Thesis

Introduction

In this paper I examine the conditions under which revolution is morally justified within a state, and if there are any conditions under which revolution is morally obligatory. I will begin by analyzing the nature of the obligations that exist between the state and the people. My analysis will be from the perspective of social contract theory, focusing mainly on the works of John Locke and Immanuel Kant. I use these works to framework my own conception of the social contract. I do not completely adopt either social contract theory. Instead, I will propose a new way of understanding the social contract which is heavily influenced by the aformentioned philosophers. I hope to incorporate the strongest features of each theory while addressing weaknesses.

Part I of this paper contains a detailed explanation and analysis of Lockean social contract theory. The features of the Lockean social contract which influence my conception of the social contract are the notion of strong natural rights and the necessity of a state to protect those rights. Part I ends with a summary of David Hume’s objections to Lockean social contract theory. Part II contains a detailed presentation of Kantian social contract theory, and

well as unjust before a sufficient moral justification for revolution exists. Five additional considerations are introduced which pertain to judging the legitimacy of a state. The distinction between the goodness, justness and legitimacy of a state is also discussed at length in Part III. Part III concludes by examining the potential for a moral obligation to revolt in certain circumstances.

violations are a consistent, necessary feature of the moral justification for revolution that is presented.

I will provide one note concerning human rights as they are discussed in this essay. The rights presupposed by the social contract in Part III are strong, natural rights extremely similar to those presented in Lockean political theory. However, the rights differ in their ultimate origin. The reasoning capability and inherent equality of individuals entitles them to a certain kind of treatment that adequately respects and protects these qualities. Individual rights are the specific content of the moral treatment to which each individual is entitled. It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed, complete explanation for the origin of these rights. I imagine an account of human rights grounded in an individual’s rationality or autonomy would be cohesive with this thesis. This kind of grounding for human rights has been proposed by Alan Gerwirth in The Basis and Content of Human Rights as well as James Griffin in On Human Rights (Gerwirth,

1978; Griffin 2008). This is not to say that either of these specific theories for human rights has been adopted for this essay, I simply wish to broadly demonstrate the kind of grounding for human rights that would fit naturally with this project.

Part I: Lockean Social Contract Locke’s Social Contract

breach of the social contract, or a violation of individual rights by the state. To clarify, I am using the term “state” to refer to the specific political institutions, organizations and leadership which have governing power. This definition is used for the rest of the paper.

In order to examine the nature of political society and the necessity of a social contract within Lockean political theory, I will begin by introducing Locke’s the state of nature. The state of nature represents people acting outside of an established political structure, prior to the formation of the body politic. The state of nature does not necessarily represent a physical time and place, but is a rhetorical device used to examine the relations and rules among people without political structure. Locke asserts that men in the state of nature are free and naturally equal. By naturally equal, I mean that no one person has a natural right of rule or power over the others. Locke refers to this as a “…state of equality…” that exists among people in the state of nature (Locke 1993, 9). Though there is great freedom in the state of nature, people are still beholden to the law of nature which Locke identifies as reason. Through reason it can be determined that the state of equality results in a moral obligation to refrain from causing “… harm to another in its life, health, liberty, or possessions” (Locke 1993, 9). Additionally, men have an obligation towards self-preservation, which is the result of being made from a great, omnipotent Creator. When this ability of self-preservation is not directly threatened, men are obliged to “…preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another” (Locke 1993, 9).

not exist in times of dispute. When a person uses force or violence on another, if the victim is unable to enforce a fair punishment, then the victim remains in a “state of war” with the

aggressor. The state of war has no guarantee of deserved reparations or promises of peace (Locke 1993, 16). In addition, Locke notes that allowing all individuals the power to judge and enforce punishment would often result in individuals being required to judge their own guilt. This allows for the influence of personal biases which inhibit the ability to achieve objectively fair verdicts or punishments. Locke asserts that the state of nature is unstable and ill-fitted to the long-term preservation of mankind. When properly constructed, the state can remedy the problems present in the state of nature. However, one cannot enter into the body politic and form the state without consenting to relinquish some natural rights. The relinquishing of some natural rights for the benefits provided by the state is the beginning of the social contract.

include the duty to preserve a free, autonomous life as this is an essential feature of a rational, moral agent. This is because one’s right to life does not just reference a right to be alive, but to have a life befitting of moral agent. This is not necessarily a standard reading of Locke, but I believe there is textual evidence which supports this interpretation. I will return to this point at the end of the section on Locke.

It is relevant to clarify the role of unanimous consent after the coming together of the body politic (Locke 1993). Locke argues that all must consent to form the body politic. Those who do not consent to be part of the body politic are outside of the state formed by the body politic. However, after the state has been formed, political power is delegated to political associations which can create laws and actively govern (Locke 1993). The populace vote on representatives and these representatives vote on the laws of the state. Majority rule has authority in elections and in law-making (Locke 1993). This is because the individual has already

consented to live under the state and relinquish some of their liberties. The individual has also consented to live under the majority rule within the state. Locke argues that those who form the state clearly give express consent, however the following generations give tacit rather than express consent. They do this by utilizing the benefits and resources that are provided in virtue of the state’s existence (roads, sidewalks, etc) (Locke 1993).

Breaching the Social Contract

important to establish the extent of state interference that is necessary to breach the social contract.

