Faculty Publications
Faculty Publications
2014
Deprivative Recognition
Erez Aloni
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, [email protected]
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Citation Details
AbstRAct
Family law is now replete with proposals advocating for the legal recognition of nonmarital relationships: those between friends, relatives, unmarried intimate partners, and the like. The presumption underlying these proposals is that legal recognition is financially beneficial to partners. This assumption is sometimes wrong: Legal recognition of relationships can be harmful to unmarried partners—a reality whose impact on policy concerning regulation of nonmarital unions has not been explored. As this Article shows, a significant number of people benefit financially from nonrecognition of their relationships. While in most cases the state turns a blind eye to this financial gain, when it comes to a particular set of benefits, the state routinely recognizes partners against their will in order to withhold or terminate benefits, a subset of ascriptive recognition that I call “deprivative recognition.”
Deprivative recognition is unjust because it is asymmetrical: It deprives couples of benefits they would receive if they were unpartnered while they nevertheless remain ineligible to receive benefits granted to married couples in similar arenas. This asymmetry is particularly troublesome because those who enjoy the benefits of nonrecognition often belong to particularly vulnerable populations, such as those who qualify for means-tested programs. This Article recognizes and provides a normative assessment of deprivative recognition and the distributive injustices it creates.
Identifying deprivative recognition, in turn, unearths a larger set of theoretical questions about the interplay between cultural recognition and distributive justice in the law of unmarried partners, including a question about what kind of law promotes both cultural recognition and distributive justice for unmarried partners. The Article builds on Nancy Fraser’s theory of recognition and redistribution as a “folk paradigm of justice,” explaining why it is essential for the law of unmarried partners to adopt both of these aspects of justice and how this can be done.
AuthoR
Erez Aloni is an Assistant Professor at Whittier Law School and holds an LL.M. and an S.J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. For significantly helpful and challenging feedback, I am extremely grateful to: Anita L. Allen, Noa Ben-Asher, Alexander Boni-Saenz, Cynthia Grant Bowman, Tonya Brito, Mary Anne Case, Leslie Cohen, Melissa J. Durkee, Elizabeth F. Emens, Casey Faucon, Katherine M. Franke, Cynthia Godsoe, Suzanne B. Goldberg, Margaux J. Hall, Claudia E. Haupt, Frederick Hertz, Clare Huntington, Suzanne A. Kim, Serena Mayeri, Kim Hai Pearson, Nancy Polikoff, Elizabeth S. Scott, Kendall Thomas and Abigail Yevnin. I also benefited from
uc
LA L
AW REV
the Center for International and Comparative Law, the University of Chicago Law School Workshop on Regulating Family, Sex and Gender, Pace Law School faculty colloquium, and the Nontraditional Marriages: Transgressive and Transformative workshop at Wisconsin Law School. Thanks also to the editors of the UCLA Law Review for their excellent editing.
tAbLE of contEnts
Introduction...1278
I. The Potential Financial Benefits of Nonrecognition ...1285
A. Means-Tested Assistance ...1289
1. Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid ...1291
2. Financial Aid for Higher Education ...1294
B. Post-Marital Entitlements ...1297
C. Marriage Penalty...1298
II. The Trend Toward Regognition and Its Effect on the Currently Unrecognized ...1299
A. How Marriage Exceptionalism Results in Cultural and Economic Injustices ...1300
B. The Trend Toward Legal Recognition ...1302
C. Recognizing Nonrecognition...1309
III. Piercing the Veil of Nonrecognition...1313
A. Exploring Traditional Deprivative Recognition ...1314
1. The Cohabitation-Termination Rule ...1315
2. Social Welfare ...1320
3. Traditional Deprivative Recognition as a Regulatory Mechanism ...1323
B. Unintended Deprivative Recognition ...1330
C. The Regulatory Effect of Deprivative Recognition ...1331
IV. Recognition and Redistribution in Family Law ...1333
A. Recognition Versus Redistribution ...1333
B. Beyond Recognition ...1337
1. Deconstructing Proposals for Recognition...1337
2. Reconstructing the Differences ...1341
Conclusion ...1344
INTRODUCTION
Following extensive efforts by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) organizations,1 the Department of Education recently announced
thateligibilityforfinancialaidforchildrenwholivewithunmarriedorsame-sex parentswillbedeterminedbasedonbothparents’incomes.2
Beforethisnewrule, childrenof unmarriedorsame-sexparentscouldincludeonlyoneparenton theirfinancialaidapplication,amatterthatcausedsomeofthesechildrento feel asthough their parents’unions weresecondclass.3
EvenJustice Kennedy, writingforthemajorityinUnitedStatesv.Windsor,4referredtotheold
finan-cialaidruleasacaseinwhichsame-sexcoupleswouldbe“honored”totake on obligations toward each other if given the opportunity.5 The media,
LGBTorganizations,andthosewhosupporttherecognitionofcomplexfamily formshaveseenthispolicychangeasapoliticalvictory.6
But,onsecondthought,thisformoflegalrecognitionwillresultinreduction oreliminationoffinancialaidforthemajorityofapplicantswhohaveunmarriedor same-sexparents.7
Moreover,legallyrecognizingtheseparentsaspartners primarilyto increasetheirparticipation inpayingfortheirchildren’s
educa-1. See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, FAFSA Changes to Recognize Same-Sex Parents by 2014,
HUFFINGTONPOST(Apr.30,2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/fafsa-changes-same-sex-parents-2014_n_3185755.html(“‘GLSENhaslongworkedtoensurethatsexual orientationandgenderidentityarenotusedtodiscriminateagainststudentsinournation’s K-12 schools, whether that student identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT),hasLGBTfriends,orcomesfromanLGBTfamily,’saidGLSENDirectorof PublicPolicyShawnGaylord,pertheBlade.”).
2. Id.
3. SeeinfraPartI.A.2.
4. UnitedStatesv.Windsor,No.12-307(U.S.June26,2013)(holdingsection3oftheDefense ofMarriageActunconstitutional).
5. Id.(“DOMAdivestsmarriedsame-sexcouplesofthedutiesandresponsibilitiesthatarean essentialpartofmarriedlifeandthattheyinmostcaseswouldbehonoredtoacceptwere DOMAnotinforce. Forinstance,becauseitisexpectedthatspouseswillsupporteachother as they pursueeducational opportunities,federallaw takes intoconsideration a spouse’s incomeincalculatingastudent’sfederalfinancialaideligibility. Same-sexmarriedcouples areexemptfromthisrequirement.”(citationomitted)). In fact,bythetimeWindsorwas handeddown,thefinancialaidpolicyhadalreadychanged—amatterthatwentunmentioned byJusticeKennedy. Klein,supranote1(reportingonthechangeofcalculatingfinancialon April30,2013,almosttwomonthsbeforetheWindsordecisionwasissued).
6. Klein,supranote1.
7. SeeTroyOnink,DepartmentOfEducation“ComesOut”onCollegeAidforChildrenofGayParents,
FORBES(May6,2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/troyonink/2013/05/06/department-of-education-comes-out-on-college-aid-for-students-of-gay-parents(“[S]tudentswith parents whoarenotmarriedwillnowhavetoreportbothparent’s[sic]incomes,decreasingtheiraid eligibilitysubstantially.”).
tionisaneconomicinjustice. Thisissobecausealthoughtheirparenthoodis legallyrecognized,theirrelationshipisnot. Lackingsuchrecognition,these couples are excludedfrom hundredsof tangible economicbenefits that are granted onlyto marriedcouples.8
Asnotedby JusticeKennedyin Windsor,
the financial loss that unmarried parent couples thus suffer from nonrecognition of their relationship has a direct financial effect on their parenthood.9 Furthermore,thisnewruleappliesonlytoparentswholivetogether;
thus,inreality,itdoesnotaffectparentsperse,butonlycohabitatingparents. Thebottomlineisthatrecognizingcouplesonlyforpurposesofwithholding a benefit from them while denying other related benefits and protections leadstoeconomicmaldistribution.10
Thenewfederalrulehighlightsoneofthefoundationalmisconceptions inlegalscholarshipsurroundingdomesticrelationships:thedominantassumption thatlegalrecognitionofrelationshipsisalwayseconomicallybeneficialtothe recognizedpartners.11 Moreimportantly,theruleillustratesthecomplicated
andundertheorizedinterplaybetweendistributivejusticeandcultural recog-nitionin the lawgoverningunmarried partners:12
Cultural recognitioncan
8. See,e.g.,Goodridgev.Dep’tofPub.Health,798N.E.2d941,956–57(Mass.2003)(“[T]he factremainsthatmaritalchildrenreapameasureoffamilystabilityandeconomicsecurity basedontheirparents’legallyprivilegedstatusthatislargelyinaccessible,ornotasreadily accessible,tononmaritalchildren. Someofthesebenefitsaresocial....Othersarematerial, suchasthegreatereaseofaccesstofamily-basedStateandFederalbenefitsthatattendthe presumptionsofone’sparentage.”).
9. UnitedStatesv.Windsor,No.12-307(U.S.June26,2013)(“DOMAalsobringsfinancial harmtochildrenofsame-sexcouples. Itraisesthecostofhealthcareforfamiliesbytaxing healthbenefitsprovidedbyemployerstotheirworkers’same-sexspouses. Anditdeniesor reducesbenefitsallowedtofamiliesuponthelossofaspouseandparent,benefitsthatarean integralpartoffamilysecurity.”(citationsomitted)).
