Civil-Procedure-Digests.pdf

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Civil Procedure

DIGESTED CASES

University of Santo Tomas

Faculty of Civil Law

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CIVIL PROCEDURE

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NAVALES

V. ABAYA

FACTS

Petitioners consisting of more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP who all took part in a failed coup attempt in Oakwood Suites, Makati, filed a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court questioning the jurisdiction of the Judge Advocate General in filing charges against them for violations of the Articles of War Sections 67, 96, and 97. The Regional Trial Court acquitted 290 of the original 331 soldiers who participated in the mutiny. Petitioners contend that the Judge Advocate General due to the fact that their participation in the mutiny was not service connected. The present petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus were then filed with the Supreme Court. Acting on the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order in the petition for prohibition, the Supreme Court directed the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the petition.

:

ISSUE

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can divest the military courts of jurisdiction. :

RA 7055 provides that "Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts." As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.

HELD:

The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what are considered “service-connected crimes or offenses” under Commonwealth Act 408 (CA 408), as amended, also known as the Articles of War. Section 1 of RA 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. In view of the clear mandate of RA 7055, the Regional Trial Court cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97 of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as “service-connected offenses or crimes” under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. There was no factual and legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to rule that violations of said articles of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d’etat and, as such, absorbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup d’etat against Navales, et al., and recommended the dismissal of the case against them. The trial court approved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against Navales et al. There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the Navale et al., committed the violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup d’etat. In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, the RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION

EMILIO La’o

v.

Republic

FACTS

:

Government Service Insurance System GSIS is the registered owner of three parcels of land with a five-storey building and other improvements thereon. GSIS entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the Republic through the office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC). The lease was vitiated by force as the term was clearly in advantage of the OGCC. GSIS filed for nullification of the contract contending the former President Marcos used his influence to perfect the lease agreement. The OGCC contended, among other things that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction as the alleged transactions were under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Executive Order No. 9.

ISSUE

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. :

HELD:

While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case maybe raised at any stage of the proceedings. It is nevertheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision it is improper and too late for a party to question the jurisdiction of the court. A party who has invoked jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief cannot be permitted afterwards to deny the same jurisdiction to escape liability. Thus petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the courts below.

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TIJAM

vs.

SIBONGHANOY

FACTS:

Petitioner filed for recovery of a sum of money from respondent Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Judgment was in favor of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court for the first time upon appeal.

HELD:

The Court believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. : Other merits on the appeal.

The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing. In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court The orders appealed from are affirmed.

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MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI

vs.

HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ and FRANCISCO RAMOS

FACTS

Judgment for a sum of money and a writ of execution was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali. The Notice of Levy made on a parcel of land registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this title." However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in this title" and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final Deed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title.

:

Petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, filed a petition with the respondent Court praying for the cancellation of the TCT. An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dismissing the petition. The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition as they filed for the cancellation of the TCT. Instead, they filed a complaint praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made on the property previously registered in the name of Domingo Magali, herein private respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos failed to obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.

Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, dismissed Civil Case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. A Motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the respondent Judge. A second Motion for reconsideration was similarly denied.

ISSUE

Whether or not the dismissal of civil case can be annulled and set aside. :

HELD

It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter.

:

The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their right over their property in the Civil Case is rendered more acute in the face of the undisputed fact that the property in question admittedly belonged to the petitioners, and that the title in the name of the private respondent was the result of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in the execution proceeding. The

