_ATO _FABIO_, LE_VIT_{A FA}BIO_, IRENE _FABIO_, TERESIT_{A M}OLER _A, ROSE_MARIE _C. P_AK _AY,

LIG_{AYA C. MA}S_ANGK _{AY, A}L_FRE_DO _{F. CA}STILLO_,

MELIN_{DA F. CA}STILLO_{, M}ER _CE_DIT_{A F. CA}STILLO_, ESTEL_A

DE _JESUS _AQUINO_{, F}ELE_CITO _FABIO_{, A}N_{D A}LEX_AN_DER 

FABIO_, REPRESENTE_D HEREIN B_{Y A}NGELIT_{A F.} ESTEIB_AR 

AS THEIR _ATTORNE_Y-IN_-FACT_, RESPON_DENTS_.

D E _C I S I O N

CARPIO_{, J.}:

T_{he Facts}

respondents, who are the heirs of Juan Fabio, , filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, an application for registration of title

situated in Barangay Sapang, Ternate, Cavite. The respondents sought the registration of title under the provisions of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529).[4]

In the application, respondents alleged that they are the owners of the Lot, including all the improvements, having acquired the same through a bona fide claim of ownership. They declared that they and their 

 predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner for more than 100 years.[5]

On 29 September 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision ordering the registration of the Lot in the name of Juan Fabio.

The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner  claimed that the trial court erred in ruling that respondents have acquired a vested right over the Lot which falls within the Calumpang Point

 Naval Reservation.

the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court Hence, the instant petition.

T_he I_ssues

whether the respondents have acquired a right over the Lot.

T_{he Court's} R _uling

S_econd I_ssue: _{Validity of} R _espondents' T_itle

Petitioner asserts that both the trial and appellate courts failed to

recognize the import of the notation in the survey plan stating that the Lot falls within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation. At the time the application for registration of title was filed, the Lot was no longer open to private ownership as it had been classified as a military reservation for public service. Thus, respondents are not entitled to have the Lot registered under the Torrens system.

 persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and

convincing evidence that the properties in question have been acquired  by a legal method of acquiring public lands. Here, respondents failed to

do so, and are thus not entitled to have the Lot registered in their names. Clearly, both the trial and appellate courts gravely erred in granting

DIAZ VS REPUBLIC

R E S O L U T I O N

CORON_A, J _.:

This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of  the June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.

Petitioner's late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for  registration of a vast tract of land1cralaw located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1,  Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976.2cralaw She alleged that she possessed

the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural  products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely

for more or less 26 years.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation

237)3cralaw in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the  public domain.

Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in

 Director of Lands v. Reyes 4cralaw that the property subject of Garcia's application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216

(allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Parañaque Investment and

Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not  proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was