Civ Pro Tips for Finals 2

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Civil Procedure

Compilation of Past Exam

Questions

General Principles

Jurisdiction and Venue

What is jurisdiction?

Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear, try and decide a case. In its complete aspect, jurisdiction includes not only the power to hear and decide a case, but also the power to enforce judgment.

2012 Inigo (1) 9

Distinguish jurisdiction from exercise of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is the power or authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. Exercise of jurisdiction involves the actions involved to arrive at a decision.

2012 Inigo (1) 10

What is original, concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction?

Original jurisdiction is the power of the court to take cognizance of a case at its inception or commencement.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that possessed by the court together with another court over the same subject matter, the court obtaining jurisdiction first retains it to the exclusion of the others. But the choice of court is lodged in those persons duly authorized to file the action.

Exclusive jurisdiction is the authority possessed by a court to take cognizance of a case to the exclusion of other courts.

2012 Inigo (1) 13-14

J u r i s d i c t i o n

Distinguish between Question of Fact and Question of Law. What is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as to the findings of fact of the CA?

There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.

Generally, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and as such, only questions of law may be entertained by the Court in petitions for review under Rule 45. Under this rule, questions of fact are not reviewable.

However, factual issues may be delved into and resolved where the findings and conclusions of the trial court or the quasi-judicial bodies are functionally inconsistent with the findings of the CA.

2014 Riano (1) 101, 108

Up to what stage of a civil action may the issue of jurisdiction be raised?

It depends.

If it involves an issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter, it may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings even for the first time on appeal as provided in

Calimlim v. Ramirez. If it involves

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the object must be raised either in the motion to dismiss or by way of affirmative defense in the answer. Failure to do so at this stage of the action would constitute a waiver of the same.

Rule 16, Sec. 16; 2014 Riano (1) 88, 97

What is the jurisdiction of the RTC and MTC in civil cases?

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) Actions where subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) Actions involving title to, or possession of, real property where the assessed value of the property exceeds 20k (outside MM) or 50k (in MM), except actions for FE and UD which jurisdiction is with the MTC; (3) Admiralty and maritime actions

where claim or demand exceeds 300k (outside MM) or 400k (inside MM);

(4) Matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where gross value of estate exceeds

Objective/General

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2 B

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300k (outside MM) or 400k (in MM);

(5) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or person exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

(6) All other cases in which demand, exclusive of interests, damages, fees, litigation expenses and costs or value of property exceeds 300k (outside MM) or 400k (in MM).

The Municipal Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) Civil actions and probate proceedings, testate or intestate where the value of estate does not exceed 300k (outside MM) or 400k (in MM), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, costs; (2) Cases of FE and UD, with authority to pass on issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession if possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership;

(3) Cases involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property does not exceed 20k (outside MM) or 50k (in MM).

BP 129 Sec. 19

P filed an action in the CA for mandamus against D and also prayed for moral and exemplary damages. Does the CA have jurisdiction over the action?

Yes.

The law confers upon the CA original and concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

A, a Manila resident, bought a color TV set at the price of 15k on 24 monthly installments from B Co., a Manila-based appliance company. The transaction was covered by a conditional sale contract. A defaulted in his monthly installment payments after having paid 5 such installments. In what court may B Co. bring the action to recover the TV set?

In the MTC.

The law provides that the MTC shall have jurisdiction where the value of the personal property in controversy does not exceed 200k. Since the case at bar is for the recovery of personal property, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

P corporation filed an action against D in the RTC to collect certain amounts of money amounting to P 2 million on its claim that D, while president of P corporation and by using his position as such president and through fraud and misrepresentation, misappropriated and diverted to his personal use these corporate funds. D moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it falls within the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Rule on the motion to dismiss.

Motion to dismiss denied.

In the Securities Regulation Code of 2000, cases enumerated in Sec. 5 of PD no. 902-A have been transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the RTC. RTC has now the jurisdiction to try cases involving boards of directors, business associates, officers or partnership committing fraud and misrepresentation.

Sec. 5.2, Securities Regulation Code of

2000.

A filed an action against B to recover real property located in Cogon Market, CDOC. When the Sheriff served the summons on B, he discovered that the tenant of the house which B rented from C was no longer B but D who informed the Sheriff that B left the premises eleven months before. The Sheriff went to C, the owner of the apartment, who gave the sheriff the same information. After one month, on the basis of these facts, A filed a motion to declare B in default for failure to file his answer. The court granted the motion and allowed A to present his evidence ex parte. Afterwards, the court rendered judgment in A’s favor.

Seven months after, B, who had already resided in Batac, Ilocos Sur because of his wife who was a native of said place, spent his vacation in CDOC, and he learned from his friends that a decision was rendered against him in a case involving his real property located in Cogon Market, CDOC.

(a) B’s lawyer filed an action with the RTC to annul the judgment on the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his

Jurisdiction over

Subject matter

Jurisdiction over

the person

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person. Do you agree with B’s lawyer? Explain.

(b) Could B still file a petition for relief of judgments? Reasons. (c) Was the order of the Court in

declaring B in default tenable? Why?

(d) Assume that B spent his vacation in CDO 20 days after A filed his action. B immediately filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and on the ground that A had no cause of action because A had already sold the land to B which sale was evidenced by an absolute deed of sale executed by A in favor of B and a copy of the document was attached to the motion. If you were the judge, how would you resolve the motion.