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EUSTACIO ATWEL

Vs

CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE ASSOC., INC

FACTS

Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive Association. As CPAI president, he bought a parcel of land in behalf of the association. The property was later on converted into a wet market where agricultural, livestock and other farm products were sold. It also housed a cockpit and an area for various forms of amusement. The income generated from the property, mostly rentals from the wet market, was paid to CPAI. When Emiliano Melgazo died, his son, petitioner Manuel Melgazo, succeeded him as CPAI president and administrator of the property. On the other hand, petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were elected as CPAI vice-president and treasurer, respectively. Other elected officers and members formed their own group and registered themselves in the Securities and Exchange Commission as officers and members of respondent CPAI. However, petitioners not listed as members. CPAI alleged that it was the owner of the property and petitioners, without authority, were collecting rentals from the wet market vendors. Petitioners filed a case in the SEC for mandatory injunction where they contended that since the property was purchased using the money of petitioner Manuel Melgazo's father, it belonged to the deceased and it was impossible for the CPAI to have acquired ownership over the property in 1968 when it was only in 1997 that it was incorporated and registered with the SEC. It ruled that CPA to be one and the same as CPAI, CPA as the owner of poperty and not Melgazo. It ruled in favor of CPAI. Petitioners went to the CA and contested the jurisdiction of the SEC special commercial court over the case. CA affirmed the decision.

:

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are estopped from questioning jurisdiction after participating in the proceeding.

HELD

The Court agreed with the petitioners that estoppel cannot apply because a court's jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the Constitution or by law, not by the parties' agreement or by estoppel. The jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and other cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD

:

902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, the elements of an intra-corporate controversy are not present. The records reveal that petitioners were never officers nor members of CPAI. CPAI itself admitted this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners were the only remaining members of CPA which, obviously, was not the CPAI that was registered in the SEC. The determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed property entitled to the income generated therefrom is civil in nature and should be threshed out in a regular court - conflict among the parties here was outside the jurisdiction of the special commercial court

The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI, no exceptional circumstance appears in this case to warrant divergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel is not available here.

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DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO

Vs

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR,

and FRANCISCO TESORERO

FACTS:

Davao Light & Power Co., filed a complaint for damages against private respondent Francisco Tesorero before the RTC praying for damages in the amount of P11,OOO,OOO.OO. Instead of filing its answer, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss claiming that:

(a) the complaint did not state a cause of action;

(b) the plaintiff's claim has been extinguished or otherwise rendered moot and academic; (c) there was non-joinder of indispensable parties; and

(d) venue was improperly laid.

Of these four grounds, the last mentioned is most material in the case at bar. The trial court issue a Resolution dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground of improper venue. The plaintiff being a private corporation, undoubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the plaintiff's principal place of business as alleged in the complaint, and which for purposes of venue, is deemed as its residence. Conversely, in the defendant's motion to dismiss, it alleged and submitted that the plaintiff’s principal office is in Davao City, as stated in the Contract of Lease and another Contract of Lease of Generating Equipment executed by the plaintiff with the NAPOCOR.

The motion on the ground of improper venue was granted and petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed judgment, denied due course and dismissed the petition. The petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the venue was proper. :

HELD

It is private respondent's contention that the proper venue is Davao City, and not Cebu City. Private respondent argue that petitioner is estopped from claiming that its residence is in Cebu City, in view of contradictory statements made by petitioner prior to the filing of the action for damages. It cannot be disputed that petitioner's principal office is in Cebu City, per its amended articles of incorporation and by-laws.

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Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts presented. He is a complete stranger to the covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR, despite his protestations that he is privy thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose benefit the electric generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. We are likewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or representation made by petitioner in either the complaints or answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is in Davao City, should estop it from filing the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Moreover, there is no showing that private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on such representation by petitioner.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 1

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CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1

JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA

vs.

MARIANO T. TIANO

FACTS:

Ciriaco Potestas, father of respondent

sold a parcel of land without the consent of 3 of his heirs. Since at the time of the sales his daughters Josefina and Crecencia did not know about the sale, they did not object to it. Crecencia and Josefina filed an action for recovery of property against the ventee, Mariano Tiano. He was then served his summons and contended a special defense of prescription. He contended that it was not from the date of filing of the complaint but from the time of service of the summons that the prescription period interrupts.