There are conditions that must be met for justified property interference. First, if

property is taken from another individual, it must be a just decision that derives from the consent of the governed. In this context, consent of the governed is considered to be the majority of the populace. While the majority may not need to specifically vote on every tax or every code, these property infringements should be put through some kind of democratic process and the people should have the ability to appeal if the infringements are thought to be exorbitant. Second, the state must not undermine the “…chief end…” that was discussed earlier in the paper, but encourage greater stability and, in turn, a greater ability for individuals to meet obligations of self-preservation. This excludes acts that would debilitate the people’s ability to labor or acts that burden the populace solely for the personal well-being of the head of the state. Locke writes that if the state is “…made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them [the populace] to the

arbitrary and irregular commands of those who have it; there presently becomes a tyranny…” (Locke 1993, 102). When the state continues “…acting without authority, [the state] may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another” (Locke 1993,

102).Though every single unjust act may not warrant revolution, if the injustice is egregious enough and one cannot seek an alternative, effective appeal for damages, a revolution is justified.

justified in opposing especially abusive power. Both kings and legislatures can become abusive if they commit excessive wrongs against the people. Under a state with a chief magistrate, the chief magistrate becomes abusive when force is used against the people and no appeal exists for the wronged. Locke writes “…for where the injured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to law, there can be no pretense for force…” (Locke 1993, 105). By engaging in unlawful force against the people, where there is no appeal for grievances, the chief

magistrate, and therefore the government, is in a state of war with the people and resistance is justified. Locke makes clear that this is not only true of the chief magistrate, but “whoever so in authority exceeds the power given to him by law and makes use of the force he has under his command…may be opposed…” (Locke 1993, 103).

In this context, Locke appears to reference the right of those mistreated persons to oppose their aggressors. Each individual who is mistreated is justified in rebelling against the state in virtue of their rights being violated. When defending against the claim that his theory will lead to constant revolutions, one of Locke’s arguments is that small, isolated incidents of rights

violations could not destabilize the government. This is because the limited power and resources of smaller groups whose rights have been violated will not threaten the stability of the state. It will be infeasible for a successful revolution to occur if rights violations occur to only a few (Locke 1993). This explanation further suggests that, under a strict Lockean view, those who are justified in rebelling are those individuals whose rights have been violated.

A question may be raised regarding the ability to exploit a minority population so long as this does not undermine the overall stability of the polity. The “…chief end…” of a state

includes the protection of property rights for all individuals. If a minority has their rights

laws or rebel against the state. If the minority is a significant portion of the population, they may be able to pressure the state to change its unjust behavior, if not undermine the unjust state. It is important to note that the smaller the minority, the less power they would have against an unjust state.

Using unjust force against the populace is not only reason to justify opposition. If either the legislature or chief magistrates abuse their obligations to the people, then there may be cause for revolution. The social contract is initially formed so that the people’s property rights can be protected and the inconveniences of the state of nature can be addressed. The government has an obligation to protect and respect these property rights and ensure the political community as a whole thrives. Locke writes “…whenever the legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience…” (Locke 1993, 111). It is not that every small injustice or abuse will warrant revolution, but if the state fails to achieve the ends of the social contract, then revolution is justified. Locke further elaborates that this kind of extensive damage could show itself in “…a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices all tending the same way…” (Locke 1993, 113). Extensive rights violations by the state justify revolution. I will now closely examine Locke’s hoe Locke’s duty of self-preservation relates to revolution.

Locke and Self-Preservation

possible to tend to the preservation of mankind. Given this moral obligation, it may seem difficult to justify revolution if there is a substantial risk one’s life. However, there is reason to think that the duty to preserve one’s own life meant preserving a life that suited a moral agent. This is a life free from arbitrary will, and one that respects the inherent equality and rights of an individual. An individual could be justified, or even obliged, to risk a sub-optimal life to preserve the kind of life a moral agent ought to have.

Understanding Locke’s duty of self-preservation in this way is not a standard reading, though there is textual support for it. If it is against one’s moral duties to live under illegitimate rule, then one would be justified in risking this sub-optimal existence to attain the morally desired life worthy of preserving. It is worth asking what kind of treatment or quality of life that Lockean rights guarantee individuals. Some Lockean scholars, such as A. John Simmons, have written that Lockean rights are intended to provide individuals with an extremely large zone of non-interference in order to effectively protect individual autonomy (Simmons 1992). I think there is good reason to support an especially broad construal of an individual’s right to life given Locke’s emphasis on freedom and autonomy.

