CASE DIGEST
ON
TORTS & DAMAGES
PROFESSOR: ATTY. JUN DE GRANO
Submitted by:
List of Cases on Torts
Assigned
1 Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 Dilig 05
2 Alfialda vs. Spouses Hisole, 85 Phil 67 Cuyco 07
3 Alitalia vs. IAC, 192 SCRA 9 Lopez addendum
4 Amadora vs. CA, 160 SCRA 315 Menzon 09
5 Atlantic Gulf vs. CA, 249 SCRA 397 Bolos 10
6 Batiquin vs. CA, 258 SCRA 334 Equetan 12
7 Bonifacio vs. BLTB, 34 SCRA 618 Estanislao 13
8 Bustamante, et al., vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 89880, 6 February 1991 Lasque 14 9 Cangco vs. The Manila Railroad Company, 38 Phil 768 Aure Addendum
10
Capuno, et al., vs. Pepsi Cola, et al. G.R. No.
L-19331, 30 April 1965 Leon 16
11
China Airlines vs. CA, G.R. NO. 45985, 18 May
1990 Estanislao 18
12
City of Manila vs. Teotico, G.R. No. L-23052, 29
January 1968 Padlan 19
13
Corliss, et al., vs. The Manila Railroad Co., 27
SCRA 674 Acosta 20
14 Cruz vs. NLRC, 203 SCRA 286 Villanueva 21
15
Cuadra vs. Monfort, G.R. No. L-24101, 30
September 1970 Lopez 22
16
Culion Ice, Fish and Electric Co., Inc. vs. Phil.
Motors Corp., 55 Phil 129 Aure 23
17 Daywalt vs. Recoletos, 39 Phil 587 Barrios 24
18 De Guzman vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 90856, 23 July 1992 Roxas 26
19 Dichoso vs. CA, 192 SCRA 169 Gumabay 28
20 EPG Construction vs. CA, 210 SCRA 230 Rodriguez 30
21 Exconde vs. Capuno, G.R. No. L-10134, 29 June 1957 Lopez 31
22 Fabre vs. CA, 259 SCRA 426 Bolos 32
23 FF Cruz vs. CA, 164 SCRA 733 Equetan 36
24 Filamer Christian College vs. CA, G.R. No. 75112, 17 August 1992 Mendoza 37
25 Filinvest vs. CA, 248 SCRA 549 Salipsip Addendum
26
First Malayan vs. CA, G.R. No. 91378, 9June
1992 Padlan 39
27 Fontanilla vs. Mallaman, G.R. No. L-55963, 1 December 1989 Menzon 40
28 Gatchalian vs. Delim, 203 SCRA 126 De Chavez 41
29 Gelisan vs. Alday, 154 SCRA 388 Rodriguez 43
March 1989
31 Hermosisima vs. CA, 109 Phil 628 Salipsip Addendum
32
Jarco Marketing vs. CA, G.R. NO. 129792, 21
December 1999 Gatioan 46
33 LBC Air Cargo vs. CA, 241 SCRA 619 Dilig 48
34
Lilius, et al. vs. The Manila Railroad Co., 59 Phil
758 Abad 50
35 Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 Agonoy 51
36 Manuel vs. CA, 227 SCRA 29 Gatioan 52
37
Mckee, et al. vs. IAC et al., G.R. No. L-68102, 16
July 1992 Lasque 54
38
Merritt vs. Government, G.R. No. 1-11154, 21
March 1916 Mendoza 56
39 MHP Garments vs. CA, 236 SCRA 227 Agonoy 57
40 Nakpil & Sons vs. CA, G.R. No. L-47851, 3 October 1986 Pador 59 41
NAPOCOR vs. CA, 161 SCRA 334, GRN
L-47379 May 16, 1988 Dayo 62
42
NAPOCOR vs. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. 103442-45,
21 May 1993 Leon 63
43
Pantranco vs. Baesa, GRN 79050 November 14,
1989 Dacanay 64
44 Pecson vs. CA, 244 SCRA 407 Tejano 65
45 PHIMCO vs City of Cebu, 81 SCRA 99 Villanueva 66
46
Phoenix Construction, Inc. et al. vs. IAC, et al.,
148 SCRA 353 Dayo 67
47 Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil 809 Abad 69
48 PLDT vs. CA, 178 SCRA 94 Dacanay 70
49 Ponce vs. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 Sayo 71
50 Rakes vs. Atlantice Gulf, 7 Phil 359 Carlos 72
51 RCPI vs. CA, G.R. No. 79578, March 13, 1991 Cheng 75
52 Rubio vs. CA, 141 SCRA 488 Barrios Addendum
53 Salvosa vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70458,5 October 1988 Mori 77
54 Security Bank vs. CA, 249 SCRA 206 Tejano 79
55 Shookat vs. CA, 219 SCRA 115 Sayo 80
56
Soliman vs. Tuazon, G.R. No. 66207, 18 May
1992 Gatioan 81
57 Taylor vs. Manila Electric, 16 Phil 8 Cuyco 82
58 Umali vs. Bacani, et al., 69 SCRA 263 Acosta 83
59 Velayo vs. Shell, 100 Phil 186 Rodriguez 84
60 Vergara vs. CA, G.R. No. 77679, 30 Sept. 1987 Cheng 85
List of Cases on Damages
Assigned to:
62 Air France vs. CA, GRN 76093 March 21, 1989 Gumabay 88 63 Araos vs. CA, GRN 107057 June 2, 1994 Hamdain 90 64
Consolidated Plywood vs. CA, GRN 101706
September 23, 1992 Roxas Addendum
65 Country Bankers vs. CA, G.R. No. 85161 September 9, 1991 Agonoy 91 66 Davila vs. PAL, GRN L-28512 February 28,1973 Legasto 93 67 De Leon vs. CA, GRN L-31931 August 31, 1988 Villanueva 95 68 Eastern Shipping vs. CA, GRN 97412 July 12, 1994 Mangotara 97 69
Filinvest Credit vs. IAC, GRN L-65935 September 30, 1988
De
Chavez 100
70 Jison vs. CA, GRN L-45349 August 15, 1988 Dacanay 101 71 Lao vs. CA, G.R. No. 82808 July 11,1991 Suntay 102 72
Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, GRN
L-22415. March 30, 1966 Manlapaz 104
73
