SOME MAIN PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

SOME

MAIN

PROBLEMS

OF

PHILOSOPHY

BY

GEORGE

EDWARD

MOORE

O.M.,LITTJX,HON.LLJ).,F.B.A.

EmeritusProfessor ofPhilosophy

andFellowof Trinity College

inthe University ofCambridge

LONDON

GEORGE

ALLEN

&

UNWIN

LTD.

FERST

PUBLISHED

IN 1953

This booh

is _copyright

under

the

Berne

Convention.

Apart from any

fair dealing

for

the

_purposes

_of

private study, research, criticism or review,

as

permitted

under

the

Copyright Act,

1911,

no

portion

may

be reproduced

by

any

process zoithout written

permission.

Inquiry

should

be

made

to the

publishers.

PRINTED

IN GRJEAT

BRITAIN BY

When

I_urged Professor

Moore

to_{publish these} lectures

which

he gave

some

fortyyearsago he said to

me

_{'But surely they are out of}

date.' Certainlythey are outofdate. Moore's

own

work

in

philo-sophy

over thesefortyyears is

by

itself

_enough

to render

them

out

ofdate.

_Anyone

_{hearing these}lectures atthetimetheywere given

might

have guessedthatthey

would

soonbeout ofdate.

For

inthese

lectures_philosophyis

done

withadirectness

and

_honesty

and

inci-civeness

which

atonce_gives

hope

that

we

_{may,working with}

Moore,

soon cut a

_way

_{out of the jungle}intothelight. Itis the

same hope

we

felt

when

we

read

what

we

stillread Moore's_PrincipiaEthica

and

_{his Philosophical Studies.}

That hope was

justified.

Amongst

the_problems

which

_{agitate philosophers there} are

two

which, I _think, strikethe _{non-philosopher as especially}remote, as typically frivolous.

They

arethe

problem

of theexternalworld

and

the

_problem

_{of general}ideas.

When

_{the philosopher asks}

'Do

we

really

know

what

things are

good and what

are bad?',

when

he asks

'What

is _{goodness?' the}

plain

man

sympathizes.

When

the philosopher asks

'Do

we

really

know

of the existence of

mind

?

J

'How

do

we

know

_{the past}?'

'What

do

we

mean when we

_speakof consciousness or of

what no

longer

exists?'the_plain

man may

still

_manage

to_sympathize.

But

when

the philosopher asks

'Do

we

really

know

that thereis bread here

and

now

in our

mouths

?'

'What do

we

mean when

we

_speak of chairs

and

tables?' then the

whole

_thing is _aptto

seem

ridiculous to the plain

man.

And

when

_{the philosopher} then asks

'What

is it to

mean

any-thing?'

'What

isittohave_{a general idea of}anything?'

'What

is itto

havea universal before themind,to noticeits_presencein_something beforeone?'

'What

is itfora_{quality to}be_presentin this

and

alsoin that?1thentothe_plain

man

itseemsthat_{the philosopher}is_getting

himself into a _difficulty

_by

asking for the reduction to something

more

_simple of

what

couldn't

be

_simpler.

Moore

manages

to _{present these} central, limiting, typical

prob-lemsinsucha

way

that the reader inspiteof himself beginstofeel

them.

And

without_{this feeling}of the _difficultytherecan

be no

full

understanding of

what

it is to

remove

it.

The

idea that there is

FOREWORD

much

can be

done

about it.

For

this reason alone Moore's

intro-duction to _{philosophical} difficulties can _help us to_judge

and

to

understandthe

most

modern

_attemptsto resolvethem*

But

further theruthless

claritywith

which

Moore

shows

usthepathless jungle

before us _helps us to realize

what must

be

done

to _{get through.}

There

is

no

_path.

We

must

cuta

_way

from

treeto tree.

Itoften_happens of coursethatone cannottell

where

one wishes

to

go

until one starts.

But

there are times

when

it is _timelytoask

'Now

where

am

I _{trying to go?'}

Moore

has _always

reminded

us of

this.

One

_thinghehas_alwayssoughtto_keep beforeusisthe

differ-encebetween_questionsasto

what

is

actuallythe case

and

questions asto

what

itis

logicallypossibleshould bethecase, the

meanings

of

our

words

_being

what

_theyare.In

him

too

we

finda habitof_thought

which,carriedfurther

_by

_{Wittgenstein,}led to

enormous

advances

the _study of the

_meaning

_{of general} terms

_by

consideration of

concretecases.

I

_hope

Professor

Wisdom

was

rightin thinking that this

book was

worth

_publishing.Itconsistsof_twentylectureswhichIdeliveredat

Morley

College in

London

in the winter of 1910-11, thefirst ten

beinggiven before Christmas,andthesecondtenafter.

