• No results found

IBM System Storage Data Encryption Sg247797

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "IBM System Storage Data Encryption Sg247797"

Copied!
1036
0
0

Loading.... (view fulltext now)

Full text

(1)

ibm.com/redbooks

Front cover

IBM System Storage

Data Encryption

Alex Osuna

David Crowther

Reimar Pflieger

Esha Seth

Ferenc Toth

Understand the encryption concepts

and terminology

Compare various IBM storage

encryption methods

Plan for Tivoli Key Lifecycle

Manager and its keystores

(2)
(3)

International Technical Support Organization

IBM System Storage Data Encryption

June 2010

(4)

© Copyright International Business Machines Corporation 2010. All rights reserved.

First Edition (June 2010)

This edition applies to Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager Version 1 and later and the Encryption Key Manager Release 1 and later.

Note: Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in “Notices” on

(5)

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2010. All rights reserved. iii

Contents

Notices . . . xvii

Trademarks . . . xviii

Preface . . . xix

The team who wrote this book . . . xix

Now you can become a published author, too! . . . xx

Comments welcome. . . xxi

Stay connected to IBM Redbooks . . . xxi

Part 1. Introduction to data encryption. . . 1

Chapter 1. Encryption concepts and terminology . . . 3

1.1 Concepts of storage data encryption . . . 4

1.1.1 Symmetric key encryption . . . 4

1.1.2 Asymmetric key encryption . . . 6

1.1.3 Hybrid encryption . . . 9

1.1.4 Digital certificates . . . 9

1.2 IBM Key Management methods . . . 15

1.3 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager and Encryption Key Manager . . . 16

1.3.1 IBM Encryption Key Manager . . . 17

1.3.2 Encryption Key Manager components and resources . . . 19

1.3.3 Encryption keys. . . 21

1.3.4 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager . . . 21

1.3.5 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager components and resources . . . 22

Chapter 2. Introduction to storage data encryption. . . 27

2.1 IBM tape drive encryption . . . 28

2.2 IBM System Storage DS5000 series with encryption support. . . 29

2.3 DS8000 series with encryption support. . . 31

2.3.1 Encryption updates in DS8000 R5.0 . . . 33

2.4 Storage data encryption . . . 34

2.4.1 Encryption of data on IBM tape drives . . . 34

2.4.2 Encryption of data in IBM System Storage DS5000 Series . . . 35

2.4.3 Encryption of data in IBM System Storage DS8000 Series . . . 37

2.5 Encryption data . . . 41

2.5.1 IBM tape drive . . . 41

2.5.2 IBM Storage Series DS5000 and DS8000 . . . 43

2.6 Using data encryption . . . 44

2.6.1 Encrypting data in the tape drive . . . 44

2.6.2 Encrypting data on disk drives . . . 45

2.6.3 Fundamentals to encryption: Policy and key management. . . 46

Chapter 3. IBM storage encryption methods . . . 49

3.1 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager . . . 50

3.1.1 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager components and resources . . . 51

3.1.2 Key exchange . . . 53

3.2 IBM Encryption Key Manager . . . 54

3.2.1 Encryption Key Manager components and resources . . . 56

(6)

3.3.1 Key exchange . . . 59

3.4 DS8000 disk encryption . . . 60

3.4.1 Encryption key management . . . 62

3.4.2 Encryption deadlock . . . 67

3.4.3 Encryption recovery key support. . . 68

3.4.4 Dual platform key server support . . . 70

3.5 Comparing tape encryption methods . . . 73

3.5.1 System-Managed Encryption . . . 74

3.5.2 Library-Managed Encryption . . . 77

3.5.3 Encrypting and decrypting with SME and LME . . . 79

3.5.4 Application-Managed Encryption . . . 81

3.5.5 Mixed mode example . . . 84

Chapter 4. IBM System Storage tape automation for encryption . . . 87

4.1 IBM System Storage TS1130 and TS1120 tape drive . . . 88

4.1.1 Tape data encryption support . . . 89

4.1.2 TS1120 characteristics . . . 89

4.1.3 TS1130 characteristics . . . 91

4.1.4 3592 cartridges and media . . . 93

4.2 IBM System Storage TS1120 Tape Controller . . . 95

4.2.1 IBM TS1120 Tape Controller characteristics . . . 96

4.2.2 IBM TS1120 Tape Controller encryption support . . . 97

4.2.3 Installation with an IBM TS3500 Tape Library . . . 97

4.2.4 Installation with an IBM TS3400 Tape Library . . . 99

4.2.5 Installation with an IBM 3494 Tape Library . . . 100

4.2.6 IBM TotalStorage 3592 Model J70 Tape Controller . . . 101

4.3 IBM Virtualization Engine TS7700 . . . 102

4.4 IBM LTO Ultrium tape drives and libraries . . . 104

4.4.1 Linear Tape-Open overview . . . 105

4.4.2 LTO media . . . 106

4.4.3 IBM System Storage TS2240 Tape Drive Express Model . . . 108

4.4.4 IBM System Storage TS2340 Tape Drive Express Model . . . 109

4.4.5 IBM System Storage TS1040 Tape Drive . . . 110

4.4.6 IBM System Storage TS2900 Tape Autoloader . . . 111

4.4.7 IBM System Storage TS3100 Tape Library . . . 111

4.4.8 IBM System Storage TS3200 Tape Library . . . 113

4.4.9 IBM System Storage TS3310 Tape Library . . . 115

4.5 IBM System Storage TS3400 Tape Library . . . 118

4.6 IBM System Storage TS3500 Tape Library . . . 120

4.6.1 TS3500 frames . . . 121

4.6.2 TS3500 characteristics . . . 124

4.7 IBM TotalStorage 3494 Tape Library . . . 131

Chapter 5. Full Disk Encryption technology in disk subsystems. . . 133

5.1 FDE fundamentals . . . 134

5.2 Hardware implementation details . . . 135

5.3 FDE disks in storage products . . . 136

Part 2. IBM System Storage DS5000 . . . 139

Chapter 6. Understanding Full Disk Encryption in DS5000 . . . 141

6.1 FDE disk drives . . . 142

6.1.1 Securing data against a breach . . . 142

(7)

Contents v

6.3 Changing a security key . . . 144

6.4 Security key identifier . . . 144

6.5 Unlocking secure drives . . . 148

6.6 Secure erase . . . 149

6.7 FDE security authorizations . . . 149

6.8 FDE key terms . . . 151

Chapter 7. Configuring encryption on DS5000 with Full Disk Encryption drives . . . 153

7.1 The need for encryption . . . 154

7.1.1 Encryption method . . . 154

7.2 Disk Security components. . . 156

7.2.1 DS5000 Disk Encryption Manager . . . 156

7.2.2 Full Data Encryption disks. . . 157

7.2.3 Premium feature license . . . 157

7.2.4 Keys . . . 157

7.2.5 Security key identifier . . . 157

7.2.6 Passwords . . . 158

7.3 Setting up and enabling the Secure Disk feature . . . 159

7.3.1 FDE and the premium feature key check . . . 159

7.3.2 Secure key creation . . . 160

7.3.3 Enable disk security on the array . . . 162

7.4 Additional secure disk functions . . . 163

7.4.1 Changing the security key. . . 164

7.4.2 Saving the security key file . . . 165

7.4.3 Secure disk erase . . . 166

7.4.4 FDE drive status . . . 167

7.4.5 Hot-spare drive . . . 167

7.4.6 Log files. . . 168

7.5 Migrating secure disk arrays . . . 168

7.5.1 Planning checklist . . . 169

7.5.2 Export the array . . . 169

7.6 Import secure drive array . . . 172

7.6.1 Unlock drives . . . 173

7.6.2 Import array. . . 174

Chapter 8. DS5000 Full Disk Encryption best practices . . . 177

8.1 Physical asset protection . . . 178

8.2 Data backup . . . 179

8.3 FDE drive security key and the security key file . . . 179

8.4 DS subsystem controller shell remote login . . . 181

8.5 Working with Full Disk Encryption drives . . . 181

8.6 Replacing controllers. . . 182

8.7 Storage industry standards and practices . . . 182

Chapter 9. Frequently asked questions . . . 183

9.1 Securing arrays . . . 184

9.2 Secure erase . . . 184

9.3 Security keys and passphrases . . . 185

9.4 Premium features . . . 185

9.5 Global hot-spare drives . . . 186

9.6 Boot support . . . 186

9.7 Locked and unlocked states . . . 187

9.8 Backup and recovery . . . 187

(8)