Malaysian Airline vs. CA, GRN L-78015
December 11, 1987 Bolos 105
74
Octot vs. Ibanez, GRN L-48643 January 18,
1982 Barrios 107
75
PAL vs. CA, G.R. No. 54470. May 8, 1990 (185
SCRA 110) Dayo 109
76
PAL vs. CA, GRN 119641 May 17,1996 (257
SCRA 33) Carlos 110
77 PAL vs. Miano, GRN 106664 March 8, 1995 Hamdain 113 78 Patricio vs. Leviste, GRN 51832 April 26, 1989 Aure 114 79 People vs. Quilaton, GRN 69666 January 23, 1992 Legasto 117 80 PNB vs. Utility Assurance, GRN 39215 September 1, 1989 Manlapaz 120 81
Reformina vs. Tomol, GRN L-59096 October 11,
1985 Mangotara 121
82
Zalamea vs. CA, GRN 104235 November 18,
1993 Suntay 123
83
Zamboanga (ZAMCELCO) vs. Buat, GRN
100514 March 29,1995 Gatioan 126
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents-appellees.
Facts:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted, when an unknown bystander threw a matchstick into the nozzle after lighting a cigarette. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
Issue:
Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees.
Held: Reversed.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
The report submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation that the gasoline station being located on a thickly populated area, a person lighting a cigarette cannot be excluded and poses as a secondary hazard, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts, descriptive of the location and objective
circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.
Even then, the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
Margarita Afialda v. Basilio Hisole and Francisco Hisole G.R. No. L-2075 November 29, 1949
Facts:
This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.
Defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of action, and the motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.
Issue:
Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker.
Ruling:
NO.
The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. Claiming that the lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff contends that the article 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to
the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault.
The distinction is important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, but without costs in view of the financial situation of the appellant.
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 315
FACTS:
On April 13, 1972, Alfredo Amadora while in the Auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
The herein petitioners, as the victim’s parents, filed a civil action under Article 2180 NCC against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of the boys, and the physics teachers together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial the CFI of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.Hence this action for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are liable under Article 2180 NCC.
HELD:
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher in charge during the time of the accident. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline.
Finally, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the Article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the students of apprentice. Neither can it be held liable to answer for the tort committed by any other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending students or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
G.R. Nos. 114841-42 August 23, 1995
ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CARLITO D. CASTILLO, HEIRS OF CRISTETA
CASTILLO and CORNELIO CASTILLO, respondents. REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner company commenced the construction of a steel fabrication plant in the Municipality of Bauan, Batangas, necessitating dredging operations at the Batangas Bay in an area adjacent to the real property of private respondents.
Private respondents alleged that during the on-going construction of its steel and fabrication yard, petitioner's personnel and heavy equipment trespassed into the adjacent parcels of land belonging to private respondents without their consent. These heavy equipments damaged big portions of private respondents' property which were further used by petitioner as a depot or parking lots without paying any rent therefor, nor does it appear from the records that such use of their land was with the former's conformity.