10. Foranextendedcritiqueofthenewfinancialaidrule,seeErezAloni, RelationshipRecognition Madness,HUFFINGTONPOST(June12,2013),http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erez-aloni/relation ship-recognition-madness_b_3422346.html?utm_hp_ref=college&ir=College#es_share_ended.
11. See,e.g.,M.V.LeeBadgett,VariationsonanEquitableTheme:ExplainingInternational Same-Sex Partner Recognition Laws, in SAME-SEXCOUPLES, SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS &
HOMOSEXUALMARRIAGES:AFOCUSONCROSS-NATIONALDIFFERENTIALS95,99
(MarieDigoix&PatrickFesty eds.,2004)(“Individualsame-sexcouples,especiallythose withpropertyorchildren,wouldhavethesameeconomicincentivesasdifferent-sexcouples to desire access to the legal framework created by marriage, in addition to any other customarybenefitsofbeingmarried.”).
12. Itisimportanttonotethattheterm“recognition”canhavetwomeaningsthatsometimes intersect. “Legalrecognition”isthe actionofthestate,basedonthetypeofrelationship targeted,thathaslegalconsequencesforpartners. “Culturalrecognition,”discussedfurther inParts IIandIV,is the acknowledgmentof thedifferences of individualsorcollective groups,withoutthedemandthattheyassimilatetothedominantculture.
resultineconomicmaldistribution,andasthisArticlesubsequentlyexplains, redistributiveeconomicremediescanresultinculturalmisrecognition.13
Indeed,thefundamentalgoalsofthemarriageequalitymovementhavebeen toeliminateeconomicmaldistributionandtofosterculturalrecognitionof nontra-ditionalfamilies.14
Inrecent decades,familylawhasalsocenteredaround such strugglesbyfollowingasimilarlogic;itisnow repletewithsuggestionsthatthe state shouldrecognizeavarietyof nonmaritalrelationships—friends, rela-tives,unmarriedconjugalcouples,andnonmonogamousgroupings15—asworthy
ofprotection.
Largelymissingfromthecelebrationofrecognitioninthelawof domes-tic relations is the simple yet meaningful fact that legal recognition comes witha financialcost—sometimesanunjustcost.16
Itis difficultto overem-phasizetheimportanceofunderstandingthis phenomenonintheprojectof theorizingthelawofunmarriedpeople. Toputitsimply,attemptingtoaddress thelawofunmarriedpartnerswithouttakingaccountofthisissueisunsound. Thisisbecausethereisaclearcorrelationbetweenthedemographic charac-teristicsofunmarriedpartnersintheUnitedStatesandthegroupsthat gain fiscallyfromlegalnonrecognition. Thatis,thelargestgroupsofcohabitants includepoorandlow-incomeindividualswhoarethebeneficiariesof
means-13. Culturalrecognitionwasoneofthetwomainrationalesbehindthedepartment’snewrule.
LGBTorganizationsfoughtforthispolicyinordertorepairaculturalmisrecognitionthat the previous policy resulted in. But forthe Department of Education there were two rationales:one,reducingtheculturalharminmisrecognizingunmarriedparents;andtwo, betterreflectingthefinancialsituationofapplicantsandsavingtaxpayersmoney. SeeLibby A. Nelson, Aid Applicants With 2 Mothers, INSIDEHIGHERED (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/04/30/fafsa-changes-recognized-many-kinds-parents.
14. Cf.SuzanneB.Goldberg,WhyMarriage?,inMARRIAGEATTHECROSSROADS224,228– 33(MarshaGarrison&ElizabethS.Scotteds.,2012)(explainingthatmarriageequalityis beingpursuedforaccesstomarriage’stangiblegoodsandstatusequality). Onemayargue thatculturalrecognitionhasbeenthemainmissionofthemarriageequalitymovementand maldistribution has been the form of tangible injury that recognition proponents have asserted. Indeedthisisevidentfromthestrongresistancetocivilunions,whichsolvealmost allthe financialproblemsthatstemfromthesame-sexmarriagebanbutdonothavethe culturalweightthatisattendantwithmarriage.
15. See infra Part II.B (surveying the major proposals for legal recognition of nonmarital relationships).
16. AsIdiscussinPartII.B,theassumptionthatsomepeoplearenotinterestedinrecognitionof theirrelationshipsissometimesdiscussedinfamilylawscholarship. See,e.g.,ShaharLifshitz,
MarriedAgainstTheirWill?TowardaPluralistRegulationofSpousalRelationships,66WASH. &LEEL.REV.1565,1569(2009). But theretheassumptionisthatpeoplearenotinterested inrecognitionbecausetheyareunreadyfororuninterestedincommitmenttoeachother— notbecause the statewould recognizetheir unionin order to withhold orterminate an existingbenefit.Seeid.at1576.
testedprograms,17theelderlyanddivorced whomayloseexistingentitlements
upon remarriage,18andcollegestudentswhocanbeawarded morefinancial
aidforhighereducationbasedontheir(ortheirparents’)nonmaritalstatus.19
This Article undertakes to provide an account of the areas in which nonrecognitioncanbefinanciallyrewarding. Itthenexamineshowthenotionof gainingfromnonrecognitionhasbeenoverlookedbymostlegalscholarshipinthe area, and assesses how policies promoting legal recognition, if accepted, wouldaffectthelivesofthosepeoplecurrentlyinunrecognizedrelationships.20
Morepuzzlingthanthedominant assumptionthat legal recognition is virtuallyalwaysfinanciallybeneficialtothecoupleistheprevalenceofthebelief thatlegalrecognitionisalwaysatleastpartiallyvoluntary. Proposalsforlegal recognition of nonmarital unions assumethat only what this Article terms
partiallyascriptiverecognitioneveroccurs—thatis,theypresumethatthestate ascribesobligationsoncouplesonlyfollowingtherequestofoneofthe part-ners. Forexample,upontheendofanonmaritalrelationship,anex-partner filesaclaimforequaldistributionofthecouple’smutualproperty. Thestate thenplacesmarital-likeobligationsonthecoupleandmandatesthe distribu-tion of property. In reality, however, purelyascriptive recognition—cases in which thestaterecognizessuchcoupleswithouttherequestofeitherpartner— alreadyoccursinsomecircumstances.21
Sofar,legalscholarshiphasaddressed only partiallyascriptive recognition(whichisgenerally referredtoassimply ascriptive recognition), but has not recognized the subcategory of purely ascriptiverecognitionanditsconsequences.
ThisArticlefocusesinparticularononeformofpurelyascriptive recog-nition,whichItermdeprivative22recognition:whenneitherpartnerwill
ben-efit from recognition and yet the state still recognizes the relationship, a recognition that results in deprivation. Incases of deprivative recognition, thestateorotherthirdparty(suchasanex-spouse)requeststhatthe relation-ship be legally recognized ad-hoc, such that a benefit stemming from the
17. SeeinfraPartI.A.
18. SeeinfraPartI.B.
19. SeeinfraPartI.A.2.
20. AsIdiscussinPartI,gainingfromnonrecognitioncouldmeansimplymaintainingthestatus quo,suchasnotgettingmarried,orcouldmeanchangingstatusfrommarriedtodivorced,to beingunrecognizedbythelaw. WhatIdonotdiscussarethecasesinwhichpeopleget marriedonlyinordertogainbenefitsthatareattachedtomarriage. Foradiscussionofsuch cases,seeKerryAbrams,MarriageFraud,100CALIF.L.REV.1(2012).
21. SeeinfraPartIII(discussingthedifferencesbetweenpartiallyandpurelyascriptiverecognition).
22. Deprivative(adjective):
tendingtodeprive,causingdeprivation,relatingtodeprivation.
nonrecognitionmaybewithheldorterminated.23
Forexample,the cohabitation-terminationrule,which hasbeenadoptedinmoststates,providesthat upon cohabitationwithanewpartner,analimonyrecipientlosesheralimony.24
Deprivativerecognitionandthefinancialadvantagesofnonrecognition lieatthecrossroadsoffamilylawandpovertylaw. Thewaythatpublicpolicy— especially as reflected in the U.S. welfare system—affects people’s marital choiceshasbeenthesubjectofmuchdebate.25 Buttheeffectsofdeprivative
recognition and the gain from nonrecognition within the broaderlaw and policyregardingunmarriedpartnershipsremainvirtuallyunexplored.26
ThisArticlethusjuxtaposescasesinwhichthestateidentifiesandterminates benefitsthatstemfromnonrecognition(forexample,terminationofalimony upontherecipient’scohabitation)withcasesinwhichthestateturnsablind eyetothefinancialadvantagesofnonrecognition(suchaswithSupplemental SecurityIncome,incometax,andsurvivor’sbenefits). Bycomparingthebenefits that are terminated uponcohabitation withthebenefits that remain,this Articletheorizesdeprivativerecognitionasaselectiveregulatorymechanism. I argue that deprivative recognition targets what social conservatives see as immoral behaviors like cohabitation after divorce and reliance on welfare,
23. Thus,itisnotonlythepartner’spleatothestatethatdifferentiatespartiallyascriptiveand deprivativerecognition. Rather,partiallyascriptiverecognitionaimstoredressaneconomic injusticethatstemsfromthemisrecognitionoftherelationships,while,asthisArticleshows, deprivativerecognitionresultsintheprivationofessentialfinancialresources. SeeinfraPart III(definingdeprivativerecognition). AsIdiscussinPartsIIIandIV,it ispossiblethat someothersortofpurelyascriptiverecognitionwillnotbedeprivative.
