BARRIOQUINTO vs. FERNANDEZ January 21, 1949, Feria
Petitioners: Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto, charged with the crime of murder
Action: To compel respondents to decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty. Respondents: Commissioners of the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission (GAC)
Facts:
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto charged with the crime of murder o Barrioquinto not yet been arrested
o Jimenez sentenced by CFI life imprisonment.
Before expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal, Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation
o Issued by Pres. Manuel Roxas with concurrence by Congress o Based on Art. VII, Sec. 10, par. 6 of Consti
o Did not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives Jimenez and Barrioquinto submitted ther cases to the GAC.
Jan. 9, 1947 – GAC returned the cases of the petitioners to CFI Zamboanga without deciding WON they are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, because Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have not admitted committed the offense
Issue:
WON GAC should to immediately proceed to hear and decide the applications for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez Held/Ratio:
Yes. Pardon
- granted by the Chief Executive
- a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof - granted to one after conviction
- looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, i.e., it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (Art. 36, RPC).
Amnesty
- by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress - a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice
- granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
- looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is NOT necessary that he should admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense it is sufficient that the evidence shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
It is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty.
Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the GAC should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established CANNOT be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation not only as innocent but as a patriot or hero, cannot be punished as a criminal.
VERA vs. PEOPLE January 31, 1963, Barrera
Petitioners: Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Paulino Bayran, and 92 others, as John Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon.
Action: Invoking the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, series of 1946 to the 8th GAC Facts:
No one admitted having committed the crime charged. Vera, the only defendant who took the witness stand, denied killing
GAC: (Jan. 12, 1956) REMAND to court of origin for trial. It could NOT take cognizance of the case, because the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who (1) admits the commission of the crime (2) pleads that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement, and (3) perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation.
MR denied
GAC: (January 11, 1957): MR DENIED. Defendants NOT entitled to amnesty since deceased was actually a lieutenant of the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organization then engaged in the resistance movement it may not be said with any amount of truth that the aforesaid killing was to further the resistance movement at the time, as the defense intimates. Rather, the killing of Lt. Lozañes of the Hunters ROTC Guerrilla would tend to weakened commensurately the resistance movement against the Japanese invaders.
o Implied admission NOT sufficient, per AO 144 of DOJ: ―. . . in order that the Amnesty Commission may take cognizance of the case, the accused admit that he committed the acts charged against him in furtherance of the resistance movement or against persons who aided in the war efforts of the enemy
Issue:
1. WON it is not necessary for the defendants to admit the commission of the crime to be entitled to amnesty 2. WON the case is validly applied for an amnesty
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. New ruling: People vs. Llanita, et al. (April 26, 1950) and People vs. Guillermo, et al. (May 19, 1950), wherein: defendants must admit commission of crime to be entitled to amnesty
"It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation." (Emphasis supplied.)
2. No. The killing of the deceased was NOT in furtherance of the resistance movement, but was due to the rivalry between (1) the Hunter's Guerrilla, to which he belonged, and (3) the Vera's Guerrilla of petitioners.
CRISTOBAL vs. LABRADOR December 7, 1940, Laurel
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its election case No. 7890, rendered on November 28, 1940, sustaining the right of Teofilo C. Santos to remain in the list of registered voters in precinct No. 11 of the municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal.
The antecedents which form the factual background of this election controversy are briefly narrated as follows:
Petitioner: Cristobal, he believes that the pardon to Teofilo did not restore Teofilo to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does NOT apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.
March 15, 1930 – CFI Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos, respondent herein, guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to 6 months of arresto mayor, committed Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo, the amounts P375 and P125
CA: (December 20, 1930) AFFIRMED
Imprisoned from March 14, 1932 - August 18, 1932 Civil liability was
Despite conviction, Teofilo continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon for 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal president of that municipality.
August 22, 1938 - Commonwealth Act No. 357, ―Election Code‖ approved by the National Assembly
o Section 94, paragraph (b) of Election Code disqualifies Teofilo from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property."
In view of this provision, Teofilo applied to the President, for an absolute pardon He was favorably recommended by the Secretary of Justice
December 24, 1939 – pardon GRANTED, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility."
November 16, 1940 - Petitioner Miguel Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Teofilo from the list of voters because Teofilo is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of the Election Code.