Private respondents further alleged that as a result of the dredging operation of petitioner company, the sea silt and water overflowed and were deposited upon their land. Consequently, the said property which used to be agricultural lands principally devoted to rice production and each averaging an annual net harvest of 75 cavans could no longer be planted with palay as the soil became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture.
Petitioner company denied all the allegations of private respondents and contended that its personnel and equipment had neither intruded upon nor occupied any portion of private respondents' landholdings. The alleged sea silt with water, according to petitioner was due to the flood brought by the heavy rains when typhoon "Ruping" hit and lashed the province of Batangas during that year.
An action for damages was filed with the trial court which decided the case ordering defendant to pay private respondents.
Petitioner company appealed to the Court of Appeals but the said court affirmed the trial court’s judgement with modifications on the amount.
Hence, this petition.
Whether or not the respondent court misapplied Article 2177 of the New Civil Code.
HELD:
When the Court of Appeals ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondents not only the expected total amount of profits the latter would have derived from the expected sale of their palay harvest for 135 months or over 11 years, from the half hectare agricultural land, but also rentals on the basis of P5.00 per square meter of their said entire landholdings it misapplied Article 2177. What Article 2177 says is that no damages can be twice from the same act or omission.
However, the Supreme Court finds that respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in increasing the amount of damages awarded to private respondents by the court a quo.
Respondent appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the judgment of the trial court by increasing the award of damages in favor of private respondents who, in the first place, did not interpose an appeal therefrom. This being the case, they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court.
The procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the lower court.
The evidence on record indubitably support the findings of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner company is liable for the destruction of the property of herein private respondents and consequently entitle the latter to an award of the damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED with regard to the amount of damages awarded to private respondents and the awards of the trial court on this matter are hereby reinstated for that purpose. In all other respects, the decision of respondent court is
AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
BATIQUIN VS COURT OF APPEALS 258 SCRA 334
GR No. 118231 July 5, 1996 Facts:
Dr. Batiquin was a resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City, performed a simple caesarian section on Mrs. Flotilde Villegas on the latter’s first child. Days after the operation Mrs. Villegas checked out on the said hospital and paid the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) as Dr. Batiquin’s professional fee thru the latter’s secretary.
Soon after leaving the hospital Mrs. Villegas begun to suffer abdominal pains, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin, who prescribed her certain medicines. And in the meantime Mrs. Villegas was given a medical certificate by Dr. Batiquin to report for work.
Mrs. Villegas reported for work at the Rural Bank of Ayungon, Negros Oriental but the pain kept on recurring prompting Mrs. Villegas to consult Dr. Ma. Salud Kho.
When Dr. Ma. Salud Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas, she found a piece of rubber material which she described a foreign body.
Mrs. Villegas sued Dr. Batiquin for damages. Issue:
Wether the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applies. Held:
Yes The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applies as the entire operation proceedings was under exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin; aside from the caesarian operation Mrs. Villegas underwent no other operation which could have introduced the rubber; and Dr. Batiquin, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.
Bonifacio vs BLT Bus Co., Inc. Facts:
Jovito Bonifacio Sr. and his wife, together with their neighbors were on their way to Los Banos, Laguna. The spouses’ Mercedes Benz was driven by Alberto Concepcion, a duly licensed driver.
They began to travel at 4am and around 5:20am Concepcion noticed a cargo truck parked on the left portion of the highway without any parking light. Concepcion was running the Benz only at the speed of 30 miles per hour because it was drizzling. He also noticed a bus on the left side of the highway which was going the opposite direction as they were. Since the benz was on the correct lane Concepcion continued the route. Just as he was about to pass the parked truck, the bus swrved to the lane of the benz and collided with the latter. This caused Jovito to be thrown out of the car and die. Others were seriously injured.
Issue: who among the drivers is at fault? Is the employer of the guilty driver
liable?
Held: De Luna, the driver of the BLT bus was at fault. Concepcion was not at
fault.
De luna’s defense that he did not know that anyone else was using the highway was no excuse to his negligent operation of the vehicle, since he should be especially be watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway; his failure to keep a proper lookout for persons and objects in the line to be traversed constitutes negligence.
Concepcion on the other hand, did not have sufficient time to evade the sudden swerve of the bus. He was on his proper lane and the speed of the Benz was not a cause of the mishp.
On the second issue, BLTB company contends that they excercised due diligence in selection of employees because their drivers underwent proficiency tests and issued service manuals to employees. However, due diligence in selection will not help if it is proved that there was no diligence of a good father in the supervision of such employees.
It was proven that: (a) brake linings were changed more than 30 days prior to the incident when linings last 30 day only, (b) De Luna was at the wheel for more than 11 hours already when the accident happened, (c) De Luna had 31 infractions prior to the mishap but received warnings only, (d) the overhauling of the bus was overdue by 6 months.