And

Ithink

I should have

had

less

_hope

that_{they were worth}publishing

had

I

not thought(perhaps mistakenly)that,

though

much

of

them

is

no

doubt

'out_{of date/ yetthey}alsocontain

much

which

is_{as yet}

_{by no}

means

outof date.

My

audience were invited aftereach lecture to raise _questions

about

what

I

had

said in _it,

and

it is to one of the resulting dis-cussionsthatthefirstsentenceof_Chapter

XV

refers.

The

lectures are

now

_printed substantiallyin the

form

in

which

they

were

delivered. I have

made

a

_good

_many

verbal changes, substitutingforanexpression

which

Iusedinthelecturesanother expression

which

I

now

think expresses

my

meaning

better.

But

I

could not

make

_{such changes everywhere}:

my

-old_terminologystill

appears in

many

places;

and

I have _therefor^a^ded footnotes

ex-plaining

where

I

now

thinkittobeincorrect, f

n

Chapters

XIX

and

XX,

however,Ihave

made

more

extensive_die/rations,

_though

only

by

omission omission ofseveral_pages,

which

seem

to

me

now

both confused

and

_confusing

and

notto

make

_any'substantialaddition to

what

I

was

_saying.I_have,therefore, I believe,retained the substance

even of these

two

_chapters,

and

have

added

an

_Appendix

to_explain

what seem

to

me

tobe thechief defects in

what

I haveretained.

I

am

wellawarethatthere area

_good

_many

_positivemistakes in

what

is_{here printed};

and

thereisbesidesa

good

dealofrepetition,

since I _{often repeated} atthe _beginning ofalecture_{part of}

what

I

had

said inthe _{precedingone, hoping,} in

some

cases, to

make

my

meaning

clearer.

There

are

two

matters about

which

I should have

added

foot-notes,

had

I noticed

them

earlier;

and

I should like to mention

them

_{briefly here.}

The

first istheview

which

I _express

on

p. 128, thatit is _{possible that}

some

material _{objects occupy merelypoints}

orlines orareas. This

now

seemsto

me

to _{be a complete}mistake :

nothing,Ishould_say,can

be

_properlycalled either a_{material thing} or a part of a materialthing,unlessitoccupies a

volume

though, of course, the

volume

may

beextremelysmall.Thispointis,ofcourse,

xii

PREFACE

connected with

_my

_{mistake (pointed}out

on

_{p. 34,} note _{2) in} sup-posingthata surfacecan

be

properlycalled a "part" of a material thing.

The

secondpointabout

which

Ioughttohave

added

a

foot-noteconcerns therelationbetween

what

I_sayabout_{propositions in} ChapterIII

and what

I_sayabout

them

in _Chapter

XIV,

pp. 265-6,

and

_againin

_XVII,

_{p. 309.} In_{III, p. 56,} 1_{say ''Therecertainly}are in the Universe such _things as _{propositions",} whereas in

XIV

(p. 256)IsaythatI

am

recommending

aview aboutthe_analysisof

belief

which

_may

be_expressed

_by

_saying

"There

_simplyare

no

such

things as propositions",

and

in

XVII

(p. 309) I _{say "I don't}

now

believe thatthere aresuch_things as_propositions at all".

Now

this looksasif,

when

Iwrote

XIV

and XVII,

I

had abandoned

the very

view

which

inIII I

had

declaredtobe_certainlytrue;

and

_certainly

I _{had, if}in III I

had

_{been usingthe expression} 'Thereare such

thingsas propositions' inthe

same

sensein

which

I

was

_usingitin

XIV

and

XVIL

But

I

now

feeldoubtfulwhetherinIII I

had

been

usingthatexpressionmerelyin thatsense. Ithinkitis_{possible that}

in IIII

was

_{usingit,partly atleast,}insuch asensethatthe truthof

what

it _expresses

would

follow

from

the

mere

fact that such ex-pressionsas'I_{believirthe proposition that}thesunis_largerthanthe

moon*

_{are perfectly correct}

_ways

_{of expressing something}

which

is

often true as_{tfyeycertainly are};whereasin

XIV

and

XVII

I

was

using 'There are suthTthings as propositions* in a

way

which

is

perhaps

more

doubtfullycorrect,

namely

insucha

way

thatit

would

not_{express a truth unless} such_expressionsas'I believethe

propo-sitionthatthesunis_largerthanthe

moon'

canbe_{correctlyanalysed}

in acertain

_way

which

isa_{verydifferent usage.}

Itis _perhaps

worth

_mentioning that _Chapters

I-X

are the

'un-published writings' ofmine, to

which Lord

Russell refers in the Prefaceto

The

_{Problems ofPhilosophy.}

I should like

finally to acknowledge very gratefully

my

obli-gations to the Editor of the

Muirhead

_{Library, Professor}

H. D,

Lewis.