24. SeeinfraPartIII.A.1(discussingthecohabitation-terminationdoctrine).
25. See,e.g.,LeslieA.Whittington&JamesAlm,TheEffectsofPublicPolicyonMaritalStatusin theUnitedStates,inMARRIAGEANDTHEECONOMY75,76(ShoshanaA. Grossbard-Shechtman,ed.,2003)(“TheU.S.welfaresystemhasprobablygeneratedmorecontroversy abouthowpublicpolicyaffectshumanbehaviorthananyotherprogram.”).
26. Ashasbeenrecognizedforalmostadecade,thetwofieldsoffamilylawandpovertylaw generallyoperateseparately. PartofthisArticle’scontributionisinjoiningthescholarship thataimstointegratethem. SeeJillElaineHasday,TheCanonofFamilyLaw,57STAN.L. REV.825,832(2004)(“Theexclusionofwelfarelawfromthefamilylawcanonhasallowed legalauthoritiestoavoidexplainingwhythelawappliesverydifferentrulestogovernfamilial rightsandresponsibilitiesinpoorfamilies.”);seealsoTonyaL.Brito,TheWelfarizationof FamilyLaw,48U.KAN.L.REV.229, 229(2000)(“Familylawandwelfarelawsharea connectednessthathasnotbeenextensivelyaddressedbyscholarsineitherthefamilylawor welfarelawarenas.”);JanetHalley&KerryRittich,CriticalDirectionsinComparativeFamily Law:GenealogiesandContemporaryStudiesofFamilyLawExceptionalism,58AM.J.COMP. L.753,764(2010)(Familylaw,asreflectedinmodernfamilylawcodes,courses,barexams, andcasebooks,“beginstolooklikeacollectionofthelegalissuesabouttheformationand dissolutionofformalfamilyrelationships;thelegalissuesaffectingtheongoinglifeoffamily relationshipsarealmostallhousedinothercourses! Thisexclusionisstunning,whenyou thinkaboutit.”).
whilevalidatingotherkindsofassistancethattheydeemsociallyacceptable.27 Further,thisArticlesuggeststhatthemoredeprivativerecognition expands, themoreitwillburdenandimpedethecreationofnewkinshipnetworksbecause ofconcernsaboutthefinanciallossthatmayresult,orabouttheintrusiveand bureaucraticnatureofdeprivativerecognition.28
I contend that deprivative recognition is an asymmetrical apparatus. Couplesarerecognizedonlyforthepurposeofterminatingabenefit;theyare notrecognizedwhenitisamatterofgainingmostofthepartnershiprights that would otherwisestem from these same relationships. (Often, the law doesnotevenascribelegallybindingfinancialobligationsbetweenthe now-recognizedpartnersupontheirseparation). Inthisway,deprivativerecognition often leads to economic maldistribution: The deprivatively recognized couples may notsupporteachotherfinancially,noraretheyobligedtodoso—even whenrecognitionresultsincuttingoffanindividualfromavitalsourceofincome (suchasalimonyorwelfare).29
If,asthisArticleputsforward,legalrecognitionisnotalwaystantamountto culturalandeconomicjustice,andculturalrecognitioncanresultineconomic injustice,whatkindof lawwouldbe ableto protecttheneeds ofunmarried partnerswithoutcausingmisrecognitionormaldistribution? Indeed,deprivative recognitionreflectsaverygreatdilemmainfamilylawandthusinvites explo-rationofalargerstrategicproblem:Ontheonehand,pursuingredistributivejustice independentlyfromculturalrecognition,andviceversa,wouldresultinalackof justiceforunmarriedcouples. Yetontheotherhand,simultaneouslypursuing redistributionandculturalrecognitioncanresultinoneundercuttingtheother.30
Legal scholarshaveoverlooked thetension inherent in simultaneously pursuingbothdistributivejusticeandculturalrecognitioninfamilylaw. But theinterplayofthetwohasstoodinthecenterofdiscussionsinpoliticalscience andmoralphilosophyforalmosttwentyyears.31
Thehistoryisinstructive. In the 1960s, cultural recognition of differences became the primary political demandintheUnitedStatesandotherWesterndevelopeddemocraciesand has remainedsuch. Subsequently,inthe 1990s,a fewinfluential theoreticians
27. Cf.AnitaBernstein,ForandAgainstMarriage:ARevision,102MICH.L.REV.129,182 (2003)(“[T]ransferpaymentsto assistneedy childrenandtheircaregiversare considered pathological(‘welfare asweknow it’),whiletransferpaymentsforwidowedanddisabled personsstayrespectable,akindofinsurance.”(footnoteomitted)).
28. SeeinfraPartIII.A.3.
29. Seeid.
30. Forexamplesofhowredistributionalandrecognitionalremediescanundercuteachotherin theregulationofunmarriedpartnerships,seeinfraPartIV.B.
contendedthatculturalrecognitionisthemostimportantaspirationfor polit-icalmovementstopursue. Butin1995,theprominentcriticalscholarNancy Fraser challengedthe adequacy of recognition as the preeminent social-justice claim.32
WhileFraseracceptedtheimportanceofrecognition,sheproposeda modelofredistributionandrecognitionas“folkparadigmsofjustice.”33
Inorder to pursuethetwoaspectsof justiceconcurrently,shedistinguished between transformativeremedies,whichaimtocorrectsocialinjusticeattheroot,and affirmativeremedies,focusedonlyoncorrectingspecificproblems.34
Sheasserted thatnothingshortofadoptingtransformativerecognitionand redistribution remedies(ratherthanaffirmativeremedies)would“meettherequirementsof justiceforall”whileavoidingtheostensibledichotomyandcontradictionbetween thetwo.35
Fraser’sinsightprovidesacriticaladditiontothelawofunmarriedcouples. Buildingonherwork,Iarguethatwhileredistributionandrecognitionhave, defacto,longbeenatthecenteroffamilylaw,majorproposalsinthefieldfail toencompassbothcomponents. Isubmitthatthelawofunmarriedpartners oughttobebasedonaperspectivethatacknowledgestheimportantofboth culturalrecognitionandredistribution—inpursuingajustpolicytoaccommodate unmarriedpartners,bothaimsarecrucial,andapolicythatisbasedonthese foundationswillavoidretrogradepolicieslikedeprivativerecognition.
ExtrapolatingfromFraser’sframework,Icataloguemajorproposalsand theoriesconcerningrecognitionofnonmaritalunionsthatariseinfamilylaw scholarship. Isorttheseapproachesaccordingtotheirremediesandevaluate whichtheoriesfailtoachieve,andwhichsucceedinachieving,thedual perspec-tives of cultural recognition and equitable economic redistribution. While thistheoreticalexaminationrevealssignificanttensionsbetweenlegalpolicies thataimmainlytoremedyculturalmisrecognitionandthoseinvestedmainly in redistribution, I offer an analysis,in general terms, ofwhich proposals andpoliciescouldbereconciledandhowthiscouldbedone.
ThisArticleisorganizedintofourParts. PartIexploresthepossiblefinancial benefitsofnonrecognition. PartIIlaysouttheargumentthattheriseinthe
32. SeeNancyFraser,FromRedistributiontoRecognition?DilemmasofJusticeina‘Post-Socialist’ Age,212NEWLEFTREV.68,70–74(1995).
33. NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICALEXCHANGE11(Joel Golbet al.trans.,2003)(“[I]n their
politicalreference...theterms‘redistribution’and‘recognition’refernottophilosophical paradigmsbutrathertofolkparadigmsofjustice,whichinformpresent-daystrugglesincivil society.”).
34. Fraser,supranote32,at82–86.
number of complexfamily structures,has resultedin dignitary harm and economic injustice to people in nonmarital unions, contra marriage exceptionalismintheUnitedStates. TheArticlethencritiquesthemaintheories andproposalsforthetreatmentofnonmaritalunions—whicharereferredto collectively as thetrend toward recognition—for failing to take into account their impact on those who currently gain financially from being unrecog-nized. PartIIIpresentstheunacknowledgedpolicyofdeprivativerecognition asa selectiveregulatory mechanism,andoffers fourcritiques ofthat policy. PartIVexploressocialjusticerecognitionclaimsmore broadly,proposing a shifttowardatheory ofrecognition andredistributionin thelawgoverning unmarriedpartners.
I. THE POTENTIAL FINANCIAL BENEFITSOF NONRECOGNITION
JoeEntwisleand hisgirlfriendhave beentogether foradecade butdo notgetmarriedbecause,iftheydo,Joe,whoisparalyzedfromtheshoulders down, willlose his Medicaidbenefits,which areessential tohisdaily life.36
HillarySt.Pierrehadhealthinsurancebut,likeothers, whenshedeveloped cancer shecontemplated“Medicaiddivorce” inorder toget bettercoverage andavoidbankruptingtheentirefamily.37 AngelaandDavidBoytergotdivorced
toavoidthetax“marriagepenalty.”38 AndUSNews&WorldReportadvises
studentsand theirfamiliesthat “[t]heremay beabigfinancialaidrewardif youchooseadelay[inmarriage]orsimplycohabitation.”39
Theseareonlya fewexamplesof howpeoplecanbenefiteconomicallyfromtheirnonmarital status.
Who comprises the major groups that gain financially from nonrecognition, by what methods do they gain, and how pervasive is this phenomenon? Thesearedifficultquestions,andthisArticlecannotanddoes
36. StacyForster,DisabilityRuleChangeSought:MarryingCanLeadtoLossofVital Medicaid Coverage,MILWAUKEEJ.SENTINEL,Jan.2,2008,at1B.