Therefore, BLTB co. inc. is liable as employer due to its negligence in supervision.
BUSTAMANTE, ET AL., VS. CA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 89880, 6 FEBRUARY 1991. FACTS:
Six thirty in the morning, a collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck and a passenger bus. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained. During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and owned by defendant Del Pilar. The passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned jointly by Magtibay and Serrado.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. After the impact, the truck skidded towards the other side of the road and landed on a nearby residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it. CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision, and dismissed the complaint insofar as del Pilar and Montesino are concerned. SC reversed and set aside the judgment of the CA reinstated that of the lower court, with the modification on the indemnity for death of each of the victims which increased to P 50, 000.00 each (lasque,
mervin’s digest).
ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of last clear chance applicable in a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles?
RULING:
The Appellate erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between defendants because the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, it erred in absolving the owner
and driver of the cargo truck from liability. Furthermore, because as between defendants, the doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable of the injured person by reason of his discovery of the later’s peril, and it cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the injury.
CAPUNO VS. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES GR. No. L-19331 / April 30,1965
FACTS:
The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi. At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola. This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its, from which order the present appeal has been taken. The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal is that the action had already prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action filed by petitioners based on quasi-delict is barred by prescription.
HELD:
The action filed is barred by prescription.
There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). When they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. In other words the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent. But the complaint here was filed only on after the lapse of more than five years.
An action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) maybe brought" which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.
Submitted by: Estanislao, Rizalino jr.
China Air Lines, Ltd. vs Court of Appeals GR 45985. May 18, 1990
Facts:
Jose Pagsibigan bought a Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-Manila ticket from Transaire Travel Agency. The latter contacted Philippine Air Lines who was then a ticketing agent of China Airlines. PAL ticketing clerk Roberto Espiritu issued a CAL ticket of the desired flight with a departure time 5:20pm.
Pagsibigan arrived at the airport one hour before the mentioned departure time only to be informed that the flight he was supposed to take had already left for Taipei 10:20 in the morning of that day.
Pagsibigan filed for damages.
Issue:Who may be held liable? Held:
Espiritu and Philippine Air Lines are liable, China Air Lines is not.
It is important to recognize that the contractual relations of PAL between CAL is one of Agency. However, this action premised on the negligence of the employee and the complainant seeks recovery for the resulting damages from both PAL and Espiritu without qualification, what is sought to be imposed is the direct and primary liability of PAL as an employee under Art. 2180 of the new civil code.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer in the selection or in the supervision of its employees. Such presumption is rebuttable by clear showing of the exercise of care and diligence of a good father of the family by the employer.
In the case at bar however, PAL failed to adduce evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against it. Its main defense that it is only an agent and may not be held liable to third persons when duly acting is untenable. A case for damages against the agent arising from torts is an admitted exception to the rule invoked by PAL.
Therefore, Espiritu is primarily liable under Art. 2176 while PAL is liable under 2180.
Submitted by: Padlan, Jay Vincent S.
City of Manila vs. Teotico 22SCRA267 Facts:
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 pm, Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a “loading and unloading” zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. In addition to the eye injury he suffered, Teotico also had several injuries in his body which necessitated medical treatment.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed with the court a civil case for damages against the City of Manila as provided by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
“Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
The City of Manila, on the other hand, contended that P. Burgos is a national highway, which meant that it did not belong to the City of Manila and thus could not be held liable.
Issue:
Whehter or not the City of Manila is liable for the damages caused by the defective road to Teotico
Held:
Yes, the City of Manila is liable.
In Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the defective road or street belongs to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either “control or supervision” over said street or road.
In the case at bar, even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its “control or supervision” by the City of Manila, as provided for by Section 18 of Republic Act 409.
Submitted by: Acosta, Voltaire S.
CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. # L-21291, March 28, 1969
Facts:
Preciolita V. Corliss whose husband, the late Ralph W. Corliss, was, at the tender age of twenty-one, the victim of a grim tragedy, when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company, close to midnight on the evening of Febuary 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga.
Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff, substantially declared in his deposition, that at the time of the accident, he also awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and that while there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop dead stop. Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see the train coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident. Virgilio de la Paz, another witness of the plaintiff, testified that on the night of February 21, 1957, he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field. He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him.
Issue:
Whether the plaintiff can recover damages from defendant
Held:
The accident was caused by the negligence of Ralph Corliss. The latter was sufficiently warned in advance that defendant’s train was coming because of the siren and signal of the train, and besides, the victim knew about the setup of the checkpoint, and the existence of the trucks. Under the circumstances, the victim should have stopped completely before the crossing and should have allowed the train to go through its course. Having failed to do this, the victim is considered negligent, and plaintiff was not allowed to recover damages.