ISSUE

Whether or not the prescription period stops at the time of the filing of the complaint. :

HELD

Civil actions are deemed commenced from date of the filing and docketing of the complaint with the Clerk of Court, without taking into account the issuance and service of summons. Commencement of the suit prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period, interrupts the prescription period. Prescription period commences at the time when the suit is filed. The established rule is that the commencement of a suit prior to expiration period interrupts the running of the statute as to parties to the action. The contention that the period was not interrupted until after the defendant received the summons legal basis.

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LOURDES DELA CRUZ

V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

The petition for review seeks to nullify Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court reinstated the Decision of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which ordered petitioner Dela Cruz to vacate the subject lot in favor of respondent. Petitioner Lourdes dela Cruz, was one of the lessees of the house of the Reyes family. After a fire ravaged the house, the Reyes demanded all the lessees to vacate the premises. Dela Cruz refused and subsequently, the lot was sold by the Reyes to Tan. Tan sent eviction notice to dela Cruz and then finally filed an ejection case against them. The case was filed in the MeTC after 1 year of the instance of forcible entry. Dela Cruz contended that the MeTC have no jurisdiction over the complaint.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the complaint.

RULING

The original jurisdiction over ejectment cases lies in first level courts. Section 1 of Rule 70 of the rules of court defines 2 kinds of procedure that is under the jurisdiction of Summary Procedure which is cognizance by first level courts. In action of forcible entry, 3 requisites must concur 1) Plaintiffs must allege prior physical possession of the property 2) Deprivation of possession 3) Must be files within 1 year. The other kind of ejectment is unlawful detainer were one unlawfully withholds a property after an expiration or termination of the right to possess. The court finds that the ejectment case falls within the latter. In unlawful detainer cases, jurisdiction is conferred by allegation in the pleadings.

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REPUBLIC

V. KENRICH DEVELOPMENT CORP

:

ISSUE

Whether or not jurisdiction was acquired over the complaint by BNP. :

HELD

In the case at bar, jurisdiction was not acquired. Respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal. BNP must be reassessed of the proper docket fees.

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It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature on the action. Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time within the expiration of applicable prescription or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel.

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SUN INSURANCE OFFICE

V. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge

and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG.

FACTS

Petitioner Sun Insurance Office filed a complaint for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, private respondent filed a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner.

:

Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos. Only the amount of P21O.OO was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection, which was disregarded by respondent Judge. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges to the exclusion of Judge Castro. The Court issued a Resolution directing the judges to reassess the docket fees and requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered. Judge Maximiano Asuncion, to whom Civil Case was thereafter assigned, issued an Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion. Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, Denying due course to the petition insofar as it seeks annulment of the order

ISSUE

Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.

:

HELD

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency.

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ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA

Vs

FIDELA DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:

A complaint for rescission of a deed of sale was filed by herein respondents, heirs of Fidela del Rosario, which was signed by the deceased, which was fraudulently executed. They averred that Fidela signed the deed wherein facts demonstrate that she intended to sign a deed of mortgage. Petitioner contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since that the proper docket fee was not properly assessed and paid. Respondents contend that they did not know that they paid the incorrect amount and fault the clerk of court.

ISSUE

Whether or not jurisdiction was properly acquired. :

HELD

This Court has ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment. The party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court. If petitioners believed that the assessment was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court. Instead, petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees through this petition, attempting to support their position with the opinion and certification of the Clerk of Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such certification has no bearing on the instant case.

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Neypes

v

Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal and, on the 15th day thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE

Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideraiton.

:

HELD

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.

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days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 2

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HEIRS OF DOLLETON

V. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC.

FACTS

MELICOR

FACTS:

Private respondents own a parcel of land. They allowed Bertuldo Hinog to use a portion of the said property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house. After the expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but Hinog refused and instead claimed ownership. Private respondents filed a complaint for “Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages” against Hinog. Trial ensued but Hinog died without completing his evidence. New counsel appeared for the deceased and filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees and further alleged that the private respondents failed to pay the correct docket fee since the main subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for recovery of ownership, possession and removal of construction. Private respondents opposed. The trial court ordered the complaint to be expunged from the records. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court in reinstating the complaint upon the payment of deficiency docket fees.

