ARTICLE 1157
G.R. No. L-3489 September 7, 1907 VICENTE NAVALES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EULOGIA RIAS, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Pantaleon E. del Rosario for appellants.
F. Sevilla y Macam for appellee. TORRES, J.:
On the 18th of November, 1904, Vicente Navales filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso, claiming that the latter should be sentenced to pay him the sum of 1,200 pesos, Philippine currency, as damages, together with costs and such other expenses as the court might consider just and equitable. To this end he alleged that the said defendants, without due cause, ordered the pulling down and destruction of his house erected in Daanbuangan, town of Naga, Island of Cebu, which was 6 meters in height with an area of 8.70 square meters, built of wood with a nipa roof, and worth 1,000 pesos, which amount he expended in its construction. He further alleged that the destruction took place in the month of April, 1904, and that, notwithstanding his efforts, he had not obtained any reimbursement from the defendants, and that by reason of their refusal he had been prejudiced to the extent of 200 pesos, Philippine currency.
The defendant, in answer to the foregoing complaint, denied all and each one of the allegations therein contained, and asked that judgment be entered dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
After considering the proofs submitted by both parties and the proceedings upon the trial, the judge, on the 17th of January, 1906, rendered judgment declaring that the decision entered by the justice of the peace of Naga, and the order given by virtue thereof were illegal, as well as the action of the deputy sheriff Luciano Bacayo, that the defendant were thereby liable for the damages caused to the plaintiff, which amounted to 500 pesos, and that the defendants were sentenced to pay the said sum to the plaintiff, with costs. The defendant upon being informed of this decision, asked that it be set aside, and also moved for a new trial on the ground that the decision was not in accordance with the weight of the evidence. The motion was denied, to which exception was taken, and at the request of the interested party, the corresponding bill of exceptions was limited.
The aim of this litigation, therefore, is to obtain payment through a judicial decision, of the damages said to have been caused by the execution of a judgment rendered by the justice of the peace, in an action for ejectment.
It is undeniable that, in order to remove from the land of Eulogia Rias, situated within the jurisdiction of the town of Naga, the house which Vicente Navales had constructed thereon, by virtue of the decision of the justice in the action instituted by the said Eulogia Rias against the owner of the house , Vicente Navales, the deputy sheriff who carried the judgment into execution was obliged to destroy the said house and removed it from the land, according to the usual procedure in the action for ejectment.
In the order of execution issued to the deputy sheriff, the directive portion of the judgment of the justice of the peace was inserted, and it contained the essential statement that the said judgment, by reason of its not having been appealed from, had become final, and from the contents of the same may be inferred that there had been an action for ejectment between the above-named parties, and that there was no reason why it should not be enforced when it had already become final and acquired the nature of res adjudicata.
Section 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
Execution. — If no appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace shall be perfected as herein provided, the justice of the peace shall, at the request of the successful party, issue execution for the enforcement of the judgment, and the expiration of the time limited by law for the perfection of an appeal.
Assuming that the order for execution of final judgment was issued in accordance with the law, and in view of the fact that it has not been alleged nor proven that the sheriff when complying with the same had committed trespass or exceeded his functions, it must be presumed according to section 334 (14) of the said Code of Procedure, that the official duty was regularly performed. Therefore, it is not possible to impute liability to the plaintiff who obtained the judgment and the execution thereof, when the same was not disputed nor alleged to be null or illegal, and much less to compel the payment of damages to the person who was defeated in the action and sentenced to be ejected from the land which he improperly occupied with his house.
No proof has been submitted that a contract had been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants, or that the latter had committed illegal acts or omissions or incurred in any kind of fault or negligence, from any of which an obligation might have arisen on the part of the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff. For this reason, the claim for indemnity, on account of acts performed by the sheriff while enforcing a judgment, can not under any consideration be sustained. (Art. 1089, Civil Code.)
The illegality of the judgment of the justice of the peace, that of the writ of execution thereunder, or of the acts performed by the sheriff for the enforcement of the judgment, has not been shown. Therefore, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the complaint for damages filed by Vicente Navales against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso is dismissed without special ruling as to costs. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and EVANGELINA VIRATA, petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in Civil Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. 1
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the employer of Ochoa; that for the death of Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, docketed as C Case No. 3162-P of said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal case on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability; that on February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said c case to withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial and presented evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the same parties for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused an injury by name accident; and that on January 31, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. 2
The principal issue is weather or not the of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.