(a) Yes, I agree with B’s lawyer.

The law provides that whenever the whereabouts of a defendant are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and in such time as the court may order.

In the case at bar, the jurisdiction over the person of B was not acquired because of the improper service of summons. Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, the action should be annulled.

(b) No, B may not file a petition for relief from judgment.

The Rules provide that the remedy of petition for relief of judgment is only available where the judgment was entered through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and the same must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment but not more than 6 months after the judgment was entered.

The facts show that the grounds for petition for relief are not available in the instant case and that 7 months has already elapsed since the judgment was rendered. Hence, petition for relief is not a remedy available to B.

(c) No, the order of default is not tenable. Given that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, B, was not acquired in the instant case, it is void. (d) [Bance] I will grant the motions.

The facts show that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant has not been acquired. Hence, there is a valid ground to grant the motion to dismiss.

It is immaterial that B raised another ground to dismiss the action for

the same does not constitute voluntary appearance. In La Naval Drug Corp v. CA, the Court ruled that a defendant may raise as many defenses, alternatively or hypothetically and that it should not be the invocation of available additional defenses that should be construed as a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but the failure to raise the defense.

What is the legal effect of the non-payment of the docket fees in full?

Generally, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Therefore, the entire proceedings of the case are null and void. This is because the payment of docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

There were however instances when the court has relaxed the rule and held that the non-payment of docket fees does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Also, if the amount of docket fees is insufficient, the party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost.

Action by P against D in the RTC for a sum of money was sought to be dismissed by D on the ground of prescription. The motion to dismiss was denied and D brought a special civil action for certiorari in the CA against the order of denial of his motion to dismiss. The CA dismissed the petition. Then, D filed his answer, after which trial was held and judgment rendered against D. On appeal from this judgment to the CA, D filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging htat P had not paid the appropriate docketing fees in the trial court. Rule on the motion to dismiss.

Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay these fees within a reasonable time before the expiry of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. It is when the plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement that the defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or he would be considered in estoppel.

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Here, D filed an answer and participated in the proceedings before the TC. It was only after judgment was rendered against him that he raised the issue of jurisdiction. While the lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of an action, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the court's jurisdiction because the judgment or decision subsequently rendered is adverse to him.

National Steel Corp. v CA

P sued D to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale to him over a parcel of land the purchase price of which had allegedly already been fully paid by P. After his motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription was denied, D filed his answer in due course and thence trial was held. After trial, judgment was rendered against D who then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that P did not pay the correct docket fees which should have been assessed on the basis of the value of the property and damages sought and not on the basis of the action as one for specific performance when it was actually for recovery of property. Rule on the motion to dismiss.

In the first place, the action is really for recovery of real property and not for specific performance since P's primary objective is to regain the ownership and possession of the parcel of land. In the second place, it was held that while the payment of the required docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even the nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

If the amount of docket fees is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. Thirdly, the motion to dismiss came too late. D is already estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction after he had actually taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and after the court had rendered a judgment adverse to him.

Riano (1) 350; National Steel Corp. v. CA

In civil cases, where should the appellant pay the appellate court docket fee and what is the effect of non-payment of such fee?

The appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from the full

amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment thereof shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be.

Non-payment of such fee is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal by the trial court

Rule 40, Sec. 5 and Rule 41, Sec. 4, Riano (1), 650-651

V e n u e

What is the venue of actions against non-resident defendants?

If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found.

Rule 4, Sec. 3

A entered into a lease contract with B whereby A leased his house in CDO to B. It was stipulated in the lease contract that if A should violate the contract, he should be sued in Opol, Misamis Oriental, and if B should violate the contract, he should be sued in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

One year after the contract of lease was executed, B failed to pay the rentals for 6 months, so A filed an action for unlawful detainer in MTC of Tagoloan. B’s lawyer believes that the MTC of Tagoloan has no jurisdiction over the case because the property is located in CDO, and the stipulation is contrary to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court as amended, therefore, it is void.

Is B’s lawyer correct? Explain.

No, B’s lawyer is not correct. Jurisprudence provides that when parties agree on the venue of actions other than those found in the Rules, the stipulated venue is considered merely an additional to that already prescribed by law, unless the stipulations contain restrictive words which show the intention of the parties to limit the place stipulated as the exclusive venue.

In the case at bar, the parties did not use restrictive words to signify their intention to make the stipulated venues exclusive. Therefore, the action may filed in any of the three venues: Tagoloan or Opol, as stipulated and CDO.

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A and B, both residents of Batangas, entered into a Contract of Lease over a parcel of land belonging to B located in Cebu City. A filed a complaint before the RTC in Batangas for the rescission of the lease. B filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Batangas Court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the land being located in Cebu City. Resolve the motion.

The motion is tenable.

The Rules provide that actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property or a portion thereof is situated.

Although the action brought by A is captioned as one for rescission, it is fundamentally one that involves an interest over a real property and hence, may only be instituted in the place where the real property or a portion thereof is located.

