PRINCIPIA ETHIC A

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PRINCIPIA ETHICA

PRINCIPIA ETHIC A

BY

GEORGE EDWARD MOORE

"Everythingiswhatit_is,

andnotanotherthing"

BISHOPBUTLEB

CAMBRIDGE

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1959

PUBLISHED BY

THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bentley House, 200 EustouRoad, London,N.W.1

AmericanBranch:32East 57thStreet,NewYork22,N.Y.

FirstEdition 1903 Reprinted 1922 1929 1948 1951 1954 1956 1959

Printed in Great Britainat the University Press, Cambridge (BrookeCrutchley, University Printer)

DOCTORIBUS AMICISQUE CANTABRIGIENSIBUS DISCIPULUS AMICUS CANTABRIGIENSIS

PRIMITIAS

D. D. D.

AUCTOR

PEEFACE.

~"FTappears ^to me that in Ethics, as inall other philosophical

-- studies, the difficulties and disagreements, ^of which its history is full,are mainly due ^{to a} very simple ^cause: namely to the attempt ^to answer _questions, without first discovering preciselywhat _question itiswhich you ^{desire to answer.}^

I do not know how far this source of error would be done _away, if philosophers would _try to discover what _{question they} were asking, before they ^set about to answer _it; for the work of analysis and distinction is often very ^difficult: we may ^often

fail to make the necessary discovery, even though we makea definite attempt ^to do so. But Iam inclined to think that in

many ^{cases a resolute} attempt would ^{be sufficient to ensure} success; so _that, if only ^this attempt were made, many ^{of the} most _glaringdifficulties anddisagreements ⁱⁿphilosophy would disappear. At all events, philosophers seem, ⁱⁿ general, not to

make the attempt;^and,whether inconsequence^ofthisomission or_not, they are constantly endeavouring ^to prove ^that Yes or

No will answer questions, towhich neither answer is correct,

owing^{to the fact that} what _theyhave before their minds isnot one _question,but _several,to some of which the trueanswer is

No/ ^{toothers Yes.}

I have triedin thisbook to distinguish clearly two kinds of question, which moral philosophers have _{always professed} to

answer, but _which, as I have tried to shew, they have almost always confusedboth with one^anotherandwith other_questions.

These two _questions may ^be expressed, the first in the form:

What kind of things ought ^{to exist for their} own sakes^? the second in theform^: What kindof actions oughtwe to perform^? I have tried to shew _exactly what it is that we ask about a thing, when we ask whether it ought ^{to exist for its}own _sake,

is good ^{in itself or has intrinsic value;} and _exactly what it is that we askabout an action,when we askwhetherwe _ought to do _it, whetherit is aright action ora _duty.

But from a clear insight into the nature of these two questions, there appears ^to me to follow a second most impor tantresult: namely,whatisthenatureofthe_evidence,by which alone any ^ethical proposition can be proved or disproved, con firmed or rendered doubtful. Once we _recognise the exact meaning ^{of the two} questions, I think it also becomes _plain exactly what kind of reasons are relevant as arguments ^foror against any particularanswer to them. It becomes_{plain that,}

foranswers to the_{first question,} no relevant evidencewhatever can beadduced: from no other _truth, except themselves ^alone, can it be inferred that they are ^either true or false. Wecan guard against ^error only by taking care, that, when we _{try to} answer _{a question} of this kind, we havebefore our mindsthat question only, and not some other orothers; but that thereis

great danger ^{of such errors of confusion I} have tried to shew, andalso what are the chiefprecautions by ^{the use of which} we may guard against them. Asforthe second_question,it becomes equallyplain, that any answer ^{to it is} capable ^of proof ^{or dis} proof ^{that,indeed, so} many^differentconsiderationsarerelevant to its truth or falsehood, as to make the attainment of proba

bility very^difficult, and theattainment of certainty impossible.