The Supreme Court has held that:
According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or quasi-delito has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that upholds 'the spirit that given life' rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is 'more congruent' with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress', to borrow the felicitous language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to 359, to hod as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault covers not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or consequently, a separate civil action lies against the in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty and acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the, two assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words the extinction of civil liability refereed to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Brief stated, We hold, in reitration of Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.3
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is reinstated and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE G.R. No. 140847 DE BARILI, CEBU CITY, '
Petitioner, Present: PUNO, J., - versus' - ' Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.Promulgated: September 23, 2005 x--- x D E C I S I O N TINGA, J.:
At the core of this case is an obscure old special law. The issue is whether a provision in the law prohibiting the sale of the properties donated to the charitable organization that was incorporated by the same law bars the implementation of agrarian reform laws as regards said properties.
Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili (Hospicio') is a charitable organization created as a body corporate in 1925 by Act No. 3239. The law was enacted in order to formally accept the offer made by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establish a home for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids and incapacitated and helpless persons. [1] The Hospicio was to be maintained with the revenues of the personal and real properties to be endowed by the Cuis and other donors.[2]
Section 4 of Act No. 3239 provides that '[t]he personal and real property donated to the [Hospicio] by its founders or by other persons shall not be sold under any consideration.[3]
On 10 October 1987, the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an order ordaining that two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of twenty-two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiaries. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, a land reform law, was cited as legal basis for the order. The Hospicio filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary, citing the aforementioned Section 4 of Act No. 3239. It argued that Act No. 3239 is a special law, which could not have been repealed by P.D. No. 27, a general law, or by the latter's general repealing clause.
The DAR Secretary rejected the motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 30 March 1997. Therein, the DAR Secretary held that P.D. No. 27 was a special law, as it applied only to particular individuals in the State, specifically the tenants of rice and corn lands. Moreover, P.D. No. 27, which covered all rice and corn lands, provides no exemptions based on the manner of acquisition of the land by the landowner.[4]
The Order of the DAR Secretary was assailed in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision[5] dated 9 July 1999, the Court of Appeals Special Eleventh Division affirmed the DAR Secretary's issuance. It sustained the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) position that Section 4 of Act No. 3239 was expressly repealed not only by P.D. No. 27, but also by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, both laws being explicit in mandating the distribution of agricultural lands to qualified beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals further noted that the subject lands did not fall among the exemptions provided under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657. Finally, the appellate court brought into play the aims of land reform, affirming as it did 'the need to distribute and create an economic equilibrium among the inhabitants of this land, most especially those with less privilege in life, our peasant farmer.[6]
Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeals' Decision, the Hospicio lodged the present Petition for Review. The Hospicio alleges' that P.D. No. 27, the CARL, and Executive Order No. 407[7] all violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. More sedately, the Hospicio also argues that Act No. 3239 was not repealed either by P.D. No. 27 or Rep. Act No. 6657 and that the forced disposition of the Hospicio's landholdings would incapacitate the discharge of its charitable functions, which equally promote social justice and the upliftment of the lives of the less fortunate.
On the other hand, the OSG, representing respondent DAR, bluntly replies that Act No. 3239 was repealed by P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657, which do not exempt lands owned by eleemosynary or charitable institutions from the coverage of those agrarian reform laws.
A brief recapitulation of the relevant laws is in order.
P.D. No. 27, "Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them Ownership of the Land they Till, and Providing the Instrument and Mechanism Therefor, has once been touted as perhaps 'a radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root [of the problem of land tenancy].[8] Its constitutionality was upheld in De Chavez v. Zobel.[9] The law generally 'ordains the emancipation of tenants and confers on them ownership of the lands they till.[10] The following provisions of P.D. No. 27 have concretized this policy:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended do hereby decree and order the emancipation of all tenant farmers as of this day, October 21, 1972;
This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands[[11]] primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not;
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated;
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it;
The CARL was not yet in effect when the DARRO and the DAR issued their respective orders. Said law vests P.D. No. 27 with suppletory effect insofar as the earlier law does not run inconsistent with the later law.[12] Under Section 4 of the CARL, placed under coverage are all public and private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, subject to the exempted lands listed in Section 10 thereof.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither P.D. No. 27 nor the CARL exempts the lands of the Hospicio or other charitable institutions from the coverage of agrarian reform. Ultimately, the result arrived at in the assailed issuances should be affirmed. Nonetheless, both the DAR Secretary and the appellate court failed to appreciate what to this Court is indeed the decisive legal dimension of the case.
Section 4 of Act No. 3239 prohibits the sale 'under any consideration of the lands donated to the Hospicio. But the land transfers mandated under P.D. No. 27 cannot be considered a conventional sale under our civil laws.
Generally, sale arises out of a contractual obligation. Thus, it must meet the first essential requisite of every contract that is the presence of consent.[13] Consent implies an act of volition in entering into the agreement.[14] The absence or vitiation of consent renders the sale either void or voidable.
