42mentalbarriers.pdf

Jonathan

Richmond

Planners

and

politicians tend to renderthe

complex

in black-and-white. Technological

metaphors

play an important

role in this process _ofself-delusion

which

results in impoverishedplanning. Analysts rely too

much

on

quantitative techniques because they provide an illusion ofscience

and

certainty. Politicians are too easily

swayed

by

the vivid

imagery of technological solutions, ignoring the difficult, abstractquestions ofsocialvalues

and

goals

which

should

be addressedbefore

any

technologyischosen. These themesareexploredwith the aidofa case_{study of}transportation

planning in Southern California.

Two

thingsfill the

mind

withever-increasing

wonder

and

awe

the

more

often

and

the

more

intensely the

mind

is

drawn

tothem: thestarry

heavens

above

me

and

the

moral

law within

me.

—

Immanuel

Kant

Critique of Practical

Reason

When

Copernicus arguedin1543, thattheearthrotates

daily

on

its

own

axis

and

moves

annually

around

a

sta-tionary sun, he

was

attacked

by

aLutheranfollower,

Mel-achthan, since "the eyes arewitnesses that the heavens

revolveinthespace oftwenty-four hours" (Kuhn, 1957).

Because

we

allseethe

world

throughtheeyes ofour

own

experience

and

values, each theorycarriesits

own

setof

assumptions

which

givesitmeaning.

Only

through

aware-nessoftheshortcomingsbesettingthe

way

we

receive

and

deal with information

do

we

stand a chance of finding

a

more

ready path to understanding.

Butnotonlyare

we

unaware;

we

do

not seektobe

more

aware.

We

suffer, says Boulding (1968),

from

agora-phobia, "the fearof

open

spaces, especially

open

spaces

inthemind."

We

identifywith

and

arereassured

by

rec-ognizable forms:

we

trytoblotout thevoid

and

disorder of the

unknown

over

which

we

have

no

control.

Though

one

canonly bewise,

warned Harold

Laski in 1930, "if

he admitsthat his

knowledge

of the subjectis

mainly

a

measure

of his ignorance of its boundaries,"

we

delude

ourselvesinto believing that

we

have successfullyclosed

in

on

the essence of the subject

under

study in

an

ef-fort to escape

from

thereality

and

consequences ofour

ignorance.

Thus, says Ackoff (1981),

"we

usually try to reduce

complex

situationsto

what

appeartobe oneor

more

sim-ple solvableproblems. This is

sometimes

referred to as

'cutting the

problem

down

to size.' In sodoing

we

often

reduce our chances offinding a creative solution to the

original problem."

Pacey(1983)illustrates just this

phenomenon

by

relating

the

problems

associatedwith simple

hand

pumps

usedat villagewells in India.

While

about 150,000

new

pumps

had beeninstalled

by

1975,as

many

as two-thirdsof

them

were simultaneously out of order.

Engineers identified faults

and

corrected defects, but

pumps

continued tobreak

down.

"What

at firstheld

up

solution of the problem," writes Pacey, "was a

view

of

technology

which began

and ended

with the

machine

. . .

Peoplein

many

walksoflifetendtofocus

on

thetangible,

technical aspects of

any

practical problem,

and

then to

think that theextraordinarycapabilitiesof

modern

tech-nology ought to lead to an appropriate 'fix.'"

Progress required the realization that this

was

more

thanjustan engineering problem.

A

"breakthrough only

came

when

allaspects of theadministration, maintenance

and

technicaldesignofthe

pump

were

thoughtof in

rela-tion to

one

another.. .Arrangements for servicing the

pumps

were

not veryeffective. There

was

another diffi-culty, too, because in

many

villages,

nobody

felt

any

per-sonal responsibility for looking after the

pumps.

.

."

Without

an adequateadministrative system to keep the

pumps

in

good working

order, repairing a

pump

could

provide

no

more

than a short-term solution: without

propermaintenance

—

somethinglocalpeople could

pro-vide if

shown

how

—

it

would soon

be out oforder once

more."It

was

only

when

thesethingsweretackled together

that

pump

performance

began

to improve."

Schon

(1983)emphasizestheneedfor"problemsetting ...a process inwhich, interactively,

we name

the things

to

which

we

will attend

and frame

the context in

which

we

willattendtothem,"butfinds that"fromthe

process of

problem

solving."

Our

uncritical tendency to takeproblemsas "given"

and

ourfailuretoprobethe

alter-native contexts in

which

they

may

be set,

may

not only

lead us unsuspectingly

down

the

wrong

path, but also

keep

more

productiveavenues

beyond

sight. Thus, while

the defective village

pumps

were

automatically seen as

a technological

problem

to be"solved," without inquiry

into thecontext in

which

the defects existed, the key to

curing the

problem

—

which

layoutside the technological

domain

—

remained

inaccessible.

"Our

technology—the subject ofourpredictions"— says

Schon

(1967), "alsohelpstodeterminethe theoriesunder

which

we

make

predictions, sinceit provides the

meta-phors out of

which

our theories aremade." This article

will

show

how

technological

metaphors

cantacitlyframe

thecontextin

which

professional analytic

work

and

polit-ical decision-makingareconducted,

masking from view

the

more

basic issues

upon

which

both should depend.

Two

different

metaphors

implicit inprocesses of

anal-ysis

and

decision-makingwill be

made

explicit.

On

the

one hand, thetendencyfor theanalyst toformulate

and

tackle a

problem

through the lens of the technique he

uses

—

ratherthanreflect

on

thenature

and

context of the

problem at

hand

before choosing

any

techniques

—

will

be

shown

togivequantitative

methods

bothadistorting

andcontrolling

power

overhis

view

oftheworld

and

the conclusionshe reaches.

A

theory of action willbe pre-sented

which

isrootedinadesirefor closure, forthe

mind

toselectsimplebutinadequateconceptstodealwith

con-ditions of complexity. Quantitative

models

are desired,

itwillbeargued, because"itiscomfortingtoimaginethat

someone

inthistopsy-turvy

world

hasan answer"

(Win-ner, 1975).