37. HillarySt.Pierre,IConsideredA“MedicaidDivorce”When CancerBeganBankruptingMe,
HUFFINGTONPOST (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hillary-st-pierre/i-considered-a-medicaid-d_b_816668.html;seealsoMichaelL.Olver&ChristopherC.Lee,
Medicaid Divorce: AnOverview, HELSELLFETTERMAN (Dec. 2010), www.helsell.com/ helsell-news/medicaid-divorce-an-overview.
38. SeeBoyter v.Comm'r,668 F.2d1382,1383–84(4thCir.1981) (holdingthat the sham transactiondoctrinecouldbeappliedtomarriedtaxpayerswhodivorceinordertoavoidthe marriagepenalty).
39. Kim Clark, How to Maximize Your Student's Chances for Need-Based Aid, US NEWS& WORLDREP.(Apr.10,2008), http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2008/04/10/how-to-maximize-your-students-chances-for-need-based-aid.
notpurport toprovideexhaustive answers. Giving accuratestatistics and informationaboutthepervasiveness ofthe occurrenceisimpossiblebecause thecensus(andothersources)doesnotexaminehowmanyofthenonmarital householdsgainfinanciallyfromtheirnonrecognition.40
Otherdifficultiesin providing quantitative and qualitative accounts of the phenomenon stem fromtheethicsofgainingfinanciallyfromnonrecognition. Whileforsome, gaining from nonrecognition could be a side effect of an independent life choice (suchas, havingthe relationshipone wants),forothers itcouldbe a strategicbehaviortoavoidthefinanciallossthatderivesfromlegalrecognition.41 Anditisnoteasy—sometimesitisevenimpossible—todistinguishbetween those who are unmarriedbecause of their fear of financialloss attached to recognitionandthosewhoareunmarriedforotherreasons(andsomemayof coursebemotivatedbybothfinanciallossandotherreasons).
Toclarify,Iamnotimplyingthatthemainmotivationbehindlivingin unmarriedrelationshipsistoincreaseeligibilityformeans-testedprogramsor to avoidlosingentitlements. Theeffectof welfarepoliciesonmarriageand cohabitationisahighlycontestedone.42
Butevenifthedecisionnottoget marriedisbasedsolelyonadesiretoavoidfinancialloss,itdoesnotnecessarilyraise anethicalproblem. Somepartnershipsaresimplyunrecognizedbythestate,and,
40. Moreover,untilrecentlyitwasdifficulttoidentifytherangeofnonmaritalrelationshipsin theUnitedStates. SeeSheelaKennedy&CatherineA.Fitch,MeasuringCohabitationand FamilyStructure in theUnited States:Assessing theImpact ofNew Data Fromthe Current PopulationSurvey,49DEMOGRAPHY1479,1480(2012)(explaininghow,priorto2007,the AnnualSocialandEconomicSupplementtothe CurrentPopulationSurvey documented onlypersonswhoreportedthemselvesas“unmarriedpartners”ofthehouseholder,andhow thechangesincethenallowsthestatetobetteridentifydifferentsortsofnonmaritalunions);
seealso Sven Drefahl, Dothe Married Really LiveLonger? TheRoleof Cohabitationand SocioeconomicStatus,74J.MARRIAGE&FAM.462,463(2012)(“Moreandmoreindividuals areclassifiedasnever married,widowed,ordivorced,eventhoughtheyare livingwitha partner.”).
41. CompareKathryn Edin,FewGoodMen:WhyPoorMothersDon’tMarryorRemarry,AM.
PROSPECT,Jan.3,2000,at26,31(reportingthatshehasfound“virtuallynosupportforthe
welfaredisincentivesargument,sinceveryfewmotherssaythattheyhaveavoidedmarriageor remarriage to maintain eligibility for welfare, even when asked directly”), with Maxine Eichner, Beyond Private Ordering: Families and the Supportive Stat, 23 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIALLAW.305,306(2010)(“SocialSecuritysurvivors’benefitsinfluencesome
recipientsnottomarry.”),andMarshaGarrison,RevivingMarriage:CouldWe?ShouldWe?,
10J.L. &FAM.STUD. 279, 296 (2008) (“[P]olicies that distinguish cohabitation from marriageinviteevasionandcontributeto thedeclineof formalmarriageifthose policies attachsignificantfinancialbenefitstononmarriage.”).
42. See,e.g.,LisaA.Gennetian&VirginiaKnox,StayingSingle:TheEffectsofWelfareReform PoliciesonMarriageandCohabitation1–5(NextGeneration,WorkingPaperNo.13,2003) (surveyingsomeofthedisagreementsabouttheconnectionbetweenwelfareprogramsand motivationtomarry);Whittington&Alm,supranote25,at76.
forthem,theconcomitantfinancialgainisunavoidable. Ifthestatedoesnot imposeanymutual obligationsonfriends orsame-sexcouples,thenthereis nothingunethicalinacceptingthefinancialgainthataccruesfromthesestatuses.43
Further,ifopposite-sexcoupleswhocangetmarriedfeelthattheyareunready todoso,ordonotwantthemaritalstatusforideological reasons,thentheirgain fromnonrecognitionisasideeffectoftheirrelationship. Infact,whenpartners areaskedabouttheirrelationshiponofficialforms,mostoftentheoptionsare “married,”“divorced,”or“single,” sotheycannotdeclareadifferentstatus.44 Andthosewhodonotgetmarriedinordertobebetterofffinanciallyareno dif-ferent from those who getmarried to gain marital benefits—a legitimateand widelyacceptedpractice.45 (Irefernottothepracticeofgettingmarried“fictively”
solelytogetmaritalbenefits,buttothecommonpracticeofconsideringmarital benefitsinthedecisiontogetmarried.) Finally,thestateitselfcreatesdomestic partnershipsregistrations,opentoelderlyonly,in ordertoallowthesepartners to avoid the terminationof post-marital benefits,butallowingthemtoenjoy stateprotectionsthatotherwisearereservedonly tomarried couples.In other words, in thecaseof elderly population (perhapsbecausethegroupholds considerablepoliticalpower)thestatesupportsstrategicbehaviorwithregardto benefitsthatstemfromnonrecognition.
BeforeIproceed,oneimportantcaveatisinorder. Bydocumentingthe financial gains that stem fromlegal nonrecognition,this Article does not denytheculturalsignificancethatisattachedtomarriage,particularlyinU.S. society.46 NordoestheArticledisregardthefinancialperksthatattachtomarriage.
Clearly,nonrecognition cancomewithmanyeconomicdisadvantages—as has
43. See,e.g.,AxelBerryhill,FAFSAtoIncludeOptionsforReportingSame-sexParentsStarting 2014, http://www.dailycal.org/2013/05/01/department-of-education-announces-that-fafsa-will-include-options-to-report-same-sex-parents-starting-2014(lastupdatedMay2,2013) (tellingthestoryofanunmarriedlesbiancouple’sdaughterwho“hasnowaytofullytellthe truthwhenapplyingforfinancialaid”).
44. Cf.NAT’LORG.FORWOMEN,CivilMarriagev.CivilUnions(2012),availableathttp://www. now.org/issues/marriage/marriage_unions.html(“Every day we fill out forms that ask us whetherwearemarried,single,divorcedorwidowed.Peoplejoinedinaciviluniondonotfit inanyofthosecategories.”).
45. SeeNancyF.Cott,NoObjections,WhatHistoryTellsUsAboutRemakingMarriage,BOS.REV. (Jan.1,2011), http://bostonreview.net/nancy-f-cott-no-objections-history-of-marriage-same-sex-gay(“GovernmentsatalllevelsintheUnitedStateshavelongencouragedpeopletomarryfor economicbenefittothepublicaswellastothemselves.”);ForManyAmericans,“MarriageIsan EconomicDecision,” Sociologist Says,NPR (Sept. 29, 2010),www.npr.org/templates/transcript/ transcript.php?storyId=130218357(interviewingAndrewJ.Cherlin,whosaysthat“marriageisan economicdecision”).
46. ErezAloni,Incrementalism,CivilUnions,andthePossibilityofPredictingLegalRecognitionof Same-SexMarriage,18DUKEJ.GENDERL.&POL’Y105,141n.213(2010)(discussingthe valueofmarriageinAmericansocietycomparedtoEuropeancountries).
beenemphasizedinalmosteveryarticleandcourtcaseonthesubject.47 And marriage has other invaluable benefits, such as parental presumptions and decisionmakingprivileges, theabsenceof whichoften requirespeople to go through expensiveand emotionally exhausting procedures.48
Instead, the argumenthereinisthat,insomecases,thefinancialbenefitsofnonrecognition trump theother potentialbenefitsof marriage. In addition,in a regimein which peoplecangetmarriedanddivorcedfairlyeasily,acouplecould gain fromnonrecognitionandthenchangeitsstatustoenjoytheprivilegesofmarriage; later,theycoulddivorceandenjoythevalueofnonrecognition.49
This fluidi-tyisavailableonlytocoupleswhocangetmarriedinthefirstplace.50 Finally,
thebenefitsfromnonrecognitionareoftentime-limited;thus,inorder to enjoy thesebenefits,individualstypicallymustnotremainunmarriedforeverbut ra-therjustdelaymarriage. Forexample,welfaregrantsprovidedbyTemporary As-sistanceforNeedyFamilies(TANF)arelimitedtofiveyears, and educational financialaidislimitedtothetimeonepursuesacademicstudies.51
Below,Idividethepotentialgainfromnonrecognitionintothreecentral categories. First,nonmaritalstatusmattersinrelationtoprogramsforwhich applicant’s eligibilityand benefitlevelismeans-tested(suchasfinancialaid, Medicaid, TANF, and Social Security Disability Insurance).52 Second,
nonmarital status matters vis-à-vis entitlements that commence upon the endingofthepreviousmarriage,andthatare,insomecases,terminatedupon remarriage (such as alimony and survivors’ benefits). Third, marital status mattersincasesinwhichthestateorthirdpartiestreattheunmarriedpartnersas
47. See,e.g.,Hernandez v.Robles,855 N.E.2d1,6(N.Y. 2006)(“Itisundisputed thatthe benefitsofmarriagearemany.”).
48. For example, in the absence of marriage, a partner who wants to have medical decisionmakingprerogativesneedseithertohaveapowerofattorney,or,inaminorityof states,to registerwiththestate. See NANCYD.POLIKOFF,BEYOND(STRAIGHTAND
GAY)MARRIAGE:VALUINGALLFAMILIESUNDERTHELAW160–61(2008). Without
parentalpresumption,thenonbiologicalparentmustgothroughadoptionprocedures. See
Clare Huntington, Negative Family Law, in FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW
UNDERMINESFAMILYRELATIONSHIPSch.4(forthcoming2014).