He

not _only took

_upon

himself the labour of_suggesting

titlesfor

_my

Chapters titles

which

I

was

_{only too glad}to_adopt,

with one or

two

_{slight alterations};

he

also

made

such

alterations

atthe _beginning ofeach lecture as

were

_{necessary to}

adapt it for

book-form

; and,_finally,

by

_{taking the trouble to}read through the

whole

of the _page-proofs,

_he

discovered _misprints

_{which had}

escaped

my

notice

and which would

have _disfigured the book.

FOREWORD

_page

ix

PREFACE

xi

I

What

is

Philosophy?

i

II

_Sense-Data

28

ffl

Propositions 5

2

IV

Wajs

oj

Knowing

7

2

V

Hume's

_Theory

89

VI

_Hume's

Theory

Examined

108

VH

Material

_Things

127

Vffl

Existence

in

_Space

145

DC

Existence

in

Time

,

164

X

The

Notion

_of

_Infinity

182

XI

Is

Time Real?

201

XH

The

_Meaning

_of

'Real*

216

XIII

Imagination

and Memory

234

XIV

Beliefs

and

Propositions

252

XV

True

and

False

Beliefs

270

XVI

Being,

Fact

and

Existence

288

XVH

Truths

and

Universals

36

XVin

_Relations,

Properties

and

Resemblance

3

21

XIX

Disjunctive

and

Other

Properties

33^

XX

Abstractions

and

_Being

353

APPENDIX

374

Chapter

I

WHAT

IS

PHILOSOPHY

?

I_want,asastart,to try togive

you

a general ideaof

what

_philosophy

is: or,inother words,

what

sort_{of questions}itisthat_philosophers

are constantlyengagedin_discussing

and

_tryingtoanswer. I

want

to

beginin this

way

for

two

reasons. Inthefirst_place,

_by

_{doingthis, I}

shall

be

_giving

_you

some

idea of

what

the _problems are

which

I

myself

mean

todiscuss intherestofthiscourse.

_And,

inthesecond

place, I thinkitis the best

way

ofbeginning any discussion of the

main

_{problems of philosophy.}

_By

_attemptingto

give, first ofall, a

general sketch oroutlineof the

whole

subject,

you

point out

how

the different_{separateproblems}areconnected withoneanother

and

can

give abetteridea oftheirrelativeimportance.

I

am

_{going, then,} first ofall _{to try tp give a description of the}

whole_{rangeof philosophy.}

But

thisisnotatallan_easythingto do. Itisnot_easy, because,

when

you

come

to lookinto_{the matter,}

_you

find that philosophershavein fact discussedan

immense

_varietyof different sorts_{of questions};

and

itisverydifficultto giveanygeneral

description,

which

will

embrace

allof thesequestions,

and

alsovery

difficultto_arrange

them

_{properly in}relation tooneanother.Icannot

hope

really to

do

more

thanto indicateroughlythe

main

sorts of questionswith

which

philosophersare concerned,

and

topoint out

some

of the

most

_important connections between these _questions.

I_{will try to begin}

_by

_{describing those questions}

which seem

to

me

to

be

themost_important

and

the

most

_{generally interesting,}

and

will

then go

on

tothose

which

aresubordinate.

To

_beginwith,then,itseemsto

me

thatthe

most

_important

and

interestingthing

which

philosophershavetried to

do

is

no

lessthan

this;

namely

:

To

give a generaldescription^thewfypleofthe Uni-verse, _mentioningalltiie

most

jmpofl^nt

^^

n "^^JTiy^iwmitih'jj

know

to "be

_STiC

_^SjC^g^yy

fatfr j*_{-Ifc^Y-flhat fhg*r,}a_T: ...^J*

impof&iitkinds of thingswhiclrwejjojjflkabfiolutelyjtf^ bein

"

'"

*

; ..

various_{kinds of things are}related tooneanother. Iwillcallallthis;

hence will_{say that the} first

and most

_important

_problem

_of

philo-sophyis:

To

_givea general description of thewholeUniverse.

Many

philosophers (though

by no means

all)have, Ithink, certainly tried

to givesuch_{a description}:

and

the verydifferent_descriptions

which

different _philosophershave_given are,I think,

_among

the

most

im-portant differences between them.

And

the

problem

is, it

seems

to

me, plainlyone

which

is peculiar to philosophy.

There

is

no

other science

which

tries to _say:

Such and

such kinds of things are the

only kinds of thingsthatthereare inthe Universe, or

which

we know

tobeinit.

And

Iwill

now

_{try toexplain}

more

_clearly,

_by

means

of examples,exactly

what

I

mean

_by

thisfirst

_problem

_exactly

what

I

mean

_by

_{a general description of the whole Universe.}Iwill_try,that

is, tomentionthe

most

importantdifferences

between

_the

descrip-tions _given

_by

different _{philosophers.}

And

I _{wish, for a particular}

reason, to begin in a particular way.