Part 3. Implementing tape data encryption . . . 189

Chapter 10. Planning for software and hardware to support tape drives . . . 191

10.1 Encryption planning. . . 192

10.2 Planning assumptions . . . 192

10.3 Encryption planning quick-reference tables . . . 193

10.4 Choosing encryption methods. . . 196

10.4.1 Encryption method comparison. . . 197

10.4.2 System z encryption methods . . . 197

10.4.3 Open systems encryption methods. . . 198

10.4.4 Decision time . . . 199

10.5 Solutions available by operating system . . . 199

10.5.1 The z/OS solution components . . . 199

10.5.2 z/VM, z/VSE, and z/TPF solution components for TS1120 drives . . . 202

10.5.3 IBM System i encryption solution components . . . 204

10.5.4 AIX solution components . . . 206

10.5.5 Linux on System z. . . 209

10.5.6 Linux on System p, System x, and other Intel or AMD Opteron servers. . . 210

10.5.7 HP-UX, Sun, and Microsoft Windows components. . . 213

10.5.8 Tivoli Storage Manager . . . 216

10.6 Ordering information . . . 216

10.6.1 TS1120 tape drive prerequisites . . . 216

10.6.2 Tape controller prerequisites. . . 218

10.6.3 LTO4 and LTO5 tape drive prerequisites . . . 219

10.6.4 Tape library prerequisites . . . 220

10.6.5 Other library and rack open systems installations. . . 222

10.6.6 TS7700 Virtualization Engine prerequisites . . . 222

10.6.7 General software prerequisites for encryption . . . 223

10.6.8 TS1120 and TS1130 supported platforms . . . 224

10.6.9 IBM LTO4 and LTO5 tape drive supported platforms . . . 225

10.7 Other planning considerations for tape data encryption . . . 226

10.7.1 In-band and out-of-band . . . 226

10.7.2 Performance considerations . . . 227

10.7.3 Encryption with other backup applications . . . 227

10.7.4 ALMS and encryption in the TS3500 library . . . 228

10.7.5 TS1120 and TS1130 rekeying considerations . . . 229

10.8 Upgrade and migration considerations . . . 230

10.8.1 Potential issues . . . 230

10.8.2 TS1120 and TS1130 compatibility considerations . . . 231

10.8.3 DFSMSdss host-based encryption . . . 235

10.8.4 Positioning TS1120 Tape Encryption and Encryption Facility for z/OS . . . 236

Chapter 11. Planning for Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager and its keystores. . . 237

11.1 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager planning quick reference . . . 238

11.2 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager and keystore considerations. . . 241

11.2.1 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager configuration planning checklist . . . 244

11.3 Working with keys and certificates . . . 245

11.3.1 IT Service Management . . . 245

11.3.2 General security . . . 246

11.3.3 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager key server availability . . . 246

11.3.4 Encryption deadlock prevention for DS8000. . . 247

11.3.5 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager key server. . . 247

(9)

Contents vii

11.4 Multiple Tivoli Key Lifecycle Managers for redundancy . . . 249

11.4.1 Setting up primary and secondary Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager servers. . . 250

11.4.2 Synchronizing primary and secondary Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager servers . 250 11.5 Backup and restore . . . 251

11.5.1 Categories of data in a backup file . . . 251

11.5.2 Backup file security . . . 252

11.5.3 IBM Tivoli Storage Manager as a backup repository . . . 252

11.5.4 Backup and restore runtime requirements . . . 252

11.5.5 Backing up critical files . . . 253

11.5.6 Restoring a backup file . . . 254

11.5.7 Deleting a backup file . . . 256

11.6 Key exporting and importing tasks . . . 256

11.6.1 Exporting keys . . . 256

11.6.2 Importing keys. . . 257

11.6.3 Importing the public key . . . 258

11.6.4 Exporting the public key . . . 258

11.7 Integration and EKM to Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager migration . . . 259

11.7.1 Integrating Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager for DS8000 with an existing EKM tape encryption installation . . . 259

11.7.2 Migrating from EKM to Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager . . . 259

11.7.3 Multiple encrypted disk or tape devices . . . 260

11.8 Data exchange with business partners . . . 261

11.9 Disaster recovery considerations . . . 262

11.10 Database selection . . . 263

Chapter 12. Implementing Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager . . . 265

12.1 Implementation notes . . . 266

12.2 Installing Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager on 64-bit Windows Server 2008 . . . 266

12.3 Installing Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager on 64-bit Red Hat Enterprise Linux AS Version 5.3 server . . . 299

12.4 Installing Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager on z/OS . . . 329

12.5 Configuring Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager . . . 335

12.5.1 Configuration forLTO4 and TS1100 . . . 339

12.5.2 Configuration for DS8000 disk drives . . . 348

12.6 Conclusions. . . 351

Chapter 13. Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager operational considerations . . . 353

13.1 Scripting with Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager . . . 354

13.1.1 Simple Linux backup script example. . . 354

13.2 Synchronizing primary Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager configuration data . . . 355

13.2.1 Setting up primary and secondary Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager servers. . . 355

13.2.2 Synchronizing primary and secondary Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager servers . 356 13.3 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager maintenance . . . 357

13.3.1 General disk and tape management . . . 357

13.3.2 Adding and removing drives . . . 359

13.3.3 Scheduling key group rollover for LTO tape drives . . . 364

13.3.4 Scheduling certificate rollover for 3592 tape . . . 368

13.4 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager backup and restore procedures . . . 371

13.4.1 Using the GUI to back up . . . 372

13.4.2 Restore by using the GUI . . . 373

13.4.3 Backing up by using the command line. . . 376

13.4.4 Restore by using the command line . . . 377

(10)

13.5.1 Sharing TS1100 certificate data with a business partner . . . 379

13.5.2 Sharing LTO key data with a business partner . . . 381

13.6 Removing Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager . . . 384

13.6.1 Backing up the keystore . . . 385

13.7 Fixing the security warnings in your web browser. . . 385

13.7.1 Fixing the security warning in Internet Explorer browser . . . 385

13.7.2 Fixing the security warning in Firefox 2. . . 386

13.8 The Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager command-line interface . . . 386

13.8.1 Commands using wsadmin . . . 386

13.8.2 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager commands using wsadmin . . . 387

13.8.3 Setting a larger timeout interval for command processing . . . 388

13.8.4 Syntax examples. . . 388

13.8.5 Continuation character . . . 388

13.8.6 Parameter error messages . . . 389

13.8.7 Command summary . . . 389

Chapter 14. Planning for Encryption Key Manager and its keystores . . . 393

14.1 EKM planning quick-reference . . . 394

14.2 Ordering information and requirements . . . 396

14.2.1 EKM on z/OS or z/OS.e requirements . . . 396

14.2.2 EKM on z/VM, z/VSE, and z/TPF . . . 397

14.2.3 EKM on IBM System i requirements . . . 397

14.2.4 EKM on AIX requirements . . . 398

14.2.5 EKM on Linux requirements . . . 399

14.2.6 EKM on Hewlett-Packard, Sun, and Windows requirements . . . 399

14.3 EKM and keystore considerations. . . 400

14.3.1 EKM configuration planning checklist . . . 402

14.3.2 Best security practices for working with keys and certificates. . . 403

14.3.3 Acting on the advice . . . 403

14.3.4 Typical EKM implementations. . . 404

14.3.5 Multiple EKMs for redundancy . . . 407

14.3.6 Using Virtual IP Addressing . . . 408

14.3.7 Key manager backup . . . 409

14.3.8 FIPS 140-2 certification. . . 409

14.4 Other EKM considerations . . . 410

14.4.1 EKM Release 1 to EKM Release 2 migration . . . 410

14.4.2 Data exchange with business partners or other platforms . . . 410

14.4.3 Disaster recovery considerations . . . 411

14.4.4 i5/OS disaster recovery considerations. . . 411

14.4.5 EKM performance considerations . . . 411

Chapter 15. Implementing the Encryption Key Manager. . . 413

15.1 Implementing EKM in z/OS . . . 414

15.1.1 z/OS UNIX System Services. . . 414

15.1.2 Installing EKM in z/OS . . . 415

15.1.3 Security products involved: RACF, Top Secret, and ACF2. . . 417

15.1.4 Create a JCE4758RACFKS for EKM . . . 418

15.1.5 Setting up the EKM environment . . . 420

15.1.6 Starting EKM . . . 423

15.1.7 Additional definitions of hardware keystores for z/OS. . . 428

15.1.8 Virtual IP Addressing . . . 429

15.1.9 EKM TCP/IP configuration . . . 430

(11)