Locke supported the notion that human beings attain a higher moral standing than that of other beasts. This heightened moral standing is given by God, but is exemplified by an

for this broader conception of preservation. He claims that there are two aspects of self-preservation, one relates to biological necessities described earlier and the other is a “…moral dimension…” which “…pertains to the good of each person as a rational moral agent” (Layman 2014, 7). According to Layman, in order for individuals to fully engage in self-preservation, they must preserve life that is “…appropriate for their moral status…” and includes “…social freedom.” (Layman 2014, 7)

Locke’s condemnation of individuals being subjected to arbitrary will supports this sentiment. He writes “…whenever the Legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves

speaking of political power. This broad interpretation of the duty of self-preservation applies to the individual (and mankind) whether in the state of nature or in political society. When this power is transferred over to civil society, the purpose of civil society is established (namely, the preservation of mankind), but the bounds within which the sovereign or magistrate can act are also formed. Given the previously established obligation to self-preservation, and given this broader interpretation of self-preservation, the governing powers that be cannot rule in a manner that would lower the kind of life that a rational, autonomous ought to have. Under these

assumptions, revolution becomes easier to justify even in situations where death is a serious risk. Humean Objections to Lockean Contracts

There are many strong features of the Lockean social contract which astutely capture the nature of the relationship between the state and the governed. Strong natural rights, with an emphasis on the importance of a right to life, provide strong protection against state abuse. Locke also identifies the need for a just state structure for optimal protection and respect of these rights. The social contract provides a method for the state to form and govern individuals who are inherently equal and free, without denying them the moral treatment to which they are entitled. However, there are some serious weaknesses to Lockean social contract theory that need to be considered.

Hume argues that very few, if any, societies have actually formed through the kind of social contract presented in Lockean theory. Hume writes “If we would say anything to the purpose, we must assert, that every particular government which is lawful, and which imposes any duty of allegiance on the subject, was, at first, founded on the consent and a voluntary compact” (Hume 1994, 364). Hume notes that even societies which seem to exemplify this principle, fail to meet the idealized description that Locke presents. Many societies are formed by force in combat or conquest, which is decidedly opposed to the consensual signing of a contract. Hume writes “By such acts as these, many governments have been established; and this is all the original contract, which they have to boast of” (Hume 1994, 364). If no society has formed in a way that resembles the social contract, there is reason to think the creation of a just state is extremely rare. The implication of this would be that few, if any, states have been ruled legitimately. Locke requires the consent of individuals through the social contract to legitimize the state. Hume contends that many states considered legitimate are actually illegitimate on Locke’s theory. This would be an unfortunate and negative outcome of Lockean social contract theory, though it may not say anything about whether Locke is correct that truly legitimate societies can only be formed by contract. However, this objection is claiming something even stronger than just the implausibly of states forming through contract. Hume ultimately concludes that the formation of states through contract is both implausible and unnecessary to attain a just and legitimate state. It is not just the acknowledgement that formation by social contract does not occur, but that many states that have formed without a social contract appear to be legitimate.

vain to say that all governments are or should be…founded on popular consent” (Hume 1994, 366). Even the creation of the United States, which was heavily influenced by Lockean political theory, did not meet the criteria of attaining the consent of each individual who was subject to the American state. This requirement of consent undermines the creation of states in such a manner that an extremely small minority could delegitimize even a minimalist state.

Furthermore, even if it appears that individuals within state have given their consent to be governed, Hume argues that this consent is not given in virtue of a mutual agreement between the government and the people (Hume 1994). Individuals tend to obey the established authority simply in virtue of standing in a subordinate relationship to that authority. Individuals within in a state do not regularly challenge the legitimacy of their government, especially when they are not facing particularly egregious demands from said government. Individuals obey the authority in place because it is established and obeyed by others (Hume 1994). The implications of this are that even when Lockean consent appears present in a state, there is reason to believe that individuals are not thinking about their relation to the state in terms of a social contract.

Hume concludes his critique of the social contract by arguing that basing the legitimacy of a state on the presence of consent is philosophically unnecessary. He argues that a theory of consent is useful only to the extent that it encourages stability and security within the state (Hume 1994). There is no need to base our obligation to obey the government on our obligation to keep promises, or keep the social contract. Both acts are valued in virtue of the fact that without them “…society could not otherwise subsist” (Hume 1994).

Though I do not take Hume’s objections to be devastating to social contract theory, they ought to be seriously considered when moving forward with the social contract. The objections that Hume presents have incredible force and for this reason they give an idea as to the

limitations of social contract theory. The next section introduces the developments that

when attempting a contemporary social contract theory. Part II examines the features of a Kantian, abstract social contract.

Part II: Kantian Social Contract Kant’s Social Contract

In the first section of the Metaphysics of Morals, entitled The Doctrine of Right, Kant defines the concept of a contract and the necessary steps for its formation. A contract is formed in two phases: negotiating and concluding (Kant 1996). The negotiating phase is made up of two steps which are the offering and the ascent (Kant 1996). The offering is simply the initial

presentation of offers given by one party to the other. The ascent occurs when both parties identify offers they find to be agreeable. Once this phase is complete the terms of the contract may exist, but the contract has yet to be constituted. This occurs in the constitutive phase, which also consists of two steps: promising and acceptance. (Kant 1996). It is through promising and acceptance that the obligatory nature of the contract is formed. Each party is promising to fulfill the previously agreed upon terms and accept being bound by the contract. Kant writes that the two constitutive steps must occur simultaneously between the two individuals. A defining feature of a contract is that it consists of “…the united choice between two persons by which anything at all that belongs to one passes to the other…” (Kant 1996, 68). This simultaneous choice cannot be understood as an empirical event because an empirical understanding would naturally entail a conception of promising and acceptance happening as temporally separate declarations, but this cannot be the case (Kant 1996). To show why the constitutive steps must be simultaneous, Kant examines the nature of the transfer of objects through contractual agreements. Kant writes that objects from one person to another must be transferred such that someone is always in