There

are, it

seems

to

me,

certainviewsaboutthe nature of the Universe,

which

areheld,

now-a-days,

by

almost_everybody.

_They

areso_universallyheld that_they

may, Ithink, fairlybe calledtheviewsof

Common

Sense. I

do

not

know

that

Common

Sense can

be

said to have

_any

views aboutthe wholeUniverse:

none

ofits _{views, perhaps,}

amount

tothis.

But

it

has, I think, very definiteviews tothe effect that certain kindsof thingscertainly are inthe Universe,

and

asto

some

ofthe

_ways

in

which

_{these kinds of things}are related toone another.

And

I wish

to begin

by

describing these views,becauseit

seems

to

me

that

what

is

most

_amazing

and most

_interestingabouttheviewsof

_many

philo-sophers,isthe

_way

in

which

_theygo

_beyond

or_positivelycontradict theviews of

Common

Sense:_{theyprofess to}

know

that there arein

theUniverse

most

_importantkinds of_things,

which

Common

Sense

doesnot_{profess to}

know

of,

and

alsotheyprofessto

know

that there are not in theUniverse_(or,at_least,that,ifthereare,

we

do

not

know

it), things of the existence of

which

Common

Senseis

most

sure, I

think, therefore,

you

willbestrealise

what

_{these philosophical}

des-criptionsof theUniversereallymean,

by

realising

how

verydifferent theyare

from

theviewsof

Common

Sense

how

far,in

some

points,

theygo

beyond

Common

Sense,

and

how

absolutely, in others,they

contradictit.I_wish,therefore, tobegin

by

describing

what

Itake to

bethe

most

_{important views}of

Common

Sense:_things

which

we

all

rommonly

assume

tojbe trueaboutthe

_U^erse^

and which

we

are

gurediat

we Eaow

tobetjueaEoutit.

"

^xiTBe^nwith,

then,itseemsto

me

we

_{certainly believe}thatthere

areinthe _Univereg

_{eno^^i^jmTnK^^}

WHAT

IS

PHILOSOPHY?

3

-

We

_know,for instance, that_thereare

upon

the

sur-faceofthe_earth, besides our

own

bodies, the bodies ofmillions of other

men

;

we

know

that there arethe bodies ofmillions of other

animals; millions _{of plants too; and, besides all}

these, an even greater

number

of inanimateobjects mountains,

and

allthe stones

upon

them,grains of sand, different sorts of minerals

and

_{soils, all}

the _drops ofwater in rivers

and

inthe sea,

and

moreover ever so

many

different objectsmanufactured

_by

men

;houses

and

chairsand

tables

and

_railway

engine^^t;q., etc. But, besides all these things

upon

thesurfaceoftheeartttf_ghereistheearthitself an

enormous

,S*aS&*tfj3i3S'

And

we

believetoo,nowa3ays^tKaftKTeartE*itself,

and

all thatis initor

_upon

it,

huge

asit seems tous, is _absurdly

small in _{comparison with} the whole material Universe.

We

are

accustomedto

_{Ay TcS-^t}

j]j^

number

ofvisible stars,areeachof

them

_gr^rm^es'oT

_matter]"Sa3"

most

of

_{them many}

tirn6_?

_{^l^j^^ti^^^hl}

We

_{are iaccustbmeH,}

too, tothe idea_{tiat^th^are^^t^t^dat,such,huge};

distances

from

us that_anydistance

from

_pointto_point

_upon

thesurfaceof theeartE'is" absurdly small in _comparison. All this

we

now

believe about the materialUniverse:itis_surely

Common

Senseto believeit all. _But,

as

_you

know, there

was

atime

when

itwas

_{by no means}

Common

Senseto believe

some

_{of these things}:there

was

atime

when

_nobody

believed

some

of them.

There was

a time

when

there were not nearlyso

_{many men}

_upon

the earthasthere are

now

;

and

when

those

who

were

_upon

itdidnot

know

how

_many

there were.

_They

believed only in the existence of a comparatively small

number

of

human

bodies besidetheir

own

;ofa comparatively small

number

of animals

and

_plants;

and

they

had no

idea

how

largethesurfaceof the earth

was.

_They

believed, too, that_{the heavenly bodies}were small

com-pared to the _earth,

and

at _{comparatively short} distances

from

the earth. But I think I

am

_{rightin saying}

we

now

believe that these primitive views aboutthe material Universewere certainly wrong.

We

should _say that

we

know

that_theywere

_wrong

:

we

have

dis-covered that _they were

_{wrong: and}

this _discovery is _{part of} our

progressinknowledge.

But

thoughtherearethussome_thingsabout

which

the'dews of

Common

_{Sense have changed}:_yet,sofar as

con-cerns the point that there are in the Universe a _great number of material_objects,it_has,sofaras

we

_{know, remained}the same.