Contents ix

15.2.1 Install the IBM Software Developer Kit . . . 431

15.3 Installing EKM on a Microsoft Windows platform . . . 436

15.3.1 EKM setup tasks . . . 437

15.3.2 Installing the IBM Software Developer Kit on Microsoft Windows. . . 438

15.3.3 Starting EKM on Microsoft Windows. . . 443

15.3.4 Configuring and starting EKM . . . 444

15.4 Installing EKM in i5/OS . . . 450

15.4.1 New installation of the Encryption Key Manager. . . 450

15.4.2 Upgrading the Encryption Key Manager . . . 453

15.4.3 Configuring EKM for tape data encryption . . . 455

15.5 Implementing LTO4 and LTO5 encryption . . . 458

15.5.1 LTO4 EKM implementation checklist . . . 459

15.5.2 Download the latest EKM software . . . 459

15.5.3 Create a JCEKS keystore . . . 463

15.5.4 Off-site or business partner exchange with LTO4 compared to 3592. . . 466

15.5.5 EKM Version 2 installation and customization on Microsoft Windows . . . 467

15.5.6 Starting EKM . . . 469

15.5.7 Starting EKM as a Microsoft Windows Service . . . 470

15.6 Implementing LTO4 and LTO5 Library-Managed Encryption . . . 472

15.6.1 Barcode Encryption Policy . . . 472

15.6.2 Specifying a Barcode Encryption Policy . . . 475

15.6.3 TS3500 Library-Managed Encryption differences from TS3310, TS3200, TS3100, and TS2900 . . . 479

15.7 LTO4 or LTO5 System-Managed Encryption implementation. . . 480

15.7.1 LTO4 SME implementation checklist for Windows . . . 480

Chapter 16. Planning and managing your keys with Encryption Key Manager . . . . 481

16.1 Keystore and SAF Digital Certificates (keyrings) . . . 482

16.2 JCEKS. . . 482

16.2.1 Examples of managing public-private key pairs . . . 483

16.2.2 Managing symmetric keys in a JCEKS keystore. . . 486

16.2.3 Example using iKeyman . . . 490

16.3 JCE4758KS and JCECCAKS . . . 497

16.3.1 Script notes . . . 497

16.3.2 Symmetric keys in a JCECCAKS . . . 499

16.4 JCERACFKS . . . 500

16.5 JCE4758RACFKS and JCECCARACFKS . . . 502

16.5.1 RACDCERT keywords . . . 503

16.5.2 Best practice . . . 505

16.6 PKCS#11 . . . 506

16.7 IBMi5OSKeyStore . . . 506

16.7.1 Digital Certificate Manager . . . 507

16.7.2 Setting up an IBMi5OSKeyStore. . . 507

16.8 ShowPrivateTool . . . 522

16.9 MatchKeys tool . . . 524

16.10 Hardware cryptography . . . 527

Chapter 17. Encryption Key Manager operational considerations. . . 531

17.1 EKM commands . . . 532

17.1.1 The EKM sync command and EKM properties file . . . 532

17.1.2 EKM command-line interface and command set . . . 533

17.2 Backup procedures . . . 538

(12)

17.2.2 Identifying DFSMShsm to z/OS UNIX System Services . . . 540

17.2.3 Keystore backup . . . 540

17.2.4 RACF . . . 541

17.3 ICSF disaster recovery procedures. . . 542

17.3.1 Key recovery checklist . . . 542

17.3.2 Prerequisites . . . 543

17.3.3 Pre-key change: All LPARs in the sysplex . . . 543

17.3.4 Check the ICSF installation options data . . . 546

17.3.5 Disable all services . . . 547

17.3.6 Entering master keys for all LPARs in the sysplex . . . 548

17.3.7 Post-key change for all LPARs in the sysplex. . . 553

17.3.8 Exiting disaster recovery . . . 554

17.4 Business partner tape-sharing example . . . 554

17.4.1 Key-sharing steps . . . 554

17.4.2 Exporting a public key and certificate to a business partner . . . 555

17.4.3 Exporting a symmetric key from a JCEKS keystore . . . 559

17.4.4 Importing a public key and a certificate from a business partner . . . 559

17.4.5 Tape exchange and verification . . . 561

17.4.6 Importing symmetric keys to a JCEKS keystore . . . 563

17.5 RACF export tool for z/OS . . . 563

17.6 Audit log considerations . . . 564

17.6.1 Audit overview. . . 565

17.6.2 Audit log parsing tool . . . 565

Chapter 18. Implementing TS1100 series encryption in System z . . . 571

18.1 Implementation overview . . . 572

18.2 Implementation prerequisites . . . 572

18.2.1 Implementing the initial tape library hardware. . . 573

18.2.2 Initial z/OS software definitions . . . 574

18.3 EKM implementation overview . . . 575

18.4 Implementing the tape library . . . 576

18.4.1 Implementation steps for the IBM TS3500 Tape Library. . . 576

18.4.2 Implementation steps for the IBM 3494 Tape Library . . . 579

18.4.3 Implementation steps for the IBM TS3400 Tape Library. . . 583

18.5 Implementing the tape control unit . . . 585

18.6 z/OS implementation steps . . . 585

18.6.1 z/OS software maintenance . . . 586

18.6.2 Update PARMLIB member IECIOSxx. . . 586

18.6.3 Define or update Data Class definitions . . . 587

18.6.4 Considerations for JES3 . . . 591

18.6.5 Tape management system . . . 592

18.6.6 DFSMSrmm support for tape data encryption. . . 592

18.6.7 DFSMSdfp access method service . . . 596

18.6.8 Data Facility Data Set Services considerations . . . 597

18.6.9 DFSMS Hierarchal Storage Manager considerations . . . 598

18.7 z/VM implementation steps . . . 599

18.7.1 Tape library and tape control unit implementation . . . 600

18.7.2 Out-of-band encryption . . . 600

18.7.3 Defining key aliases to z/VM . . . 604

18.7.4 Using ATTACH and DETACH to control encryption . . . 605

18.7.5 Using SET RDEVICE to control encryption. . . 606

18.7.6 QUERY responses . . . 606

(13)