Nevertheless thekind of evidence,which is both _necessary and alone relevant to such proof and

disproof, ^is capable ^of exact

PREFACE IX

definition. Such evidence must contain propositions of two kinds and oftwo _{kinds only}^: it must_consist, in the first place, of truths with regard ^to the results ofthe action inquestion ofcausal truths butit mustalso contain ethical truths of our

first or self-evident class. Many ^{truths of both kinds are}

necessary to the proof that any ^action ought ^to be done_; and any^{other kind ofevidence is} wholly irrelevant. Itfollows _that, ifany^ethical philosopher^{offers for} propositions ofthefirst kind any evidence whatever,^orif,for propositions ofthe second_kind, he either fails to adduce both causal and ethical truths, or adduces truths that are neither, his reasoning has not the ^least tendency ^{to establish his} conclusions. But _{not only} are his conclusions_totally devoid ofweight^: we have, moreover, reason to suspect him ofthe error of confusion; since the _offeringof irrelevant evidencegenerally indicates that the philosopher who

offers it has had before his mind, not the question which he professes to answer, but some other _entirely different one.

Ethical discussion, hitherto, has perhaps ^consisted chiefly in reasoning ^ofthis totally irrelevant kind.

One main _{object of} this book may, ^then, be expressed by

slightlychanging ^{one of} Kants famous titles. I have endea voured to write Prolegomena ^to any ^future Ethics that can possibly pretend ^to be scientific. In other _words, I have endeavoured to discoverwhat are the fundamental principles of ethical reasoning; and the establishment of these principles, rather than ofany conclusions which may be attained by ^their

use, may be regarded^as my ^main object. I have, however, also attempted, ⁱⁿ Chapter ^{VI, to} present some conclusions, with regard ^to the proper answer of the question What is good ⁱⁿ

itself? which are very^different from any which have commonlv been advocated by philosophers. ^I have tried to define the classes withinwhich all great goods and evils fall_; and I have maintained that very many^different things ^are good and ^evil

X

in themselves, and that neither class of things possesses any other propertywhich is both common to all its members and peculiar to them.

In order to express the ^fact that ethical propositions of my

first class are incapable ^of proof ^ordisproof, I have sometimes followed Sidgwick^s usage ⁱⁿ calling them ^*Intuitions/ But I

beg ^it may ^be noticed that I am not an Intuitionist/ in the ordinary sense ^of the term. Sidgwick ^himself seems never to have been _clearly aware of the immense _importance of the difference which distinguishes ^his Intuitionism from the

common _doctrine, which has generally been called by ^that name. The Intuitionist proper ^is distinguished by ^maintain ing that propositions of my ^{second class} propositions which assert that acertain action is right or a duty are incapable ^of proof^or disproofbyanyenquiry ^into the results ofsuchactions.

I, on the _contrary, am no less anxious to maintain _{that pro} positions ofthis kind arenot Intuitions, thanto maintain that propositions ofmyfirst class are Intuitions.

Again, ^I would wish it observed _that, when I call such propositions Intuitions/ I mean _merely to assertthat they ^are incapable ^ofproof^{; I} imply nothing whatever ^{as to the} manner

or origin of our cognition ^of them. Still less do I imply (as

most Intuitionists have _{done) that}any proposition whateveris true, becausewe _cognise it in a_particularway^orby^theexercise ofany particular faculty^: I hold, on the_contrary, that inevery

way ^{in which it is} possible to cognise a true proposition, ^{it is} also possible tocognise a ^{false one.}

When this book had been already completed, ^I found, ⁱⁿ Brentanos Origin ^of the Knowledge ^of Right and Wrong^1,

1 TheOrigin^oftheKnowledge^ofEightand Wrong. By^FranzBrentano.

English Translation by^CecilHague. Constable, 1902. ^Ihavewritten a review of thisbook, which_{will, Ihope,appear} in the International Journal _ofEthics for October, 1903. ^Imay^{refer tothisreviewforafulleraccountof}my^reasons

fordisagreeingwith Brentano.