Court: (November 28, 1940) DENIED. Pardon has had the effect of excluding the respondent from the disqualification Cristobal filed petition for certiorari
It is the contention of the petitioner that the pardon granted by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondent to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these propositions involve an inquiry into the primary question of the nature and extent of the pardoning power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation by the Constitution.
Issue:
WON pardon by the President may be restricted by legislative action Held/Ratio:
Yes.
Par. of section 11 of Article VII Consti:
o “The President shall have the (1) power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem pro to impose. He shall have the (2) power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
o 2 limitations:
2. Such power does NOT extend cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power CANNOT be restricted or controlled by legislative action. An absolute pardon removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.
ICAB, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting.
When pardon is granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, it removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
o ICAB, while the pardon extended to Teofilo is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
PELOBELLO vs. PLATINO June 20, 1941, Laurel
Petitioner: Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI Tayabas against Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque.
Facts:
Proceedings were had pursuant to the provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94 (a), of the Election Code.
It was alleged that the Teofilo, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of attack to persons in authority; imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by plenary pardon.
Was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915;
December 25, 1940 - the President, granted the respondent absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights. Issue:
1. WON the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office (Sec. 4, Election Code).
Held/Ratio: No
1. The pardoning power CANNOT be restricted or controlled by legislative action;
a. an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction;
b. when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. c. That the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the
President who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.
d. ICAB,
i. it is admitted that the Platino committed the offense more than 25 years ago; ii. he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915;
iii. thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940.
2. Under the circumstances above, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
IN RE LONTOK April 7, 1922, Malcolm
Action: For disbarment of Marcleino Lontok because of being convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude (Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 21.)
Facts:
Lontok, in answer, prays that the charges be dismissed, and bases his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former Governor General Harrison.
Lontok was convicted CFI Zambales of the crime of bigamy, AFFIRMED by the SC.
February 9, 1921 - a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of the following tenor: Lontok’s sentence REMITTED provided he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct
Issue:
WON an action for disbarment is proper when a lawyer commits a crime involving moral turpitude Held/Ratio:
No
Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted.
But where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law.
"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender;
o When the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the of fender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.
If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as
it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
"There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment."
Article 130 of the Penal Code: one of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by pardon.
The motion for disbarment is based solely on the judgment of conviction for a crime of which the respondent has been pardoned, and that the language of the pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in nature to a parole.
If Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct, the condition of his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to disbarment.
TORRES vs. GONZALES July 23, 1987, Feliciano
Petitioner: William Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa
Action: Original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner. He impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that (1) he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment in estafa and sedition; (2) he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
We issued the writ and during the hearing and from the return filed by the respondents through the Solicitor General, and other pleadings in this case, the following facts emerged:
Facts:
<1979 - Torres was convicted by the CFI Manila of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from 11 years, 10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75; AFFIRMEDF by the CA. Maximum sentence to EXPIRE on November 2, 2000
April 18, 1979 - a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President provided that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.‖ Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
May 21, 1986 – the Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres, relying upon the decisions in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of
Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]).
o Evidence showed that on March 22, 1982 and June 24, 1982, Torres had been charged with 22 counts of estafa, which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the RTC Rizal.
o Also, on June 26, 1985, Torres had been convicted by the RTC Rizal of the crime of sedition: this conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
o On January 14, 1986 (NBI addressed to the Board) – A long list of charges had been brought against Torres during the last 20 years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of BP 22, and violation of PD 772 (interfering with police functions). Some having been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a status report on each of the charges there listed and identified. LLpr
June 4, 1986 - Minister of Justice wrote to the President informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to Torres
September 8, 1986 - the President cancelled the conditional pardon
October 10, 1986 – Torres was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Issue:
WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
Held/Ratio:
Issue has 3 precedents:
1. Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons
- The determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, we held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered." By accepting the terms under which the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that the Governor-General's determination (rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. In reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code which empowered the Governor-General. LibLex
2. Sales vs. Director of Prisons
- The executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it, and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him." 9
- "Due process is not necessarily judicial. The appellee had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition, with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted." 12
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either (1) a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be (2) a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
o Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
IBP vs. ZAMORA
August 15, 2000, Kanpunan
Action: Special civil action to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
Facts:
Because of increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order.
Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
Issues:
1. WON the President has full discretion in calling out the armed forces
2. WON the President has factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
3. WON the court may review calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. It is the intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
o Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
o This power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus: Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
2. Yes. The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces he categorically asserted that, violent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila. . .(recent bombings) 3. Yes. Only when the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment
deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. (On the other hand, the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. – calling out vs. martial law and suspension of writ of habeas corpus)
SANLAKAS vs. EXEC. SEC. February 3, 2004, Tinga Facts:
Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring ―a state of rebellion‖ and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
State of rebellion LIFTED on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435. Issue:
WON the declaration of state of rebellion an unstated residual power by the President Held/Ratio:
Yes
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ―sequence‖ of ―graduated powers.‖ 1. The calling out power
2. The power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 3. The power to declare martial law.
- In the exercise of the first power, the Constitution states: “whenever it becomes necessary” the President may call the armed forces ―to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.‖
- In the exercise of the latter 2 powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of 2 conditions, namely: a. an actual invasion or rebellion
b. public safety requires the exercise of such power.
The Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State.
The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.
o … unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
AQUINO vs. ENRILE
September 17, 1974, Makalintal
Petition: 9 petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of the President's Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972.
The petitioners in the other cases, except Benigno Aquino, Jr. (G.R. No. L-35546), either have been permitted to withdraw their petitions or have been released from detention subject to certain restrictions.
o In the case of Aquino, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearms were lodged against him with a Military Commission on August 11, 1973;
o On the following August 23: he challenged the jurisdiction of said Commission as well as his continued detention by virtue of those charges in a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in this Court (G.R. No. L-37364).
o The question came up as to WON Aquino's petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed on the ground that the case as to him should more appropriately be resolved in this new petition. Of the twelve Justices, however, eight voted against such dismissal and chose to consider the case on the merits.
Facts:
Petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force . . ." General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 (September
21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial law.
o In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, he ordered the (1) to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, (2) prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and (3) to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction
o He ordered all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by him.
1935 Constitution:
"The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."
Issues:
1. WON the Court may inquire into the validity of Proclamation No. 1081
2. WON petitions should be dismissed (petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn their petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions)
Held/Ratio:
1. Various opinions:
a. Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino - the question is political and therefore its determination is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
b. Justice Barredo - political questions are not per se beyond the Court's jurisdiction, the Judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being plenary and all-embracing, but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with the Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does with national security, for which the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone. c. Justice Esguerra - maintains that the findings of the President on the existence of the grounds for the declaration of martial law are final
and conclusive upon the Courts.
d. Justice Antonio - finds that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the factor of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare martial law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided to him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.
e. Justices Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Muñoz Palma - the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the Court. The test is not whether the President's decision is correct but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily. Applying this test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the President's proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I concur with them in that finding. The factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, particularly in regard to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, had not disappeared, indeed had been exacerbated, as events shortly before said proclamation clearly demonstrated. On this point the Court is practically unanimous; Justice Teehankee merely refrained from discussing it.
2. With respect to the petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn their petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions, 5 the ruling of the Court is that the petitions should be dismissed.
- The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the existence of a state of rebellion, necessarily implies the power (subject, in the opinion of the Justices who consider Lansang
applicable, to the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released detainees conditions or restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out the purposes of the proclamation. Justice Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel of petitioner Rodrigo" and others similarly situated and so to this extent dissents from the ruling of the majority; while Justice Teehankee believes that those restrictions do not constitute deprivation of physical liberty within the meaning of the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
- Implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said privilege with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take precedence. On this particular point, that is, that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, the Court is practically
unanimous. Justice Fernando, however, says that to him that is still an open question; and Justice Muñoz Palma qualifiedly dissents from the majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons she discusses therein votes for the dismissal of the petitions.
DISMISSED. OLAGUER vs. MC May 22, 1987, Gancayco
Action: Prohibition and habeas corpus (1) to enjoin Military Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the trial of their case, and (2) release from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law, in gross violation of their constitutional right to due process of law.
Facts:
December 24, 1979 - Petitioners Eduardo B. Olaguer and 9 others (all civilians) were arrested by the military authorities, all initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City, then transferred to the detention center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer who remained in detention at Camp Crame.
May 30, 1980 - petitioners were charged for subversion
June 13, 1980 - respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP created Military Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed against the petitioners. July 30, 1980 - an amended charge sheet was filed for 7, namely: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2)
conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. 5 Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.