Contents xi

18.8 Miscellaneous implementation considerations . . . 607

18.8.1 Data exchange with other data centers or business partners . . . 607

18.8.2 Availability . . . 608

18.9 TS1120 and TS1130 tape cartridge rekeying in z/OS. . . 608

18.9.1 TS1120 Model E05 rekeying support in z/OS . . . 608

18.9.2 IEHINITT enhancements . . . 609

18.9.3 Security considerations . . . 612

18.9.4 Packaging . . . 612

18.9.5 Rekeying exits and messages . . . 612

Chapter 19. Implementing TS7700 tape encryption . . . 613

19.1 TS7700 encryption overview . . . 614

19.2 Prerequisites . . . 615

19.2.1 Tape drives . . . 615

19.2.2 TS7700 Virtualization Engine . . . 615

19.2.3 Library Manager . . . 615

19.2.4 Encryption Key Manager. . . 615

19.3 Implementation overview . . . 616

19.3.1 Implementing the initial tape library hardware. . . 616

19.3.2 Implementing the initial TS7700 . . . 616

19.3.3 Initial z/OS software definitions . . . 617

19.3.4 EKM implementation overview . . . 617

19.4 Tape library implementation and setup for encryption . . . 617

19.4.1 Enabling drives for encryption in the IBM TS3500 Tape Library. . . 618

19.4.2 Enabling drives for encryption in the IBM 3494 Tape Library . . . 620

19.4.3 Encryption-enabled drives . . . 623

19.5 Software implementation steps . . . 623

19.5.1 z/OS software maintenance . . . 623

19.5.2 Encryption Key Manager installation. . . 623

19.5.3 z/OS DFSMS implementation steps . . . 623

19.6 TS7700 implementation steps. . . 624

19.6.1 Configuring the TS7700 for encryption . . . 624

19.6.2 Creating TS7700 storage groups . . . 626

19.6.3 Creating TS7700 management classes . . . 627

19.6.4 Activate the TS7700 Encryption Feature License . . . 629

19.6.5 EKM addresses. . . 631

19.6.6 Testing EKM connectivity . . . 632

19.6.7 Configuring pool encryption settings for the TS7700 . . . 632

19.7 Implementation considerations . . . 634

19.7.1 Management construct definitions and transfer . . . 634

19.7.2 Changing storage pool encryption settings . . . 634

19.7.3 Moving data to encrypted storage pools . . . 635

19.7.4 EKM operation . . . 637

19.7.5 Tracking encryption usage . . . 638

19.7.6 Data exchange with other data centers or business partners . . . 638

19.8 TS7700 encryption with z/VM, z/VSE, or z/TPF . . . 638

Chapter 20. Implementing TS1120 and TS1130 encryption in an open systems environment . . . 641

20.1 Encryption overview in an open systems environment . . . 642

20.2 Adding drives to a logical library . . . 643

20.2.1 Advanced Library Management System considerations . . . 643

20.3 Managing the encryption and business partner exchange . . . 644

(14)

20.3.2 Keeping track of key usage. . . 647

20.4 Encryption implementation checklist . . . 648

20.4.1 Planning your EKM environment. . . 648

20.4.2 EKM setup tasks . . . 649

20.4.3 Application-Managed Encryption setup tasks . . . 649

20.4.4 System-Managed (Atape) Encryption setup tasks . . . 650

20.4.5 Library-Managed Encryption setup tasks . . . 651

20.5 Implementing Library-Managed Encryption . . . 651

20.5.1 LME implementation tasks . . . 651

20.5.2 Upgrading firmware. . . 652

20.5.3 Add EKM or Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager IP addresses . . . 658

20.5.4 Enabling Library-Managed Encryption . . . 659

20.5.5 Barcode Encryption Policy . . . 662

20.6 Implementing System-Managed Encryption . . . 668

20.6.1 System-Managed Encryption tasks. . . 669

20.6.2 Atape device driver . . . 670

20.6.3 Update Atape EKM proxy configuration . . . 670

20.6.4 System-Managed Encryption Atape device entries . . . 672

20.6.5 Updating the Atape device driver configuration . . . 673

20.6.6 Enabling System-Managed Encryption using the TS3500 web GUI. . . 674

20.6.7 Using SMIT to enable System-Managed Encryption . . . 676

20.6.8 Managing System-Managed Encryption and business partner exchange . . . . 683

20.7 Application-Managed Encryption . . . 686

20.7.1 IBM Tivoli Storage Manager overview . . . 686

20.7.2 IBM Tivoli Storage Manager support for 3592 drive encryption . . . 687

20.7.3 Implementing Application-Managed Encryption . . . 688

20.7.4 IBM Tivoli Storage Manager encryption considerations . . . 691

20.8 IBM 3494 with TS1120 or TS1130 encryption . . . 692

20.8.1 Review the 3494 encryption-capable drives . . . 692

20.8.2 Specifying a Barcode Encryption Policy . . . 696

20.8.3 Entering the EKM IP address and key labels . . . 698

20.8.4 ILEP key label mapping . . . 699

Chapter 21. Tape data encryption with i5/OS . . . 701

21.1 Planning for tape data encryption with i5/OS . . . 702

21.1.1 Hardware prerequisites . . . 702

21.1.2 Software prerequisites . . . 703

21.1.3 Disaster recovery considerations . . . 704

21.1.4 EKM keystore considerations . . . 705

21.1.5 TS1120 Tape Encryption policy considerations . . . 706

21.1.6 Considerations for sharing tapes with partners. . . 707

21.1.7 Steps for implementing tape encryption with i5/OS . . . 709

21.2 Setup and usage of tape data encryption with i5/OS . . . 709

21.2.1 Creating an EKM keystore and certificate. . . 710

21.2.2 Configuring the TS3500 library for Library-Managed Encryption . . . 722

21.2.3 Importing and exporting encryption keys . . . 732

21.2.4 Working with encrypted tape cartridges . . . 744

21.2.5 Troubleshooting . . . 749

Part 4. DS8000 encryption features. . . 751

Chapter 22. IBM System Storage DS8000 encryption preparation. . . 753

22.1 Encryption-capable DS8000 ordering and configuration. . . 754

(15)

Contents xiii

22.3 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager configuration . . . 756

22.3.1 Log in to Tivoli Integrated Portal . . . 756

22.3.2 Creating an image certificate or certificate request. . . 757

22.3.3 Configure the SFIs . . . 761

22.3.4 Starting and stopping the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager server and determining its status . . . 765

22.4 Configuring the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager server connections to the DS8000 . . 767

Chapter 23. DS8000 encryption features and implementation . . . 771

23.1 DS8100/DS8300 (R4.2) GUI configuration for encryption . . . 772

23.1.1 Configuring the encryption group . . . 772

23.1.2 Applying the encryption activation key . . . 773

23.1.3 Configuring and administering encrypted arrays. . . 776

23.1.4 Configuring and administering encrypted ranks . . . 780

23.1.5 Configuring and administering encrypted extent pools . . . 783

23.2 DS8700 (R5.0) GUI configuration for encryption . . . 788

23.2.1 Configuring the recovery key . . . 788

23.2.2 Configuring the encryption group . . . 792

23.2.3 Applying the encryption activation key . . . 794

23.2.4 Configuring and administering encrypted arrays. . . 796

23.2.5 Configuring and administering encrypted ranks . . . 798

23.2.6 Configuring and administering encrypted extent pools . . . 801

23.3 DS8000 DS CLI configuration for encryption . . . 804

23.3.1 Configuring the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager server connection . . . 804

23.3.2 Configuring and administering the encryption group. . . 806

23.3.3 Applying encryption activation key . . . 807

23.3.4 Creating encrypted arrays. . . 807

23.3.5 Creating encrypted ranks . . . 808

23.3.6 Creating encrypted extent pools . . . 809

23.4 Encryption and Copy Services functions. . . 810

Chapter 24. DS8700 advanced encryption features and implementation . . . 811

24.1 New security roles: Storage and security administrator . . . 812

24.2 Recovery key support . . . 814

24.2.1 Configuring the recovery key . . . 814

24.2.2 Validating the recovery key . . . 818

24.2.3 Initiating recovery . . . 820

24.2.4 Using the process to rekey the recovery key . . . 826

24.2.5 Deleting the recovery key . . . 830

24.2.6 Recovery key state summary . . . 833

24.3 Dual platform key server support . . . 833

24.3.1 Setting up Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager server . . . 833

Chapter 25. Best practices and guidelines for DS8000 encryption . . . 845

25.1 Best practices for encrypting storage environments . . . 846

25.1.1 Security . . . 846

25.1.2 Availability . . . 846

25.1.3 Encryption deadlock prevention . . . 847

25.2 Dual Hardware Management Console and redundancy . . . 850

25.2.1 Dual Hardware Management Console advantages . . . 850

25.2.2 Redundant HMC configurations . . . 850

25.3 Multiple Tivoli Key Lifecycle Managers for redundancy . . . 852

25.3.1 Setting up primary and secondary Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager servers. . . 853 25.3.2 Synchronizing primary and secondary Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager servers . 853