Such models

provide a determinate

answer

withthe scientific appearanceof authority, but theycan

distract us

from

exposingthefundamental

problems

we

face.

On

the other hand, the inclination for politicians to

viewquestionsoftechnologychoice

from

the perspective

ofasuperficially attractivetechnology, ratherthan

from

adiscussion ofsocialvalues

and

goals, willbe

shown

to resultnotinthe choice of a particulartechnologyforits

abilitiestoresolve a particularproblem,butinthe

deter-mination of both goals

and

solutions according to the

symbolicappealof particular technologies. Whileanalysts

find securityintheapparentcertaintyofanswersderived

fromquantitative techniques, politicians,itwillbeargued,

draw on

the comfortingsolidity of the physical

and

the obvious, focusing technology choice

on

a

machinery

broughtintoviewnot so often

by

ourparticularly

human

conceptual abilities as

by

our equally

human

emotions

and

fears. Technologies are thereby selected because of

their intuitive appeal as cure-all solutions.

In a Southern California

which

demanded

increasing

mobility

by

car, it

seemed

onlynatural to buildmassive

freewaysystems.

With

hindsight

we

now

questionthe

wis-dom

of such narrow-sighted programs, but fall into a

similar trap by

assuming

that all ills can be cured

by

building a

network

of railways.

By

failing to test our

intuitions,

we

ignore the central value questions

which

mighthelp usdecideifthetechnologyshould haveaplace

inoursociety,

and

aredeflected

from

pathstopotentially

more

creative solutions.

Thisarticlewill startwith severalexamples

from

out-sidetransportationtodevelopa generaltheory

which

will

beusedtohelp explain the puzzles tobe observedinthe

main

focusof the article: a case study oftransportation

planningprocessesinSouthernCalifornia.

Examples

will

begivenofboththe reductionisticuseofcomputer models

by

analysts,

and

thesuperficial intuition-leduse of

tech-nological

metaphors

by

politicians. Both a reliance

on

computational procedures

and

the

promotion

ofa given

technology as panacea provide easy

ways

out. But not

only does the reductionism exhibited in both cases fail

to

make

the "big questions"go away, but the abrogation

of responsibility toconfrontthe

more

basicquestions

may

lead to decisions to

whose

consequences

we

are blind

throughthe tacitimpositionofanethos

which

we

would

reject

were

we

aware

of it.

Patterns of the

Mind

We

haveaparadox: the

mind

is

more

thanamachine,

but

we

increasingly

deny

the

power

of

mind

over

machine

by

behaving in

more

machine-like ways.

Machines

aredeterminate formal systems; they

work

on

the basisofconcepts

programmed

into them.

A

com-puter deals with information accordingto a setof rules

encapsulatedinitsprogram.

These

rules

form

the

boun-daries within

which

the system operates.

Computers, says Searle (1985) are syntactical

symbol

processors:lackingthesemantical content of amind, they

have

no

way

of attaching

meaning

to symbols.

A

com-putersimulation

may

producean"optimal" solution

which

involves destroying a

low-income community,

polluting the

atmosphere

or

damaging

areas of natural beauty to

make

way

for a

new

freeway. But the

computer

has

no

way

toinquireinto its

own

system ofinquiry,

no

way

to

judge that system unethical

and

move

to a

new way

of

looking at the

world

beyond

the assumptions within

which

its

program must

operate.

The

mind, in contrast, is directed

by

intentionality—

"thebeliefs,fears, hopes

and

desires" characteristic of "Free

Will"—

which

the machine, locked into itsprogram, can

do

something, Imightjust

damn

well

do

somethingelse,"

saysSearle.

The

planner's

commitment

"toserve the public

interest" (AICP, 1981)

may

lead

him

to question

whether

itisrighttoperformcertain acts

on

people,

and from

such

an

awarenesschallenge thetenetsof thesystemof

evalua-tion

which

led to sucha "solution."

Such

reflection

may

guide

him

to alterhis perspective; hetherebytearshimself

from

a

bounded

view

tobetterprovidefortheclientshe

is to serve.

The

ability toescape

from

the constraints of a

narrow

system of inquiry,

and

to

do

so

on

the basis of a

never-ending ethical debate, necessarily elevates

mind

above

machine.Yet, inour yearningfor simplicity,

we

falleasily

into the steady

rhythm

of mechanical ways.

Considerthefollowingproblem:

you

are giventhe three

numbers

2, 4, 6,

and

toldthey

conform

toa simple rela-tionalrule.

You

aretodiscover therule

by

suggestingsets

of three numbers,

and

being told the

numbers conform

or

do

not

conform

tothe rule.

You

may

tryas

many

sets

of

numbers

as

you

wish before

announcing

what

you

think the rule is.

The

ruleis, simply, "three

numbers

inincreasingorder

of magnitude." But if

you

are like 23 of the 29 subjects

tested intheexperimentof

Wason

(1960)orlikethe

two

of three graduate students tested

by

this author in the transportation doctoralseminarat

MIT,

you

willhavegot

it

wrong

atfirstattempt. Innearlyallcases, incorrect rules

were

sufficient, but not necessary: "increasing intervals

of two," forexample.

"The

pointisnotthat

most

subjects

failedtogive the correctruleattheirfirst

announcement,

butthattheyadoptedastrategy

which

tendedtopreclude

its attainment."

By

successively giving sets of

numbers

meetingthetestofsufficiency, they confirmedtheir

exist-ingbuterroneousbeliefs, while successrequired"a

will-ingness to testthose intuitiveideas

which

so often carry thefeeling of certitude."

Alexander(1965)assertsthat designers, "limitedasthey

must

be

by

thecapacity of the

mind

to

form

intuitively accessible structures,"

do

notperform suchtests.Quitethe

reverse, "themind'sfirst function isto reduce the

ambi-guity

and

overlap in a confusing situation" since "it is

endowed

with a basic intolerance for ambiguity."