outside of both the giver and receiver’s possession. However, if the object is not in anyone’s possession, in that instance no one has the ability to give or receive the object. (Kant 1996) The notion of simultaneous transfer is contrary to the idea that an object must be released or

abandoned in order for another to receive it. A stated above, the social contract differs from other contracts made among individuals in that it is not event but a concept used to understand the nature of the obligations between the government of the people. However, Kant’s understanding of standard contracts has some implications for how one ought to think about the social contract. It is not the case that individual liberties are first relinquished and then the governing body provides security and structure. The transfer of unrestrained liberty and security occurs

simultaneously between the sovereign and the populace and this simultaneous choice provides a foundation for society. However, limitations on sovereign behavior arise when considering that individuals would not reasonably agree to enter a contract which offends human dignity. A simultaneous exchange of all individual rights could not occur.

Kant writes on the contract which constitutes society in his essay titled On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory but it Does not Apply in Practice. He writes “The basic law,

which can only come from the general, united will of the people, is called the original contract.” (Kant 1793, 107). By “basic law”, Kant seems to be referring to those laws which both

there is an aversion and disgust that occurs when the government commits rights violation against others. This original contract is the foundation for obligations within a political society. As stated above, the social contract is not an actual document and does not have an empirical account according to Kant. It is an abstract concept which explains the nature of the obligations between the government and the people. When Kant describes the social contract as arising from the general, united will of the people, he is not envisioning the entire populace coming together to sign a constitution. Rather, when guided by reflective, informed reason, the people understand their obligations to the government through the social contract.

social contract, because it does not respect the basic freedoms of persons. The social contract gives reasons to obey legitimate governments that do not overstep their bounds. That being said, in Perpetual Peace Kant discusses the idea that a gradual progression towards becoming a just state may be required in some cases (Kant 1795).

Kant’s Objection to Revolution

As stated previously, Kant’s conception of the abstract social contract contains many benefits that a strict Lockean social contract lacks. Presenting the social contract as a product of reason which dictates the kind of state one ought to have is much better equipped to answer Hume’s objections. However, there are reasons against adopting a strict Kantian theory as well, especially in a paper justifying revolution. Kant seemingly rejected the idea that the people could ever engage in a morally justified revolution against the state. He endorsed the view that people have basic human dignity and that just governments have certain obligations to the people. However, He did not explicitly endorse a moral right to revolt against the government, even when the government has committed wrongs against the populace. Though the people could advocate for a change through protest and other forms of expression, if they actively and violently revolted against the state, they committed an immoral act. Adopting a theory in which revolution is never justified, regardless of the justness or legitimacy of the state, seems

unsatisfying. There is something morally counterintuitive about condemning the oppressed who rise against oppressors. Being committed to this condemnation would be reason enough to rethink commitments to Kantian theory.

Kant’s Opposition to Revolution by Thomas Hill Jr., the nature of Kant’s objection to revolution

is reexamined.

the civil society is the source of authority, the arbiter of disputes and ultimate source of justice. The people, for the sake of fully realizing their freedom and autonomy, are obligated to respect the laws arising from the civil society. In his essay, Hill writes that dissent against certain unjust laws within a society can clearly be justified and even legally acceptable within Kant’s theory, but that there is ultimately a legal obligation to maintain the existence of the state. As stated above, a legal right of revolution within a social contract or constitution is incoherent, because this would authorize the destruction of what the constitution was meant to protect (Hill 2002). Kant goes from this explanation to then conclude that revolution is immoral.

Hill questions whether establishing revolution is illegal would necessarily entail that it is also immoral. He writes “Kant’s belief that revolution is morally impermissible in all conditions, then, is a substantive moral claim, going beyond his conceptual point that legal systems cannot allow a right to overturn forcibly the ultimate source of legal authority.” (Hill 2002, 290). Hill examines multiple explanations behind this “…substantive moral claim…” (Hill 2002, 290). First, Hill distinguishes between juridical and ethical duties within Kant’s moral theory. Juridical duties are those which can be enforced by an outside party (the sovereign, laws, etc) and

generally pertain to respecting just laws. Hill writes that, for example, “We satisfy juridical duties if we avoid behaving in prohibited ways, such as theft, murder, and breach of contract, regardless of the motives behind our restraint” (Hill 2002, 290). Ethical duties cannot be

instructions than juridical duties. Because of this difference, juridical are known as perfect while ethical duties are imperfect. The duty to abstain from revolution is categorized as a juridical duty according to Kant. As Hill writes, one must prioritize the satisfaction of juridical over ethical duties because juridical are “perfect.” (Hill 2002, 291). In addition, Kant believes there to be a moral obligation to obey juridical duties. Due to this classification scheme, it becomes clear why showing the illegality of revolution led Kant to believe that the act revolution was always immoral. Hill writes “to assert that revolution is always contrary to a perfect juridical duty implies that it is always immoral” (Hill 2002, 291).