In this case, the deprivation of the Hospicio's property did not arise as a consequence of the Hospicio's consent to the transfer. There was no meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on one hand, and the DAR or the tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause which are to constitute the contract[15] that is to serve ultimately as the basis for the transfer of ownership of the subject lands.[16] Instead, the obligation to transfer arises by compulsion of law, particularly P.D. No. 27.[17]
Agrarian reform is justified under the State's inherent power of eminent domain that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.[18] It has even been characterized as beyond the traditional exercise of eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of expropriation. As expounded in the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, thus:
. . . . However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.[19]
This characterization is warranted whether the expropriation is operative under the CARL or P.D. No. 27, as both laws are keyed into the same governmental objective. Moreover, under both laws, the landowner is entitled to just compensation for the properties taken.
The twin process of expropriation of lands under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been aptly described in common law jurisdictions as 'sale made under the process of the court, and in the mode prescribed by law, and 'which is not the voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc.[20] The term has not been precisely defined in this jurisdiction, but reference to the phrase itself is made in Articles 223, 232, 237 and 243 of the Civil Code, which uniformly exempt the family home 'from execution, forced sale, or attachment.[21] Yet a forced sale is clearly different from the sales described under Book V of the Civil Code which are conventional sales, as it does not arise from the consensual agreement of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of law. Still, since law is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there can be no dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as' it is authorized by law.
The crucial question now arises, whether the sale prohibited under Section 4 of Act No. 3239 includes even a forced sale. Of course an overly literal reading of the provision would justify such inclusion, but appropriately a more sophisticated approach to statutory construction is warranted.
No sance is required to discern the intent of Section 4. It ensures that the properties received by the Hospicio are not alienated for profit by the officers or administrators, in contravention of the charitable purpose for which the Hospicio was created. To an extent, it makes possible the perpetual operation of the Hospicio, which was empowered by law to operate for an indefinite period, by assuring the existence of the property on which the Hospicio could operate. We also do not doubt that whatever fruits of the forcibly retained property would also serve a source of funding for the operations of the Hospicio.
The salutariness of these objectives is beyond doubt. The interests they seek to protect are present whether the prohibition encompasses only conventional sales, or even forced sales. Yet to insist that Section 4 likewise prohibits sales or dispositions by operation of law would necessarily imply that the Hospicio is also beyond the reach of any form of judicial execution. The charitable nature of the Hospicio does not shield it from susceptibility to civil liability, and an absolute prohibition on sales, whether forced or conventional, deprives whatever judgment creditors of the Hospicio from any effective means of enforcing relief.
Was it the intent of the framers of Act No. 3239 to exempt the Hospicio from all judicial processes, even those arising from civil transactions? We do not think so. The contemporaneous construction of Section 4 indicates that the prohibition intended by the crafters of the law pertained only to conventional sales, and not forced sales. The law was promulgated in 1925, or when the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was in effect. The provisions in the Civil Code referring to 'forced sales' were not derived from the Spanish Civil Code. On the other hand, the consensual nature of the contract of sale, and of
contracts in general, is recognized under the Spanish Civil Code. Under Article 1261 of the Spanish Civil Code, there is no contract unless the consent of the contracting parties exists.[22]
Evidently, the word 'sale, as contemplated by the framers of the law in 1925, pertains to its concept in civil law, with the requisite of consent being present. It cannot refer to sales or dispositions that arise by operation of law, such as through judicial execution, or, as in this case, expropriation.
Thus, we can hardly characterize the acquisition of the subject properties from the Hospicio for the benefit of the tenants as a sale, within the contemplation of Section 4 of Act No. 3239. The transfer arises from compulsion of law, and not the desire of any parties. Even if the Hospicio had voluntarily offered to surrender its properties to agrarian reform, the resulting transaction would not be considered as a conventional sale, since the obligation is created not out of the mandate of the parties, but the will of the law.
The DARRO Order did note that Section 4 of Act No. 3239 is not applicable in this case, since the transfer is compulsory on the part of the landowner, unlike in
ordinary sale.[23] Regrettably, the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals failed to apply that sound principle, preferring to rely instead on the conclusion that Section 4 was repealed by P.D. No. 27 and the CARL.
Nonetheless, even assuming for the nonce that Section 4 contemplates even forced sales such as those through expropriation, we would agree with the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals that Section 4 is deemed repealed by P.D. No. 27 and the CARL.
The scope of lands subjected to agrarian reform under these two laws is overwhelming. P.D. No. 27 applies to all private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn with tenant farmers under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy,[24] while the CARL is even broader in scope, generally covering all public and private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. Under Section 10 of the CARL, the only exempted lands are:
Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds, and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed . . . .
Arguing against 'too literal an interpretation of Section 10, the Hospicio claims that a serious reading of the provision is revelatory of the spirit and intent of the exemptions. It argues that there are three categories of exemption as: '(1) those needed by the nation, such as parks, wildlife and forest reserves, fishponds and for national defense, etc.; (2) those for educational purposes such as school sites; and (3) for religious and charitable purposes like church sites, etc. [25] The Hospicio then claims it falls under the third category of 'religious and charitable purposes.[26]
To begin with, the terms 'charitable purposes' and 'charitable organizations' do not appear in Section 10 of the CARL. For its part, Hospicio unduly assumes that charity is integrally wedded to religiosity, despite the fact that there are charitable institutions that are avowedly secular in orientation. We disagree that there is a clear intent or spirit to include properties held by charitable institutions, even those directly utilized for charitable purposes, in the list of exempted properties under the CARL. Section 10 does not include properties which are generally used for charitable purposes, such as orphanages, from the exemption. Not even all properties owned by religious institutions are
exempt, save for those places of worship and the convents/Islamic centers appurtenant thereto. Even assuming that the Hospicio were actually owned and operated by the Catholic Church, it still would not be exempted from the CARL.
It is axiomatic that where a general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, the Court will not curtail nor add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others.[27] We cannot simply impute into a statute an exception which the Congress did not incorporate. Moreover, general welfare legislation such as land reform laws is to be construed in favor of the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of the people.[28] Since a broad construction of the provision listing the properties exempted under the CARL would tend to denigrate the aims of agrarian reform, a strict application of these exceptions is in order.
The crafters of P.D. No. 27 and the CARL were presumably aware of the radical scale of the intended legislation, and the massive effects on property relations nationwide. Considering the magnitude of the changes ordained in these laws, it would be foolhardy to require or expect the legislature to denominate each and every law that would be consequently or logically amended or repealed by the new laws. Hence, the viability of general repealing clauses, which are existent in both P.D. No. 27[29] and the CARL,[30] as a means of repealing all previous enactments inconsistent with revolutionary new laws. The presence of such general repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, whether the prior law is a general law or a special law, or as in this case, a special private law. Without such clause, a later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior special law on the same subject. But with such clause contained in the subsequent general law, the prior special law will be deemed repealed, as the clause is a clear legislative intent to bring about that result. [31]
Should we construe Section 4 of Act No. 3239 as barring forced sales through expropriation of the properties of the Hospicio, such prohibition would irreconcilably countermand both P.D. No. 27 and the CARL and their mandate to subject the properties to agrarian reform. The general repealing clauses of the two later laws would then sufficiently repeal Section 4 of Act No. 3239, to the extent that it may prohibit expropriation of agricultural lands for agrarian reform.
Still, in light of our earlier determinative pronouncement that Section 4 of Act No. 3239 does not contemplate forced sales as part of the prohibition therein, there ultimately is no need to make an abject declaration that Section 4 has indeed been repealed. Indeed, the Court considers the prohibition on Section 4 as still effectual, but only insofar as it relates to conventional sales under the Civil Code.
The other arguments raised by the Hospicio are similarly bereft of merit. It wants us to hold that P.D. No. 27 and the CARL, both enacted to implement the urgently needed policy of agrarian reform, violate the non-impairment of contracts clause under the Bill of Rights. Yet the broad sweep of this argument ignores the nuances adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 10 of Article III. We have held that the State's exercise of police powers may prevail over obligations imposed by private contracts.[32] Especially in point is Kabiling v. NHA,[33] wherein a law authorizing the expropriation of properties in favor of qualified squatter families was challenged on the basis of the non-impairment clause. The Court held:
The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive development plans for this depressed community, provides the justification for the exercise of the police power of the State. The police power of the State has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers." It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.