Rule 4, Sec. 1

A agreed to sell to B for 500k on installment basis a parcel of land located in Camiguin. A is a resident of Malaybalay and B of CDOC. In the contract to sell executed by A and B among the stipulations were that title to the land should pass to B only after the purchase was fully paid and that after full payment, A would execute a deed of absolute sale in B’s favor. After paying 2 installments but before full payment of the purchase price, B requested that the land be resurveyed to determine the actual area of the land which was along the beach. A agreed and after resurvey, it was found that because of natural erosion caused by the waves of the sea, the area of the land described in the Certificate of Title was reduced by 20%. B wanted that the purchase price be reduced also by 20%. And the trouble began.

(e) After paying 80% of the purchase price, B demanded that A execute a deed of absolute sale as agreed upon in the contract to sell. A refused saying that B should pay first the balance of 20%. B filed in Camiguin an action against A for the latter to execute the absolute deed of sale. A filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue arguing that the motion was in personam therefore must be filed in Bukidnon where he resided. Supposing you were the Judge, how would you rule on the motion?

(f) Instead of filing a motion to dismiss, A filed his answer and

set up the counterclaim that his contract with B be rescinded for B’s failure to pay the entire amount of the purchase price. Is the counterclaim set up by A permissive or compulsory? Explain. (g) The action referred to above was

filed with the RTC, but at the time it was filed the balance of 20% amounted to 100k. A filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction since the balance of the purchase price was only 100k. Is the motion tenable? Why? Would your answer be the same if at the time the action was filed the balance was 300k? Why?

(h) Suppose that after the execution of the contract to sell, B immediately occupied the land and built a beach house. Suppose also that after B demanded the reduction of the purchase price by 20%, A wanted to file an action first to recover possession of the land. Suppose also that the 20% balance amounted to 100k. In what court should the action be filed? Explain.

(i) Referring to question d, after A filed an action to recover possession of the land , B filed an answer with counterclaim set up prayed that A be ordered to execute the deed of absolute sale mentioned in the contract to sell. Is the counterclaim permissive or compulsory? Explain.

(j) Referring to question A above, after B filed his complaint, the sheriff served the summons on A through A’s brother who lived in Hubangon. A’s brother after receiving the summons left for Russia and stayed there for 6 months. Apparently, A’s brother forgot about the summons because one month after, B, with notice to A, filed a motion to declare A in default for failure to file an answer and to render judgment on the basis of the complaint. The judge granted the two motions, and in the judgment of the judge ordered A to return to B all the payments made by him plus interest of 30% per annum until the entire amount shall have been fully paid.

1) Was the order of the judge declaring A in default valid? Explain.

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2) Assuming that the order was valid, was the judgment rendered by the court valid? Explain.

(a) The motion to dismiss should be denied. While the action may seem like an action for specific performance to compel A to execute a Deed of Sale, the facts show that the ultimate purpose of the action is title to the real property. Hence, this is a real action for it affects title to or interest in real property which under the Rules must be commenced and tried in the place where the real property or a portion thereof is situated.

The property being located in Camiguin, the RTC of Camiguin is thus the proper venue for the action.

(b) It is a compulsory counterclaim.

A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties.

Since A’s counterclaim arises out of the same transaction – the transaction covered by the Contract to Sell – and only involves A and B, his counterclaim is compulsory.

(c) No, the motion is not tenable.

In real actions, it is the assessed value of the land which determines jurisdiction. The action was not for the recovery of the unpaid balance but for the execution of the sale which would have the effect of ownership of the property. Therefore, the assessed value of the land would determine which court has jurisdiction and not the unpaid balance. The value of the land being 500k, it is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC and the fact that the unpaid balance is only 100k is immaterial.

Yes, my answer would be the same even if the balance is 300k as it is the assessed value of the land which is the basis for determining jurisdiction in real actions.

(d) The action should be filed in the RTC of Camiguin.

The Rules provide that the RTC has exclusive and original jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property where the assessed value exceeds 20k.

(e) The counterclaim is compulsory for it arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties

of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

Since B’s claim arises out of the same transaction and only involves A and B, then the claim is compulsory.

(f)

(1) Yes, the order of the judge in declaring A in default was valid.

The Rules provide that if the defending party fails to answer within the time allotted the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party, with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.

(2) No, the judgment rendered by the court is not valid.

The Rules provide that a judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

There being no showing that the 30% interest was prayed for, the judgment should not have included the same.

Comment [Bance]:

This question was probably asked before the 1997 Rules, meaning, during such time when actions involving title to real property is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, this question would have been easily answered by emphasizing that this is a real action, not a personal action, and hence within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

The problem with the question now is that it only provides that the parties agreed to pay P500k. Under the present rules, the assessed value is needed to determine jurisdiction. P500k is not the assessed value, it is merely the fair market value which can’t be the basis for determining jurisdiction.

Bottomline: the facts really do not provide which court has jurisdiction.

Advice: Read with extra caution.

P sues D in RTC Manila to recover 100k and a parcel of land located in Manila. P is a resident of Manila while D is a resident of Quezon City. D moves to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Decide.

Motion should be denied.

The Rules provide that a party may assert in one pleading as many causes of action provided that, among others, where the causes of action are between different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the

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causes of action falls within its jurisdiction and the venue lies therein.

Since the action involves the recovery of a real property, this is a real action which must be instituted in the place where the property is found. The claim for 100k may be properly joined with the claim for recovery of real property. Hence, the action is properly filed with the RTC of Manila.