Hill identifies multiple problems with the conclusion that revolution is always immoral on this basis. First, Hill contends that Kant does not provide an adequate argument for why an indirect ethical duty is connected to every juridical duty, or for the claim that juridical duties are perfect but ethical duties are not (Hill 2002). However, even if these claims are granted as true, Hill remains unconvinced that the act of revolting is always immoral. Hill proposes that an indirect ethical duty could still exist in regards to obeying the law, but it is implausible that this means one must unequivocally obey all laws or else they are doing something immoral (Hill 2002). For example, Hill writes that they may be an indirect moral obligation to “…give it [the law] weight in our deliberations and to resist, if we must, respectfully,” but this need not entail an unequivocal moral obligation to obey all laws (Hill 2002, 291).

revolution. Where there is conflict between unequivocal juridical duties and the utilization of the categorical imperative, Hill writes “Kant himself would no doubt have given priority to the Categorical Imperative, even if this meant acknowledging a need to modify the perfect duties” (Hill 2002). Hill concludes that it may be possible to put forth a maxim regarding revolution that does not violate Kant’s categorical imperative. This maxim would have to ensure that revolution is not a frequent occurrence that would threaten the stability of the state. Hill offers the following as a maxim that meets these requirements: “When the ruler is clearly unjust, oppressive, and utterly resistant to reform and revolution is almost certain to be successful, bloodless, and more humane and respectful of human rights, then I will join in the revolution.” (Hill 2002, 295). This maxim could be thought to maintain the stability and longevity of a state while also morally justifying resistance to a state that is the source of gross injustice.

Respect of basic human rights and human dignity is at the center of Kantian moral theory. This is a fact that Hill acknowledges in his essay. It seems unlikely to conclude that Kant would have condemned as morally wrong acts of revolution that would restore the status of human rights in states where they had been seriously threatened or rendered nonexistent. As I have previously stated, I base my justifications for revolution on the grounds that a necessary

condition for revolution is a breach of the social contract, or a violation of basic rights. Based on the work of the previous essay, it is not clear that Kant’s objection would always apply to

revolution with this necessary condition. Does this mean that one should completely adopt the Kantian social contract theory when justifying revolution?

high probability that it will succeed in order to be justified. One of the reasons for this is that Kantian rights are derivative, and ultimately not as strong as natural rights that are found Lockean political theory. Strong, natural rights provide more of basis for protecting individual autonomy and freedom from abusive states. However, there are also good reasons to think that an abstract social contract, similar to that in Kantian political philosophy, is a more plausible theory, as well as more effective as a standard for measuring the justness of states.

The next section will go into more detail describing the benefits of natural rights as well as abstract social contracts. It also proposes the outline of a social contract theory which

successfully incorporates these two ideas. In context of revolution, the social contract proposed below is used as a tool for determining when states have unjustly infringed upon the people’s rights, which is a necessary condition for revolution.

Part III: Social Contracts and Revolution Lockean Versus Kantian Social Contract

expansive explanations of expressed consent, including notions of tacit consent put forth by Locke, do not seem plausible for forming or maintaining the state.

I propose the social contract to be a standard to which judges the justness of states. When the social contract is broken, the basic moral obligations required to constitute the state are not being met. I intend to adopt a more abstract conception of the social contract, whose origin can be deduced through proper reasoning. Unlike Kant, I argue that the type of social contract which is the best standard for judging the justness states is one which presupposes strong, natural rights. By “…best standard for judging the justness of states…” I mean that the social contract will recognize as just only those states which provide the basic treatment required of rational, moral agents. In other words, it will deem as just those states which protect basic individual rights. States which are just according to the social contract will provide necessary security while guaranteeing maximum freedom for the development of passions, pursuits, and character which all rational, moral agents strive for. In addition, the standard will track with common intuitions of how a just state ought to act.

Lockean contract. Though expressed consent or acknowledgement is not a requirement for my conception, it may still be considered a weakness if individuals have no intuitions regarding state restrictions or basic rights. I would have to show why intuitions counter to my claims are a product of some form of faulty reasoning.

However, I think individuals regularly think of states as justified in virtue of their respect and protection of human rights. An extremely common notion is that the state has certain

restrictions on its behavior in virtue of the fact that individuals deserve a certain kind of treatment. The idea that governments cannot overstep basic human rights is agreed upon on an international scale. Historical and contemporary examples can be provided to support this fact. During the 18th _{Century, the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration} of the Rights of Man and Citizen exemplified this notion (Scholastic Inc, 2002; Jellinek 2010). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, recognizes the “…inherent dignity…” and “…equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family…” (Roosevelt 2003). Tunisian and Egyptian constitutions arising out of the Arab Spring also referenced the natural rights of citizens. The Egyptian Constitution voted for in 2014 asserts that “Personal freedom is a natural right, shall be protected and may not be infringed upon.” (Constitute 2014) Article 51, entitled Public Rights, Freedom, and Duties, states that “Dignity is the right of every human being and may not be violated.” (Constitute 2014) The Tunisian Constitution sets to establish a state where “…the system of rule is governed by the respect for human rights and freedoms…” (Woodrow Wilson Center 2013)

international law and political philosophy have become increasingly interested in the notion of universal human rights supported on this international scale. Where lack of empirical examples and common conceptions weakened the Lockean contract, the fact that many individuals think of government as being restricted in the ways that I have described should strengthen the social contract proposed.