Submitted by: VILLANUEVA, Vincent Irving P.
CRUZ vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 98273 October 28, 1991 FACTS:
Clarita V. Cruz went abroad pursuant to an employment contract that she hoped would improve her future. Although a high school graduate, she agreed to work as a domestic helper in Kuwait in consideration of an attractive salary and vacation leave benefits she could not expect to earn in this country. But her foreign adventure proved to be a bitter disappointment. On March 18, 1988, after completing her two-year engagement, she was back home in the Philippines with her dead dreams and an angry grievance.
On March 23, 1988, she filed a complaint against EMS Manpower and Placement Services (Phil.) and its foreign principal, Abdul Karim Al Yahya
In its answer and position paper, the private respondent raised the principal defense of settlement as evidenced by the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the complainant
NLRC dismissed the complaint by the petitioner. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the affidavit of desistance signed by the complainant is a valid waiver of her right to collect for compensation against private respondents.
HELD:
No.
The Court is convinced that the petitioner was not fully aware of the import and consequences of the Affidavit of Desistance when she executed it, allegedly with the assistance of counsel.
This decision demonstrates once again the tenderness of the Court toward the worker subjected to the lawless exploitation and impositions of his employer. The protection of our overseas workers is especially necessary because of the inconveniences and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for a better life in a foreign land away from their loved ones and their own government.
Submitted by: Lopez, John
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, ET AL. vs. ALFONSO MONFORT G.R. No. L-24101
September 30, 1970 Facts:
Cuadra,12, and Monfort,13, were classmates in grade six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962, they were assigned to weed the grass in the school premises. While performing the assigned task, Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said that she had found an earthworm, and as a prank to frighten Cuadra threw the headband towards her. At that precise moment, Monfort turned to face her friend, and the headband thus hit her right eye, injuring it. Cuadra treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye began to swell, and the parents thus took her to a doctor where she had to undergo surgery, despite that, she eventually lost sight in that eye, as a result of the said injury.
The parents of Ciuadra sued for damages, based on article 2176 and 2180 of the civil code,
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Issue:
Whether or not the parents of Maria Teressa Cuadra may be held liable for the acts of their minor child’s tortuous act?
Held:
The act of throwing the head band was deemed to be a childish prank, and was in fact not an act contemplated by 2176 of the civil code. Being a childish prank, the court declared that there was no way that any parent could ever anticipate such prank. The said act also did not reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
Submitted by: Aure, Gary C.
CULION ICE, FISH,ETC. vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS Facts:
The manager of defendant corporation accepted the job of changing the gasoline engine of plaintiff’s boat. After installing a new fuel tank and a new carburetor, the boat was taken out for trial. During this period, a backfire occurred in the cylinder of the engine. The boat was ultimately destroyed. Plaintiff filed an action to recover the value of the boat from the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not there is negligence on the part of Philippine motors and was the accident avoidable?
Held:
The burning of the boat resulted from an accident but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It should not have occurred if he observed the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work, which he attempts to do. The defendant was held liable for the value of the vessel.
Submitted by: Barrios, Noelle Ann E.
DAYWALT vs. RECOLETOS, ET AL. G.R. No. L-13505 February 4, 1919 FACTS:
In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W. Daywalt, a tract of land upon the issuance of a title to the land and a Torrens certificate. A second contract was executed in the form of a deed of conveyance. The stipulated price was fixed at P4,000, and the area of the land enclosed in the boundaries defined in the contract was stated to be 452 hectares and a fraction.
In 1908, the parties entered into still another agreement, superseding the old. Later on, the Torrens certificate was in time issued to Teodorica Endencia, but in the course of the proceedings, it was found by official survey that the area of the tract was about 1.248 hectares instead of 452 hectares. In view of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to the purchaser, asserting that she never intended to sell so large an amount of land and that she had been misinformed as to its area.
The defendant, La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation whose representative, Father Isidro Sanz had long been well acquainted with Teodorica Endencia and exerted over her an influence and ascendancy. Teodorica appears to be a woman of little personal force, easily subject to influence, and upon all the important matters of business including the tract in issue, was accustomed to seek, and was given, the advice of father Sanz and other members of his order with whom she came in contact.
As Teodorica still retained possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the defendant corporation were pastured upon said land.
Litigation prospered due to Endencia’s change of mind and refusal to comply with her agreement with Daywalt despite order of the court for specific performance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inducement made by Father Sanz to Endencia constitutes actionable interference in the contract
Whether or not the defendant corporation made itself a co-participant with Endencia in the breach of the contract due to the alleged unlawful intervention.