Comment [Bance]:

Caution. This problem does not state the assessed value of the real property. This was probably asked before the 1997 Rules.

If the assessed value is given, it should be within the jurisdictional amount of the RTC or MTC to confer jurisdiction.

Last February 1990, T died in Quezon City, his place of residence, leaving a will. May the RTC of Bulacan take cognizance of the petition for the probate of his will even if he left no property in Bulacan?

No.

While the Rules allow for parties to stipulate on venue, the Rules however expressly provide that in the settlement of the estate of the deceased, the same shall be filed at the place where the deceased was a resident at the time of his death, or in the case of an inhabitant of a foreign country, in the place where he has any estate.

P, a resident of Manila, sued D, also a resident of Manila, in the RTC-QC to collect P500,000.00 based on a promissory note. The RTC-QC dismissed the action motu proprio on the ground that the parties, being both residents of Manila, it has no jurisdiction over the case. Is the dismissal correct?

No, the matter of residence is one of venue only and not of jurisdiction. A court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings.

Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to be improperly laid, because the venue, although technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue have been devised.

Riano (1) 208-209; Guzman v Batario

Banta was an operator and owner of JB Buslines. He resided in Iligan City but the offie was in CDO. Dongo was a Filipino and a resident of Butuan before he went to America. In December 1996, Dongo went to Butuan for a vacation. During the vacation, he went to Iligan City driving his own car. While he was in Marcos Bridge in CDO, a bus of Banta bumped him causing damages to the car and to him.

Dongo, represented by his attorney-in-fact because he had already returned to America, filed an action for damages against Banta in the RTC of Butuan. Banta filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue contending that the action should have been filed in Iligan City where he resided. Rule on the motion.

The motion is tenable.

The Rules provide that all personal actions may be commenced and tried in the court where the plaintiff or any principal plaintiff resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff is a non-resident, having been in Butuan only for a vacation. Since the plaintiff is a non-resident, the proper venue for the action is in Iligan City where the defendant resides.

Baritua v. CA

[Note] This was already asked in Midterm Exam.

Actions, Causes of Action

and Parties

Define the following: (a) Civil action

(b) Special proceeding (c) Action in personam (d) Action in rem (e) Action quasi in rem (f) Real action

(g) Personal action (h) Mixed action (i) Transitory action (j) Local action (k) Right of action (l) Cause of Action (m) Venue

Objective/General

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1

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(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. (b) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.

(c) An action in personam is one which seeks to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person. In an action in personam, no one, other than the defendant, not the whole world, is sought to be held liable.

(d) An action in rem is an action where the object of the suit is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sorts against the right sought to be established. The judgment is binding against the whole world.

(e) An action quasi in rem is one directed against an individual named as defendant and the purpose of which is to subject his property to the obligation or lien burdening it.

(f) A real action is one affecting title to, or possession of, real property.

(g) A personal action is one which does not involve title to, or possession of, real property.

(h) A mixed action is one where there is a mixture of real and personal action, but is reducible to neither of them.

(i) A transitory action is one which generally depends on the residences of the parties, usually at the option of the plaintiff.

(j) A local action is one which has to be instituted in a particular place independently of the residences of the parties.

(k) A right of action is the right of the plaintiff to bring an action and to prosecute that action to final judgment.

(l) A cause of action is an act or omission committed by which a party violates a right of another.

(m) Venue is the place, or the geographical area in which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case.

May a personal action be an action in rem? May a real action be an action in personam?

Yes. A personal action is not necessarily an action in personam. Nor is a real action, necessarily an action in rem.

An in personam or an in rem action is a classification of actions according to the object of the action. A personal and real action is a classification according to foundation.

Hence, an action to recover title to or possession of real property is a real action but it is an action in personam for it is brought against the person upon whom the claim is made and not the whole world. While an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage is a personal action because it is not founded on real property but it is an in rem action because the issue of the status of a person is one directed against the whole world.

Distinguish cause of action and right of action.

(a) A cause of action refers to the act or omission committed by the defendants, while right of action refers to the right of the plaintiff to institute the action;

(b) A cause of action is determined by the pleadings, whereas a right of action is determined by the substantive law;

(c) A right of action may be taken away by running of the statute of limitations, by estoppel or other circumstances; which do not at all affect the cause of action;

(d) There is no right of action where there is no cause of action.

What are the elements of cause of action?

The elements are as follows: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff; (b) the correlative obligation of

the defendant to respect that right;

(c) an act or omission on the part of the defendant constituting a violation of said legal right.

2012 Inigo (1) 82; 2014 Riano (1) 232

State the totality rule in determining the jurisdiction of civil actions.

The totality rule states that where claims in all the causes of action are principally for the recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

Rule 2, Sec. 5(d)

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X filed an action for reconveyance and cancellation of Torrens Title against Y, who had been living abroad for many years and who was already six feet under the ground when the suit was filed. Summons by publication to Y or to his estate was directed by the trial court. Despite the publication, Y did not file his answer. A decision was rendered in favor of X and it was served by publication.

A son of Y learned of the case and filed a petition to set aside as null and void the decision for lack of jurisdiction. X oppose the petition contending that an action for cancellation of title was quasi in rem and that service of summons by publication could be allowed considering that Y was a non-resident of the Philippines. Is the contention tenable? Explain.