(16)

25.4 Backup and restore the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager servers . . . 853

25.4.1 Categories of data in a backup file . . . 854

25.4.2 Backup file security . . . 854

25.4.3 IBM Tivoli Storage Manager as a backup repository . . . 854

25.4.4 Backup and restore runtime requirements . . . 854

25.4.5 Backing up critical files . . . 855

25.4.6 Restoring a backup file . . . 856

25.4.7 Deleting a backup file . . . 858

25.5 Key exporting and importing tasks . . . 858

25.5.1 Exporting keys . . . 859

25.5.2 Importing keys. . . 859

Appendix A. z/OS planning and implementation checklists . . . 863

DFSMS Systems Managed Tape planning . . . 864

DFSMS planning and the z/OS encryption planning checklist . . . 864

Storage administrator stand-alone environment planning. . . 865

Storage administrator tape library environment planning . . . 866

DFSMS Systems Managed Tape implementation . . . 867

Object access method planning . . . 869

Storage administrator OAM planning . . . 869

OAM implementation . . . 870

DFSMShsm tape environment . . . 871

Appendix B. DS8700 encryption-related system reference codes . . . 873

Appendix C. z/OS Java and Open Edition tips . . . 877

JZOS . . . 878

Console communication with batch jobs . . . 878

Encryption Key Manager and JZOS . . . 879

MVS Open Edition tips . . . 882

Exporting a variable . . . 882

Setting up an alias . . . 882

Copying the escape character . . . 883

Advantages of VT100 . . . 884

Advanced security hwkeytool and keytool scripts . . . 885

Complete keytool example for JCEKS using hidden passwords . . . 885

Complete hwkeytool example for JCE4758KS using hidden passwords . . . 887

Java . . . 889

Security and providers . . . 889

Garbage Collector . . . 890

Verifying the installation . . . 891

z/OS region size . . . 891

Policy files . . . 891

Appendix D. Asymmetric and Symmetric Master Key change procedures . . . 893

Asymmetric Master Key change ceremony . . . 894

Prerequisites . . . 894

Testing encryption and decryption . . . 894

Pre-key change: Disabling PKA services for all images in the sysplex. . . 894

Key change: First LPAR in the sysplex . . . 896

Key change: Subsequent LPARs in the sysplex . . . 902

Post-key change: All LPARs in the sysplex . . . 906

ICSF tips . . . 910

(17)

Contents xv

Symmetric Master Key change ceremony . . . 911

Prerequisites . . . 912

Testing the encryption and decryption . . . 912

Disabling dynamic CKDS updates for all images in the sysplex . . . 912

Key change: First LPAR in the sysplex . . . 913

Reenciphering the CKDS under the new SYM-MK. . . 919

Changing the new SYM-MK and activating the re-enciphered CKDS . . . 921

Key change: Subsequent LPARs in the sysplex . . . 922

Post-key change: All LPARs in the sysplex . . . 925

Appendix E. z/OS tape data encryption diagnostics . . . 931

EKM problem determination when running z/OS . . . 932

Error scenarios . . . 932

Diagnostic scenarios . . . 935

Encryption Key Manager error codes and recovery actions. . . 938

Drive error codes . . . 940

Control unit error codes . . . 941

IOS628E message indicates connection failure . . . 942

Appendix F. IEHINITT exits and messages for rekeying . . . 943

Dynamic Exits Service Facility support . . . 944

Error conditions . . . 944

Programming considerations . . . 945

REKEY messages . . . 945

New messages . . . 946

Modified messages . . . 946

Appendix G. Implementing EKM on z/OS SECURE key processing to TS1100 and LTO4/LTO5 drives . . . 949

Implementing EKM in z/OS . . . 950

Prerequisites . . . 950

z/OS UNIX System Services. . . 950

Installing the Encryption Key Manager in z/OS. . . 951

Create a JCECCAKS for EKM . . . 953

Setting up the EKM environment . . . 954

Starting EKM . . . 957

Configuring EKM TCP/IP . . . 962

Enterprise-wide key management. . . 964

Conclusions . . . 964

Appendix H. Encryption testing in an open systems environment . . . 965

Encryption key path test . . . 966

Using key path diagnostics in an LME environment . . . 966

Key Path Diagnostic test in a SME environment. . . 969

Testing data encryption . . . 973

IBM Tape Diagnostic Tool. . . 973

Encryption Verification test using the ITDT-GE. . . 973

Encryption verification using the ITDT-SE . . . 978

Encryption test using the device driver functions . . . 979

Related publications . . . 985

IBM Redbooks publications . . . 985

Other publications . . . 985

(18)

How to get IBM Redbooks publications . . . 988 Help from IBM . . . 988

(19)

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2010. All rights reserved. xvii

Notices

This information was developed for products and services offered in the U.S.A.

IBM may not offer the products, services, or features discussed in this document in other countries. Consult your local IBM representative for information on the products and services currently available in your area. Any reference to an IBM product, program, or service is not intended to state or imply that only that IBM product, program, or service may be used. Any functionally equivalent product, program, or service that does not infringe any IBM intellectual property right may be used instead. However, it is the user's responsibility to evaluate and verify the operation of any non-IBM product, program, or service.

IBM may have patents or pending patent applications covering subject matter described in this document. The furnishing of this document does not give you any license to these patents. You can send license inquiries, in writing, to:

IBM Director of Licensing, IBM Corporation, North Castle Drive, Armonk, NY 10504-1785 U.S.A.

The following paragraph does not apply to the United Kingdom or any other country where such provisions are inconsistent with local law: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION

PROVIDES THIS PUBLICATION "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Some states do not allow disclaimer of express or implied warranties in certain transactions, therefore, this statement may not apply to you.

This information could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically made to the information herein; these changes will be incorporated in new editions of the publication. IBM may make improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described in this publication at any time without notice.

Any references in this information to non-IBM websites are provided for convenience only and do not in any manner serve as an endorsement of those websites. The materials at those websites are not part of the materials for this IBM product and use of those websites is at your own risk.

IBM may use or distribute any of the information you supply in any way it believes appropriate without incurring any obligation to you.

Information concerning non-IBM products was obtained from the suppliers of those products, their published announcements or other publicly available sources. IBM has not tested those products and cannot confirm the accuracy of performance, compatibility or any other claims related to non-IBM products. Questions on the capabilities of non-IBM products should be addressed to the suppliers of those products.

This information contains examples of data and reports used in daily business operations. To illustrate them as completely as possible, the examples include the names of individuals, companies, brands, and products. All of these names are fictitious and any similarity to the names and addresses used by an actual business enterprise is entirely coincidental.

The following company name appearing in this publication is fictitious: ZABYXC

This name is used for instructional purposes only.

COPYRIGHT LICENSE:

This information contains sample application programs in source language, which illustrate programming techniques on various operating platforms. You may copy, modify, and distribute these sample programs in any form without payment to IBM, for the purposes of developing, using, marketing or distributing application programs conforming to the application programming interface for the operating platform for which the sample programs are written. These examples have not been thoroughly tested under all conditions. IBM, therefore, cannot guarantee or imply reliability, serviceability, or function of these programs.