The

complexities of

modern

designproblems, he

sug-gests, are like thedifficultyof

complex

arithmetic: they

cannot be completed in

one

jump. "Complexity defeats

us unless

we

find a simpler

way

of writing it down." Designers, hesays, rarelyconfesstheirinability to solve the

complex problems which

confront

them

daily. "In-stead,

when

a designer does not understand a

problem

closely

enough

tofindtheorderitreallycalls for, hefalls

back

on

some

arbitrarilychosen formalorder.

The

prob-lem, becauseofitscomplexity, remains unsolved"(1964).

Brewer

(1973)demonstratesthis

phenomenon

at

work

inplanningpracticeinhisaccountofmodelingeffortsfor

the

community

renewal

program

of theCityof

San

Fran-cisco.

He

shows

how

"arbitraryweights"

were

frequently applied without a theoretical basis for assigning them.

Particularly disturbing

was

the

unfounded

use of

analo-gies

from

chemicalkinetics

and

physics."Theassumptions,

builtinto therentpressurerelationship,"forexample,"are

offensiveto sense,

common

or otherwise....Ifa

model

builderhasneverbeensensitizedtothe detailsof aspecific

empirical context,

one

shouldnot findfaultwithhisgreat

inferential leaps,

from

decaying isotopes to decaying

houses or

from expanding

and

collapsingmagneticfields

to expanding

and

collapsing rentals."

It

was

notsimplythata

bad

job

had

been done, as

one

operations researcherBrewerinterviewedpointedout,but

that the city planners

wanted

to ask detailed questions

which

the

model

could not address. But, says Brewer, "even

though

the

model

can't

answer

'thosekindsof

ques-tions'it

was

decidedtobuildinso

much

detail thatthose

questions nonetheless appear to be asked." It

may

thus

bepossible toprovidetheappearanceof simpleanswers

to

complex

problems; but suchactiondoes not

make

the

problems

go

away.

Moen

(1984), havingstudied

economic

growth

poten-tial

due

to oil shale

development

in Colorado, similarly

statesthatwhile"anideal populationprojection

method

would

provideestimates of the

numbers and

characteris-tics of immigrants

and

outmigrants detailed

enough

to

planfor

community

needs,"the taskisnotonly

"formid-able" but"impossible, sincedata

on

future

employment

may

be withheld, misrepresented, or even

unknown

by

industry. Consequently, projections

may

be highly

un-reliable not only in the long run but

from day

to day."

Despitethe "ForSale"signs

"now

thelocallogo"

result-ing

from

thefailureofoil-shale-fired

growth

in

one

area,

Moen

reports that"theresponseto thefailureof

forecast-ingin

Colorado

and

elsewherehasbeenthe

development

ofincreasinglycomplicated

models

thatrequire

more

and

more

assumptions about futureevents, as well as about

relationships

among

variables

and

the stabilityof these relationships

—

all of

which

may

increasethepossibility

of error

and

illusionof precision."

Such

efforts,says

Moen,

are"high-techquantitativeanswersto

what

isessentially

a political

and

ethical problem."

Mathematical modeling,

and

especiallycomputer

model-ing, has, however,

become commonplace

in all social

endeavors of academia, consulting

and

government, so

much

so that according to operations researcher John

Mulvey

(1983),

"many

educated people treat computers

But while the apparent complexity of high-powered

computer tools lends

them

authority, all quantitative

models,

however

complicated,

must

simplifythe

complex-ity of the

world

they represent. To findpatterns, "rules"

are needed to decide both

what

isrelevant information

and what

istoberejected,

and

how

thechosen

informa-tion isto be processed.

As Wachs

(1982) says, "there is

relatively littletheory derivable

from

the social sciences

tohelp onearriveat reasonablecoreassumptions."

Such

assumptions,

which

tend to

unduly

reflect

what Godet

(1979) refers to as the "better lit" aspects of reality are

chosensubjectively, notdeterminedobjectively, but color

the

whole

analysis of

which

they

form

the fabric.

A

mathematical statement has

no

social content: it is

correctly

computed

tothe extent thatitfollows therules

of mathematics. But mathematical statements,

though

themselvesempty,

may

powerfullyorganize information,

andwill

do

sothroughtheassumptions under

which

they

areset up. JustasMelachthan'seyesfilteredinformation

to

form

his picture of the universe, so mathematical

al-gorithms

form

partial pictures of the

world

which

lack

necessary truth.

Danger

lies

when,

according to

Hoos

(1969), "intheabsenceofclearly specified limits

and

con-ditions, the assumptions

and

biases of the analyst are taken as representative of the real system

under

study."

Learner (1983) finds that a regression of

murder

rate

onvariablesthoughttoinfluence

murder

'leadstothe con-clusion that each additional execution deters thirteen

murders witha standarderror of seven.

That

seemslike

such a healthyrate ofreturn that

we

might

want

just to

randomly

draft executees

from

the population at large."

But the conclusion changes

when

the set of variables

thoughtrelevant tothe

model

isaltered.

A

result

which

looked convincing under

one

set of assumptions loses

credibility

when

those assumptions are changed.

"Indi-vidualswith differentexperiences

and

different training

willfind differentsubsetsofthevariablestobecandidates

foromission

from

the equation."

So

a right winger will

look to the

punishment

variables

and

regard others as doubtful, while"anindividualwith thebleedingheart prior sees

murder

as a result of

economic

impoverishment."

So

the conservative"finds"thatexecutionhasastrong

deterrenteffect

upon

murder, whiletheliberal"finds"that

execution actually encourages further murder.

The

death penalty case—"perhaps the single

most

im-portantlegaluse of multiple regression thusfar" (Fisher,

1980)

-

presents a two-foldproblem: inthefirstplace the

outcome

is

most

heavily influenced

by

the prior beliefs

inculcated intotheassumptions, ratherthan

by

thedata

theypurport to analyze; but, secondly,

and on

a deeper

level, notonlyare theassumptions

employed

inthe pro-cedure subject to "bias," but the procedure itselfreflects

a point ofview

—

the implicit beliefthatthedeathpenalty

should be used ifit will deter

murder

—

which

might be

rejected wereit tobe broughttothesurface

and

subjected

to critical attention.