The last objection from Hume presented was that a social contract is ultimately only as valuable as it is useful in maintaining the state (Hume 1994). This inherently rejects the notion that an individual starts out with basic rights that cannot be infringed upon by the state. I have already stated that this view would go against common conceptions regarding the required treatment of individuals within a state. I would add further that focusing only on securing state stability and overall utility may end up categorizing intuitively unjust states as just. For example, imagine a benevolent dictator who treats her people well enough so that they can maintain at least an adequate quality of life. This dictator retains an unequivocal power to punish those who act against the law. If the dictator decides that an individual may have broken the law, then there is no trial. The dictator determines guilt or innocent, and then chooses a punishment which could include a life imprisonment or even execution. There are no strict guidelines on how to impose penalties; it is simply at the discretion of the dictator. There is always some mystery involved for individuals determining what specific punishment would accompany each specific crime. This unsureness combined with the fear of receiving a harsh penalty contributes to a low crime rate. Remember that it was previously stated that most individuals have at least an

a state where the quality of life is much lower. At the very least, revolution will cause a period of hardship without a guarantee of restored stability. In this scenario, it is unlikely that Hume could refer to the state as unjust or justify a revolution. However, this kind of state intuitively appears unjust. The benevolent dictator infringes upon the right individuals have over their body and life arbitrarily, and this should not occur even if the state maintains a certain level of utility for the individuals.

The question may still be raised regarding the use of natural rights versus the “rights” that seem to appear in Kantian political philosophy. Though, as previously stated, Kant

acknowledges basic freedom and equality in each individual, human dignity is not the source of natural rights. The a priori principles for civil society that Kant provides do not result in the same strong Lockean natural rights. I believe there are good reasons to argue for natural rights, very similar to those found in Lockean political theory. As previously stated, these rights have a strong intuitive appeal. In addition, by existing outside of government, they restrict government action in a manner to protect individuals from being mistreated. They act to preserve the kind of freedom and autonomy which rational agents require to thrive. Some scholars have attempted to build a basis for basic human rights based on Kantian conceptions of human dignity (Donnelly 2014; Rorty 1993). While I have proposed an abstract social contract which is heavily influenced by Kant, I have intended to show that natural rights similar to those in Lockean political theory would work within an abstract contract, and are more desirable. Kantian rights are not self-evident or within the individual. Rights are ultimately derivative according to Kant. In his paper Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity, Oliver Sensen aims to clarify what he takes to be common

value…” but “…refers to a relational property of being elevated” (Sensen 2009, 310). Sensen distinguishes between a contemporary paradigm of dignity and a traditional paradigm. The traditional paradigm refers to humans as having a significant standing in nature because of their reasoning capacities, but this is a relational standing and creates “… a duty to use it [reason] in a proper way.” (Sensen 2009, 313). This is different from stating that an individual has an

inalienable character which commands a certain kind of treatment. The contemporary paradigm views human dignity as an inner part of the human being. It states that an individual is special simply in virtue of the type of being she is (Sensen 2009). Sensen identifies multiple important differences between the two conceptions. There are two main differences that are relevant for this paper. The first is that the traditional paradigm is a description of a relational standing but “…it does not yet imply anything about how human beings should treat one another.” (Sensen 2009, 313). The contemporary paradigm would likely have implications on the treatment

required of human beings. The second difference is that, according to the traditional conception, “…dignity was said to be connected to duties and not rights.” (Sensen 2009, 314). Sensen goes on to argue that Kant references human dignity using the traditional paradigm rather than the contemporary paradigm. If Sensen is correct, then this is a good reason to think that the kind of rights that would result in the desired restrictions on the state would not come out of Kantian theory.

against the state. Individuals may have an obligation, in some cases, to live under the arbitrary will of the state. For any potential Kantian revolution, the state must degrade to a point where it is very clearly unjust and oppressive, such that moral implications outweigh a strong obligation to maintain the stability of the state. Kant’s juridical duty to obey the law is constantly weighed against rights violations that may occur. The commitment to the stability of the state is such a high priority, that one must be nearly assured of a victorious revolution and a successful rebuilding of the state to justify the revolution. It is also a concern that Kant would have difficulty justifying revolution against benevolent dictators like the one previously described. Strong natural rights ensure the protection and maintenance of intuitively just states which provide the basic treatment to which each individual is entitled. For this reason, and the inability to arrive at strong protections based upon human dignity, I stipulate natural rights that are not Kantian, but which still coincide with an abstract social contract.

It is nearly impossible to attain basic protection of rights without the creation of a state. Those who thrive in the state of nature would likely be forced to use intimidation, physical violence, coercion and other morally questionable means simply to stay alive. In other words, fulfilling basic biological requirements of life would likely require one to mistreat and violate the rights of others. This environment does not ensure that the individual has the kind of life that a rational, moral agent ought to have. The harm is two-fold in the sense that the state of nature both actively requires one to commit rights violations to survive and fails to provide adequate protection of rights for others, including those who thrive. Given that the state enables an individual to preserve their property and protect their rights, where previously they could not adequately do so, one who is reasoning properly can ascertain the necessity of the state. To form this state, one must relinquish some of their liberties in manner that does not offend their

standing as an autonomous, free, moral agent. Instead of building in this protection with

expressed consent, one could adopt a standard of reasonably informed hypothetical consent. The

In the next section I introduce principles for an abstract social contract which protects natural human rights. The relevance of using the language of a “contract” may be questioned at this juncture of the paper. I maintain the social contract language because I think it is beneficial to understanding the function and purpose behind the principles named below. The social contract, even in abstract form, is the best representation of why the state can restrict behavior even though individuals are naturally free and equal. Every individual may not give their expressed consent to be restricted, but hypothetical consent is meant to result in the type of agreement every individual would consent to if properly considering their interests. Individuals still respect obligations to the state, only to the extent that it provides some improved condition for their lives. The social contract presented below represents a joint endeavor in which the state and the people are bound together under the assumption that each is strengthened, assuming the other abides by the contractual terms. The state is judged to be just, and is therefore likely to be supported by the people, assuming it does not violate individual rights. The people receive protection of their rights, assuming they restrict some of their liberties and accept necessary property infringement. I think the notion of a contract, even one that is abstract and based upon hypothetical consent, is befitting of this relationship between the state and the people.