The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs the obligations of contract is without merit. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.[34]
More pertinently, what the Hospicio alleges would be impaired is not actually a contract, but a legislative act, Act No. 3239. The Hospicio admits just as much in its petition, '[Act No. 3239] is not merely an ordinary contract but a contract enacted into law . . . Act No. 3239 is thus a contract within the purview of the impairment clause of the Constitution. [35]
The inanity of this argument is palpable. The non-impairment clause reads: 'No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. If, as the Hospicio argues, the constitutional provision applies as well to the impairment of obligations created by law, then Section 10, Article III operates to bar the legislature from amending or repealing its own enactments. This is of course not the case, as the provision was intended to shield the impairment of obligations created by private agreements, and not by legislative fiat. Certainly, Congress can at any time expressly amend or repeal any and all sections of Act No. 3239 without fear of violating the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. In fine, Section 10[36] of Act 3239 provides that the privileges granted by the Act to the Hospicio are subject to the conditions on the grant of franchises as provided in the Jones Law. Section 28 of the Jones Law in turn provides in part, thus:
No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States, and that lands or right of use and occupation of lands thus granted shall revert to the government by which they were respectively granted upon the termination of the franchises and rights under which they were granted or upon their revocation or repeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the Hospicio alludes to its functions as a charitable institution, which equally promote social justice and the upliftment of lives of the less fortunate. It notes that these purposes are no less noble than giving land to the landless, whom they, with perhaps a touch of contempt, suggest are 'perfectly healthy to care for themselves.[37]
The rationale for holding that the properties of the Hospicio are covered by P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657 is so well-grounded in law that it obviates any resort to the sordid game of choosing which of the two competing aspirations is nobler. The body which would have unquestionable discretion in assigning hierarchical values on the modalities by which social justice may be implemented is the legislature. Land reform affords the opportunity for the landless to break away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others. By refusing to exempt properties owned by charitable institutions or maintained for charitable purposes from agrarian reform, the legislature has indicated a policy choice which the Court is bound to implement.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 186382 April 5, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
DOMINGO PANITERCE, Accused-Appellant. R E S O L U T I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us is an appeal filed by Domingo Paniterce y Martinez (Paniterce) assailing the Decision1 dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001, entitled People of the Philippines v. Domingo Paniterce," which affirmed with modification the Decision dated March 2, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37, in Criminal Case Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078, 6079, 6080 and 6081.2 The RTC found Paniterce guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness.
In four Informations, all dated February 11, 2002, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Hedy S. Aganan charged Paniterce with four counts of rape of his daughter AAA. Except for the dates3 of the commission of the rapes, the four Informations identically read:
That sometime in the year 1997 in x x x Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with grave abuse of confidence being the father of the offended party with lewd designs by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with his daughter AAA, a 10 year-old minor, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded by the Honorable Court.4
In two Amended Informations, both dated December 3, 2002, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Daniel M. Salvadora charged Paniterce with two counts of rape of his other daughter BBB. Aside from the dates5 of the commission of the rapes, the Informations similarly state:
Criminal Case Nos. 6080 and 6081
That on or about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of August 26, 2000 x x x Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with grave abuse of confidence being the father of the offended party with lewd designs by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously committed RAPE upon his 12- year old daughter BBB by then and there, caressing and inserting his finger inside her vagina against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded by the Honorable Court.6
When arraigned, Paniterce pleaded not guilty to all the charges.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision on March 2, 2005, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the prosecution having proved the guilt of accused Domingo Paniterce of the crimes of Rape as charged in the aforementioned Informations, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalties of imprisonment, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 6076, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as maximum for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code as the alleged molestation took place in April 1997 and RA 8353 took effect only on October 22, 1997;
In Criminal Cases Nos. 6077, 6078, 6080 and 6081, he is hereby sentenced to suffer in each every case the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum and to pay AAA and BBB Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages;
In Criminal Case No. 6079, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.7 On June 4, 2005, Paniterce was committed to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City.
Paniterce filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001. The appellate court rendered a Decision on August 22, 2008 affirming the RTC judgment with modifications, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting DOMINGO PANITERCE is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. For Acts of Lasciviousness, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6077, 6078, 6080 and 6081, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer in each [and] every case an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum and to pay AAA and BBB Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
2. For Rape, in Criminal Case No. 6079, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty for Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 6076 is AFFIRMED without any modification.8
On 16 September 2008, Paniterce, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals conveying his intention to appeal to us the aforementioned Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the appellate court. The Court of Appeals gave due course to Paniterce’s Notice of Appeal on September 23, 2008,9 and directed its Judicial Records Division to elevate to us the original records in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001.
On 15 April 2009, we required10 the parties to file their supplemental briefs, and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to confirm the commitment of Paniterce at the Bureau of Corrections and submit his report thereon within 10 days from notice.
Paniterce filed his Supplemental Brief11 on June 16, 2009, while the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation12 on June 18, 2009 stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief considering that Paniterce did not raise any new issue in his appeal. On July 22, 2009, we submitted G.R. No. 186382 for resolution.
However, in a letter dated October 12, 2009, Julio A. Arciaga, the Assistant Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed us that Paniterce had died on August 22, 2009 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. Paniterce’s Death Certificate was attached to said letter.
Given Paniterce’s death, we are now faced with the question of the effect of such death on the present appeal.
Paniterce’s death on August 22, 2009, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his criminal liabilities for the rape and acts of lasciviousness committed against his daughters, but also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on said crimes.1awphi1
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas13:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.14
Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Paniterce’s appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of the crimes charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Paniterce had incurred criminal liabilities, they were totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Paniterce’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him when he died, his civil liabilities arising from the crimes, being civil liabilities ex delicto, were likewise extinguished by his death.