49. See Abrams,supra note20,at46. (“Thepossibility of ‘divorce ondemand’createdthe potential for the widespread instrumental use of marriage as a vehicle for opting into particularbenefitsofmarriageandthenoptingoutbeforetheburdensbecameoppressive.”).
50. Thus, for instance,if a college student couple benefits from their nonmarital status by receivingmorefinancialaid,theycangetmarriedupongraduationandenjoythe marriage-taxbonus.
51. BrendaCossman,ContestingConservatisms,FamilyFeudsandthePrivatizationofDependency,
13AM.U.J.GENDERSOC.POL'Y&L.415,469(2005)(“TANFestablishedafive-year
lifetimelimitonwelfareassistanceandsignificantlytoughenedworkrequirements.”).
52. FREDERICKHERTZ, COUNSELING UNMARRIEDCOUPLES:A GUIDETOEFFECTIVE
separateeconomicunitsforthepurposeofrealizingpotentialliability(rather thanassistance,asincategoryone),whilethemarriedaretreatedasoneeconomic unit(suchasincometax,bankruptcy,53andjointliabilityforshareddebts54). I
elaborate briefly on all broad categories but not on every possible benefit withineachcategory.55
Ilookmorefullyatthefirstcategory(means-tested programs)becauseitismostrelevantforthepopulationthattypicallylivesin nonmaritalunions inthe UnitedStates. The second category,post-marital entitlements,ismarkedlyrelevanttothelivesofunmarriedpartnerstoo,butI explore it further in Part III.A.1 in the contextof deprivative recognition. The thirdcategory, involving tax,bankruptcy, and jointliability,represents animportantvenue offiscal gain,butitislesscorrelatedwiththeprofileof U.S.cohabitants,soIpresentitonlybriefly.56
A. Means-TestedAssistance
Generally,eligibilityformeans-testedassistanceiscalculatedonthebasisof the meanspossessedby the applicant(income andassets).57 When thelaw
recognizestheapplicants’relationship,thestateconsidersthepartner’swealth as partoftheoverallfamilywealthindeterminingeligibilityandbenefit level.58
53. Filingforjointbankruptcyislimitedtospouses. 11U.S.C.§302(a)(2006). Often,filing jointlyisanadvantagebecauseitcansavethecostsandfeesoffilingtwoseparateclaims,and becauseconsolidationisfinanciallybeneficial. SeeA.MecheleDickerson,ToLove,Honor, and(Oh!)Pay:ShouldSpousesBeForcedtoPayEachOther'sDebts?,78B.U.L.Rev.961,975– 87(1998). But beingtreatedasmarriedcouldbeadisadvantagebecausethe“meanstest” includesincomefromnearlyanysourcetothedebtororthedebtor’sspouse. 11U.S.C.§ 101(10A)(2006).
54. HERTZ,supranote52,at93–100.
55. Foramorecomprehensive—butnotexhaustiveandnotupdated—listofpossiblefinancial advantagesfornonmarriedcouples,seeWendellE.Primus&JenniferBeeson,SafetyNet Programs, Marriage, and Cohabitation, in JUSTLIVING TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONSOF
COHABITATIONONFAMILIES,CHILDREN,ANDSOCIAL POLICY 170, 176–81 (Alan
Booth&AnnC.Croutereds.,2002).
56. Tosufferthemarriagepenalty,acoupleneedstobe“dualearning,middleincome.” Thisis lesstypicallytheprofileofcohabitantsintheUnitedStates. Inaddition,themarriagepenalty couldbebalancedbyotherbenefitsprovidedbymarriagethataremoretypicalforthosein theuppermiddleclass,suchastheestate-taxexemption. Butforelderlycouples,oneofthe maingroupsofcohabitantsintheUnitedStates,jointliabilityasaresultofmarriagecanbe veryimportant. SeeJohnR.Schleppenbach,StrangeBedfellows:WhyOlderStraightCouples ShouldAdvocateforthePassageoftheIllinoisCivilUnionAct,17ELDERL.J.31,40(2009) (“Olderindividuals whocontemplate remarriagemay alsobe justifiablyconcerned about protectingtheirindividualwealthandavoidingtheliabilitiesofapotentialspouse.”).
57. Inthecaseoffinancialaidforcollege,itissometimesthewealthoftheparentsthatmatters.
SeeinfraPartI.A.2.
58. Inotherprograms—likefoodstampsandSection8assistance—eligibilityiscalculatedbased onhouseholdincome,regardlessofmaritalstatus. HERTZ,supranote52,at197–98. For
Depending on the partner’s income level, not being recognizedas a family unitmayormaynotbeadvantageous. Usually,becauseeligibilityisrestricted tothepoorest,theadditionofeventhesmallestincomecouldrendersomeone unqualified. Forexample,underthe2013federalguidelines,thepovertylevel foronepersonis$11,490peryear,whileforahouseholdoftwoitis$15,510. Thus,often,addingthewealthofanotherpersonincreasestheassetsowned together andeliminates eligibility.59 Other times,however,especially ifthe
nonapplicantpartnerispoorer,notincludingthepartner’sincomemayresult inalossbecausethetotalhouseholdincomewouldnotbedividedbytheactual numberoffamilymembers.
Eligibilityfor means-testedassistanceisveryrelevantto manynonmarital householdsintheUnitedStates—thereisacorrelationbetweenthepopulation eligible for means-based assistance and the demographic of people in nonmaritalunions. Lookingatsharedincome earnedintheyears 2006–2008, closeto11percentofhouseholdscomposedofnonmaritalunionslivedbelow thepovertyline.60
Sincethiscalculationisbasedontheincomeofbothpartners— whichisnotcalculatedinmostmeans-testedprograms—itthusreflectslower numbers thanthe actualpercentage of cohabitingcoupleswho are likelyto relyonmeans-basedprograms.61 Adifferentandmoretraditionalcalculation
in 2009 found that among cohabitantswithout collegedegrees, 31 percent livedbelowthepovertyline(comparedwith9percentofmarriedadultswithout college degrees).62 There is, thus, a solid correlation between living in
nonmaritalhouseholds and eligibility formeans-tested programs inthe United States.
thisreason,Idonotdiscusstheseprogramsbelow. Buteveninthesecases,beingunmarried canbehelpful,assomewomenlivewith“a‘shadowed’cohabitingpartner,whounofficially occupiesthehomeasacontributingmemberbutwhosepresenceisconcealedfromhousingand publicassistanceauthorities.” MaryaLeroyDantzer,Place,Face,Space:HowHousingAssistance andHouseholdCompositionShapeLow-IncomeMothers’AccesstoResources158(Apr. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University) (on file with author),
availableathttp://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20002467.
59. SeeCYNTHIAGRANTBOWMAN,UNMARRIEDCOUPLES,LAW,ANDPUBLICPOLICY
108(2010); cf.Kennedy&Fitch,supra note40,at1485 (“Includingcohabiting partner incomes in family poverty measurements more completely accounts for the economic resourcesavailableincohabitingfamiliesandthussubstantiallyreducesestimatedpovertyrates.”).
60. Kennedy&Fitch,supranote40,at1493.
61. John Iceland, Measuring Poverty With Different Units of Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF
MEASUREMENTISSUESINFAMILYRESEARCH221,222–23(SandraL.Hofferth&Lynn
M.Caspereds.,2007).
62. RichardFry&D’VeraCohn,LivingTogether:TheEconomicsofCohabitation,PEWSOCIAL&
DEMOGRAPHICTRENDS(June27,2011),
Theotherprominentgroupofcohabitantsthatislinkedtomeans-tested assistanceisstudentsinhighereducation,whocanusetheirrelationshipstatus(or theirparents’)toincreasetheireligibility—notonlyforfinancialaidfromthe federalgovernment,butforothersupportfromtheuniversityandforexternal grants. Below,Iexaminemorethoroughlytwooftheprogramsthatcan ben-efittheunrecognized.