(20)

Trademarks

IBM, the IBM logo, and ibm.com are trademarks or registered trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation in the United States, other countries, or both. These and other IBM trademarked terms are marked on their first occurrence in this information with the appropriate symbol (® or ™), indicating US registered or common law trademarks owned by IBM at the time this information was published. Such trademarks may also be registered or common law trademarks in other countries. A current list of IBM trademarks is available on the web at http://www.ibm.com/legal/copytrade.shtml

The following terms are trademarks of the International Business Machines Corporation in the United States, other countries, or both:

AIX 5L™ AIX® alphaWorks® AS/400® CICS® DB2® developerWorks® DS8000® ESCON® FICON® FlashCopy® i5/OS® IBM® iSeries® Language Environment® Lotus® MVS™ Netfinity® OS/400® Parallel Sysplex® pSeries® RACF® Redbooks® Redbooks (logo) ® RS/6000® System i5® System i® System p® System Storage DS® System Storage® System x® System z9® System z® Tivoli® TotalStorage® VTAM® WebSphere® xSeries® z/OS® z/VM® z/VSE™ z9® zSeries®

The following terms are trademarks of other companies:

AMD, AMD Opteron, the AMD Arrow logo, and combinations thereof, are trademarks of Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

SUSE, the Novell logo, and the N logo are registered trademarks of Novell, Inc. in the United States and other countries.

VMware, the VMware "boxes" logo and design are registered trademarks or trademarks of VMware, Inc. in the United States and/or other jurisdictions.

Java, and all Java-based trademarks are trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States, other countries, or both.

Microsoft, Windows, and the Windows logo are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States, other countries, or both.

Microsoft product screen shot(s) reprinted with permission from Microsoft Corporation.

Intel Xeon, Intel, Itanium, Intel logo, Intel Inside logo, and Intel Centrino logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries in the United States and other countries.

UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group in the United States and other countries. Linux is a trademark of Linus Torvalds in the United States, other countries, or both.

(21)

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2010. All rights reserved. xix

Preface

Strong security is not a luxury anymore in today’s round-the-clock, global business environment. It is a requirement. Ensuring the protection and security of an organization’s information is the foundation of any successful business.

Encrypting data is a key element when addressing these concerns. IBM® provides a wide range of IBM storage hardware products that are capable of encrypting the data that is written on them. This product line includes a variety of disk systems and tape drives. Several IBM storage products support encryption:

򐂰 Disk systems:

– IBM System Storage® DS5000 series – IBM System Storage DS8000® series 򐂰 Tape drives:

– IBM System Storage TS1130 Model E06 and Model EU6 Tape Drive – IBM System Storage TS1120 Model E05 Tape Drive

– IBM System Storage Linear Tape-Open (LTO) Ultrium Generation 4 Tape Drive This IBM Redbooks® publication describes IBM System Storage data encryption. This book is intended for anyone who needs to learn more about the concepts of data encryption and the IBM storage hardware and software that enable data encryption.

The team who wrote this book

This book was produced by a team of specialists from around the world working at the International Technical Support Organization, Austin Center.

Alex Osuna is a Project Leader at the International Technical Support Organization, Tucson

Center. He writes extensively and teaches IBM classes worldwide on all areas of storage. Before joining the ITSO five years ago, Alex was a Tivoli® Principal Systems Engineer in storage. Alex has over 31 years experience in the IT industry with over 29 of them spent in the storage arena. He holds certification from IBM, Red Hat, and Microsoft®.

David Crowther has over 30 years experience in the IT industry, the last 24 working for IBM.

During his IBM career, he has worked in Technical Pre-sales, Services and Support, and currently works in IBM BetaWorks where he manages early beta programs for Tivoli Security and Provisioning products. In addition, he creates and runs enablement workshops, authors technical cookbooks and manuals, and provides technical support, presents, and acts as a subject matter expert for the new products. He also has wide experience in running beta programs on and supporting products from many of the other IBM brands, including Large Systems, Networking, Pervasive, Lotus®, Voice, and WebSphere®. He is a Consulting IT Specialist, Chartered IT Professional, and Chartered Engineer, and he holds a Master’s degree in Electrical Sciences from Cambridge University.

(22)

Reimar Pflieger is an IT Specialist from Germany working at the IBM Global Technology

Services Organization. He provides post-sales support as a Product Field Engineer for RMSS products in Mainz. He joined IBM in 1998 and worked for many years as a Process Support and Manufacturing Engineer in Disk and Wafer Production. In his current job role as an RMSS Product Field Engineer, he supports Open Systems Tape, Tape Libraries from entry level to high-end level and Tape Encryption solutions. His experience with Operating Systems includes Linux®, Windows® and AIX® platforms.

Esha Seth is a Software Engineer working at the IBM Systems and Technology Labs in

Pune, India. She graduated in 2006 with a Bachelor of Engineering degree in Computer Science from Pune University. She joined IBM after graduation and has worked as a Systems Software developer for the Systems and Storage Management group. During her tenure at IBM, she has contributed to all phases of the software development life cycle and

collaborated with global teams in various projects for the IBM Systems Director product. Her areas of technical expertise include understanding storage and systems Management, IBM Systems Management solutions, service-oriented architecture (SOA), JAVA and Eclipse and OSGi plug-in development. Currently, she is a part of the IBM Systems Director Network Manager team and is involved in its development efforts.

Ferenc Toth is a Test Engineer working for DS8000 Storage Server manufacturing in Vac,

Hungary. He has four years of experience in high-end disk subsystem testing, test process optimization, and new product implementation. He holds a Masters of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, with a specialization in embedded systems, from the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary. His focus is hardware and software qualification for all the supported DS8000 releases in the manufacturing environment. Thanks to the following people for their contributions to this project:

David Kahler

IBM Systems & Technology Group, Systems Hardware Development Steven R. Hart, CISSP

z/OS® Cryptography Anjul Mathur IBM Tucson Jacob Sheppard IBM Tucson James Whelan

IBM Systems & Technology Group, Development Operations and Technical Support

Now you can become a published author, too!

Here’s an opportunity to spotlight your skills, grow your career, and become a published author - all at the same time! Join an ITSO residency project and help write a book in your area of expertise, while honing your experience using leading-edge technologies. Your efforts will help to increase product acceptance and customer satisfaction, as you expand your network of technical contacts and relationships. Residencies run from two to six weeks in length, and you can participate either in person or as a remote resident working from your home base.

(23)

Preface xxi

Find out more about the residency program, browse the residency index, and apply online at: ibm.com/redbooks/residencies.html

Comments welcome

Your comments are important to us!

We want our books to be as helpful as possible. Send us your comments about this book or other IBM Redbooks publications in one of the following ways:

򐂰 Use the online Contact us review Redbooks form found at: ibm.com/redbooks

򐂰 Send your comments in an email to:

redbooks@us.ibm.com

򐂰 Mail your comments to:

IBM Corporation, International Technical Support Organization Dept. HYTD Mail Station P099

2455 South Road

Poughkeepsie, NY 12601-5400

Stay connected to IBM Redbooks

򐂰 Find us on Facebook:

http://www.facebook.com/IBMRedbooks

򐂰 Follow us on twitter:

http://twitter.com/ibmredbooks

򐂰 Look for us on LinkedIn:

http://www.linkedin.com/groups?home=&gid=2130806

򐂰 Explore new Redbooks publications, residencies, and workshops with the IBM Redbooks weekly newsletter:

https://www.redbooks.ibm.com/Redbooks.nsf/subscribe?OpenForm

򐂰 Stay current on recent Redbooks publications with RSS Feeds:

(24)
(25)

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2010. All rights reserved. 1

Part 1

Introduction to data

encryption

In this part, we introduce the concepts of data encryption and the IBM storage hardware and software that enable data encryption.

(26)
(27)

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2010. All rights reserved. 3

Chapter 1.

Encryption concepts and

terminology

In this chapter, we introduce data encryption concepts and terminology.

(28)

1.1 Concepts of storage data encryption

In this section, we describe basic encryption, cryptographic terms, and ideas. Encryption has been used to exchange information in a secure and confidential way for many centuries. Encryption transforms data that is unprotected, or

plain

text

, into encrypted data, or

ciphertext,

by using a

key

. It is very difficult to “break” ciphertext in order to change it back to the clear text without the associated encryption key.