Consequently, the appealed Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals – finding Paniterce guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness, sentencing him to imprisonment, and ordering him to indemnify his victims – had become ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of accused-appellant Domingo Paniterce y Martinez, the Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078, 6079, 6080, and 6081 before the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City are DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 1158
G.R. No. L-30511 February 14, 1980 MANUEL M. SERRANO, petitioner, vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA; EMERITO M. RAMOS, SUSANA B. RAMOS, EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR., JOSEFA RAMOS DELA RAMA, HORACIO DELA RAMA, ANTONIO B. RAMOS, FILOMENA RAMOS LEDESMA, RODOLFO LEDESMA, VICTORIA RAMOS TANJUATCO, and TEOFILO TANJUATCO, respondents.
Rene Diokno for petitioner.
F.E. Evangelista & Glecerio T. Orsolino for respondent Central Bank of the Philippines.
Feliciano C. Tumale, Pacifico T. Torres and Antonio B. Periquet for respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Josefina G. Salonga for all other respondents.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, that seeks the establishment of joint and solidary liability to the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos, with interest, against respondent Central Bank of the Philippines and Overseas Bank of Manila and its stockholders, on the alleged failure of the Overseas Bank of Manila to return the time deposits made by petitioner and assigned to him, on the ground that respondent Central Bank failed in its duty to exercise strict supervision over respondent Overseas Bank of Manila to protect depositors and the general public. 1 Petitioner also prays that both respondent banks be ordered to execute the proper and necessary documents to constitute all properties fisted in Annex "7" of the Answer of respondent Central Bank of the Philippines in G.R. No. L-29352, entitled "Emerita M. Ramos, et al vs. Central Bank of the Philippines," into a trust fund in favor of petitioner and all other depositors of respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. It is also prayed that the respondents be prohibited permanently from honoring, implementing, or doing any act predicated upon the validity or efficacy of the deeds of mortgage, assignment. and/or conveyance or transfer of whatever nature of the properties listed in Annex "7" of the Answer of respondent Central Bank in G.R. No. 29352. 2
A sought for ex-parte preliminary injunction against both respondent banks was not given by this Court. Undisputed pertinent facts are:
On October 13, 1966 and December 12, 1966, petitioner made a time deposit, for one year with 6% interest, of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 3 Concepcion Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6-½% interest, on March 6, 1967, of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the same respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 4
On August 31, 1968, Concepcion Maneja, married to Felixberto M. Serrano, assigned and conveyed to petitioner Manuel M. Serrano, her time deposit of P200,000.00 with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 5
Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of the aforementioned time deposits from the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, dating from December 6, 1967 up to March 4, 1968, not a single one of the time deposit certificates was honored by respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 6
Respondent Central Bank admits that it is charged with the duty of administering the banking system of the Republic and it exercises supervision over all doing business in the Philippines, but denies the petitioner's allegation that the Central Bank has the duty to exercise a most rigid and stringent supervision of banks, implying that respondent Central Bank has to watch every move or activity of all banks, including respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Respondent Central Bank claims that as of March 12, 1965, the Overseas Bank of Manila, while operating, was only on a limited degree of banking operations since the Monetary Board decided in its Resolution No. 322, dated March 12, 1965, to prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila from making new loans and investments in view of its chronic reserve deficiencies against its deposit liabilities. This limited operation of respondent Overseas Bank of Manila continued up to 1968. 7
Respondent Central Bank also denied that it is guarantor of the permanent solvency of any banking institution as claimed by petitioner. It claims that neither the law nor sound banking supervision requires respondent Central Bank to advertise or represent to the public any remedial measures it may impose upon chronic delinquent banks as such action may inevitably result to panic or bank "runs". In the years 1966-1967, there were no findings to declare the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as insolvent. 8
Respondent Central Bank likewise denied that a constructive trust was created in favor of petitioner and his predecessor in interest Concepcion Maneja when their time deposits were made in 1966 and 1967 with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as during that time the latter was not an insolvent bank and its operation as a banking institution was being salvaged by the respondent Central Bank. 9
Respondent Central Bank avers no knowledge of petitioner's claim that the properties given by respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as additional collaterals to respondent Central Bank of the Philippines for the former's overdrafts and emergency loans were acquired through the use of depositors' money, including that of the petitioner and Concepcion Maneja. 10
In G.R. No. L-29362, entitled "Emerita M. Ramos, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines," a case was filed by the petitioner Ramos, wherein respondent Overseas Bank of Manila sought to prevent respondent Central Bank from closing, declaring the former insolvent, and liquidating its assets. Petitioner Manuel Serrano in this case, filed on September 6, 1968, a motion to intervene in G.R. No. L-29352, on the ground that Serrano had a real and legal interest as depositor of the Overseas Bank of Manila in the matter in litigation in that case. Respondent Central Bank in G.R. No. L-29352 opposed petitioner Manuel Serrano's motion to intervene in that case, on the ground that his claim as depositor of the Overseas Bank of Manila should properly be ventilated in the Court of First Instance, and if this Court were to allow Serrano to intervene as depositor in G.R. No. L-29352, thousands of other depositors would follow and thus cause an avalanche of cases in this Court. In the resolution dated October 4, 1968, this Court denied Serrano's, motion to intervene. The contents of said motion to intervene are substantially the same as those of the present petition. 11