1. SupplementalSecurityIncomeandMedicaid
TitleXVI oftheSocialSecurityActestablishesSupplementalSecurity Income(SSI),ameans-testedprogramthatassistspeopleoversixty-fiveyears old,orwhoareblindordisabledanddonothavesufficientincomeandresources to maintaina standardoflivingat theestablishedfederalminimum-income level.63
In many states, if a person is eligiblefor SSI, she is automatically qualifiedforMedicaid.64
SinceMedicaidprovidesfreeaccesstoavarietyof expensivemedicaltreatments,oftenitisessentialtopreserveSSIeligibilityin ordertoensureaccesstoMedicaid.65
Being in unrecognizedrelationships can be substantiallyadvantageous forthepurposeofeligibilityforSSI.66
First,inthecaseofspouseswholive together,if one spouse isineligiblefor SSI,the Social Security Administration deemsaportionofthatspouse’sincomeorassetsaspartoftheclaimant’sincome.67
Second,the amountthat isgrantedtotwo eligiblespouses issmaller than the amountgrantedtotwoeligibleindividuals. Thus,in2014,themonthlypayment thateligiblemarriedcouplesreceivedfromthefederalgovernmentwas$1082.68
IfpartnerswereunmarriedandbothwereeligibleforSSI,eachindividualreceived $721amonth,acombinedamountof$1442.69
Inbothcases,thesearesolid fi-nancialenticementsforlow-incomepeople.
63. 42U.S.C.§1381(2006).
64. UnderstandingSupplementalSecurityIncome(SSI):SSIandEligibilityforOtherGovernment andStatePrograms,SOCIALSECURITYADMIN.,http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm (lastvisitedOct.19,2013)[hereinafterUnderstandingSupplementalSecurityIncome].
65. James R.Sheldon,Jr.&DianaM.Straube, Disability,Divorce,SSI,and Medicaid:Using CreativeAlimony,ChildSupportandPropertySettlementstoMaximizeSSI,EnsureMedicaid Eligibility,andCreateFundingforAssistiveTechnology,(Nat’lAssistiveTech.Advoc.Project, NeighborhoodLegalServicesInc.,Buffalo,N.Y.),Sept.2008,availableathttp://www.nls.org/files/ Disability%20Law%20Hotlines/National%20AT%20Advocacy/DisabilityDivorce.pdf.
66. Robert E. Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Marriage Penalties and Support Anomalies,22GA.ST.U.L.REV.561,566–68(2006)(explainingthemarriagepenaltyfor marriedcoupleswhoreceiveSupplementalSecurityIncome(SSI)).
67. 20C.F.R.§416.1802(a)(1)(2008).
68. UnderstandingSupplementalSecurityIncome,supranote64.
The state is not entirely blind, however, to the possibility that a nonspouse is supportingthe applicant. The SocialSecurityAdministration definesincomeas“anythingyoureceiveincashorinkindthatyoucanuseto meetyourneedsforfoodandshelter.”70
Accordingly,ifanapplicant’sunmarried partnerispayingtherent,forexample,theAdministrationmaycountpartof thatpaymentindeterminingtheapplicant’sbenefiteligibility.71 Inaddition,
toprevent“fraud,”72theCodeofFederalRegulationsdeterminesthatthepartiesdo
nothavetobelegallymarriedtobeconsideredspousesforthepurposesofSSI eli-gibility—they only needto hold themselvesoutasa marriedcouple.73
Ac-cordingly,aclaimantforSSIbenefitswhostatesonherapplicationthatsheis unmarriedandislivinginthesamehouseholdwithanunrelated, opposite-sex personcouldbedeemedmarriedifthecouple“lead[s]peopletobelievethat [they]areeachother’shusbandandwife.”74
Butmostnonrecognizedpartners donotfallunderthe definitionof “holdingthemselvesout”ashusbandand wife as interpreted by the SocialSecurity Administration, and thereby still enjoythebenefitsoftheunmarriedstatusforpurposesofSSIandMedicaid.75
70. 20C.F.R.§416.1102(2008).
71. 20C.F.R.§416.1131(2008).
72. Smithv.Shalala,5F.3d235,239(7thCir.1993)(holdingthat thegoalofthe“deemed married”provisionis,interalia,thepreventionoffraud).
73. 20C.F.R.§416.1816(2008).
74. 20C.F.R.§416.1826(c)(2)(2008).
75. FortheSocialSecurityAdministrationtodeterminewhetherthecoupleholdsitselfoutas husbandandwife,theapplicantneedstoanswerthefollowingquestions:whatnamesthetwo areknownby;whethertheyintroducethemselvesashusbandandwife,or,ifnot,howthey areintroduced;whatnamesareusedonthemailforeachofthem;whoownsorrentsthe placewheretheylive;andwhetheranydeeds,leases,timepaymentpapers,taxpapers,orany otherpapersshowthecoupleashusbandandwife. 20C.F.R.§416.1826(c)(1)(i)–(v)(2008).
TheSocialSecurityAdministrationisnotboundbyastate’sdefinitionof“marriage”forthis purpose; and “deemed married” is not limited to a state’s definition of “common law marriage”(whichisrecognizedonlyinaminorityofstates). BarbaraSamuels,BasicSocial Security Retirement and Basic SSI Eligibility Requirements, 143 PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTENEWYORKLAW41N1(2004)(“‘Holdingout’isaconceptuniquetoSSI. It
has no relationship to the concept of common law marriage.”). But the above-listed questions,whicharewrittenintotheregulation,are,indeed,similartothoserequiredfor proofofvalidcommonlawmarriage. SeeGÖRANLIND,COMMONLAWMARRIAGE:A
LEGALINSTITUTIONFORCOHABITATION511–14 (2008). Notably, the definition of
“holdingthemselvesoutasamarriedcouple”seemstopresentahighbarforprovingsuch behavior:tobedeemedasholdingthemselvesoutasamarriedcouple,thecoupleshouldusea singlelastname,introducethemselvesashusbandandwife,andsoon—practicesthatseem lesstypicalformostcohabitantstodaythaninthepast. Seeid.at913–14. Indeed,oneofthe reasons thatcommon law marriageishard toprove isthatmostpeopledo not“present themselvesashusbandandwife”today. Seeid.at564–65.
Nowonder,then,thattheonlyreportedcourtdecisionthatupheldtheSocialSecurity Administration’sdecisiontodeemanunmarriedcoupleasmarriedincludesauniquesetof factsinwhichthecoupledemonstratedthattheyheldeachotheroutasmarried:thewife
Similarly, nonmarital households can gain significantly from nonrecognitionwithrespecttotheireligibilityforMedicaid. Oneexampleis thewayinformalpartnersarefinanciallyprivileged(comparedtorecognized couples)whenoneofthemrequiresnursing-homeservices. Sincelong-term careisveryexpensive,Medicaidhasbecomeacommonsourcetofund nursing-home care.76 According to the spousal impoverishment provisions of the
MedicareCatastrophicCoverageActof1988,77“allofacouple’sresourcesare
consideredindeterminingMedicaideligibilityregardlessofwhethertheassetsare jointly or separately held.”78
The institutionalized spouse can qualify for Medicaidifthecouple“spendsdown”theirassetsonthehospitalization—for example,ifthecouplespendstheirmoneyuntiltheappropriateassetlimitis reached.79
Theoretically,ifthepartnersareunmarriedandkeeptheirfinances separate,80 the noninstitutionalized person can keep her personal assets yet
haveMedicaidpayforthehospitalizationofherpartner.81
Thevaluableadvantagesforunmarriedcouplesdescribedabovehaveinduced a noticeable number of couples to engage in “Medicaid divorce,” since the medicalcostsofonespousecanforcethecoupletodepleteitsassets,leaving the otherspouseimpoverished.82 While statisticalstudiesabout the sizeof
this phenomenondo not exist,the observableamountofanecdotal evidence— fromcourtcases,legalguidesforlawyersonhowtohandlesuchdivorces,and newspaperarticles—testifiesthatthisisnotamarginaloccurrence.83
Medicaid
di-wroteontheSSIapplicationthat,whiletheyarenotmarried,“theyholdthemselvesoutto thecommunity ashusbandandwife,”andona varietyof otheroccasionstheypresented themselvesashusbandandwife. Smithv.Sullivan,767F.Supp.186,187–88(C.D.Ill. 1991). In the second reported case, in which the court rejected the Social Security Administration’sfindingthatdeemedacoupleasmarried,thecourtnotedthatcohabitation “isnotadispositivefactortobeconsideredintheanalysis.” Brownv.Apfel,No. 98-CIV-2915-HB,1999WL144515,at*1,*3(S.D.N.Y.Mar.16,1999).
76. AndrewD.Wone,Don’tWanttoPayforYourInstitutionalizedSpouse?TheRoleofSpousal RefusalandMedicaidinFundingLongTermCare,14ELDERL.J.485,490–501(2006).
77. 42U.S.C.§1396r-5(2006).
78. McNamarav.OhioDep’tofHumanServs.,744N.E.2d1216,1219(OhioCt.App.2000).
79. But thenoninstitutionalizedspouseretains asmallpart ofthe couple’sresourceswithout affectingtheeligibilityoftheinstitutionalizedspouse.
80. Cf.HERTZ,supranote52,at196.
81. Ontheotherhand,thestatusof“married”canbebeneficialbecauseitexemptsjointlyownedhomes fromthespend-downrequirement—anoteworthyadvantagethatnonmaritalpartnerscannotenjoy.
Mostunmarriedpartners,however,donotneedthisexemptioninthefirstplace.
82. Cf.Olver&Lee,supranote37(“SincerecentchangestoMedicaidrulesinMay2006,the ‘Medicaiddivorce’hasbeenresurrectedasaplanningtool.”).
83. Lawmakers did not ignore this phenomenon, constantly stating that “using a divorce proceedingtoaccelerateMedicaid...violatespublicpolicyingeneralandtheunderlying policyoftheMedicaidAct.” H.K.v.Div.ofMed.AssistanceandHealthServs.,878A.2d 16,19(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2005).
vorcepresentsaslightlydifferentethicalquestionbecauseitrequireschanging a statusratherthanmerelymaintaining thestatusquoof stayingunmarried.84
ForthepurposesofthisArticle,itissufficienttofocusonthewaythatunmarried couples (rather thanthose who get divorced toachieve eligibility) can gain fromMedicaid.