The

use of statistical analysis thus distracts us

from

decidingwhethersocietyshould

—

asamatterofprinciple

—

have the right to kill

someone,

a debate

which

is

em-barrassing because it exposes the roots of our ethical values, lays

them open

tocriticism,

and

leaves usuneasy

sincethereis

no

unique"sure"solution. Itis temptingfor those

on

bothsides ofthedeath penalty debateto stand

behind the illusion of science provided

by

the apparent

precisionofeconometrictechnique. But

when

opponents

become

entangledintechnicalargumentsoverthealleged deterrenteffect ofcapitalpunishment, theircaseis

weak-ened becausethe"right to kill"istacitly(if

unintentional-ly) presupposed

by

the calculusemployed. (See

Kelman,

1982

and

Macintyre, 1977forpenetrating discussion of

the assumptions of utilitarianism.)

Quantitative techniques, then, arenot simply subject

toabuse; theiruse for "honest"purposes

may

implyaset

ofbeliefs

which

theirusersmightreject

were

they

aware

of them. 'Thequantitative

approach

tendsto divert our

attention

away

from

theevaluation of theconcepts

and

variables themselves. . .," says

Young

(1979).

"We

can

therefore be

drawn

into

an

uncritical acceptance of the

overall

framework

oftheories

and

approaches tonature

and

society."

Passenger Rail in Southern California

Commuter

railthrivesin

many

EastCoastcities

which

depend

on

ittobringworkersto

town

inthe

morning

and

send

them

home

inthe evening. Traditionalurbancenters

—

concentratedfociof

employment

activity

—

sitat the core

of transportation

networks

branching out to suburbia.

Butthe

low

density

and

widespreaddistributionofboth

population

and economic

activity inSouthernCalifornia

generates a

complex

pattern of transportation

demands

between

a

myriad

of origins

and

destinations. This pat-terncallsfor service

more

similartoa telephone

network

(which connects

anywhere

to everywhere) than to rigid

linear-based public transportation; this does not

augur

well for rail "solutions."

The

trainis being chosen in California in reaction to

the era ofroadbuilding

and

thecultofthecar,

now

seen as selfish

and

wasteful.

The

train, moreover, not only

avoidsroads, butcarriesdeep romantic connotations

dat-ing

back

to an era

when

we

apparently travelled easily

and

ingrace,

and

when

congestion, pollution

and

energy

abuse

were

neither termsinthe vernacular nor

discom-forts to the senses.

Adriana

Gianturco,

Governor

Brown's transportation administrator,

was

a

champion

of the rail cause.

Under

her aegis,

new

AMTRAK

trains

became

part-funded

by

the State of California

and

plans

were

hatchedfor

com-muter

rail operations throughout Southern California.

One

ofthem, connecting

Oxnard,

sixty-sixmiles

north-westofLosAngeles, with

Union

StationnearLA'scentral

business district, started operation.

Oxnard

Commuter

Rail

Initial ridership forecasts for the

proposed

Oxnard

commuter

rail service

were

not encouraging and,

under

instructions

from

superiors,Caltrans (California

Depart-ment

ofTransportation)staff"adjusted"theassumptions

oftheir

model

topredict greater

numbers

ofriders. Final

projections of 1,286 daily passengers in each direction

would

nevermaterialize:duringfour

months

ofoperation, ridership

peaked

at only 175 daily passengers in each

direction and, in February 1983, the

new

Republican

Deukmeijian

administration

moved

to suspend service.

The

obvious interpretation of this story

would

focus

on

the deliberate inflation of projections; but such a perspectiveallows

more

significant ethicalissuestoescape attention.

A

more

criticaleyemight

complain

that the

computer

model

was wrongly employed

even before "adjustments"

were

requested.

The

methodology

failed toproperly

ac-countforproblemspassengers

would

facegettingbetween

stations

and

their

homes

and

places of

work,

and

forthe

low

frequency

and poor

timings of the

proposed

service.

All of these factors

would

discourage people

from

using thetrain,

and

would

providea greater disincentive than

the

model

allowedfor. Accordingtothisview,

more

sen-sitivityshouldhavebeen

shown

in setting

up

themodel, orabetter

model

shouldhavebeen chosen or developed. Butthe

problem

goesdeeper

when

we

appreciate that the

model

was

not just inappropriate for estimating

de-mand,

but whollyinadequatetothe task ofinquiringinto

how

transportation might be appropriatelyprovided to

serve society.

Analysis startedwith the

assumption

ofa given

tech-nology—rail. There

was no

consideration ofalternatives,

nor evenan attempt todefinetheobjectivesof theservice,

which

might be

more

properlystated intermsof

alleviat-ingcongestion

and

pollution,savingenergy

and

providing

mobility to those

who

might otherwise be denied it.

With

demand

asimplicitsurrogatefortheseobjectives,

thedegreeto

which

theultimate goalsmight be achieved

is obscured.

The

relations of theequations are allowed

to influence outcome, regardless of

whether

they imply

a socially justifiabletheory. Arriving atsucha theoryis

the

most

intractable

and

difficultproblem; butthedesire

foraneatly-bounded

problem

definition

makes

for

avoid-anceofsuchissues,

and

asupposedlyvalue-neutral

math-ematical representation attractive.

We

cannot

blame

the

model

forfailing toaskthedeeper

social questions.

The

model

is only part of a system of inquiry that excludessuchdebate. Butthe

model

diverts attention

from

suchquestions.Just as thedeath penalty

modelling implicitly

assumed

that capital

punishment

should be usedifacertaindeterrenteffectcouldbe

estab-lished, it is implicit in the

Oxnard

modelling that rail

serviceshould be provided ifa certain

"demand"

can be

established.

The

"fact" that

we

see

demand

projected

satisfiesusthatthe servicecan

meet

"need."