PREFACE XI

opinions^far more _{closely resembling}my own, than those ^ofany other ethical writer with whom I am acquainted. Brentano appears ^to agree with me _{completely (1)} inregarding^{all ethical} propositions as defined by^{the fact that} they predicate asingle unique objective concept; (2) in dividing such propositions sharply into the same two kinds; (3) in holding that the ^first kind areincapable of proof; and ₍₄₎with regard ^to thekind of evidence which ^is _necessary and relevant to the proof ^{of the} second kind. But he regards the fundamental ethicalconcept as being,not the simple one which I denote by good, butthe complex ^one which I have taken to define beautiful _; and he does not _recognise,but even deniesbyimplication,the _principle which I have called the principle of organic ^unities. In conse quence ^{of these} two differences, his conclusions as to what things are good ⁱⁿ themselves, also differ very materially from mine. He_{agrees, however,} that there are many different goods, and that the love of good andbeautiful objects constitutes an important^class among^them.

I wish to refer to one oversight, of which I became aware only when it was too late to correct _it,and which may, ^I am

afraid, cause unnecessary ^{trouble to} some readers. I have omitted to discuss directlythe mutual relations of the several different notions, which are all expressed by ^the word ^*end.

The consequences ^{of this} omission may perhaps be _partially avoided by^areference to my^{article on} Teleology ⁱⁿ Baldwins

Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.

If I were to rewrite my ^{work now, I should make a} very different, andI believe that I could make a much better book.

Butitmay ^{be doubted} whether,ⁱⁿ attempting^to satisfymyself, I might not merely render more obscure the ideas which I am

most anxious to convey, without a corresponding gainⁱⁿ com

pleteness and_accuracy. However that may be, my ^{belief that}

to publish the book as it stands wasprobably the best thing^I could _do,does not prevent me _{from being painfully}aware that

itisfull ofdefects.

TRFNITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

August, ^1903.

[Thisbookisnow_reprintedwithout any^{alterationwhatever,} except that a few misprintsandgrammatical^mistakeshave been corrected. It is reprinted, because I am ^still inagreement^with

its main tendency and conclusions; and it isreprinted without alteration, because I found _that, if I were to begin correcting

what in it seemed to me to need correction, I could not stop shortofrewriting the whole book.

G. E. MJ

CAMBRIDGE, ^1922.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER ^I.

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS.

SECTION. PAGE

1. In orderto define Ethics,wemustdiscoverwhatisbothcommon and_peculiartoallundoubtedethicaljudgments^{; . . . 1}

2. but this is not that they are concerned with human conduct, but that they are concernedwithacertainpredicate good, anditsconverse bad, whichmaybe appliedbothtoconduct

andtoother_things.

... ...

3. The_subjectsofthejudgments^{ofascientificEthics are}not, like those ofsome_studies, ^*particular things ; ^. . . . 3 4. but ^itincludesalluniversaljudgments which^{asserttherelation}

of goodness ^toanysubject,andhenceincludes Casuistry ^. 3 B.

5. Itmust, however, enquire not onlywhat things are universally related to goodness, but_also,what this predicate, to which

they are related, ^is: 6

6. and theanswerto thisquestion^is thatitisindefinable . . 6 7. orsimple^:forifby^definitionbemeantthe analysis^ofan_object

ofthought,onlycomplexobjectscan bedefined; . . . 7 8. and ofthe three senses inwhich definition canbe_used,this

isthemost important ⁸

9. Whatisthus indefinableisnot^*the good, or thewhole ofthat which alwayspossesses the predicate good, butthispredicate

itself. 8

10. Good, then,denotesone uniquesimple object^ofthoughtamong innumerableothers;butthisobjecthas_verycommonly^been

identified with some other a _fallacy which may ^{be called}

thenaturalistic fallacy ^.

...

M. b

SECT. PAGE 11. and which reduces what is used as afundamentalprinciple of

Ethics either to a tautology or ^to a statement about the

meaning^{ofaword. 10}

12. Thenatureof this fallacy^iseasilyrecognised^{; . . .} .12

13. and if it were avoided, it would be plain that the only^alter nativestotheadmissionthat good ^isindefinable,are either that ^it is complex ^{or that there is} nonotion atallpeculiar to Ethics alternatives which can only be refuted by ^an appeal^toinspection, but which can besorefuted. . . 16 14. The naturalistic fallacy illustrated byBentham; andtheim

portanceof avoiding^itpointed^{out. 17}

a

15. Therelationswhichethicaljudgments^{assert tohold}universally between goodness andother things are oftwokinds:a_thing

may ^{be asserted either to be} good ^{itselfor to} be _causally relatedtosomething^elsewhichisitselfgood ^tobe good^as

ameans. 21

16. Ourinvestigations of the^latterkindof relationcannot hope^to establishmorethanthatacertainkindof actionwillgenerally befollowedbythe best possible^results;

....