So

far

as

we

know,

men

have believed this almost as _long as _they have

believed anything: _theyhave _{always believed} inthe existenceofa

4

SOME MAIN PROBLEMS

But,now,besides materialobjects, we^b^Levejlsothiatthere are

in the Universe certain

_phenomena

very different

from

material

TJEjje^^

we

.men, Besides having bodies,

*^6

_Haye^mm&;

and

one of the chief _things which

we

mean,

by

saying

we

have winds, is, I think, this:

jiai^lYi foat

we

perform

certainjoaentalacts oracts ofspaciousness^

That

istosay,

we

see"'

and

hearandfeel

and remember

and imagine andthink

and

believe

and

desireandlike

and

dislikeandwill

and

love

and

are_angry

and

afraid, etc.

These

thingsthat

we

do

are all of

them

mental acts

acts of

mind

or actsofconsciousness: whenever

we

_{do any}of_them,

we

areconscious of_something: each of

them

_{partly consists in}our

being consciousofsomethingin

some

_way

orother:

and

itseemsto

me

that_{the thing}of

which

we

are

most

certain,

when we

say

we

are certain that

we

have minds,isthat

we

do_{these things} that

we

per-formtheseactsof consciousness.

At

allevents

we

are certain that

we

do

_perform

them and

that these acts are _{somethingvery} different

from_{material objects.}

To

hearisnot_itself*material_object,however

closelyit

_may

be_{related to certain material objects};

and

so

on

with

all the rest _{seeing, remembering, feeling,} thinking, etc.

These

things, these acts of consciousness are certainly not themselves materialobjects.

And

yet

we

are quite certain thatthereare

immense

numbers

of

them

in the Universe. _{Every one} of_{us performs}

im-mense numbers

of

them

everyday

and

all_daylong:

we

are

perpetu-ally seeing different things, hearing different things, thinking of different things,

remembering

different things.

We

ceaseto_perform

them

only while

we

are asleep,withoutdreaming;

and

evenin sleep,

so longas

we

dream,

we

are_performingactsof consciousness.

There

are,therefore, inthe Universeatany

moment

millionsofdifferent actsofconsciousness_{beingperformed}

_by

millionsofdifferent _men,

and

_perhapsalso

_by

_many

kinds ofanimals. It _is, I_{think, certainly}

Common

Sensetobelieve allthis.

So

far,then,

we

haveseenthat

Common

Sensebelieves thatthere are inthe Universe,atleast

two

differentkinds of_things.

There

are,

to_beginwith,

enormous numbers

of_{material objects};

and

thereare

also_{a verygreat}

number

ofmentalactsoractsof Consciousness.

But

Common

Sensehas_{also, Ithink, certainvery}definiteviewsas tojthe

_way

inwhichthese

two

kinds of

thingsarerelated toone an-other._{But, before}

I

_explain

what

theseviews_are,

Tmust

fcratmention something which

we

believe tobe_{true of absolutely}allthematerial objectswhichIhave mentioned and, indeed, not only of

them

but

WHAT

IS

PHILOSOPHY?

We

believe, infact,ofallmaterial_objects,thateachof

them

is

any

given

moment,

situated

somewhere

or_{other in s^meffiKg'irai}

JUT. J-a

-i .

-

-I

- --? - -. .-vi.: ..--<-r-^***--*-^*^ ,^ , .,

-Q.-^,.\-we

caU

_jQgg.

And

_by

sayingthattheyareall of

them

_{in space,}

we

mean,

I think,atleast

two

_things.

_We

_mean,inthefirst_{place, that}

eachof

them

is,atanygiven

moment,

at

some

definite_distancehym,

^Jjh^rest. It

_may

be

_{impossible practically} to measure all these distances,orindeedto

measure

anyof

them

_{absolutelyexactly}:but

we

believe that all of

them

could _{theoretically} be measured,

and

expressed as so

many

miles or feet or inches, or such

and

such a fraction of

an

inch,

down

to those objects

which

are absolutely

touching one another,

and

between

which

thereforethedistanceis

nothing at all.

We

believe, for instance, that the earthis _(roughly

speaking) so

many

millions of miles distant

from

the sun in one direction,

and

many

more

millions ofmiles distant

from

the pole-star in another;

and

that just as there is, at

any

given

moment,

a

definite distance between the sun

and

the earth,

and

between the pole-star

and

theearth, so thereisalso adefinitedistance between

the

sun and

the _pole-star,

and

_{similarly between any one} of the

heavenlybodies

and

alltherest.

And

so toobetweenallthe bodies

on

the surface of theearth, oranypartsof thesebodies:_any

two

of

them

are,at

any

given

moment,

eithertouching oneanother, orelse at

some

definitedistance

from

oneanother a distance

which

can

be

roughlyexpressedasso

many

miles orfeetorinches orfractionsof

an

inch.