2. FinancialAidforHigherEducation
Eligibilityforfinancialaidinpostsecondaryeducationisdeterminedby theFederalStudentAid,anofficeoftheU.S.DepartmentofEducation. To qualifyforfinancialaidanddeterminethelevelofsupportthatsheiseligible for,astudentisrequiredtofillouttheFreeApplicationforFederal Student Aid form(FAFSA).85 The morefinancially needythe studentis,the more
aidthestudentreceives(upto amaximumlevel). TheFAFSAisoftenalso usedbycollegesanduniversitiestodetermineeligibilityfornonfederalscholarships andisrequiredbyvirtuallyeveryU.S.collegeanduniversity.86
84. Ethicallyspeaking,Medicaiddivorcepresentsaslightlydifferentsituationthanthosethat werepreviouslydiscussed,suchasSSIandfinancialaid. Thedifferenceisthatherecouples whomayalreadyberesponsibletooneanother,andmayhaveenjoyedsomeprotectionsof marriage,getdivorcedtoavoidfinancialloss. Whilesuchanactioncan,insomecases,be unethical,Idonotthinkthatitshouldbecategoricallyperceivedasunethical. Thequestion ofethicshereshould beexaminedcasebycase,accordingtothe specificcoupleandthe specificcircumstances. Ifthecouplewaseconomicallyandemotionallyinterdependent,there maybeareasontoviewsuchactasunethical;but,inothercases,marriagestatusdoesnot meanthatthecouplehadobligationsthatwarrantcombiningtheirassets. Inanyevent,the ethicalquestionisnotmaterialforpurposeofthisarticle. Foradiscussionoftheethicsof Medicaiddivorce,seeRandyCohen,GetADivorce,N.Y.TIMES,July28,2002,(“Ultimately, thequestion iswhoshouldpayforyourhusband'scare:Medicaidoryou,thelate-in-life spouse? To methe answer is both. You should assist him but should not be utterly impoverished. AndMedicaidshouldbereformedsoastospareyouthispainfuldilemma.
Medicaidrulesenvisionacoupleinalifelongeconomicpartnership. Whilethisistrueof manycouples,itisnotthecaseforthoselikeyouwhomarrylateinlife.”);seealsoAbrams,
supranote20,at56–58(arguingthatmarriageisapoorproxyforeligibilityforbenefitsand entitlementsbecausemaritalstatusdoesnotnecessarilyreflectinterdependency).
85. SeeFormsandWorksheets,FEDERALSTUDENTAID,http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWeb App/students/english/forms.jsp(lastvisitedNov.4,2013). Usingtheinformationprovided on the Free Application forFederal StudentAid form (FAFSA), Federal StudentAid calculatesthestudent’sfinancialneedbasedonhisfinancialsituationandthetuitioncostsof theschoolstowhichheisapplying. CarolineWaldner,InDefenseofCollegeSavingsPlans: Using529PlanstoIncreasetheImpactofDirectFederalGrantsforHigherEducationtoLow-and Moderate-IncomeStudents,11FLA.TAXREV.97,128n.101(2011).
86. CROSBY BURNS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNEQUAL AID: DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENTOFGAYANDTRANSGENDERAPPLICANTSANDFAMILIESHEADEDBY
Inevaluatingfinancialneed,Federal StudentAiddividesstudentsinto twostatuses:“dependent” onor“independent”oftheirparentsfortheir tui-tion. Dependent students must report their parents’ income and assets, as wellastheirown, ontheFAFSA.87
Federalstudentaidprogramsarebased ontheconceptthatadependentstudent’sparentshavetheprimary responsi-bilityforpayingfortheirchild’seducation.88 Familystatuscouldbenefitthe
student in two ways:First, if the student is dependentand herparents are unmarried,itmayreduce thetotalexpected familycontribution. Second,if thestudentisindependent,shewouldbenefitbynondisclosureofherpartner’s income.89
Untilthe2013–14academicyear,financialaidwasoneofthevenuesin which unmarried students and students with unmarriedparents could gain fromnonrecognition. Butevenunderthenewfederalregulationdiscussedin theintroduction,studentswhoseunmarriedparentsdonotlivetogetherstill enjoy a significant financialadvantage over similarly situated students with marriedparents. Additionally,thechangeintherulehasnoteliminatedthe possibleadvantageofindependent(fromtheirparents)unmarriedpartners.
For purposes of determining the expected family contribution of the student’sunmarriedparents—whethertheparentsaredivorcedorwerenever married—thedependentstudentshouldincludeontheFAFSAinformation abouttheparentwithwhomshelivedlongerduringthetwelvemonthsbefore thedateshecompletestheapplication. Thus,inmanycases,ifthelegalparent in-formallyliveswithanotherpersonwhoisnotthelegalparentoftheapplicantand notmarriedtotheapplicant’sparent,theotherpartner’sincomewouldnotbe calculated, which would thus increase the student’s likelihood of eligibility significantly. But,asstatedbefore,iftheapplicant’slegalparentsare unmar-riedandshareresidency,bothincomeswillbecalculatedandwilldecreasethe likelihoodofeligibilityandbenefitlevel.
Todemonstrate,considerthefollowingscenario:Sylvia,Lori’smother, livesinformallywithAri,whoisnotLori’sfather. AlthoughSylviaandAri are economically and emotionally interdependent, under the rules, because
87. 2011–2012FSAHANDBOOKWITHACTIVEINDEX,FEDERALSTUDENTAIDAVG-21(2011),available athttps://ifap.ed.gov/ifap/byAwardYear.jsp?type=fsahandbook&awardyear=2011-2012.
88. Id.
89. Of course,for the purposesof federal studentaid, being married isbeneficial forsome couples. AccordingtotheFAFSA,marriedcouples,eventhoseundertwenty-fouryearsold, areconsideredindependent,whichismostoftenanadvantage. Id. Inanotherscenario,the studentapplicantcouldhaveaspousewithanincomelowerthanhers,whichwouldincrease thehousehold’stotalincomebutalsoincreasethefamily’shouseholdsize.
theyareunmarried,90Ari’sincomeandpresenceinthehouseholdwouldnot
beincludedontheapplication. ThatcouldinflateLori’sfinancialaidpackage significantly.91 NowassumethatAriandSylviaaremarried(butstill,Arihas
notlegallyadoptedLoriorassumedotherlegalresponsibilityforherexpenses andwell-being). Sinceinformationaboutstepparents,evenwithanexisting prenuptialagreement,isconsideredontheapplication,92Loriwillneedtoreport
bothincomes,thusarrivingatahigherincome,withthreerecognizedpersons inherhousehold.
Inanotherscenario,Loriisagraduatestudentwithnoincome,under independentstatusbecausegraduatestudentsareautomaticallyconsidered inde-pendent.93 LoriisengagedtoTom,whoseannualincomeis$100,000. Theyhave
been dating for ten years and Tom has been very financially supportive of Lori.94
Under therules,muchofTom’ssupportwouldbeconsidered“in-kind support,”whichisnotincludedontheapplicationform.95 Insum,Lori’sstatusas
unmarriedwouldprobablyincreasethechancesofherbeingeligiblefor fi-nancialaid.
Itisthussafetosaythat,evenunderthenewrule,inanunknownnumberof cases,living ininformal relationshipsorhaving unmarriedparents (whodo notshareresidence)isfinanciallybeneficialtopeopleapplyingforstudent fi-nancialaid. Because,asstatedbefore,studentsareamajorgroupofcohabitants andsoarethoseinpost-maritalunions(parentsofthestudents),financialaid isaconsequentialinstanceinwhichnonrecognitionisbeneficial.96
90. AndassumingAridoesnotcontributetomorethanhalfofSylvia’sfinances.
91. BURNS,supranote86,at8–11.
92. 2011–2012 FSA HANDBOOK WITH ACTIVEINDEX, supra note 87, at AVG-29 (“A stepparentistreatedlikeabiologicalparentifthestepparenthaslegallyadoptedthestudent orif thestepparent ismarried, asof the dateofapplication, toa student’s biologicalor adoptiveparentwhoseinformationwillbereportedontheFAFSA. Therearenoexceptions.
Aprenuptialagreementdoesnotexemptthestepparentfromprovidinginformationrequired ofaparentontheFAFSA.”(emphasisomitted)).
93. Id.atAVG-22.
94. Lori may need to reportpart of Tom’ssupport as“untaxed income” butnot as spousal income. Id.atAVG-20. Forexample,ifhernameislistedontheapartment’sleaseandTom paystherent,sheneedstoincludethissumassupport. But ifhernameisnotonthelease, sheshouldnotdisclosethefinancialsupport. Id. Ifsheisinastatethatrecognizescommon lawmarriagesand,underthetermsofthestate,sheisinsuchaunion,thensheisconsidered married. Butonlyaminorityofstatesrecognizecommonlawmarriage,andeveninthose,it seems that Lori’s relationship might not be considered common law marriage—either becausethecouple doesnotintroducethemselves asspouses orbecause theirtimeliving togetherwouldbeconsideredatrialperiod,apremaritalstage. SeeLIND,supranote75,at 796–97.
95. 2011–2012FSAHANDBOOKWITHACTIVEINDEX,supranote87,atAVG-21.