It must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an incidental matter. The remedy against an interlocutory order is to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order.

HELD:

Such special circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case. Nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government

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Flores

v.

Mallare-Philipps

FACTS:

Respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand was only P11,643.00 and refused to pay representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit. Fernando Calion allegedly indebted to petitioner joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Mallare-Phillipps who dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction :

HELD:

In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate and independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial court.

In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction. No. order appealed from is affirmed

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CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 3

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vs.

WARNER BARNES FACTS:

Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered into a contract with Tina J. Gamboa for the shipment of one case of rayon yardage. Upon arrival, it was discovered that there were a shortage of 1,723.12 pesos on the shipment from San Francisco, California, on steamer Clovis Victory, to Manila. Consignee, Jovito Salonga, demanded from American President Lines agents of the ship Clovis Victory, demanding settlement, and when apparently no action was taken on this claim, plaintiff demanded payment thereof from Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., as agent of the insurance company in the Philippines to pay him the excess amount. In the meantime, American President Lines agreed to pay to the plaintiff the amount under its liability in the bill of lading, and when this offer was rejected, the claim was finally settled. As a result, the amount claimed in the complaint as the ultimate liability of the defendant under the insurance contract was reduced. The trial court held that defendant, as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance is responsible upon the insurance claim subject to the suit.

ISSUE

Whether or not the defendant is the real party in interest. :

HELD:

It is claimed that this action should have been filed against its principal, the Westchester Fire Insurance. This point is also well taken. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real party in interest, or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein. The real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the "party entitled to the avails of the suit"

In the case at bar, the defendant issued upon in its capacity as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance in spite of the fact that the insurance contract has not been signed by it. As we have said, the defendant did not assume any obligation thereunder either as agent or as a principal. It cannot, therefore, be made liable under said contract, and hence it can be said that this case was filed against one who is not the real party in interest

(32)

32 | P a g e

EDUARDO RAYO

v.

METROBANK

FACTS:

Midas Diversified Export obtained loans from Metrobank. To secure the payment OF the loan, a mortgage was executed in favor of Metrobank over three parcels of land When Midas failed to pay, Metrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. At the bidding, Metrobank acquired the property. Metrobank posted a bondrecquired for the issuance of a writ of possession. Rayo, a co-assignee of the property filed an action for nullification of the sale. Metrobank opposed for the motion contending that he is not a real party in interest.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner has a legal personality in the suit. :

HELD:

Initially, it is recognized herein petitioner as the co-assignee of the subject real properties. However, while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, the petitioner has no present substantial interest to institute the annulment of judgment proceedings and nullify the order granting the writ of possession. Rayo would not be injured by the judgment. An ex-parte application for a writ of possession not a strictly judicial process contemplated in Article 443 of the New Civil Code. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession.

(33)

33 | P a g e

Hon. Carlos Fortich

Vs

Hon Renato Corona

FACTS:

This case concerns the motion for reconsideration of the court’s resolution dated November 17, 1998 and motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. In previous case, the Court voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration as a result of which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolution dated January 27, 1999 that the movants have no legal personality to seek redress before the Court as their motion to intervene was already denied and that the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited. In this motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed that the case be referred to the Court en banc inasmuch as their earlier MR was resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision under the Constitution was not met.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the referral to the court en banc partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration.

HELD:

It is affirmative. The contention, therefore, that the Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier MR of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the present MR necessarily partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited. True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second MRs must be filed with express leave of court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution.

(34)

34 | P a g e

RAMON P. ARON

vs.