The contention is untenable. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action since it involves title to or possession of real property but it is also an action in personam for it binds only a particular individual. The action being in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide a case against him. Summons by publication in actions in personam will not enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, except when: (a) the identity and/or whereabouts of the defendant are unknown or (b) if he is a resident defendant temporarily out of the country.

In the case at bar, Y does not fall in any of the exceptions, as he is a non-resident defendant. Hence, jurisdiction over his person could not have been acquired through summons by publication.

Furthermore, as enunciated in

Ching v. CA, a defendant who has already

died could not have been validly served with summons as he has no more civil personality. It was lost through his death.

2014 Riano (1) 229-231; Ching v. CA

C a u s e s o f A c t i o n s

Suppose you are the counsel for D who is sued in the MTC for unlawful detainer and on a P50,000 PN, what would be your proper and effective procedural recourse?

I will move for the severance of one cause of action given that there is a

misjoinder of causes of action. The Rules provide that joinder of causes of action is allowed provided that the joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules.

The action for UD being a special civil action, it should not be joined with the collection for sum of money.

May P properly and correctly file a complaint in the RTC against D to recover P1 Million based on a promissory note and another P1 Million based on tortious interference with contract, and for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage to secure a loan of P5 Million?

No, P may only join the actions arising out of the PN and the contract, but not the foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

The Rules provide that a party may plead as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party but that the joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules.

In the case at bar, P may join the complaint to recover 1M based on the promissory note and the 1M based on the tortious interference with a contract. However, the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is misjoined, since foreclosure is governed by special rules, and should be severed and proceeded with separately.

Rule 2, Sec. 5-6

P, a resident of Manila, filed a complaint against D, a resident of Iloilo, in the RTC-Manila. This complaint contains 2 causes of action, one for money, and the other for title to real property in Baguio, both causes of action arising out of the same transaction between the parties. Is there anything procedurally wrong with the complaint?

Yes.

While the Rules allow for the joinder of causes of action, the same requires that where the causes of action pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided that one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein.

While joinder of causes of action is allowed, it is however subject to the rules on jurisdiction and venue. In the case at bar, the action for money may be tried in Manila or Iloilo, the residence of the plaintiff or defendant at the plaintiff’s election; while the action for title to real property may only be brought in Baguio where the real property is located.

Hence, joining the causes of action is procedurally infirm.

Mijares v. Piccio

In an action of recovery of sum of money based on obligation, the prayer included

In rem v. In personam

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payment of 2nd obligation which has not yet expired. Proper?

No, it is not proper. If the obligation has not yet expired, no cause of action accrues. Praying to include payment of the obligation which has not yet expire is premature, which should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. However, if the 1st obligation and the 2nd obligation arose from a single contract with an acceleration clause, then the prayer including the 2nd obligation is proper.

Inigo(1) 84, 90

Hibok-Hibok Corporation had a contract with Mantique Corporation under which Hibok-Hibok would construct for Mantique a hotel and restaurant in Mahinog. Mantigue required Hibok-Hibok to put up a performance bond with Catarman Insurance as the surety.

Hibok-Hibok however, failed to finish the hotel restaurant on time, and besides Mantique discovered that materials used were substandard. Mantique filed two actions: one action was for breach of contract and damages against Hibok-Hibok and lodged with Branch 1 of RTC Camiguin. The other was against Catarman Insurance on its liability under the performance bond, and lodged with Branch 2 of the same court. If you were the lawyer of Catarman Insurance, what would you do?

If I were the lawyer of Catarman Insurance, I would move for the dismissal of the case

Aga filed an action for forcible entry against Nino. During the pendency of the case, Nino filed an action against Aga to quiet title on the property involved in the forcible entry case. Nino then filed a motion to dismiss the forcible entry case on the ground of litis pendencia because of his action to quiet title filed against Aga.

(a) Rule on the motion.

(b) Supposing it was Aga who filed the motion to dismiss, will the same prosper?

(c) Supposing the property involved in these cases for forcible entry and quieting of title was located in Velez, CDO and its value was not less than 16M. In what court should the two cases be filed? Explain.

(a) No, the motion will not prosper.

Litis pendencia, as a ground for dismissal, exist where there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.

While indeed there is a pending action between the same parties in the instant case, this is not for the same cause of action. Quieting of title is founded on ownership, while forcible entry tackles with possession.

Hence, there is no same cause of action in the instant case to warrant dismissal of the same.

(b) The motion will still be dismissed. There is still no splitting of cause of action as the causes of action of Aga and Nino are different – one is founded on possession, and the other on ownership.

The two actions are distinct and separate and thus, may continue irregardless of the existence of the other action.

(c) The action for forcible entry shall be filed in the MTC of CDO since the law provides that MTCs shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction over actions involving forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Given that the subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC, the case should be filed therewith regardless of the amount of the property.

The action for quieting of title however, being in the nature of an action involving title or possession of a real property, requires perusal of the assessed value to determine jurisdiction. Given that the assessed value exceeds 20k, the same is within the jurisdiction of the RTC of CDO. [Note] This was already asked in Midterm Exam.