Computer technology has enabled increasingly sophisticated encryption algorithms. Working with the U.S. Government National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), IBM invented one of the first computer-based algorithms, Data Encryption Standard (DES), in 1974. With the advances in computer technology, DES is now considered obsolete. Today, there are several widely used encryption algorithms, including Triple DES (TDES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

Early encryption methods used the same key to encrypt clear text to generate cipher text and to decrypt the cipher text to regenerate the clear text. Because the same key is used for both encryption and decryption, this method is called

symmetric encryption

. All the encryption algorithms previously mentioned use symmetric encryption.

It was only in the 1970s that cryptographers invented asymmetric key algorithms for encryption and decryption. These algorithms use separate keys for encryption and

decryption. The keys are mathematically related, but deriving one key from the other key is practically impossible. Encryption methods using separate keys for encryption and decryption are called

asymmetric encryption.

Asymmetric encryption addresses certain drawbacks of symmetric encryption, which became more important with computer-based cryptography, which we describe in detail in the

following sections about symmetric and asymmetric key encryption.

The IBM Storage Data Encryption solution uses a combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods.This combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms is prevalent in many security solutions, including Transport Layer Security (TLS), Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), and Kerberos.

1.1.1 Symmetric key encryption

Symmetric key encryption uses identical keys, or keys that can be related through a simple transformation, for encryption and decryption. Everyone who gets knowledge of the key can transform the ciphertext back to plain text. If you want to preserve confidentiality, you must protect your key and keep it a secret. Therefore, symmetric encryption is also called

private

or

secret key encryption

, which is not to be confused with the private key in an asymmetric key system.

In Figure 1-1 on page 5, we show a sample encryption and decryption data flow path. Here, we use the symmetric key AES_256_ITSO to encrypt plain text using the AES encryption algorithm, which yields encrypted data. The decryption of the enciphered text uses the same AES_256_ITSO symmetric key and the AES algorithm to decrypt the data back to its plain text format.

(29)

Chapter 1. Encryption concepts and terminology 5

Figure 1-1 Symmetric key encryption

Symmetric key encryption algorithms are significantly faster than asymmetric encryption algorithms, which makes symmetric encryption an ideal candidate for encrypting large amounts of data.

In addition, the comparable key sizes for symmetric encryption as opposed to asymmetric encryption differ significantly. While a symmetric AES encryption might use a 128-bit secret key, the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) encryption algorithm suggests a 1024-bit key length. Secret key algorithms can be architected to support encryption one bit at a time or by specified blocks of bits. The AES standard supports 128-bit block sizes and key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits. The IBM tape and disk data encryption solution uses an AES-256 bit key. Other well-known symmetric key examples include Twofish, Blowfish, Serpent, Cast5, DES, TDES, and IDEA.

Speed and short key length are advantages of symmetric encryption, but symmetric

encryption has two drawbacks, which are the way that keys are exchanged and the number of required keys.

Secure exchange of keys has always been a problem with symmetric encryption. The sender and the recipient have to share a common, secret key. The sender of a confidential message must make sure that no one other than the intended recipient gets knowledge of the key. So, the sender has to transfer the key to the recipient in a secure way, for example, in a

face-to-face meeting, through a trusted courier, or a secure electronic channel. This method of transferring keys might work as long as only a few people are involved in the exchange of confidential information. When a larger number of people have to exchange keys, the distribution of secret keys becomes difficult and inefficient with this method.

The second drawback of symmetric encryption is the large number of required keys. When a group of people are to exchange symmetrically encrypted information, each possible pair of two people in this group has to share a secret key. The number of required keys grows very

Symmetric Key AES_256_ITSO

Algorithm

AES Encrypted Data

Symmetric Key AES_256_ITSO Decryption Process Decryption Process Encryption Process Plain Text Encrypted Data

Plain Text Algorithm

(30)

fast with the number of people in the group. The number of required keys in relation to the number of people can be calculated with the following formula, where k is the number of keys, and n is the number of people:

kn=n(n-1)/2

As you can see in Figure 1-2, the number of required keys grows extremely fast. For a group of 100 people, 4,950 separate keys are required. A group of 1,000 people requires 499,500 keys. Key distribution and key management are challenges.

Figure 1-2 Number of keys required for symmetric encryption

The IBM tape data encryption solution utilizes an AES algorithm with a key length of 256 bits for the encryption on the tape drive. The AES algorithm is based on the Rijndael algorithm. AES is an accepted standard that supports a subset of the key sizes and block sizes that the Rijndael algorithm supports.

The shortcomings of symmetric encryption in terms of key distribution and key management are addressed by asymmetric key encryption, which we describe in the next section.

1.1.2 Asymmetric key encryption

The

asymmetric key encryption

method uses key pairs for encrypting and decrypting data. One key is used to encrypt the data, and the other key is used to decrypt the data. Because the key that is used for encrypting a message cannot be used for decrypting it, this key does not have to be kept a secret. It can be widely shared and is therefore called a

public key

. Anyone who wants to send secure data to an organization can use its public key. The receiving organization then uses its

private key

to decrypt the data. The private key is the corresponding half of the public-private key pair and must always be kept a secret. Because

Rijndael algorithm: The Rijndael algorithm supports block sizes of 128, 160, 192, 224,

(31)

Chapter 1. Encryption concepts and terminology 7

asymmetric encryption uses public-private key pairs, it is also called

public-private key

encryption

or

public key encryption.

Public-private key encryption is useful for sharing information between organizations and is widely used on the Internet today to secure transactions, including Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).

The concept of asymmetric encryption is relatively new. For centuries, cryptographers believed that the sender and the recipient had to share the same secret key. In the early 1970s, British cryptographers Ellis, Cocks, and Williamson discovered a way to use separate keys for encrypting and decrypting data. Because they were working for GCHQ, a British intelligence agency, their findings were kept secret until 1997. In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman invented a solution to the problem, which has since become known as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In 1977 Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman published an algorithm for public-key encryption.

Well-known examples of asymmetric key algorithms are RSA, Diffie-Hellman, Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and ElGamal.

Today, the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm is the most widely used public key technique.

The advantage of asymmetric key encryption is the ability to share secret data without sharing the same encryption key. But there are disadvantages, too. Asymmetric key encryption is computationally more intensive and therefore significantly slower than symmetric key encryption. In practice, you will often use a combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption. We describe this method in 1.1.3, “Hybrid encryption” on page 9.

Digital signature

You can use public/private key pairs to protect the content of a message, and also to digitally sign a message. When a digitally signed message is sent, the receiver can be sure that the sender has sent it, because the receiver can prove it by using the public key from the sender. In practice, predominantly for efficiency reasons, a hash value of the message is signed rather than the whole message, but the overall procedure is the same.

For example, if Tony wants to send JoHann a digitally signed message, Tony will not use JoHann’s public key to encrypt the message, but Tony’s own private key. The content of the encrypted message is not protected, because anyone can decrypt the message by using Tony’s public key. But, if JoHann is able to decrypt Tony’s message with Tony’s public key, JoHann can be sure that Tony sent the message. JoHann has proof that the message was encrypted with Tony’s private key, and JoHann knows that only Tony has access to this key. In the previous example, JoHann has to make sure that Tony’s public key really belongs to Tony, and not to someone pretending to be Tony. If JoHann cannot confirm that it is really Tony’s public key, JoHann will need a trusted third party to verify Tony’s identity. A

certificate

issued and signed by a

Certification Authority

(CA) can confirm that the public key belongs to Tony. A

certificate

binds together the identity of a person or organization and its public key. If JoHann trusts the CA, JoHann can be sure that it really was Tony who sent the message. We describe certificates in detail in 1.1.4, “Digital certificates” on page 9.

Trapdoor functions: RSA uses

trapdoor functions

. Trapdoor functions are mathematical functions that are easy to compute in one direction, but they are difficult to compute in the reverse direction without additional information. This additional information is called the

trapdoor

. In the case of RSA, the private key is the trapdoor.

(32)

Of course, you can combine public key encryption and digital signature to produce a message that is both encryption protected and digitally signed.