Heirs of Alfredo REALON

FACTS

Roman Realon was the owner of two parcels of land which was inherited by Alfredo Realon and his siblings. Sometime in 1979, Alfredo executed a contract to sell his undivided portion of the lot to petitioner. He also obliged himself to execute a deed of final sale. However Alfredo failed to register the sale. To secure the balance of the purchase price Aaron, mortgaged the property to the remaining heir. Alfredo Realon died and his successors were unaware about the sale. Engr. Ilaban filed, the attorney-in-fact of Aron, filed a case for consignation against the heirs of Realon. The Realon’s countered by contending that undue influence was present at the execution of the sale and that the balance of the price due in the contract to sell was not paid. Aaron contended that the contract to sell was superseded by the deeds of the sale with mortgage. In respond the Realon’s contended that even the other heirs did not receive the proceeds from the contract to sell allegedly executed by Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court held that there was fraud present.

:

ISSUE

Whether or not the other heirs of Alfredo are the real parties in interest. :

HELD

The settled rule is that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in a fiduciary capacity. The beneficiary must be deemed as the real party in interest. Thus the presence of all the indispensible party is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. The plaintiff is mandated to implead all indispensable party and in the absence of one render all subsequent judgment voids. Failure to include the other heirs as indispensible parties in the complaint to nullify the contract to sell is fatal to the complaint.

(35)

35 | P a g e

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR

v.

HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN

FACTS

Paciencia Regala owns a fishpond, which her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Mercado leased to Eduardo Lapid for a three years. Lessee in turn sub-leased the fishpond to Rafael Lopez during the last seven months of the original lease. Ernesto Salenga was hired by Eduardo Lapid as fishpond watchman. In the sub-lease, Rafael Lopez rehired respondent Salenga. Ernesto Salenga sent the demand letter to Rafael Lopez and Lourdes Lapid for unpaid salaries and non-payment of the share in the harvest. Salenga file a Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB). Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case was instituted by petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Mercado, through a Complaint-Affidavit against private respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019. Petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P filed by respondent Salenga as there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga and Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was dismissible on its face.

:

ISSUES

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to pursue the instant petition. :

Whether or not the Ombudsman likewise erred in reversing his own resolution.

HELD

The "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, there is no question on his authority and legal standing. Faustino Mercado, is an agent himself and as such cannot further delegate his agency to another. An agent cannot delegate to another the same agency. Re-delegation of the agency would be detrimental to the principal as the second agent has no privity of contract with the former. In the instant case, petitioner has no privity of contract with Paciencia Regala, owner of the fishpond and principal of Faustino Mercado.

:

The nature of the case is determined by the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Respondent Salenga’s complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in assuming jurisdiction as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. A defense asserted in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the allegations of the defendant. The instant petition is denied for lack of merit, and the Order and Memorandum of

(36)

36 | P a g e

MACLARING LUCMAN

VICTORIANA BORLASA vs.

VICENTED POLISTICO

FACTS

An action was instituted by petitioner against respondent in the Court of First Instance for the purpose of securing the dissolution of a voluntary association named Turuhan Polistico & Co., and to compel the defendants to account for and surrender the money and property of the association in order that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets applied according to law. The trial judge having sustained a demurrer for defect of parties and the plaintiffs electing not to amend, the cause was dismissed, and from this order an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to this court.

:

ISSUE

Whether or not a suit in behalf of some members proper. :

HELD:

To require all members to appear would be quite impossible. Hence, some members must be made to sue but only in behalf of all the members who are not around and it is impracticable to bring them all to the court. A number of them may sue for the benefit of all.

(40)

40 | P a g e

MARIBETH CORDOVA

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

and HON. JUDGE RICARDO TORNILLA

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court against private respondents, spouses Romeo and Marietta Laguardia, and Judge Ricardo F. Tornilla, along with the Sheriff and his deputies. Cordova failed to include a certificate of forum shopping. The complaint, however, did not include the certification against forum shopping required. It was only subsequently that petitioner submitted the certification in compliance with the circular and thus, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and for failure to prosecute.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was substantial compliance in the requirements. :

HELD

the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with this requirement does not excuse a party’s failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the certificate requirement, special circumstances or compelling reasons existed, which made the strict application of the circular clearly inequitable. In this case, however, petitioner’s action hardly justifies a deviation from the mandatory nature of the afore-quoted provision. Hence, petitioner’s complaint was clearly dismissible on the ground of forum shopping.