This Court rendered decision in G.R. No. L-29352 on October 4, 1971, which became final and executory on March 3, 1972, favorable to the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, with the dispositive portion to wit:
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for in the petition are hereby granted and respondent Central Bank's resolution Nos. 1263, 1290 and 1333 (that prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila to participate in clearing, direct the suspension of its operation, and ordering the liquidation of said bank) are hereby annulled and set aside; and said respondent Central Bank of the Philippines is directed to comply with its obligations under the Voting Trust Agreement, and to desist from taking action in violation therefor. Costs against respondent Central Bank of the Philippines. 12
Because of the above decision, petitioner in this case filed a motion for judgment in this case, praying for a decision on the merits, adjudging respondent Central Bank jointly and severally liable with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila to the petitioner for the P350,000 time deposit made with the latter bank, with all interests due therein; and declaring all assets assigned or mortgaged by the respondents Overseas Bank of Manila and the Ramos groups in favor of the Central Bank as trust funds for the benefit of petitioner and other depositors. 13
By the very nature of the claims and causes of action against respondents, they in reality are recovery of time deposits plus interest from respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and recovery of damages against respondent Central Bank for its alleged failure to strictly supervise the acts of the other respondent Bank and protect the interests of its depositors by virtue of the constructive trust created when respondent Central Bank required the other respondent to increase its collaterals for its overdrafts said emergency loans, said collaterals allegedly acquired through the use of depositors money. These claims shoud be ventilated in the Court of First Instance of proper jurisdiction as We already pointed out when this Court denied petitioner's motion to intervene in G.R. No. L-29352. Claims of these nature are not proper in actions for mandamus and prohibition as there is no shown clear abuse of discretion by the Central Bank in its exercise of supervision over the other respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and if there was, petitioner here is not the proper party to raise that question, but rather the Overseas Bank of Manila, as it did in G.R. No. L-29352. Neither is there anything to prohibit in this case, since the questioned acts of the respondent Central Bank (the acts of dissolving and liquidating the Overseas Bank of Manila), which petitioner here intends to use as his basis for claims of damages against respondent Central Bank, had been accomplished a long time ago.
Furthermore, both parties overlooked one fundamental principle in the nature of bank deposits when the petitioner claimed that there should be created a constructive trust in his favor when the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila increased its collaterals in favor of respondent Central Bank for the former's overdrafts and emergency loans, since these collaterals were acquired by the use of depositors' money.
Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans. 14 Current and savings deposit are loans to a bank because it can use the same. The petitioner here in making time deposits that earn interests with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila was in reality a creditor of the respondent Bank and not a depositor. The respondent Bank was in turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure of he respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Antonio, Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Barredo (Chairman) J., concur in the judgment on the of the concurring opinion of Justice Aquino.
G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009 THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioner, vs.
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSON'S LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision2 dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, which affirmed in toto the Joint Decision3 dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210; and (2) the Resolution4 dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate court in the same case which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila. Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates, and leases out commercial buildings and other structures, among which, are SM City, Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta. Mesa, Manila; SM City, North Avenue, Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las Piñas.
The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for use as parking spaces. Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the construction of their own parking facilities. Respondent Shangri-la is renting its parking facilities, consisting of land and building specifically used as parking spaces, which were constructed for the lessor’s account.
Respondents expend for the maintenance and administration of their respective parking facilities. They provide security personnel to protect the vehicles parked in their parking facilities and maintain order within the area. In turn, they collect the following parking fees from the persons making use of their parking facilities, regardless of whether said persons are mall patrons or not:
Respondent Parking Fees
Ayala Land On weekdays, P25.00 for the first four hours andP10.00 for every succeeding hour; on weekends, flat rate of P25.00 per day
Robinsons P20.00 for the first three hours and P10.00 for every succeeding hour
Shangri-la Flat rate of P30.00 per day
SM Prime P10.00 to P20.00 (depending on whether the parking space is outdoors or indoors) for the first three hours and 59 minutes, and P10.00 for every succeeding hour or fraction thereof
The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners contain the stipulation that respondents shall not be responsible for any loss or damage to the vehicles parked in respondents’ parking facilities.