Justified Revolution

I take the social contract to be a set of principles necessary for a just state, and therefore it is the standard by which to judge the justness of states. It is not what forms the state, but it is a tool which ensures that the state is just. If the social contract is breached, the state is unjust. This is a necessary condition for the justification of revolution. Given this function, and the

the moral justification for revolution. The principles are as follows: 1) The state must provide a baseline of security and stability for the lives of the governed; 2) The state must act in a manner that preserves, protects, and respects an individual’s natural rights; 3) The people must relinquish some of their liberties, but only to the extent that it is required for the fulfillment of the first and second principles.

Liberties refer to the actions one can rightfully take with their property free from interference. By stipulating how the government ought to act in regards to the people, the social contract ultimately works to restrain abusive, tyrannical or other unseemly government acts. The social contract, construed in this way, can be understood as moral constraint on political action.

A breach of the social contract is a necessary condition for the moral justification of revolution. At this point it is necessary to define revolution for my purposes. By revolution I mean the active destruction of an unjust institution or political system with the intent to create just institutions or systems in its place. To be considered revolution, the act must do more than just challenge the specific persons who hold positions of power, it should challenge some larger feature of the political system. My use of the term “revolution” for this paper is somewhat specialized as it requires revolutionaries to have the intent to restore justice rather than simply take over a state.

When the state violates this first principle, it both prevents individuals from fulfilling their moral obligations and unjustifiably restricts individuals’ liberties. However, given the lack of protection and rampant instability that accompanies life prior to the existence of the state; the violation of this first principle cannot be the only necessary requirement for the moral

stability that would be necessary for property institutions, but that these regimes appear undesirable or unjust. For almost all states, even unjust ones, the structure and organization of society creates significant improvements on security and stability. A state which provides these property institutions through slave labor or mistreatment of the poor still seems unacceptable. This is not the type of state which enables the fulfillment of moral obligations. This should be some indication that a just state must do more than provide basic security and stability. If revolution is to be a tool for destructing unjust states, then it must be justified even in

circumstances where the people gain some basic benefits from the state’s existence. However, revolution can also be justified if basic rights violations occur, and this is exemplified in the second and the third principle listed above.

life that a rational, moral agent ought to have. In addition to freedom, the life of rational moral agents ought to include an important form of autonomy and preservation of dignity. It is justified for the state to infringe upon individual liberties to ensure that this right to life is preserved and protected for all. The third principle still ensures that the maximum amount of freedom is enjoyed by individuals, but second principle (in conjunction with the third) ensures that this freedom is not at the expense of robbing others of a certain desirable quality of life.

If the state restricts liberties without providing for the proper use and preservation of property, then it violates rights to autonomy and property ownership. If the state acts in a manner that fails to uphold or is in violation of an individual’s natural rights, then the state prevents the individual from the kind of life to which they are entitled. When in violation of the principles above, the state becomes an obstacle to fulfilling moral obligations. This is the reason that, when rights are violated, the state is no longer considered just. An unjust state, failing to uphold an individual’s basic natural rights inhibits individuals from realizing their moral obligations as they could in a just state. The unjust state resigns individuals to live in a way that offends their moral standing as free, autonomous, rational beings. The justifications for revolting are very similar (though not identical to) the justifications for forming the state. Individuals are obliged to form a just state that will enable them to fulfill moral obligations. Revolution is a mechanism for tearing down unjust states which stand in the way of moral obligations.

social contract. One assesses the justness of a state by using the social contract described above. A state’s “goodness” can also be evaluated. The goodness of a state depends on the type of benefits it offers individuals in their everyday lives. A good and just state, for example, would abide by the social contract and also provide benefits to individuals extending beyond what the social contract required. Finally, the legitimacy of a state can be assessed. A legitimate state is owed the allegiance of the people in virtue of some baseline of protection or quality of life that it provides. A state is illegitimate when there is no reason to give allegiance to it. A state could be unjust but legitimate on my view. In this case, the state is in violation of the social contract, but revolution against the state is not justified because additional considerations earn the state allegiance.

There are at least five considerations one should take in to account when determining the legitimacy of the state. The five considerations are: 1) The extent of the rights violations; 2) The degree of the rights violations; 3) The harm caused by revolution; 4) The likelihood of a

successful revolution; 5) The existence of effective, legal appeal. I will briefly address each of these considerations.