P a r t i e s

Juan Tiu imported a fertilizer from Taiwan. The fertilizer was shipped on board and this was insured by Luxury Insurance against all risk at the port of departure under a marine policy with a note at a lower left side stamped the name of Bell Corp. as claim agent. When the cargo arrived at Manila, some portion was in bad condition. Tiu then filed with Bell Corp. a formal statement of claim with proof of loss and demanded for settlement corresponding to the value of the damage portion. After conveying the claim to its principal who refused to pay the claim, Bell Corp.

Splitting cause of action

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informed Tiu could not be paid. Tiu filed an action against Luxury and Bell. Bell filed a motion to dismiss contending that it was merely a claim agent of the insurance company and therefore, was not a real party in interest. Bell Corp also contended that Tiu had no cause of action against it because it did not take part in the marine insurance. Are the two contentions tenable?

Yes, the contentions of Bell Corp. are tenable.

Under the Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. In the case of Smith-Bell v. CA, the Court ruled that Smith-Bell being a mere agent and representative, it is not the real party in interest.

As can be gleaned from the facts, Bell Corp. was not even party to the contract of insurance and was merely the claim agent. Bell Co. is improperly impleaded in the action and should be dropped from the case.

A, owner of an improved city lot, leased the same to B. While B is in possession, he was dispossessed by C. B, therefore, filed an action against C to recover possession. C contested upon the ground that B, not being the owner of the land, is not the real party in interest. Is C's contention correct?

If the action filed is for forcible entry wherein the issue is only possession de facto, B, as the lessee, has a right of action against C to recover the same. B is a party in interest in the sense that he has a present substantial interest in the land, the possession of which he had been deprived.

A complaint entitled “A as attorney-in-fact for X, plaintiff, versus B, defendant” was filed to recover a car in B’s possession. A’s power of attorney expressly authorized A to sue for the recovery of the car. B files a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of capacity to sue. Rule on the motion.

The motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of capacity to sue is an incorrect ground to invoke; hence it should denied.

The correct ground would be is that the claim states no cause of action. The real party in interest is the principal, the owner of the property. A is only an attorney-in-fact. An attorney-in-fact cannot use in his own name because he is not the real party in interest. There is no cause of action in favor of the agent as the cause of action is with the principal.

2012 Inigo (1) 325

A brought an action against X and Y in one complaint before the RTC of CDO. As his first cause of action, A alleges that X purchased from him on various occasions premium rice worth 150k but refused to pay the said amount despite several demands. As his second cause of action, A alleges that Y likewise purchased from him on various occasions ordinary rice worth 180k but refused to pay the said amount despite repeated demands. The total amount of A’s demand against X and Y is 330k. Both X and Y now separately move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. How would you resolve the two motions?

I will grant the motions to dismiss. The Rules provide that a party joining the causes of action must comply with the rules on joinder of parties which require for permissive joinder of parties, the right to relief must arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there must be a question of law or fact common to all such defendants.

In the case at bar, the joinder may not be permitted because the cause of action arose from two different transaction and involves questions of facts that is not common to X and Y. Since X and Y may not be joined as parties, the case must proceed separately and the totality rule may not be applied.

Thus, the individual amount of demand and not the aggregate amount would determine jurisdiction. The claim against X and Y both not exceeding 300k, the case is not within the jurisdiction of the RTC but the MTC.

Rule 3, Sec. 5

P, a Manila resident, filed a collection action against C and D in RTC Manila, alleging a total claim of P230,000 (P180.,000 for principal and P50,000 for attorney's fees) against C based on a promissory note and a claim of P100,000 against D based on the unpaid purchase price of goods delivered. Both C and D moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Rule on both motions to dismiss.

The motions should be granted. While the totality rule allows for the aggregate amount claimed to be the test of jurisdiction, the two causes of action however cannot be joined. The Rules state that the joinder of causes of action must comply with the rules on joinder of parties. For there to be a joinder of parties,

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the right to relief must arise out of the same transaction or series of transaction and there must be a question of law or fact common the persons being joined.

Given that both requisites are absent, the actions cannot be joined and must be proceeded with separately. The actions must be instituted in the MTC, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over actions or claims not exceeding 300k.

D purchased a car from P, a car dealer, on installments and secured the purchase price balance (covered by a promissory note) with a chattel mortgage on the car. While the purchase price was not yet fully paid and the mortgage on the car still existing, D sold the car to E. With D having defaulted on the payments, P, seeking to foreclose the chattel mortgage, sued out a writ of replevin against D and E, but since D could no longer be served with summons, P moved to drop D as defendant. Rule on P's motion to drop D.

The motion to drop D as defendant cannot be granted without dismissing the complaint because D is an indispensable party. The replevin suit is anchored on P’s alleged right to possess the car and which right in turn is founded on the alleged default of D.

If the case against D is dismissed, there would be no remaining cause of action against E. P’s right to possess the car is conditioned on D’s actual default and this default cannot be established in D’s absence.

Servicewide Specialists v. CA

P sued A, B, C and D to recover from each of them different pieces of jewelry which were allegedly delivered to each of them as a commission agent of the plaintiff. The jewelries were delivered on different dates. If you were counsel for all the defendants, what would be your proper recourse?

I would ask that all but one defendant be dropped from the complaint because the defendants are mis-joined. The plaintiff's claim against each of the defendants did not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and there is no question of fact or law common to each of them. Each claim therefore is a separate cause of action.