Example of public-private key encryption

Figure 1-3 shows an encryption and decryption data path when using public key encryption algorithms. In the diagram, the plain text is enciphered using the public key and an RSA encryption algorithm, which yields the encrypted data.

Starting with the enciphered text, a private key is used, with the RSA algorithm to decrypt the data back to plain text.

Figure 1-3 Public-private key encryption

In Figure 1-4 on page 9, we show a more complicated example of data protection and sharing using an asymmetric key pair. In this example, Tony has a private key, and JoHann has a copy of Tony’s public key. Tony sends JoHann a message that is encrypted with Tony’s private key. JoHann then uses the public key to decrypt the message. When the message is decrypted to clear text, this decryption proves to JoHann that he is in fact communicating with Tony, because only Tony has a copy of the private key. JoHann then public-key encrypts the data that he wants to protect and sends it to Tony. Tony can use his private key to decrypt the data.

Asymmetric Public Key

Plain Text

Public/Private Key Encryption

Algorithm RSA Encrypted Data Asymmetric Private Key Algorithm AES Encrypted Data Decryption Process Algorithm RSA

Plain Text

(33)

Chapter 1. Encryption concepts and terminology 9

Figure 1-4 Identity verification using public-private key encryption

Both asymmetric and symmetric key encryption schemes are powerful ways to protect and secure data.

1.1.3 Hybrid encryption

In practice, encryption methods often combine symmetric and asymmetric encryption. Thus, they can take advantage of fast encryption with symmetric encryption and still securely exchange keys using asymmetric encryption.

Hybrid methods use a symmetric data key to actually encrypt and decrypt data. They do not transfer this symmetric data key in the clear, but they use public-private key encryption to encrypt the data key. The recipient is able to decrypt the encrypted data key and use the data key to encrypt or decrypt a message.

Hybrid encryption methods allow you to combine secure and convenient key exchange with fast and efficient encryption of large amounts of data.

1.1.4 Digital certificates

Another possibility is to make sure that the sender can trust the receiver by using a certificate, which is signed by a certificate authority(CA). Digital certificates are a way to bind public key information with an identity. The certificates are signed by a CA. If users trust the CA and can verify the CA’s signature, they can also verify that a certain public key does indeed belong to the person or entity that is identified in the certificate.

Private Key Message Network Encrypted Public Key Data Encrypted Private Key

Bob

Message Data

Alice

Message Data Public Key

(34)

Digital certificates

are thus a way to bind public key information with an identity. The following information can be stored in a digital certificate:

򐂰 Name of the issuer

򐂰 Subject Distinguished Name (DN) 򐂰 Public key belonging to the owner 򐂰 Validity date for the public key 򐂰 Serial number of the digital certificate 򐂰 Digital signature of the issuer

In this section, we describe the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), certificate chains, the certificate request, and certificate responses. X.509 is a well established and accepted standard for certificate management.

In Figure 1-5 on page 11, we have an abstract simplified version of part of the process of a self-signed certificate. It shows that both the issuer and the subject of the certificate are IBM. This certificate has a public key, a private key, and a public key that is

signed

by the private key of this certificate. Data can be encrypted using a public key, which can then be decrypted by a private key. This situation means that only the entity with the private key can decrypt the data and ensures that only the entity for whom the data is intended can decrypt it.

When the private key is used to encrypt data, additional aspects must be considered. In this case, we have a copy of the public key as clear text, and a copy that is encrypted by our private key. This case means that

anyone

with a copy of our freely shared public key can decrypt the data.

This approach means that when we send copies of our public key out in a certificate format, the entity receiving the certificate can verify that the public key they were sent was sent by us, was not intercepted in transit, and was not tampered with.

Because we have the only copy of our private key, we are the only entity that can encrypt a copy of the public key in the certificate. If the entity uses our public key to decrypt the enciphered copy of the public key in the certificate, if the decrypted public key matches the clear public key, and if the owners of the public key trust that only we have our private key, they know that when they use that public key to encrypt data, we are the only entity with the capability to decrypt it. Figure 1-5 on page 11 shows a sample digital certificate.

In general, using a public key to encrypt data secures that data, ensuring confidentiality. When using a private key to encrypt data, the following conditions are true:

򐂰 Identity proof 򐂰 Message integrity 򐂰 Non-repudiation

(35)

Chapter 1. Encryption concepts and terminology 11

Figure 1-5 Sample digital certificate

When sending information that was private key-encrypted, the receiver of the message knows that the message must have been sent by the entity with the private key; the receiver also can verify that the message was not tampered with. Finally, the entity receiving a message that was private key-encrypted knows that the message that they got cannot be denied by the sender. Only the sender has the private key; therefore, the sender must have sent it.

Certificate authorities

A

certificate authority (CA)

is a company that holds and makes available trusted certificates. Companies can send certificates to a CA to be added to the chain of trust. As long as a company trusts the CA, certificates that are issued by that CA can be trusted.

For example, Figure 1-6 on page 12 describes what company ZABYXC does to generate a certificate request to the JohannTonyArtCA third-party certificate authority (CA) company. In the figure, we see that company ZABYXC already trusts JohannTonyArtCA, because ZABYXC has a copy of the JohannTonyArtRootCA in its certificate repository. This copy of JohannTonyArtRootCA has only the public key and an encrypted copy of the public key, which is encrypted with JohannTonyArtRootCA’s private key.

Company ZABYXC also has a self-signed personal certificate with a public and a private key associated with it. Using certificate managing tools, company ZABYXC exports a copy of its self-signed personal certificate that includes only the certificate information, the public key, and the encrypted version of the public key.

(36)

This certificate request is sent to JohannTonyArtCA.

Figure 1-6 Certificate request

In Figure 1-7 on page 13, JohannTonyArtCA receives the certificate response from company ZABYXC. JohannTonyArtCA then uses the private key from JohannTonyArtRootCA to encrypt a copy of the certificate request’s public key and attaches both the clear public key and the new encrypted copy of the public key to a certificate response. In addition, the certificate response has the issuer changed to JohannTonyArtCA. This response is sent to company ZABYXC.

When company ZABYXC receives the certificate response from JohannTonyArtCA, company ZABYXC imports the certificate into the company’s certificate repository. The company replaces the self-signed personal certificate in the repository, and it keeps the private key previously associated with the personal certificate.

Company ZABYXC can verify that the certificate response came from JohannTonyArtCA, because they have a copy of JohannTonyArtRootCA. They can use the public key from JohannTonyArtRootCA to verify that the certificate response came from JohannTonyArtCA.

Third Party, CA Cert. Repository JohannTonyArt, CA Company ZABYXC Certs JohannTonyArt Root, CA Public Key JohannTonyArt Root, CA Issuer = JohannTonyArt Subject = JohannTonyArt Public Key Private Key Self Signed Personal Cert Subject = ZABYXC Issuer = ZABYXC Public Key Private Key Certificate Request

References

Related documents

As inter-speaker variability among these the two groups was minimal, ranging from 0% to 2% of lack of concord in the 21-40 group and from 41% to 46% in the 71+ generation, we

En efecto, así como los libertarianos ven en cual- quier forma de intervención del Estado una fuente inevitable de interferencias arbitrarias –con la excepción de aquella acción

Clip Pole Silver Set (Double Sided) • Heavy plastic coated cast base for added stability. • Pole can extend to a maximum height

Just as your friendly smile and attitude welcomed the guest into the Wurst Haus German Deli & Restaurant, your pleasant farewell leaves the guest feeling good and wanting

JADD is inherited as an autosomal recessive disease meaning that animals have only one mutant copy of the region (N/A) are normal but they are carriers of the disease and they

The PROMs questionnaire used in the national programme, contains several elements; the EQ-5D measure, which forms the basis for all individual procedure

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the diagnostic utility of real-time elastography (RTE) in differentiat- ing between reactive and metastatic cervical lymph nodes (LN)

South European welfare regimes had the largest health inequalities (with an exception of a smaller rate difference for limiting longstanding illness), while countries with