By extent of the violation, I mean to say the number of individuals whose rights are violated by the government. I contend that a justification for revolution can arise for all

result of the labor, energy or resources of the wronged group. This creates a situation where every individual in the state benefits, to some degree, from the unjust, immoral treatment of others within the state. Furthermore, the labor, energy and resources of those who remain properly treated is at least partially used to sustain the mistreatment of the wronged group. The state unjustly uses its power and places individuals in conflict with one another. This is similar to being forced into a state of war with one another. Though indirectly doing so, some actions of individuals are resulting in a violation of another’s rights, and there is no clear arbitrator or method of addressing the violation (as it is caused by the state). In the state of nature, it may not matter to one individual whether another is a victim of theft or murder. The violation of one individual’s rights in the state of nature does not affect the moral standing of those uninvolved in the rights violation. When the state commits rights violations, this has a significant impact on the moral standing of each individual who is part of and supports the unjust state. Because the state forces individuals in to this oppositional relationship with one another, exposing all to a certain level of insecurity and aggression, all have an additional reason to revolt against the state. It should be noted that as the number of those mistreated increases, the more this consideration contributes to the justification of revolution.

usually an obvious example of a rights violation. Censorship is unnecessarily coercive, infringing on the people’s liberties without being necessary for the continued existence of the state. It also fails to respect the autonomy of the individual. Suppose a government within a state enforced a ban on all Shakespearian plays. All other plays were accessible to the public, but Shakespearian plays were burned on site, without exception. Everyone in the state is oppressed by censorship and all contribute to one another’s oppression. If this is the only rights violation committed by the state, it is not clear that this would merit revolution. This is especially true if the revolution is violent and has no guarantee of success. This is an example where a large extent but minor gravity would fail to provide circumstances sufficient for the justification of revolution. The state may still be legitimate, though it is unjust.

victims. One might conclude that this state has lost its legitimacy die to the grave rights violations.

Considerations three and four are fairly straightforward and work together. They involve the cost of the revolution and its likelihood of success. It is important to remember that

individuals require a state because it ensures the most effective preservation and protection of basic rights. The period of revolution will create temporary instability which directly affects the ability of individuals to protect and preserve their rights. As previously discussed in the section on Locke, it may be morally justifiable to risk a sub-optimal life, lacking in basic dignity in order to attain a life free from unjust state oppression. Individuals must weigh the certainty of

oppression (living in an unjust state) versus the chance of attaining an optimal or better life. While it is true that no revolution is guaranteed to be successful, the kind of gamble that is morally justified will be influenced by both the extent and the gravity of the rights violations. Beyond their own lives, individuals will need to consider the casualties that a successful revolution will likely cause. It may the case that violent uprisings against the state would occur in areas populated with families or others who abstain from fighting. Revolution always involves those who are not directly in combat with state. It must be the case that a majority of those oppressed are willing to bear the costs of the revolution.

theory is much more restrictive regarding the justification for revolution. The mere institutional capability of addressing a rights violation does not preclude a moral justification for revolution. If legal requests for change are continually denied, or if the process of changing laws through legal measures is so long that the extent or gravity of the rights violations increase significantly, then a moral justification for revolution could arise.

Obligatory Revolution

military to resist the orders of an unjust state. The power, resources, and protection of military institutions give them an inherent advantage in conflict with unjust rulers.

This is not a completely obscure notion. The Egyptian military has historically played this role within Egypt. During the overthrow of Hosni Mubarack in 2011, the Egyptian military played a prominent role the success of the revolution. Protests from the Egyptian people began on January 25, 2011. The protests, inspired by a successful revolution in Tunisia, demanded an end to “….government corruption and the autocratic governance of President Hosni Mubarak…” (Perks 2011) Many young people in Egypt used social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to criticize government activity and organize the resistance. The government responded by shutting down these media sites which further aggravated protesters. (Perks 2011) Though the military was initially asked to maintain security by the state, this was “…a move that was welcomed by the protesters…” (Perks 2011) Eventually, the military declared “…that its duty was above all to the people of Egypt…” (Kordunsky and Lokesson 2013). The military backed the protestors and

were a major factor in the success of the revolution (Kordunsky and Lokesson 2013). This would

not be the end of conflict in Egypt. First, the military seemed hesitant to withdraw power and

began to lose the approval of the populace (Salem 2013). Second, when the military did release

power, the new President, Mohamed Morsi, would also face angry protesters in 2013. Though

the people had become disillusioned with the military after they seized power in 2011, their

intervention in 2013 once again came with “…much public support.” (Salem 2013). In both 2011

and 2013 the military contained “...an immense revolutionary energy…” (Salem 2013). This

played a significant role in ousting leaders accused of overstepping their boundaries.

Egyptian military action is the security of political power or other selfish motives (Salem 2013). The example demonstrates the influential role the military can have in deposing unjust

governments, with relatively low cost to those involved. Given the previous considerations regarding the social contract and the nature of natural rights, this example shows the potential for a moral obligation to revolt against unjust governments.

Conclusion

By beginning with Lockean and Kantian social contract theory, I argued that a necessary condition for the moral justification of revolution is a breach of the social contract. The social contract that I have presented protects strong, natural rights while retaining the abstract features of a Kantian social contract. The social contract that I have outlined acts as a standard by which to judge the justness of states. A breach of the social contract results in an unjust state, incapable of preserving and protecting human rights. I listed several other considerations that would contribute to a sufficient justification of revolution. These considerations pertain to the

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