We

believe, then, thatitistrueofallmaterial_{objects that}

eachis,at

any

given

moment,

at

some

definitedistance

from

allthe

rest. Thisisone_{of the things}

which

we mean

_by

sayingthattheyare

all_{in space.}

But

we

mean, I think,alsothateachis distant

from

all

therest in

some

direction or other:in

some

oneor other of a quite

definiteset ofdirections.

And

what

thisdefinite setofdirectionsis,

can,Ithink, beeasilyexplained.

We

all

know

the_shapeofthe_figure

which

is called_{a sphere} the_shapeofa_perfectly

round

ball.

Now

from

the centre of a _sphere a_{straight line}can

be

drawn

toeach of the points

upon

itssurface.

Each

of these_straight lines,

we

should

say,ledinadifferent direction

from

the centre:thisis

what

we mean

by

adirection.

And

moreoverthereare,

we

shouldsay,absolutely

no

directionsin

which

it is_possibleto

move

from

the centreina_straight

line exceptalong oneor other of these straight lines; if

you

areto

move

ina_{stfaight line}

from

the centre ofa_sphereatall,

you must

go

towardsoneor other of the points

on

itssurface;

and

thisis

what

I

meant by

speaking of a quil;e definite set of directions: all the

given point

form

a quitedefinite set;namely,

you must

goalong

one

or other of thestraight linesleading

from

that pointto

some

point

on

the surfaceof_{a sphere of}

which

itisthecentre.

The

second_thing,

then,

which

I_say

we

believeaboutall_{material objects}:isthat

start-ing

from

anypoint

on any

oneofthem,alltherestwilllie

_upon

one

or other ofthis definite setof_straightlines. If

_you

considerallthe straightlines

which

lead

from

anypointtoallthedifferent_points

on

thesurfaceofa_{sphere enclosingit,absolutelyevery material object} in theUniverse will, at

any

given

moment,

lie

on

one or other of thesestraightlines;itwilllieat

some

distanceorother alongoneor

other ofthem.

There

is,

we

shouldsay,

no

other position in space

which

_any material _{object could occupy;} these _{straight lines will}

passthroughevery position in space;sothat,ifanobjectisin_space

atallit

must

be

on

one or other ofthem. _{This,therefore,} is

one

of the things

which

we

mean

_by

_saying that all material _{objects are} situated in space.

We

mean,

that is,

when we

talk ofthe space in

which

_{material objects}lie

and

_{move, a space}in

which

there are

no

otherdirections in

_{which you}

_{can go}

from

_{any point, except those}

which

I have _specified.

We

_{do, I think, certainly} hold that all the

material_objectsI_{have mentioned, do}lieinsuch_{a space}:that

from

any

oneof

them

alltherest

must

at_any

moment

lieinoneor other

of thesedirections.

And

when we

talkof_{'material objects',}

we

mean,

I think, as a_{rule, only to include}underthis _{description objects of}

which

thisistrue.

But, now, I introduced this account of

what

we

believe about

material_{objects, in}orderto_explain

what

we

believeabout_thej^/fl^

tim

of material

objects t? tfmt

Q^er

quite flffrrant sort frf_tKmgg,

*

Common

_

Sensehas,I said,

some

_quite definiteviews aboutthe

_way

in

which

actsof consciousnessin_generalare related to material_objects,

and

Iwish

now

tostate

what

theseviewsare.

We

all,then,

commonly

believe,I_{think, that actsof consciousness}

are quite definitely attached, in aparticular

w^

_ff>

_Mn^-^tffflT

gblects, an<J quite?g_f^fiBittfy..T)iftt

afteMtoVr^^

And why

I

introduced

_my

account of_space,

was

inorderto

make

more

clear in

what

sense

we

believe actsof consciousnesstobeattachedto certain material_objects.

We

_believe, I_{think, that}ouractsof consciousness

allthose

which

we

_{perform, so long}as

we

are alive areattached toourbodies, inthe sensethat_{they occur}inthe

same

_{places in}

which

ourbodiesare.

We

alldo,I_{think,constantly}

assume

thisin_ordinary

WHAT

IS

PHILOSOPHY?

₇

most

_philosophershaveheld_that,

on

the_{contrary, acts}of conscious-ness

do

not occurin_anyplaceatall that_theyare,

simply,nowhere not_{in space.} Butthat

we

all do

_commonly

assume_it, thatitis a belief of

Common

_Sense, is, I _{think, pretty plain.} I _{believe, for}

instance, that

_my

actsof consciousness are_{taking place}

now

in this

room,

where

my

body

is.

At

_{the present}

moment

I

am

_hearing

and

seeing

and

thinking here, in this room.

And

_{when, just now,} I

travelled

_up

to Waterloo

_by

train, I believe that

my

mind

and

_my

acts of consciousness travelled with me.