Gacula v Martinez, 88 Phil 142

Spouses Lucy and Richard filed a petition for the adoption of Ara, the minor child of Spouses Morato and Armina. After the filing

of the petition, Ara killed her playmate, Alma. Alma’s parents sued Spouses Lucy and Richard and Spouses Morato and Armina for damages.

(a) Are Lucy and Richard indispensable parties?

(b) Are Morato and Armina indispensable parties?

(a) No, Lucy and Richard are not indispensable parties.

The law provides that a minor may sue or be sued only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem. In the case at bar, the spouses have not yet been judicially declared the parents or guardians of Ara. Hence, they are not indispensable parties.

(b) Yes, Morato and Armina are indispensable parties.

As the Rules require that a minor may only be sued with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, guardian ad litem, the parents of the minor are then indispensable parties to the action.

Given that there was no judicial approval of the petition for adoption yet, Ara remains under the care and custody of her parents, who are, in contemplation of law, indispensable parties which must be included in the case.

What is the effective recourse of the defendant where the plaintiff did not implead an indispensable party?

Defendant should move for an order directing the plaintiff to amend its complaint by impleading the indispensable party. Upon plaintiff’s failure or refusal to obey this order, the action should be dismissed.

Rule 17, Sec. 3; National Dev. Corp v. CA

Plaintiff filed a petition for mandamus to compel the then municipal mayor to issue to him the municipal license and permit to resume operations of his cockpit. Pending the action, the mayor was dismissed from office. After trial, the court issued the writ of mandamus and adjudged defendant mayor liable for damages. In due course, the sheriff levied execution of the judgment for damages on defendant mayor's properties. Is the levy valid?

The levy is void because the judgment is void and without any legal effect.

The judgment is void because there was no substitution, pursuant to the Rules of the defendant mayor and the filing of a

Indispensable/Necessary Parties

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supplemental pleading showing that the defendant mayor’s successor had adopted or continued the defendant mayor’s policy to deny the cockpit license.

Galvez v. CA

P filed an action against D for unlawful detainer with the MTC on the ground of non-payment of rent. After D filed his answer, and while the case was still pending, D died. Thereafter, D’s heirs continued, without any formal substitution, with the case and presented their position paper for the defendant.

After due hearing, the MTC rendered judgment, ordering D’s heirs to vacate the premises. After this judgment became final and executory, D’s heirs filed an action in the RTC to annul the judgment on the ground that it was rendered without jurisdiction over D’s heirs, there having been no formal substitution of parties. Is the petition to annul the MTC decision tenable?

No.

Jurisdiction over the person was acquired by the voluntary appearance of D’s heirs in the action.

The lack of a formal substitution does not invalidate the judgment where the heirs themselves appeared before the trial court, participated in the proceedings therein, and presented evidence in defense of the deceased defendant.

Vda de Salazar v. CA

Pleadings and Motions

What does the signature of counsel in a pleading constitute?

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him:

(a) That he has read the pleading; (b) That to the best of his

knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and

(c) That it is not interposed for delay.

Rule 7, Sec. 3

State the rule on verification of a pleading.

Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by an affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has:

(a) read the pleading; and

(b) that the allegations therein are true and correct

a. of his personal knowledge or

b. based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains:

(a) a verification based on “information and belief” or upon knowledge, information and belief; or

(b) lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Rule 7, Sec. 4

State the rule on forum shopping.

The certification against forum shopping is a sworn statement certifying to the following:

1) That the party has not commenced or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending; 2) That if there is such other

pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and 3) That if he should thereafter

learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within 5 days to the court where his complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.

The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as cause for administrative sanctions. Rule 7, Sec. 5

Objective/General

4

3

1

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P l e a d I n g s

The complaint simply alleges that D is legally liable to P for damages in a named amount. D moves to dismiss this complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Resolve the motion to dismiss.

The motion to dismiss is tenable. The Rules provide that a complaint or pleading asserting a claim may be dismissed on the ground that it states no cause of action.

The mere existence of a cause of action is not sufficient for a complaint to prosper. Even if the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant, the complaint may be dismissed if the complaint of pleading asserting the claim “states no cause of action”. This means that the cause of action must be unmistakably be stated or alleged in the complaint or that all the elements of the cause of action required by substantive law must clearly appear from the mere reading of the complaint.

Riano (1) 240.

'In May 1996 P sued D for mandamus alleging that he was the lowest or best bidder forI janitorial services for 1996 but that D unjustifiably refused to award the contract to him and prayed that the judgment be rendered compelling D to award him the contract. The year 1996 lapsed, P moving for the admission of a supplemental complaint alleging that he should instead be awarded damages for unrealized profits. Should P’s motion to admit supplemental complaint be admitted?

No. The petitioner’s remedy was not to supplement, but rather to amend its complaint.

The transaction, occurrence or event happening since the filing of the pleading, which is sought to be supplemented, must be pleaded in aid of a party's right of defense as the case maybe. In the case at bar, the supervening event is not invoked for that purpose but to justify the new relief sought. What was alleged as a supervening event causing damage to

petitioner was the fact that the year for which the contract should have been made had passed without the resolution of the case.