17. but a relation of theformer_kind, iftrue at_all, will be true of allcases. All ordinary^ethicaljudgments^{assertcausalrela}

tions, but they ^are commonly ^{treated as if they did} not, because the two kinds of relation are not distinguished. ^. 23

D.

18. Theinvestigation of intrinsic valuesiscomplicatedby^{the fact} that the value ofa whole may^{bedifferentfromthesumof}

the values ofitsparts, 27

19. inwhichcasethe parthastothewholea_relation,whichexhibits an_equallyimportant^differencefromandresemblancetothat

ofmeanstoend ₂₉

20. The term ^*_organic whole might^well be used todenote that a whole hasthisproperty,since,of thetwo other properties whichitiscommonly^{used to}imply,

...

21. one,that of reciprocal causal dependence betweenparts, hasno

necessaryrelation to thisone,

...

22. and the _other, upon which most ^{stress has been laid, can be} true ofno whole whatsoever,being aseif-contradictorycon

ceptiondueto confusion.

...

23. Summary^ofchapter ^{. .}

...

CONTENTS ^XT

CHAPTER ^II.

NATURALISTIC ETHICS.

SBCT.

24. Thisandthetwofollowing chapters^willconsidercertainproposed answers to thesecondof ethicalquestions^: Whatisgoodⁱⁿ

itself¹ These proposed answers^arecharacterisedby^thefacts

(1)that they declaresomeonekindofthing^to be alonegood initself_; and_{(2) that they}do_so,because theysuppose^this one thing^{to define}themeaning^of good.

....

25. Suchtheoriesmay^{bedividedinto}two groups (1)Metaphysical, (2; Naturalistic: and the second group may ^{be subdivided}

intotwo_others,(a)theorieswhichdeclaresomenatural_object, otherthanpleasure, tobesolegood,(6)Hedonism. The_pre sent chapter^willdealwith_(a). . . . . . .38

26. Definitionofwhatismeant_by Naturalism.

....

27. The common _argument that things are good, because they are natural, may ^{involve either} (1) the false proposition that

the normal, ^assuch, ^isgood

;...

28. or ₍₂₎ the false proposition that the necessary, ^as such, ^is good

...

29. But a systematized appeal ^to Natureis nowmost _prevalentin connection with the term Evolution. An examination of

Mr Herbert Spencer^{s Ethics will illustrate this} form of

Naturalism.

...

30. Darwins scientific theory ^of natural _selection, which has mainly ^{caused the} modern _vogue of the term _Evolution, must be _carefully distinguished from certain ideas which are commonly ^{associated with the latter term.}

...

31. Mr _Spencer^s connection of Evolution with Ethics seems to shew the influence ofthe naturalistic fallacy^{; . .} .48

32. but Mr_Spencerisvague^astothe ethical relations of pleasure and evolution, andhisNaturalismmay^bemainly Natural

isticHedonism

...

33. A discussionofthe third chapter ^of theDataof Ethics serves to illustrate these two _points and to shewthat Mr_Spencer

isinutterconfusionwith regard^tothefundamental_principles

ofEthics

...

34. Three _possible views as to therelation of Evolution toEthics are distinguished from the naturalistic view to which it is

proposed ^{to confine the} name Evolutionistic Ethics. On any^{ofthesethree views the relation}would be unimportant, and the Evolutionistic view, which makes it important,

involves a double _fallacy.

...

35. Summary ^ofchapter.

.... ...

62

CHAPTER ^III.

HEDONISM.