When

the train

and

_my

body

wereat_Putney,I

was

_thinking

and

_seeingat_Putney.

When

the train

and

_my

_body

reached

_Clapham

_Junction, I

was

_thinking

and

seeing at

_Clapham

_Junction.

And

so

on

with all the other_places

which

I_{passed through.}

We

all, I

_{i^y^j^qamcmLv}

assume

inthis_~

*

do

not

mean

to

"ffiaf

we

nave anydefiniteidea_{as to exactly}whereinourbodies our

actsof consciousness take_place.Idonot think

we

have.

We

should not _{be prepared} to _saywhether _they all _{took place} at _exactly the

same

_spotinourbodies orwhetherdifferent acts_{took place}at

differ-ent spots; nor should

we

be preparedto assign any_{particularspot}

as the _spot at

which

a _{particular act}took _{place. All that}

we

do, I

think, believewithcertaintyisthat_theyalldo_{take place}

somewhere

or otherinourbodies.

At

all events

we

all_constantlytalk as if

we

believedthis.

And

I

_may

illustratetheforceofthisbelief

which

we

now

have,

by

contrastingitwith a different belief

which was

for-merlyheld.

Some

_savages, I_believe, usedtohold_that, sometimes

when

a

man

was

_dreaming,his

mind

orsoulusedto leave his

_body

and

_go to

some

_{other place}

and

watch

what was

_going

on

inthat place:_{that,therefore,} whilehe

was

asleep,his actsof consciousness

might betaking placeat

some

place otherthanthat

where

his

_body

was.

Now

IthinkI

am

_{right in}

sayingthatitis

no

_longer

Common

Senseto believethis.

We

_commonly

believe

_nowadays

_{that,so long}

as

we

are_alive,

we

can, atleast_{normally, only think}

and

see

and

hear

and

feel,whereourbodiesare.

We

_believe,at_least,thatan

immense

number

ofactsof consciousness_{are attached,}each of_them,to

some

particularbody,inthe sensethat_{they occur}

somewhere

or otherin that body.

My

acts of consciousness take_place in

_my

_{body; and}

yourstake placein_yours:

and

our

minds

(generally,atleast)go with

us, wherever ourbodiesgo.

We

believe, then, I think, that

_many

acts of consciousness are attached to _particular material _objects, inthe sense that_{they take}

place where thoseobjects are.

But

I

do

not

mean

tosaythat thisis

the_onlysensein

which

we

believe

them

tobeattached_{to particular} material _{objects, ^gealso believe, jno} doubt,that

_manj

oftheicaare

degenden^

occurinl>ur bodies.

For

_instance,

1 onlysee,

when

certainchangestake_{place in}

_my

_eyes;I_onlyhear,

when

certain _{changes take place} in

_my

ears; only think, _perhaps,

when

certain_{changestake place}in

_my

brain.

We

_{certainly believe} that

_many

acts of consciousnessareattached_{to particular}bodiesin

this

_way

also.But_{the simplest}

and most

universal relation

which

we

believe toholdbetweenacts of consciousness

and

_particular bodies

is, I think, the one I have mentioned _{namely, that they occur}

wherethosebodiesare.

We

believe,then, that actsof consciousness are attachedto

some

material _objects.

But

we

believe, I_think,

no

less _{certainly, that to}

the vast_{majority of material objects,} no acts of consciousness are attached.

We

believe_{that they}are attached to the_livingbodies of

men

millionsofdifferent

men

_{and, perhaps,}of

most

animals;so

thatthereis no lack ofacts of consciousness inthe Universe*

But

nevertheless to thevast

mdority

of material pbjgftftvt frqlieve,

JT

'

We

aresurethat chairs

and

tables

and

_

d_mojinlatos

and

stone^donot_reallyseeor hear orfeelor think or_{perform any}othermentalacts:

we

aresurethat

theyarenot conscious.

We

are sure too that thesun

and

moon

and

stars

and

eartharenot conscious that

no

consciousactsareattachedto_them, inthe sensein

which

ourconsciousactsareattachedtoourbodies:

they do not feel or hear or see, as

we

do. This, then, is one very

importantthing

which

we

believeastotherelationbetweenactsof consciousness

and

material objects: namely, that

among

the vast

number

_{of material objects in}the Universethere are_{comparatively}

few

to

which

actsot'consciousnessareattached:inother

_worcb^lw

farthe _greater

number

of the material_{objects' in}the Universeare unconscious. _This, I think,

_may

fairly be said to

be

the view of

Common

_{Sense nowadays. But} this is _{another point} in _{regard to}

which

_{the present}view_of

Common

Sensediffersa

_good

deal

from

what

it oncewas.