We

are there-fore ledto

exempt

ourselves

from

investigatingboth

what

"need" actually is,

and

alternative

ways

it might be provided.

"Fewforecastersengageinblatantfalsificationinorder

toreceivea

commission

or promotion," says

Wachs

(1982).

"Many, however, are transformed in subtle steps

from

respondto pressuresforincreasedprojections.

We

should

be

more

concerned, however, about

what

theywere doing

before that pressure

was

applied.

"Caught

in a net of

languageof our

own

invention," says

Alexander

(1964),

"we overestimate the language's impartiality." In their

initially"honest"use of astandard approach, theCaltrans analystswere adoptingalanguage

which

tacitly

framed

the debate, its assumptions unquestioned.

Los Angeles

-San

Diego

Bullet Train

In

March

1982, the

newly-formed American High

SpeedRailCorporation

announced

planstoprovide

high-speed rail service

between

Los Angeles

and San

Diego.

The

Corporation

produced

findings of

demand

forecasts

by ArthurD.Littleconsultants

which

pointedtomassive

ridership

and

a profitable balance sheet.

The

point, once more, is not that

we

need a better

model.

The

sophisticatedcomputerization

was no

more

than a facade. If first

we

ask

what

transportation isfor,

the simplest of techniques enables us to realize that the

bullet train

—

an importserving thedenselyconcentrated

populationcentersofJapan

—

isunsuited tomeetthe

com-plexintra-regionalneedsofdispersedSouthernCalifornia.

But to ask

what

transportation is for

we

have to

do

more

than produce a model.

Even

if it

were

possible to

predict exactly

how many

people

would

ride, it

would

not relieve us of the responsibility to ask

why

it is that

theyshouldride

on

abullet trainratherthantakeanother

means

oftransportation

and

toinvestigate thespillovers, beneficialor otherwise, thatmightaffect the region

and

economy

asawhole.

To

askthesequestionsproperlyone

should notstart withthebullet trainat all, butwiththe

idea of social need.

Los Angeles'mostsuccessfultransitproject...

Without

more

thanthe consultant'sassurancesof

profit-ability, thestatelegislaturealmost

unanimously

approved

abilltoprovide

up

to$1.25billion intax-exemptrevenue

bondsforhigh-speedrail. Subsequent examinationofthe

Arthur D. Little

demand

projections

shows

that their

sophisticationliesonlyintheirfalsehood: the vast

major-ityof thestateLegislature

had

votedtosupportaproject

backed only

by

animpenetrable labyrinth ofcomputerized

distortion

(Richmond,

1983).

The

inherentappeal of theplantothelegislatorsisnot

difficultto see.To

many

Democrats, theplan

meant

more

public transportation. It

meant

emptierfreeways, acleaner

environment,

and

jobsinconstructing

and

operating the

enterprise. To Republicans, the bullet train shone as an

example

of capitalism

working

at its best: profitable private enterpriseprovidingbenefitswithout costto the

state.

The

technologyitself

was

symbolicofthosebenefits:

shiny exterior to see if these

outcomes

would

actually

result. Inthis

example

we

seeinteractionof the

two

forms

of reduction

under

discussion: the

power

of a

computer

model

toprovide"verification"reinforced thepoliticians'

untested

and

erroneousbeliefinthebenefitstobederived

from

a symbolically compelling panacea,

and

stopped

debate.

LightRail inLosAngeles

—

A

Problem

ofPoliticsor

Mind?

The

problem

ofpoliticsisthe

need

to

form

agreement

on

an agenda. Politics tends toboth limit

and

fragment

agendas todeal witha

myriad

of constituencies

and

the

public atlarge. Butthepopularbeliefthat"interests"are responsibleforinadequateagendasignores the

more

fun-damental

controlling

mechanism:

thelanguagein

which

politics is conducted.

Voters

would

be puzzled if they

saw on

their ballots

propositions asking if they

approved

of love or

belong-ing, offairnessorequality."Ofcourse

we

do,"they

would

reply, complaining that these

were

not issues.

Similarly, candidates of all persuasions agree

on

the

need for "effective transportation systems," but are

re-garded withsuspicioniftheyfailtodeclarejust

how

they

plan to attain such a lofty goal.

Forpoliticians, likethepeople theyserve,itisdifficult tothink

and

talk intermsofvalues

and

goals.

They

must

instead uselower-order

metaphors

within thereadygrasp of the mind: they

must

talk of the "need" for freeways or trains to

do

what

Churchman

(1979) calls

"making

polis,"to

make

ground

upon

which

tomeettheir electorate.

Analystsare

drawn

toquantitative techniquesbecauseof

theclean-cut certaintytheyappeartoprovide. Similarly,

"it is

undoubtedly

simpler" fordecision-makers "todeal

solelywithconceptsfor

which

there are physicalreferents

than totrytorelateabstract conceptssuchassecurityor

belongingtothedesign of transportation systems"

(Wachs

and

Schofer, 1969).

So

freeways

and

trains enter the

political picture with all the connotations of history,

aesthetic

and symbolism

with

which

theyare associated.

The

technologies areonly means, enabling ustoget

some-where; they are not ends. But they

become

subjects of

discoursewithoutdiscussion of the goals that drive

them

to be there. There is

no

consideration of possible

alter-nativetransportation technologies

which

mightbeimplied

by

such goals (were

we

to seek them); or of the basic values

upon

which

thesegoals ultimatelydepend.

Higher-order concepts

—

values

and

goals

—

of

which

we

are

un-awarearenonethelesstacitlyimputed

and

carriedforward

to return our sins.

For thefollowing

example

we

move

from

the

computer

room

tothecommittee

chamber

to

show

thattheaffinity

forclosure

on

the part of the analyst isparalleled

by

the

predispositiontotechnological reductionism

on

thepart of the decision-maker.

We

shall see that thepolitician's

tendency to take technology as given,

and

as an

appro-priatebasisforchoicewithoutconsideration of the

under-lyingvalues represented

by

thattechnology, issimilarto

the analyst's desire to present

problems

as determinate, quantifiable,

and

soluble without investigation of the context in

which

they are set.