96. Indeed,universitiesintheUnitedStateshaverecognizedthat“financialaidatuniversitiesis oftendistortedforstudentswithcertainfamilycircumstances,”andsomeuniversitiesemploytheir
B. Post-MaritalEntitlements
Peoplewho were previouslymarriedare one ofthe major groupswho liveoutsideofmarriageintheUnitedStates. In2008,outofthetotalnumberof households withnonmaritalunions,almost 28percentwere suchthat both partnersweredivorced,and50percentweresuchthatatleastonepartnerwas divorced.97 Divorcedandwidowedpeoplecangainfrombeinginan
unrecog-nizedrelationshipinfourmainareas:spousalsupport,Medicare,survivor’s benefits,andSocialSecurityretirementbenefits. (Inthecaseofspousalsupport, however,thereisagoodchancethatevenwithoutremarriagethebenefitswill beterminated. IdiscussthisfurtherinPartIII.A.1.)
WhenaworkercoveredbySocialSecuritydies,hersurvivingspouse(or herex-spouse,providedthat theyhadbeenmarriedforatleast tenyears)is entitledto survivor’s benefits.98
Butifthe recipient remarriesbefore sheis sixty yearsold,or fifty ifshe isdisabled, thenshe loses theentitlement.99
Similarly,theformerspouse ofaninsuredpersonwhoisentitled toretirement benefitsundertheSocialSecurityActmaybeeligible forbenefitsasadivorced spouse (if theyweremarried atleast ten years).100
Nonetheless, uponher remarriage, a divorced spouse typically cannot collect benefits on her former spouse’srecord.101 Correspondingly,iftheinsuredex-spouseisalive,remarriageof
theuninsuredatanyageprecludeseligibilityforSocialSecurityandMedicare.102 SeveralrecentstudiesconfirmthateligibilityforSocialSecurityisdecidedly influential in thedecisions of divorcedand widowedpeople regardingtheir livingarrangements.103
ownsystemsthattrytofixtheseproblems. AndrewGiambrone,YaleResistsFinancialAidDistortions, YALEDAILYNEWS(Nov.4,2011), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2011/nov/04/yale-resists-financial-aid-distortions.
97. Kennedy&Fitch,supranote40,at1491.
98. See42U.S.C.§402(e)(2006)(awardingsurvivor’sbenefits). Inordertobeeligible,thespouses hadtohavebeenmarriedforatleasttenyears. 42U.S.C§416(d)(2)(2006).
99. 42U.S.C.§402(e)(1)(A)–(B)(2006).
100. 42U.S.C.§402(b)(2006)(divorcedwife);42U.S.C.§402(c)(2006)(divorcedhusband).
101. 42U.S.C.§402(b)(1)(C)(2006)(divorcedwife);42U.S.C.§402(c)(1)(C)(2006)(divorced husband). Thedivorcedcanregaineligibilityiftheirmostrecentmarriageendseitherbydeath, divorce,orannulment. SeeRS00202.046EntitlementofaDivorcedSpouseAfterTerminationof SubsequentMarriage-Policy,SOCIALSECURITYADMIN.,https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/ 0300202046(lastupdatedFeb.12,2013).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(H) (2006) (divorced wife); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(H) (2006) (divorcedhusband);HospitalInsurance, http://treasury.tn.gov/oasi/PDFs/MEDICARE-INFORMATION.pdf.
103. SeegenerallyGaryV.Engelhardt,SocialSecurityandElderlyHomeownership,63J.URBAN
ECON.280(2008)(concludingthatreductionsinSocialSecuritybenefitswouldsignificantly altertheelderlyhomeownershiprate,especiallyforwidowedpeople);GaryV.Engelhardt,
C. MarriagePenalty
Becauseofmaritalstatusalone,somemarriedcouplespaymoreincome taxthantheywouldiftheywereunmarried,whileotherspayless. Thesepolicies areknown respectively asthe “marriagepenalty” and the“marriage bonus.” Marriage penalties and bonuses result from tax codeprovisions that treat a marriedcouple asone taxable unitand an unmarriedcouple astwo taxable units.104 Becauseofthis,sometimes—dependingonavarietyofsuchfactors
as the gap in income betweenthe partners, the number of children,etc.— nonmaritalpartnerspaylessincometaxbyvirtueoftheir“single”or“headof household”filingstatus.105 Indeed,abodyofresearchshowsthat“taxeshave
asmallbutstatisticallysignificanteffectonthedecisionwhethertomarry.”106
Inquiryintothe complexitiesof the federalrate-tables and thevarious waysthatpartnerscouldgainorloseasaresultoftheirnonmaritalstatusexceeds thescopeofthisArticle.107 ForthepurposesofthisArticle,asageneral
prin-ciple,ifthespouses’incomesarefairlysimilar,thentheirtaxliabilitywillbe greaterasjointfilersthaniftheywerenotmarriedandfiledseparately.108
In otherwords,the taxsystempenalizes mainlydual-earnercoupleswhose in-comes are somewhatequal.109 Generallyspeaking—except for the extreme
caseinwhichacoupleobviouslydivorcestofiletaxesasseparateindividuals andthenremarries—thestatedoesnottargetpeoplewhostrategicallydonot
JonathanGruber&CynthiaD.Perry,SocialSecurityandElderlyLivingArrangements,40J.
HUM.RESOURCES354(2005).
104. I.R.C.§6013(a) (West2011)(“Ahusbandandwifemay makeasinglereturnjointlyof incometaxesundersubtitleA,eventhoughoneofthespouseshasneithergrossincomenor deductions....”);I.R.C.§1(West2011)(creatingfourfilingstatuses:marriedfilingjointly,
marriedfilingseparately,single,orheadofhousehold). Thelackofmarriageneutralityis alsotheresultofprogressiveratherthanproportionaltaxrates. SeeWhittington&Alm,
supranote25,at82–83.
105. SeeHERTZ,supranote52,at117–26.
106. StephanieHunterMcMahon,ToHaveandtoHold:WhatDoesLove(ofMoney)HavetoDo WithJointTaxFiling?,11NEV.L.J.718,749(2011).
107. Foragenerallistofpossibletaxadvantagesforunmarriedcouples,seeLaurenJ.Wolven,
EstatePlanningforUnmarriedAdults,ST042ALI-ABA575(2012).
108. Abrams,supranote20,at15–16.
109. Nevertheless,evenlow-earnercouplescanbenefitfromnotbeingmarried. Astudybasedon data from the 2002 National Survey of America’s Families found that about half of unmarriedcohabitantswouldhaveowedmoretaxesiftheyweremarried. GregoryAcs& ElaineMaag,IrreconcilableDifferences?TheConflictbetweenMarriagePromotionInitiativesfor CohabitingCouplesWithChildrenandMarriagePenaltiesinTaxandTransferPrograms,NEW
FEDERALISM:NAT’LSURVEYOFAM.’SFAMILIES3(UrbanInst.Ser.No.B-66,2005).
But thestudypredictedthat,duetosomechangesinprovisionssuchastheEarnedIncome Tax Credit, by 2008, the percentage of low-income taxpayers (unmarried couples with children)facingmarriagetaxpenaltieswouldfallto10.5percent. Id.at4.
getmarriedorwhostrategicallydivorcejusttoavoidthetaxpenalty.110
Obviously, thisdescriptiondoesnotpurporttofindallthetaxloopholesthatunmarried couplescanuse—theyarenumerous,cannoteasilyberecognized,andchange everyyear.
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Thisshortandnonexhaustivesummaryillustratesthatfamily lawmust addressthe potential financialbenefitthat stems from beingunrecognized, bothbecausethereareseveralareasinwhichthisstatusisbeneficial,andbecause thereissignificantevidence—anecdotalandotherwise—thatmanypeopleare affected by thesebenefits. The account also shows that,forthe mostpart, vulnerablepopulationsarethosewhobenefitfinanciallyfromnonrecognition: elderly,highereducationstudents,andthepoor. But,asIshowinPartII,the separationbetweenpovertylawand familylawhasrendered thesesegments of thepopulation invisibleto familylaw—the waysin which recognitionof these relationships can harm people are given scant attention in the legal scholarship.
II. THETRENDTOWARDRECOGNITIONANDITSEFFECT ONTHECURRENTLYUNRECOGNIZED
Here,Igiveanaccountofthecurrentlegallandscapefornonmaritalunions intheUnitedStates. Myprimaryaimistoexplorethepotentialramifications oflegal recognitionofcurrentlyunrecognizedrelationships,inparticularfor thosepopulationsdiscussedabove.
In order to understand both the existinglaw and policy that govern unmarriedpartnersaswellasproposalsforlegalreform,itisimperativefirst to comprehend the hurdles that nonrecognized partners face. I start by providingabriefanalysisof thelegalissuesassociatedwiththeproliferation ofnonmaritalarrangementsintheUnitedStates. Specifically,Ibreakdown theinjuriesfromlegalnonrecognitiontotheresultanteconomicanddignitary inequities. Then, inPartII.B,I introducethetrend towardrecognition by presenting both the existing legal terrain and major proposals for policy
110. Inresponsetoatax-motivateddivorce,the sham-transactiondoctrinecouldbeappliedso thatthe divorcedcouplewould bedeemedto havefiledtheir taxesreturnsas “married.”
Boyterv.Comm’r,668F.2d1382(4thCir.1981). But sincethesham-transactiondoctrine islimitedonlytothosewhoremarryafterdivorce,tax-motivateddivorceisstillanoptionfor thosewhodonotremarry,whetherornottheycontinuetolivetogether. Abrams,supranote 20,at25–27;I.R.S.Priv.Ltr.Rul.78-350-76(June1,1978).