HELD:
No. As preliminary to a consideration of the first of these questions, we deem it well it dispose of the contention that the members of the defendants corporation, in advising and prompting Teodorica Endencia not to comply with
the contract of sale, were actuated by improper and malicious motives. The trial court found that this contention was not sustained, observing that while it was true that the circumstances pointed to an entire sympathy on the part of the defendant corporation with the efforts of Teodorica Endencia to defeat the plaintiff's claim to the land, the fact that its officials may have advised her not to carry the contract into effect would not constitute actionable interference with such contract. It may be added that when one considers the hardship that the ultimate performance of that contract entailed on the vendor, and the doubt in which the issue was involved to the extent that the decision of the Court of the First Instance was unfavorable to the plaintiff and the Supreme Court itself was divided the attitude of the defendant corporation, as exhibited in the conduct of its procurador, Juan Labarga, and other members of the order of the Recollect Fathers, is not difficult to understand. To our mind a fair conclusion on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in good faith that the contract cold not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was, therefore, prompted by no mean or improper motive. It is not, in our opinion, to be denied that Teodorica would have surrendered the documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence and promptings of members of the defendants corporation. But we do not credit the idea that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff.
Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, there is one proposition upon which all must agree. This is, that the stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of those that could be recovered against the immediate party to the contract would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust. In the case at bar, as Teodorica Endencia was the party directly bound by the contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation, even admitting that it has made itself coparticipant in the breach of the contract, can in no even exceed hers. This leads us to consider at this point the extent of the liability of Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her failure to surrender the certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in possession.
Submitted by: Roxas, Thomas Joseff Mari M.
DE GUZMAN vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 90856 July 23, 1992
FACTS:
Arturo de Guzman was the general manager of the Manila office of the Affiliated Machineries Agency, Ltd., which was based in Hongkong. On June 30, 1986, he received a telex message from Leo A. Fialla, managing director of AMAL in its main office, advising him of the closure of the company due to financial reverses. This message triggered the series of events that are the subject of this litigation.
Immediately upon receipt of the advise, De Guzman notified all the personnel of the Manila office. The employees then sent a letter to AMAL accepting its decision to close, subject to the payment to them of their current salaries, severance pay, and other statutory benefits. De Guzman joined them in these representations.
These requests were, however, not heeded. Consequently, the employees, now herein private respondents, lodged a complaint with the NLRC against AMAL, through Leo A. Fialla and Arturo de Guzman, for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages or commissions, separation pay, sick and vacation leave benefits, 13th month pay, and bonus.
For his part, the petitioner began selling some of AMAL's assets and applied the proceeds thereof, as well as the remaining assets, to the payment of his claims against the company. He also organized Susarco, Inc., with himself as its president and his wife as one of the incorporators and a member of the board of directors. This company is engaged in the same line of business and has the same clients as that of the dissolved AMAL.
NLRC held petitioner jointly and severally liable with AMAL
ISSUE:
Whether or not de Guzman can be held jointly and severally liable with AMAL.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the petitioner, while admittedly the highest ranking local representative of AMAL in the Philippines, is nevertheless not a stockholder and much less a member of the board of directors or an officer thereof. He is at most only a managerial employee.
Petitioner cannot be held directly responsible for the decision to close the business that resulted in his separation and that of the private respondents. That
decision came directly and exclusively from AMAL. The petitioner's participation was limited to the enforcement of this decision in line with his duties as general manager of the company.
We hold that although the petitioner cannot be made solidarily liable with AMAL for the monetary demand of its employees, he is nevertheless directly liable to them for his questionable conduct in attempting to deprive them of their just share in the assets of AMAL.
Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This is supplemented by Article 21 of the same Code thus:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Although the question of damages arising from the petitioner's bad faith has not directly sprung from the illegal dismissal, it is clearly intertwined therewith. The predicament of the private respondents caused by their dismissal was aggravated by the petitioner's act in the arrogating to himself all of AMAL's assets to the exclusion of its other creditors, including its employees. The issue of bad faith is incidental to the main action for illegal dismissal and is thus properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter.
It is stressed that the petitioner's liability to the private respondents is a direct liability in the form of moral and exemplary damages and not a solidary liability with AMAL for the claims of its employees against the company. He is being held liable not because he is the general manager of AMAL but because he took advantage of his position by applying the properties of AMAL to the payment exclusively of his own claims to the detriment of other employees.