The

transcript ofthe Executive

Committee

meetingof

theSouthern CaliforniaAssociationof

Governments

on

September

1, 1983

(SCAG,

1983a), presentsa revealing

illustrationofthis

problem

atwork.

At

thismeeting, Pro-fessor

Melvin

Webber

of the University of California,

Berkeley

and

Professor

John Kain

of

Harvard

University

reviewed the agency's Regional Transportation Plan

(SCAG,

1983b), a

document

which emphasized

the

de-velopmentofasystemoflightrail("trolley")linestoserve

the Los Angeles region.

Webber

attributed the failure of

San

Francisco's

Bay

Area

RapidTransitsystem

(BART)

tothe difficultyof

get-tingto

and from

stations: it

was

often faster todrive or

to take the bus. Buses can collect passengersthroughout

residential areas, sothey can completethe

whole

trip in

one

vehicle. Buses cantherefore providea journey

which

isin

many

casesquicker

and

more

convenient than

one

which

requires a separate trip to a

BART

station

and

a

transferto the train.

Webber

emphasizedthatpeople

con-sistentlychosetotravel

on

thebasisoftriptime

and

cost,

and

not because of the quality or aesthetics of the ride

itself.

The

reason

we

failed to eliminatetraffic

con-gestion isthatthecost ofaccessing arail

sys-tem

ishigh,

and

I thinkthat'sas true hereas it

was

inthe

Bay Area

or

more

so.

The

reason

it's probably

more

so is that

your

land use

pattern is not linear,

you

don't

match

a rail-road's geometry.

Kain

said his "overall impression of this is that

your

transportationplannersaretryingto

impose

a19th

cen-tury technology

on

a 20th or21st century city."

He

told

the politicians that rail transit

worked

in high-density

residential corridors

where

people could either

walk

to

stations or reach

them by

shorthigh-frequency feeders.

ButinLosAngelesresidential

development

is"farbelow"

that inareas

where

rail rapidtransit successfully operates,

and

thestreetsystemis

more

developed

and

parking both

more

available

and

less expensive.

Kainstressedthecaseforexpressbuses,

and

theneedto:

I have

some

sense of thereason for it; it has

to

do

with thepopularity of Lionel toy

elec-tric trains.

Light rail, he emphasized, is

no

more

than a slow ex-press bus system withthe disadvantagethat therouteis

fixed, while Los Angeles needs a flexible system.

I don't see

any

merit to itother than kindof a romantic, non-rationalattraction. It's

more

costly;it'sslower, haslowerline-haul speeds,

hassubstantially inferiordoor-to-door

capa-bilities, lesscapacity.Ijustcannotthinkof

any

merit to it; it's just incredible that it has the attraction that it has.

Followingthis,

Councilman

Snow

asked ProfessorKain

ifhe

had

"thought aboutsub-regionsfor light rail. I live

near a corridorthat'shighlyimpacted; theaverage peak-hourtravel timeis eleven miles per hour. I don't

know

what

the costs ofputtinginanexpress

busway

would

be,

but if

you add

a bus,

you

slow

down

overall traffic."

Kainrepeatedthatexpressbusesare a

much

more

flex-ible technology than light rail,

which

is"strictly a kind

ofcombinationof asort oftechnical irrationality

and

a

love affair with trains."

Mayor

ProTern Longville

now

joinedtheconversation, expressing his skepticism over findings that "potential patrons find thebuses tobeequallyattractive to rail. . .

Just

on

personal experience

and

discussions with other people, I find that very hard to swallow."

Webber

repeated that survey results indicated that:

comfort

and

even safety

were

relatively

low

down

thescale, butcertainly thedecorof the vehicle

had

nothing to

do

with their prefer-ences.

What

mattered

was

overall

door-to-door

travel time

and

overall cost in

money.

Kain added:

I've

come

tothesetechnologicalproposalswith

a very high level of skepticism that largely

arises

from

my

experiences over20 years all

throughouttheworldthatpeoplejusthave an

incredible fascinationwithtechnology,an in-credible

hope and

beliefthat

somehow

simple technologies aregoingtosolve

complex

prob-lems. Then, invariably,

when

you

look at

things carefully, it turnsout that the

techno-logicalsolutions are not

where

it'sat, that sort of nitty-gritty careful hard

work

in terms of

management

using appropriate technologies

—

what

people think of as ordinary kinds of

technologies

—

that's

where you

get

your

im-provements.

You

don't get

them

out of

some

kind of simple technological fix.

Butthisdidnot stop

Councilman

Wagner

from

saying:

I appreciate your

comments

regarding cost-effectiveness, or lack thereof, of a rail-type

system. But I also have the

same

skepticism

that

was

expressedearlierabout the

consumer

acceptance ofan extensive bus-type system.

The

Councilman

cited hisreadinesstouse therail

sys-tem in England,

where

he

would

not be

happy

to take

a bus.

Idon't

know

ifthat'sapsychological

problem

or what, but in terms of a system it doesn't

do any

good

to have the

most

cost-effective

and most

flexible system in the

world

if the ridership simply doesn't materialize.

Webber

now

mentioned

that

Golden

GateTransit's

im-proved bus service

was

"attracting middle-class users in

verylargenumbers," whileKainexplainedthatbusservice in

London

suffers

from

congestion

and poor management.

A

well-run express system

would

do

much

better.

Pro-fessor

Webber

opined that

BART

passengers couldhave been carried

by

expressbusfor one-fortieth of the total cost."Alarge part"of theproposalsinthe

SCAG

Regional

TransportationPlan

were

"justpurewaste,"offered

Pro-fessor Kain.

Mayor

Mikels asked

how much

capital investment

would

beputintorailunderamarketsystem,

and

Mayor

ProTern Longville

commented

that theoriginal"RedLine"

lightrail

had

beendissolved

by

aconspiracy ofbus

opera-torswhile"thegrosslydisproportionate

wear and

tear

on

the

roadways

caused

by heavy

vehicles such as buses,

which

is

nowhere

near captured

by what

they'recharged

to operate

on

those, has to be considered a substantial

subsidy."