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint investigation for the following purposes: (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice of shopping malls of charging parking fees; (2) assuming arguendo that the collection of parking fees was legally authorized, to find out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates charged by shopping malls; and (3) to determine the legality of the policy of shopping malls of denying liability in cases of theft, robbery, or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the parking tickets. Said Senate Committees invited the top executives of respondents, who operate the major malls in the country; the officials from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and other local government officials; and the Philippine Motorists Association (PMA) as representative of the consumers’ group.
After three public hearings held on 30 September, 3 November, and 1 December 1999, the afore-mentioned Senate Committees jointly issued Senate Committee Report No. 2255 on 2 May 2000, in which they concluded:
In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the National Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal. While it is true that the Code merely requires malls to provide parking spaces, without specifying whether it is free or not, both Committees believe that the reasonable and logical interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces are for free. This interpretation is not only reasonable and logical but finds support in the actual practice in other countries like the United States of America where parking spaces owned and operated by mall owners are free of charge.
Figuratively speaking, the Code has "expropriated" the land for parking – something similar to the subdivision law which require developers to devote so much of the land area for parks.
Moreover, Article II of R.A. No. 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) provides that "it is the policy of the State to protect the interest of the consumers, promote the general welfare and establish standards of conduct for business and industry." Obviously, a contrary interpretation (i.e., justifying the collection of parking fees) would be going against the declared policy of R.A. 7394.
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code, including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the Secretary of Public Works. This set up, however, is not being carried out in reality.
In the position paper submitted by the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), its chairman, Jejomar C. Binay, accurately pointed out that the Secretary of the DPWH is responsible for the implementation/enforcement of the National Building Code. After the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government units (LGU’s) were tasked to discharge the regulatory powers of the DPWH. Hence, in the local level, the Building Officials enforce all rules/ regulations formulated by the DPWH relative to all building plans, specifications and designs including parking space requirements. There is, however, no single national department or agency directly tasked to supervise the enforcement of the provisions of the Code on parking, notwithstanding the national character of the law.6
Senate Committee Report No. 225, thus, contained the following recommendations:
In light of the foregoing, the Committees on Trade and Commerce and Justice and Human Rights hereby recommend the following:
1. The Office of the Solicitor General should institute the necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as to enforce the penal sanction provisions of the National Building Code. The Office of the Solicitor General should likewise study how refund can be exacted from mall owners who continue to collect parking fees.
2. The Department of Trade and Industry pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines should enforce the provisions of the Code relative to parking. Towards this end, the DTI should formulate the necessary implementing rules and regulations on parking in shopping malls, with prior consultations with the local government units where these are located. Furthermore, the DTI, in coordination with the DPWH, should be empowered to regulate and supervise the construction and maintenance of parking establishments.
3. Finally, Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to expressly prohibit shopping malls from collecting parking fees by at the same time, prohibit them from invoking the waiver of liability.7
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate Committee Report No. 225, the DPWH Secretary and the local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Piñas intended to institute, through the OSG, an action to enjoin respondent SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). With the threatened action against it, respondent SM Prime filed, on 3 October 2000, a Petition for Declaratory Relief8 under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court, against the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Piñas. Said Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1208 and assigned to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, presided over by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. (Judge Marella). In its Petition, respondent SM Prime prayed for judgment:
a) Declaring Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the National Building Code as ultra vires, hence, unconstitutional and void;
b) Declaring [herein respondent SM Prime]’s clear legal right to lease parking spaces appurtenant to its department stores, malls, shopping centers and other commercial establishments; and
c) Declaring the National Building Code of the Philippines Implementing Rules and Regulations as ineffective, not having been published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, as prescribed by Section 211 of Presidential Decree No. 1096.
[Respondent SM Prime] further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises.9 The very next day, 4 October 2000, the OSG filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction)10 against respondents. This Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1210 and raffled to the RTC of Makati, Branch 135, presided over by Judge Francisco B. Ibay (Judge Ibay). Petitioner prayed that the RTC:
1. After summary hearing, a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from collecting parking fees from their customers; and
2. After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring that the practice of respondents in charging parking fees is violative of the National Building Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations and is therefore invalid, and making permanent any injunctive writ issued in this case.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.11
On 23 October 2000, Judge Ibay of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, issued an Order consolidating Civil Case No. 00-1210 with Civil Case No. 00-1208 pending before Judge Marella of RTC of Makati, Branch 138.
As a result of the pre-trial conference held on the morning of 8 August 2001, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order12of even date which limited the issues to be resolved in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 to the following:
1. Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil Case No. 00-1210 to institute the present proceedings and relative thereto whether the controversy in the collection of parking fees by mall owners is a matter of public welfare. 2. Whether declaratory relief is proper.
3. Whether respondent Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM Prime are obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or the public in general, free of charge.
4. Entitlement of the parties of [sic] award of damages.13