The supervening event was cited not to reinforce or aid the original demand, which was for the execution of the contract, but because of that his demand could no longer be enforced, thus justifying petitioner in changing the relief sought to one for recovery of damages. The supplemental complaint filed by petitioner should simply be treated as embodying amendments to the original complaint or petitioner may be required to file an amended complaint.

Superclean Services Inc. v. CA; 2012 Iñigo (1) 241

P sues D for P300,000.00 in RTC-Manila. Before D could answer, P amends his complaint to allege an alternative cause of action for specific performance. D moves to dismiss the complaint. Rule.

P can amend the complaint once as a matter of right at any time before answer. The fact that the original complaint did not plead a cause of action within the RTC's jurisdiction is of no moment. While the amendment has the effect of curing this defect, this is okay because no leave of court is sought so that there is no conceptual contradiction as no affirmative action is sought from the court.

But while an action for specific performance is within the RTC's jurisdiction since it is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the alternative cause of action for P300,000.00 puts such an estimate and brings the case within the MTC's jurisdiction because of the amount involved.

Cruz v. Tan, 87 Phil. 627

Action by P against D in the RTC for a sum of money wherein D impleaded X as a third-party defendant on the claim that X is liable to plaintiff by way of subrogation to D's liability. Judgment was rendered ordering D to pay P and X to indemnify D for this payment. X timely appealed the judgment to the CA, but D did not appeal and so P sued out a writ of execution against him after the lapse of the 15-day period for D to appeal. Is the writ of execution valid?

Yes.

The third-party complaint is independent of and distinct from the complaint, but is allowed in the original and principal case to avoid multiplicity of suits.

An appeal by any party from such judgment does not inure to the benefit of the other party who has not appealed nor can it be deemed to be an appeal of such other party from the judgment against him.

Firestone v. Tempongko

Sufficiency of complaint

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In an action concerning the fire policy against an insurance company which insured it, the defendant insurer filed a third party complaint against a re-insurer which set up in his answer the defense alleged by the defendant insurer that the loss was caused by the willful act of connivance of the plaintiff insured. May the third-party defendant re-insurer counterclaim against the plaintiff?

Yes, provided that the

counterclaim be in respect to the plaintiff’s claim against the third-party plaintiff.

Rule 6, Sec. 13

L sued C to annul a deed of sale of a lot and for L to be declared the owner thereof. Judgment went to C, and this judgment became final. Thereafter, C filed an action against L, A and B for damages for the use and occupancy of the same lot, A and B being L's transferees of the house built on the lot, this house having been transferred by L to A and B even before the filing of the annulment action. L, A and B moved to dismiss C's complaint on the ground that it is barred by the judgment in the first action. Resolve the motion to dismiss.

Motion to dismiss granted.

The second motion is barred by the "compulsory counterclaim rule" because the complaint for damages is necessarily connected with the transaction subject matter of the first action. Had the same been annulled in the first action then C would have no right to collect rents from the occupants of the lot and house, while if the court sustained the validity of the same (as it did) then C would have had such right.

The addition of A and B as additional defendants does not detract from the res judicata effect of the judgment in the first case because these parties should have been impleaded by C on his compulsory counterclaim in the first auction.

Rule 6, Section 7; 2014 Riano (1) 380 Carpena v. Manalo

In an action in the RTC by the lessee against the lessor to fix a period for his lease, may the RTC entertain the defendant lessor's counterclaim for the ejectment of plaintiff lessee on the ground of the expiry of the stipulated term in the lease contract?

No.

This is not a compulsory counterclaim because it is not within the jurisdiction of the RTC as to its nature.

The Rules provide that a compulsory counterclaim is one which is cognizable by the regular courts of justice and that the counterclaim must be within the counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court as to the amount and the nature thereof.

In ejectment cases, like forcible entry and unlawful detainer, MTC has the exclusive original jurisdiction as provided in the Rules of Court. Thus, RTC cannot entertain the defendant lessor's counterclaim for the ejectment of plaintiff lessee on the ground of the expiry of the stipulated term in the lease contract for it has no jurisdiction over the said issue.

Rule 6, Sec.7

In an unlawful detainer suit by P against D, the MTC Malolos rendered judgment ordering D to vacate the premises and to surrender their possession to P. Thereafter, a writ of execution of the judgment and a writ of demolition , were issued. During the grace period allowed D under the writ of demolition, D filed a separate action in RTC-Bulacan against P and the provincial sheriff for specific performance on the ground that D is entitled to receive the value of the improvements on the lot subject of the ejectment case because he was a builder in good faith. The RTC Bulacan issued a TRO and then later a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of MTC Malolos' writ of execution and order of demolition. Did the RTC Malolos act correctly?

No.

D’s claim is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim which he should have raised in the ejectment case. The main action having already been resolved, D cannot bring up the issue in another action. The adjudication of the issued joined by the parties in the earlier case constitutes res judicata, the theory being that what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated upon, but also such other matters as could have been raised but were not.

Furthermore, the Rules emphasize that the judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory unless the defendant appeals. The TRO and the PI were improper.

Cojuangco v. Villegas

P sues your client D, to recover possession of a parcel of land. D tells you that his wife acquired this parcel of land from its former owner, X. Is there a way by which D may cause X to be impleaded?

Yes. D should have his wife intervene in the case and once admitted as

Counterclaim, cross-claim, complaint-intervention, etc.