Commentary

The

discussion

between

Professors

Kain

and

Webber

and

the

SCAG

politicians

was

circular.

The

professors

would

present the case as they

saw

it, the politicians

would

make

remarks indicating they

had

not absorbed

theinformationtheacademics

had

presented,

and

the

pro-fessors

would

repeat theirmessage once more,

increas-ingly forcefully.

The

politicians

were

focused

on

the idea of a system

oflightraillines.

They

feltsurethathighways

were

prob-lematic,

remembered

thesupposedlysuccessful"RedCars"

and

encapsulated their values of

what

a transportation

system should

do

in the

symbol

of a trolley car.

Repeatedly

we

see evidence of thepoliticians' "sense"

experience oftechnology

—

thehard end-productof

trans-portation.

They

had

travelled

on

buses,

and

could not

Theflexibilityof thebusallows passengerstobecollectedfromalarge

effective

—

a service asrail.

They

saw

busesasreplicating existing

poor

patterns ofoperation,

and

could not

appre-ciate that, ifdesigned well, the express bus could be an

effectiveanswer.Irrelevant

comments,

suchascomplaints

about

wear and

tear

on

roads (ignoring the cost of rail

trackmaintenance)

and

"psychological"objectionstobus

use (which continued after repeated evidence

had been

offered inrefutation)simply

showed

that thepoliticians

were

only looking at the surface of the problem. In the

same way

that the

narrow

technological

approach

failed to solve the

problem

of the village

pumps

because it

ignored the context in

which

the

problem

was

set, the

SCAG

politicians

were

ineffective inaddressingSouthern

Californian transportation

problems

when

theyignored

the context in

which

those

problems were

set. In the

same way

thatsubjectsfailedtotry to falsify

intuitively-appealing—

but incorrect

—

solutions to number-series

problems

and

thereby kept themselves

from

finding the

answer, the politicians resisted attempts to falsify their

deeply-held beliefs. Light rail to

them

represented their

ideals; there

was no

callin their

minds

for an attempt at falsification.

To

have searchedfor transportation solutions

on

the

basisof goals

would

haverequired

them

todroptheimage

oflightrailassymbolicofhigher-level objectives. It

would

have required

them

to reflect

on

thevalues they

wished

toinvoke,

and

toinquireintothealternativecontextsinto

which

the

problem

might be set.

Not

only

would

an

appreciation of the consequences of each technological

option

emerge from

sucha discussion, but the

problem

would come

to be defined in non-technological terms. Technological choice

would

then be the end-product of

more

basic discussion of social issues: it

would

be part ofalargerconception ofdesign.Buttoactthat

way

would

require abstractthought,

an

admission of

doubt

and

un-certainty.

As

Professor

Kain

pointedout,thebus

was

less

glamorous,

and

required

complex

"nitty-gritty"

work.

Rail, in contrast,

was

a neat ordered concept, indeed a

comfortable

symbol

of those deeper needs

and

values;

direct exposure to

and

discussion of those needs

would

have

made

politicians vulnerableto

an

appreciation of

limits

and

the

unknown.

Inrefutation ofthisreadingofevents, itmight be sug-gestedthat thepoliticiansaredoing

no

more

thanplaying

politics. If constituents are pleased

by

the provision of

trolley cars, politicians will have a better chance at re-election.But

when

we

ask

why

thepoliticiansmightthink constituents

would

bepleased

by

suchaction,

we

realize

thatitisbecause thereis

no

conceptionof possible

alter-natives. In LosAngeles, for example, thebus system

—

though

well-run

under

the circumstances

—

is slow

and

unappealing.

There

is

no

awareness of the possible use

of principlesnotcurrentlyinpracticetocreatea

supreme

politiciansnorelectorate. Thereisadislike ofcongestion

and

pollution

which

did not exist

when

the"Red Cars"

reigned. Therearefond

memories

ofthe"RedCars,"

which

seemed

to

do

such a

good

job,

and

the weight of those

memories

translates into decision-making.

Technologies are solid

and

identifiable.

They

provide

somethingtograpplewith

where

the

more

basic

consid-erations of values

and wants

leave us vulnerable

and

perplexed. Technologyisaneffectivelanguageof

"making

polis."Yetas representative ofourdeeply-held values

and

related goals, itfallsshort.

The

failures of socialchoice are the failures of the

human

mind.

The

Search for

Churchman's

Systems

Approach

Imagine

Kant under

the night sky, looking out

and

achievingunderstandingwithin,

two

infinities

—

ofendless

reality

and

fathomless reason

—

converging in his self.

From

the spot

where

hestands the universebroadensout

"intoan

unbounded

magnitude

ofworlds

beyond

worlds andsystems ofsystems

and

intothe limitlesstimesof their

periodic motion, their beginning

and

continuance." But

the"morallaw,"through

which

the interminableskiesare understood, "begins

from

my

invisible self."

Whilethe

world

may

existindependentlyofourselves,

Kanttellsus,

we

can onlyperceiveit

—

viaourvision

and

other senses

—

as interpreted

by

our reason.

As

seen

through our mind'seye, the

world

comes

into existence

bypassingthrough thetacit filterof knowledge, experi-ence

and

beliefsthatgo to

make

up

ourindividual

iden-tities.

As

eachofusisdifferent, sowilleachofour views

oftheworld beunique. If

we

seekunderstanding,

we

must

thereforecontinuously questionthe

way we

lookat

phe-nomena

and

the

way

we

bound

our universe.

Churchman

(1982) calls for "an 'unbounded' systems

approach

which

must

include a study of humanity, not

within a

problem

area, but universally."

Churchman

is

firmly a rationalist; he believes in the

power

of reason.