Submitted by: Gumabay, Ma. Nina Katrina M. Dichoso vs. CA
GR No. 55613 December 10, 1990 Facts:
Spouses Gaspar Prila and Maria Beldad owned a parcel of land at Cagmanaba, Ocampo, Camarines Sur surveyed in the name of Gaspar. Upon the death of Maria in 1925, the eastern half was given to their only daughter, Vivencia, and when Gaspar died, the ½ portion pertaining to him was divided into three: a third was given to Vivencia, another third to Asuncion Pacamara, and the last third to Custodia Parcia. The terms of said settlement were agreed to by the three parties and the deeds were duly registered at the Register of Deeds. This was further confirmed judicially by the CFI of Camarines Sur. In 1955 Vivencia sold her portion to petitioner Dichoso who has been, ever since, in actual possession thereof, exercising various acts of ownership thereof. On the other hand, Asuncion sold to wife of private respondent Teodolfo Ramos her share but the deed mentions the area to be in excess of her share. Hence, said property which Ramos claims to have possessed is now the land in question.
Respondent Ramos took possession of the contested Riceland upon its purchase. It yielded an average harvest of 20 sacks of palay per planting whish was twice a year. One-third of the harvest went to Ramos and the remaining two-thirds was the tenant’s share. Dichoso, meanwhile, claims that the disputed land was inside his property. Sometime in 1962 Ramos, with a constabulary soldier and two policemen, allegedly seized the produce of the land consisting of 50 cavans of palay from petitioner’s tenant. In retaliation, petitioner brought with him a constabulary soldier and appropriated 6 cavans of the produce.
On December 1967, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title over the Riceland before the CFI of Camarines SUr. It rendered a decision in favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in requiring petitioner to deliver 40 cavans annually to respondent despite its finding that only 1/3 of the produce “went to” Ramos.
Ruling:
YES. Petitioner alleged that since respondent’s share of the harvest is only 1/3, only the 1/3 of the annual harvest must be awarded to him. Ramos’ contention that his tenant will be deprived of his share if only 1/3 was awarded to him. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved, and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. In view of his dispossession from 1964 and the fact that his tenant has vacated the land the same year, he cannot allege that his tenant is entitled to his 2/3 share.
Submitted by: Rodriguez, Christian Patrick S.
EPG Construction Company vs. Court of Appeals
210 SCRA 230 Facts:
Herein petitioner EPG Construction Company, Inc. and herein private respondent University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a contract for the construction of the UP Law Library for the stipulated price of P7,545,000.00. Upon completion, the building was formally turned over by the petitioner to UP; the latter issued a Certification of Acceptance. Sometime later, UP complained to the petitioner that six air-conditioning units in the building were not cooling properly. The latter agreed to shoulder the expenses for their repair, which was, however, never undertaken. UP was forced to contract with another company which repaired the units for P190,000.00. UP then demanded reimbursement of the said amount plus liquidated damages from the petitioner, which the latter rejected. UP then filed an action against the petitioner. After the trial, the trial court ruled in favor of UP and ordered the petitioner to pay actual and liquidated damages. Said decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner contended that by issuing the Certificate of Acceptance, UP has waived the guarantee provision in their contract and is now estopped from invoking it.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable under the guarantee provision in the contract notwithstanding the Certificate of Acceptance issued by UP?
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. All UP certified to, when it issued the Certificate of Acceptance, was that the building constructed by the petitioner was in good condition at the time it was turned over to it. It did not thereby relieve the petitioner of liability for any defect that may arise or be discovered later during the one-year period of the guaranty. The defects complained against were hidden and UP was not expected to recognize them at the time the work was accepted. Moreover, there was an express reservation by UP of its right to hold the petitioner liable for the defects during a period of one year.
Submitted by: Lopez, John
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-10134
June 29, 1957 Facts:
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of Balintawak Elementary school. On March 31, they were instructed by the school’s supervisor to attend a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal. From school, Dante and other students boarded the jeep that was going to take them to the parade. Dante then drove the jeep, while the driver sat by his side. They have not gone too far when the jeep turned turtle resulting to the death of two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperi.
Issue:
Whether or not Delfin capuno may be held jointly and severally liable with his son Dante Capuno, for the civil liability of his tortuous act?
Held:
Although at the time of the accident the father was not present, plaintiff contends that at the time of the accident Dante was a minor who was living with his parents. The court thus found that Delfin Capuno should be held solidarily liable for the tortuous act of his son Dante, for his failure to exercise proper parental authority.
Submitted by: BOLOS, MARIA GRACIA PATRICIA S. Fabre vs. CA, 259 SCRA 426 G.R. No. 111127. July 26, 1996 FACTS:
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired after trying him out for two weeks. His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica’s College in Malate, Manila.
Private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area ,it being his first trip to La Union, was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described as “siete.” The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was too late.
The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day. On the basis of their finding they filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was later filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano P1,500.00 for the damage to the latter’s fence. On the basis of Escano’s affidavit of desistance the case against petitioners Fabre was dismissed.
Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from the waist down. During the trial she described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence regarding the cost of her treatment and therapy.
The trial court found that no convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel to a long distance trip and that the driver was properly screened and tested before being admitted for employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the negligent act of the defendants which ultimately resulted to the accident subject of this case.
The trial court ordered herein petitioners to pay Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline Antonio for they were the only ones who adduced evidence for their claim for damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to Amyline Antonio but dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to prove their respective claims.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners, jointly or solidarily, were negligent and if they are liable for damages and to what extent.
HELD:
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. These factual findings of the two courts we regard as final and conclusive, supported as they are by the evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and, as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. He averred these facts to justify his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead. By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the road. Given the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabil’s first one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony that the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.
Considering the foregoing, the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a professional driver’s license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and record of service. Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.
In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only, from their homes to the St. Scholastica’s College in Metro Manila. They had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could remember the names of the children he would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Union was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer.
Petitioners argue that they are not a common carrier, hence, ordinary diligence or diligence of a good father of a family is only the degree of diligence due of them. As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. The article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise “extraordinary diligence” for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
The liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification as to the award of damages. Petitioners are ordered to pay jointly and severally the private respondent Amyline Antonio.
Submitted by: Equetan, Esteban M.
F.F. CRUZ and Co., INC. VS Court of Appeals 164 SCRA 731
No. L-52732, August 29, 1988 Facts:
Petitioner F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. is an owner of a furniture shop in Caloocan City which was adjacent to the residence of Mable family, herein private respondents.
That sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable requested to the herein petitioner that a firewall be constructed between the latter’s shop and their house. Such request fell on deaf ears. Unfortunately, on September 6, 1974, a fire broke out in the petitioner’s shop which eventually spread into private respondents’ house. Both the house and the shop were razed to the ground. As a result, the private respondent filed an action for recovery of damages against the petitioner. After the trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents and ordered the petitioner to pay the damages for the loss of the formers’ house, furnitures and other valuables. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Lower Court. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR is applicable in this case?
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. Under the Doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR: “Where the thing which cause the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.” The facts of the case at hand clearly call the application of the abovementioned doctrine. In the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible materials may usually be found thereon.
Furthermore, negligence or want of care on the part of the petitioner was not merely presumed; the latter’s failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinance would suffice to support findings of negligence.
Submitted by: Mendoza, Barleon R.
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 75112. October 16, 1990
Facts:
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days.
Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident, Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him.
Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages before the RTC of Roxas City. Named defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha. Also included was Agustin Masa, the director and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in his personal capacity "in that he personally authorized and allowed Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the incident, to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or permit to drive said vehicle. Allan Masa, was not impleaded as a co-defendant.
The trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party.
Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and Allan Masa are at fault and negligent of the acts complained of which caused the injury to plaintiff. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
The court absolved defendant Agustin Masa from any personal liability with respect to the complaint filed against him in his personal and private capacity, because he was not in the vehicle during the alleged incident.
Filamer appealed the lower court's judgment to the Court of Appeals. Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. Hence, the appeal.
Filamer contented that it cannot be held responsible for the tortuous act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them.
Issue:
Whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that Funtecha is an employee of Filamer and need not to have an official appointment for driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his negligent act.
The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the janitorial duties, does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption “juris tantum” that there was a negligence on its part either in the selection of the servant or employee or in the supervision over him.
Submitted by: Padlan, Jay Vincent S.
First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 209 SCRA 660
Facts:
Crisostomo Vitug fild a Civil Case against defendant First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC), to recover damages as a result of a three-vehicle collision on December 14, 1983, involving his car, another car, and an Isuzu cargo truck registered in the name of FMLFC and driven by one Crispin Sicat.
The evidence shows that while Vitug’s car was at a full stop at the intersection of New York Street and EDSA in Cubao, Quezon City, northward bound, the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck bumped a Ford Granada car behind him with such force that the Ford car thrown on top of Vitug’s car. The cargo truck thereafter hit Vitug’s car in the rear causing the gas tank to explode and setting the car ablaze.
FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it was not the owner of the truck, neither was it the employer of the driver Crispin Sicat, because it had sold the truck to Vicente Trinidad on September 24, 1980.
Issue:
Whether or not First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation is liable for the mishap
Held:
Yes, FMLFC is liable for damages caused to Vitug.
Regardless of who the actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the registered owner is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as such, directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the registered owner or operator of record is the one liable for damages caused by a vehicle regardless of any alleged sale or lease made thereon.
In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle to be valid against third persons, it must be recorded in the LTO. For, although valid between the parties, the sale cannot affect third persons who rely on the public registration of the motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was the owner and operator of the Isuzu truck, hence, fully liable to third parties injured by its operation.