August 19, 1980 - petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
MC: (December 4, 1984) CONVICTED the petitioners, DEATH by electrocution. Supervening events:
o January 17, 1981 – President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045 officially lifting martial law in the Philippines; this revoked General Order No. 8 (creating military tribunals) and directed that "the military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby dissolved upon final determination of cases pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules on double jeopardy, or other circumstances which render prosecution of the cases difficult, if not impossible."; and
o January 1981 - Petitioner Ester Misa-Jimenez was granted provisional liberty in January, 1981. Eduardo Olaguer and Othoniel Jimenez obtained provisional liberty on January 23, 1986. The rest of the petitioners have been released sometime before or after President Aquino assumed office in February, 1986.
WON a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. Held/Ratio:
No. Military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning. Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.
The trial is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are NOT courts within the Philippine judicial system.
―Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have 'exclusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.'
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.
NAVALES vs. ABAYA October 25, 2004, Callejo, Sr.
Action: Assails the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial to conduct the court-martial proceedings involving several junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP charged with violations of the Articles of War in connection with their participation in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003.
Facts:
G.R. No. 162341: Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido filed Petition for Habeas Corpus seeking the release of his clients, junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, who are allegedly being unlawfully detained by virtue of the Commitment Order 1 dated August 2, 2003 issued by General Narciso L. Abaya, Chief of Staff of the AFP, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War.
G.R. No. 162318: Petitioners (hereinafter referred to as 1Lt. Navales, et al.), 7 of the detained junior officers and enlisted men, filed with this Court a Petition to enjoin the General Court-Martial from proceeding with the trial of the petitioners and their co-accused for alleged violations of the Articles of War.
August 1, 2003 – RTC charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the "Oakwood Incident" with violation of Article 134-A (coup d'etat) of the Revised Penal Code.
o Among those charged were petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. (G.R. No. 162318) and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus Capt. Reaso, et al. (G.R. No. 162341).
September 12, 2003 - 243 of the accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying that the trial court: o Assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in accordance with Republic Act No. 7055; and
o Order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable cause against 316 of the 321 accused and, should the prosecution fail to do so, dismiss the case as against the 316 other accused.
Oct. 20, 2003 - DOJ issued the Resolution finding probable cause for coup d'etat against only 31 of the original 321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence. cCAIaD
Meanwhile, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. were charged before the General Court-Martial with violations of the Articles of War (AW), particularly: AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), AW 63 (Disrespect to the President, the Secretary of Defense, etc.) and AW 64 (Disrespect Towards Superior Officer). 12 On the other hand, Capt.
Petitioners: Citing Section 1 of RA 7055 Since the RTC (Branch 148), in its Order dated February 11, 2004, already declared that the
offenses for which all the accused were charged were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d'etat, the General Court-Martial no longer has jurisdiction over them.
o As such, respondents Gen. Abaya and the JAGO have no authority to constitute the General Court-Martial, to charge and prosecute the petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection with the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident. o The petitioners posit that, as a corollary, there is no longer any basis for their continued detention under the Commitment Order
dated August 2, 2003 issued by Gen. Abaya considering that the charge against them for coup d'etat had already been dismissed.
Respondents: The Order dated February 11, 2004 promulgated by the RTC (Branch 148), insofar as it resolved the Omnibus Motion and
declared that the charges against all the accused, including those excluded in the Amended Information, were not service-connected, is null and void.
o At the time that the said motion was resolved, petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. (as movants therein) were no longer parties in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 as the charge against them was already dismissed by the RTC (Branch 61) in the Order dated November 14, 2003.
o Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. no longer had any personality to pursue the Omnibus Motion since one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the petitioners were not "real parties in interest" at the time that their Omnibus Motion was resolved by the RTC (Branch 148).
Issue:
WON the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus. Held/Ratio:
No.
RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d'etat, null and void.
o The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve the Omnibus Motion, which prayed for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military courts in accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055.
o The said Omnibus Motion was filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the original accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003. However, this information was subsequently superseded by the Amended Information dated October 20, 2003 under which only 31 were charged with the crime of coup d'etat.
o In the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61), the Amended Information was admitted and the case against the 290 accused, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed.
o The said Order became final and executory since no motion for reconsideration thereof had been filed by any of the parties. o Therefore, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus Motion on February 11, 2004, the said motion had already
been rendered moot by the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61) admitting the Amended Information under which only 31 of the accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290.
It had become moot with respect to those whose charge against them was dismissed, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., because they were no longer parties to the case.
In view of this the case against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza, there being no motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of the accused.
Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who are no longer charged with coup d'etat, cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC (Branch 148) that the charges filed before the General Court-Martial against them were not service-connected. The same is a superfluity and cannot be given effect for having been made by the RTC (Branch 148) without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Such declaration was made by the RTC (Branch 148) in violation of Section 1, RA 7055
Section 1. Members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
o RA 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
o In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as "service-connected offenses or crimes" under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.
o Therefore, RTC in declaring that these charges were not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d'etat, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.
Further, the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. The term "court" necessarily includes the General Court-Martial These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al., as they are under detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003 issued by respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 35 of the Articles of War.
The General Court-Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. under Rep. Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.
LANSANG vs. GARCIA December 11, 1971, Concepcion
Petitioner: Action:
Respondent: Brigadier-General Eduardo Garcia Facts:
August 21, 1971 (9pm) - 2 hand grenades were thrown while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971
8 were killed and many more injured, including candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.
August 23, 1971 - President announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:
". . . by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith."
Petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed, by several persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of their detention, namely:
Respondents: Alleges:
1. Petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;"
2. That "their continued detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines;"
3. That there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country, and that "public safety and the security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the Philippines in Proclamation No. 889;" 4. Safeguards are set forth in:
a. No arrest shall be made without warrant authorized in writing by the Secretary of National Defense;
b. Such authority shall not be granted unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences," it appears satisfactorily, in accordance with Rule 113, section 6 (b), of the Rules of Court, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of the acts mentioned in the proclamation;
c. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27 and 30, 1971, to all units of his command, stating that the privilege of the writ is suspended for no other persons than those specified in the proclamation;
d. A memorandum of the DND, dated September 2, 1971, directing the Chief of the Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to prevent and/or check any abuses in connection with the suspension of the privilege of the writ; and e. EO 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential Administrative Assistance Committee to hear complaints regarding abuses
committed in connection with the implementation of Proclamation No. 889.
In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents therein traversed some allegations of fact and conclusions of law made in the petition therein and averred that Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitioner therein, had been and is detained "on the basis of a reasonable ground to believe that he has
committed overt acts in furtherance of rebellion or insurrection against the government" and, accordingly, "comes within the class of persons as to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended by Proclamation No. 889, as amended," the validity of which is not contested by him.
On August 30, 1971 - the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending Proclamation No. 889, so as to read as follows:
". . . by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion[,] and [all] other [crimes and offenses] over acts committed by them in furtherance [or on the occasion] thereof [,]. [or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.]"
September 18, 1971 - Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in certain provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the Philippines.
Issues:
1. WON "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege or the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons."
Held/Ratio:
Yes, provided it is within the constitutional limitations of the President. PP 889, NOT unsconstitutional
o 2 conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: 1. There must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger‖, and
2. For "public safety"
o The PP under consideration declares that there has been and there is actually a state of rebellion and that "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State."
o Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
- However the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
o The function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. IN RE DE VILLA
November 17, 2004, Ynares-Snatiago
Petition: For the issuance of a writ of habeas Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: (1) that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and (2) that petitioner be granted a new trial.
SC: (February 1, 2001) GUILTY of rape in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa; victim: Aileen Mendoza (12 yrs and 10 mos. then), his niece by affinity; RECLUSION PERPETUA; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
3 years after the promulgation of our Decision, June de Villa alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child, Leahlyn.
De Villa requested that DNA test be conducted, DENIED DNA test granted, saliva samples to NSRI
DNA report (March 21, 2003) - De Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's.
Issues:
1. WON issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory judgment is proper with the presence of new evidence; and
2. WON the granting a new trial under the same factual scenario is proper Held/Ratio:
1. No. In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings.
a. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction.
b. Mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
c. In the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the writ of habeas corpus was held to be available where an accused was deprived of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
2. No. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds.
a. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice.
b. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed
during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
- ICAB, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-discovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.
DISMISSED. DAVID vs. ARROYO
May 3, 2006, Sandoval-Gutierrez
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary.1 Superior strength – the use of force – cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity."
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?
Facts:
February 24, 2006 - 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. Basis: conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the UP and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely. March 3, 2006 - President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
Issues:
1. WON SC can review the factual bases of PP 1017. 2. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. Held/Ratio:
B. SUBSTANTIVE
1. Yes. But insofar as the petitioner raises arbitrariness on the part of the President
In Lansang "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily."
Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
In IBP, SC ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. 2. Not entirely
The various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists –- from Lock’s "theory of prerogative," to Watkins’ doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwain’s "principle of constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.