SECT. PAGE

36. The prevalence ofHedonism is mainly due ^{to the}naturalistic

fallacy 59

37. Hedonismmay^be defined as thedoctrine that^*Pleasureisthe sole good ^{: this doctrine}has always been ^heldby^Hedonists and used by them ^{as a} fundamental ethical principle, al though ^it has commonly been confused with others. . 61 38. Themethod_pursued in thischapter^{willconsistin}exposing^the

reasons commonlyoffered for the truth of Hedonism andin bringing out the reasons, whichsufficetoshewituntrue,by acriticismofJ.S. Mill&^H. _Sidgwick. ^. .63

39. Mill declares that Happiness ^isthe onlythingdesirable asan end, and insists that ^*Questions ^{of ultimate} ends are not amenabletodirectproof ;

...

40. yet he _gives aproof of the ^first proposition,which consistsin (1)thefallaciousconfusion of desirable with _desired, . 66 41. (2)an attempt^toshewthatnothing butpleasure^isdesired. 67 42. The theory that nothing but pleasure ^is desired seems_largely

due to a confusion between the cause and the _object of desire^:pleasure ^iscertainly not thesole object of desire,and, even if it is always among ^{the causes of} desire, that fact would not tempt anyone ^to think it a _good.

...

43. Mill attempts^{toreconcile his}doctrine that pleasure^isthesole object of desire with his admission that other things are desired, by ^{the absurd} declaration that what is a meansto

happiness^is a_part ofhappiness ⁷¹

44. Summary^{of Mills}argument and^ofmy^criticism.

...

45. Wemustnow_proceedtoconsiderthe principle ofHedonismas an _Intuition, as which it has been _{clearly recognised} by

Prof. Sidgwick ^alone. That it should be thus incapable of proof^isnot, initself, any^reasonfor dissatisfaction. . . 74 46. In thus beginning ^{to consider} what _{things are good} inthem

selves, we leave the refutation of Naturalism _behind, and enterontheseconddivision ofethicalquestions. 76

CONTENTS XV11

SECT. PAOB

47. Millsdoctrine thatsomepleasures are superior ⁱⁿ quality ^to others implies both ₍₁₎ that judgments ^of ends must be

intuitions ; 77

48. and ₍₂₎that pleasure^isnotthesolegood. ^{. . .} 79

49. Prof. Sidgwick has avoided these confusionsmade_byMill: in considering ^his arguments we _{shall, therefore, merely con}

sider the question ^Is pleasure the ^sole good

1

?

...

50. Prof. Sidgwick ^{first tries to} shew that nothing ^{outside of}

Human Existence can be good. Reasons are given ^for

doubting^this.

...

51. He then _goesontothe farmore_importantproposition thatno part^ofHumanExistence, exceptpleasure, ^isdesirable. . 85 52. But _pleasure must be distinguished from consciousness of

pleasure, and ₍₁₎ it is plain that, when so distinguished,

pleasure ^is not the sole good;

....

53. and ₍₂₎ it may ^be made _{equally plain} that consciousness of pleasure^is not thesolegood,^ifweare equallycareful to dis tinguish^itfrom itsusualaccompaniments 90 54. Of Prof. Sidgwick^s two arguments ^for the contrary view, the

second is equally compatible ^{with the} supposition that pleasure ^is a mere criterion ofwhat is right; . . .91

55. and in his _first, the appeal to reflective intuition, he fails to putthe questionclearly(1)inthathedoesnot recognise the

principle oforganic^unities; . . . . . . .92

56. and(2)inthathe failstoemphasize^thattheagreement, which he has tried to shew, between hedonistic judgments and thoseofCommonSense, only holds ^ofjudgmentsofmeans:

hedonisticjudgments^{ofends are}flagrantlyparadoxical. ^. 94 57. I conclude, then, that a reflective intuition, ^ifproper precau

tions are taken, ^will agree with Common Sense that it is

absurdtoregardmere consciousness ofpleasure as the ^sole

good. 95

0.

58. It remains to consider Egoism andUtilitarianism Itis im portant ^to distinguish the former,^as the doctrine that my

own _pleasure is sole good, from the _doctrine, opposed ^to Altruism, that to pursue my ^own pleasure exclusively ^is

right as a means 96

59. Egoism proper ^is utterly untenable, being self-contradictory^: itfailstoperceive that whenI declare a thing^to bemy^own

good, ^I mustbe declaring^ittobe goodabsolutelyorelsenot

goodat all ^. 97