Buthis

approach

does not consist ofapplying a

narrow

setofcriteria toa given "problem;"rather, itinvolves

open-ing

up

theboundaries of inquiry, guided

by

ethical

prin-ciples.Itregardsall systemsaspart oflargersystems, all parts given relevanceonly in relation to all other parts

of all other systems. "Those of us

who

practice social sciencelearn thehard

way

thatthereare

no

simple

ques-tions

and

thattheprocess of addressing aspecificquestion

will eventually requireanswersto

more

and

more

ques-tions."

Thus

"plannersshouldsearchnotfor

ways

to

make

theprison orthehospitalrun

more

smoothly,butforthe reasons

why we

have things like badly-run prisons

and

hospitals."

Thereis

no

placein

Churchman's

systemsapproachfor

the isolated modeling of

"demand"

for a

commuter

rail

service.

Such

work, detached

from

the larger picture, is

representative ofa

form

ofanalysiswithethical

assump-tions of

which

we

are unaware.

We

might not wish to

conduct suchanalysiswerethoseassumptionstobe

made

explicit.There might bea placeforquantitativemodeling, butonly

when

subservientto

and

informed

by

debateof the larger ethical questions

which

are not susceptible to

quantification; the choice of asystemofinquiry isitself central tosuchethicaldiscussion.Likewise, discussion of the case fora particulartechnology should only follow

debate of the social goals to be served; the politicians

should

broaden

their deliberations instead of focusing

quickly

on

eye-catching

and

intuitively-attractive

"solu-tions."

But with this systems approach,

we

quickly run into

difficulties.

The

SouthernCaliforniastoriesimmediately

become

bound

up

in a criss-cross of complexity.

The

modellers

who

previously

had

a "blackbox"

model

they

couldtakeoff the shelf, are

now

left perplexed, with

no

givenplaceto start.

They

had

aformula;

now

they face

a void.

To

thepoliticians, the trolley car

formed

a

symbol

of

solidity

on which

to

meet

and

holdpolitical discussions.

It

was

difficult even to

make

them

evaluatelight rail in

comparison

to the alternative of an expressbus system.

Such

choice requiredreferencetoabstractnotionsof

inter-actionpatterns,

demand

and

performancecharacteristics.

There

was

a comfortable,

dominant

(thoughfaulty)sense

of

what

the physical technology was,

and

it

was

easier

not to go

beyond

that.

More

thanthis, though,theexpressbus system

and

the

trolley each implies aset of values.

These were

touched

on

indirectlythrough

mention

of goalssuchascongestion

and

pollution reduction. Yetthe conversationneverreally

gotbehindthevaluesimplicit inthe

agenda

—

those ofan

elitemiddleclassfor

whom

eithersystem

would

represent a greater subsidy per journey than the local buses used

mostly

by low-income

residents

who

already pay,

and

would

continueto pay, a largershare of operating costs

than

would

the express bus or rail users.

The

Long Beach

trolley

would

pass through the

low-income

areas of

Compton

and

Watts. But the systems

approachasks

why

money

should bespent

on

asymbolic

transportationsystemratherthantoprovidefor the

more

pressingneedscreated

by

poverty.

While one view

might

regard the trolley as a messenger of

hope

for the area,

another might point out that it

was

of irrelevance in

meeting the real needs of

community

revitalization.

The

discussioncould

expand

toask

what

kindof

soci-ety

we

would

like to have,

what

kind ofcity

we

would

be given relative to those needs.

The

problem

becomes

ever

more

complex, itssolution

more

uncertain,

and

our

yearning for a "quick fix" greater:

we

prefer to reject

complexity.

Conclusion

Realitycontains for usuntold

numbers

of

what

Rittel

and

Webber

(1973)call"wicked"problems: whereasa cor-rect solution

may

be

found

to amathematical equation

which

isthus "tamed," thereis

no one

solutiontoasocial

problem,

no one

place to look,

no one

procedure to

follow, not evena definition ofsuccess. If

we

have such

difficulty in solving a

number

series

problem

for

which

thereisagivensolution,

how much

deeperisourtrouble

in facing

problems

for

which

there is

no one

"right"

solution.

Our

will for order

and

identity fool us into treating

"wicked"

problems

asif they

were

"tame"ones.

We

don't

have a "correct" theory of "the good,"

and

even

though

we

do

have a capacity for moral thought

—

a capacity

machineslack

— we

optfor

more

securemachine-like

ways

of dealing with information.

We

pretend

we

are being

scientific

by

couchingoursocialscienceinmathematical

terms,

by

creating large

models

we

see as "value-free."

Technological choice,

by

the

same

token, rests

on

the

in-tuitiveappealof a technological solution, ratherthan

on

what

it can actually

do

for us.

Were

we

tolook behind our

metaphors

we

might see

that they

do

notrepresent ourideals as

we

assume

they do.

Means

to ends

—

be they equations ortrolley cars

—

allcarryassumptions

which

representethical perspectives.

If

we

have not explicitly chosen these perspectives,

we

may

notonlybe

unaware

of

them

butalsoallowing

them

tosketch the geneticblueprint of society uncriticized

and

perhaps unwanted.

The

needforsecurity

makes

our

view

small. Yet if

we

allowour

minds

to rejectthecomplexitythatisinevitable

of

human

life,

we

willhave an impoverished,futile

plan-ningprocess.Until

we

all

—

analysts, planners

and

politi-ciansalike

—

beginto

examine

our assumptions

and

tosee social issues as the"big"

unbounded

questions theyare,

we

willproduce

narrow

"answers"totritely-defined

"prob-lems,"

and

provide

no

solutions at all.

Theauthorgratefullyacknowledgesthecommentsseveralindividuals suppliedonearlierdraftsofthispaper.Thecontinued support ofDonald Schon andMartinWachsisparticularlyappreciated.Responsibilityfor

theinadequacieswhich remain, of course, remain with theauthor.

JonathanRichmond, a Visiting Lecturerin theDepartment of

City and Regional Planning at Chapel Hill for the 1986/87 academicyear, isa doctoralcandidateinTransportation

Plan-ning at MIT.

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