There

_was, itseems _{pretty certain,} atime

when

most

men

believedthat actsof Consciousness were attached_{to logs} of_wood,

and

_stones,

and

_trees,

and

tothesun

and

moon

and

_many

other _objects.

_They

believedthat _spirits were at various times

m

these_objects;

and

thatwhile the_spiritswerein_them,actsof

con-sciousness often _{took place}inside

them:

the _spirit heard

and saw

and

thoughtinside_{the log ofwood,}

WHAT

IS

PHILOSOPHY?

₉

and

think inside our bodies.

There

was, then, a time

when

men

commonly

believed that consciousness

was

_{(for a time,} at _least)

attachedto

_many

_bodies,

which

we now

believetobeunconscious.

But

even then, so far as I _{know, they always believed that there}

were, at_anygiventime,

many

places inthe Universe in

which

no

acts ofconsciousness

were

_goingon.

We,

Ithink,onlygo

much

far-therthanthis:

we

believe_{that, atanygiventime,}the

number

_{of spots}

in

which no

act of consciousnessis_takingplaceis_{immenselylarger}

thanthat ofthose in

which an

actof consciousnessis_takingplace.

This,therefore,isone_thing

which

we

believewith_regardtothe relationbetween consciousness

and

_{material objects.}

But

thereare, Ithink, also

two

others

which

deservetobe mentioned.

The

firstof these is this.

We

believe that

we

are at certaintimes conscious of certainmaterial_objects:

we

_see,

and

_feel,

and

think ofthem.

But

we

believewiththeutmost_{certainty that}these material_objectscan

and

do

continueto exist even

when

we

are not conscious ofthem.

We

are, for instance, atthis

moment

_seeingcertain material_{objects in} thisroom.

But

we

believethat_theywillcontinue toexist,even

when

we

haveall_gone

_{away and}

the

room

isshut

_up

for_{the night}

and no

one

is_seeingthem.IfIleavea_room,forfiveminutes,in

which

afire is _burning,

and

then

come

back

and

findit

burningstill, I

assume

thatithas_{been burning}allthe whileI

was

_away,

and

when

no

one

was

_seeingitor_feelingits_heat,justas

much

as

when

I

was

thereto see it. ^Kfi^all.

objects thattheyare, in this

aenpe whollyinfapenrteflf nfmir n. ^scipusness pi

tnem

;_they

arejJloM<%^

gnucli'whiffiw^ lyftyft.

W*

may,

incteed, say

of

lattmaterial objects that,thev have three

character-: _{(i)they.ageqyite a difiierstxt} sort_^ofthing

from

acts of

con-sciousness; _(a)

th^aj^j^ofj^^

situated

sjamSHherpnrxrtheriiLSp&ce;

and

(3)theyjiave

_{j^^jtrope^^which}

I_{havejust mentioaed-^aanftdythatthey,}are._{a sort citbiiifcjyjjdch}

exists

when

we

arenotcoasqiQUS^fitjust$&

niuchjsjwhen

we

are.

These

three characteristics are not, I think, sufficient to~3eSneTir

material object:there

may

be

other_objects,

which

_possessallthree

and

_yetarenotmaterialobjects.

But

theyare, I think,three of the

most

_importantcharacteristics

which

material_objectshave;

and

we

shouldnotcall_{anything a materialobject,}unless

we

meant

to assert thatit

had

allthree.

A

secondthing, then,

which

we

believeabouttherelationof con-sciousnessto_matter,isthatmatteris

10

SOME MAIN PROBLEMS

ness ofit thatitexistseven

when

we

are not conscious ofit ;

and

we

believe, too, thatthere are existing atany

moment many

more

material objects, of

which no

man

or animal is conscious, than material objects of

which

we

are conscious.

And

the third thing

which

we

beKeve abouttherelationofconsciousness tomatteristhe

following.

We

believernamely,

thatthere_probably

was

atime

when

therewere noactsofconsciousness attachedto_anymaterial_objects

on

ther

^wth

:atime,

when

the earth

was

so hotthat

no

livingBeings

couldexist

_upon

it

;

and

when

therefore there could

be no

conscious

beings

on

iteither.

And

as_regards

human

bodies

and

human

con-sciousness

we

believe, I think, that this is _{not only probable,} but

certain.

We

believethatit is_onlyfor a_{comparatively limited}time

comparatively limited,

though

amounting, perhaps, to several millions_{of years} that

men

haveexisted

_upon

the earth:beforethat

time, there were

no

bodies

upon

the earth

which

could

be

called

human, and

also

no minds which

could

be

calledthe

minds

of

men

;

though

there

_may

have

been minds and

acts ofconsciousness

be-longing to other sorts of animals.

And

just as

we

believethat, at

some

timeinthe_past,there

were

_probably

no

_{conscious beings}atall

upon

theearth,

and

certainly

no

beingswith

human

consciousness;

y

we

believe thatthere

mav

_{fflme a}tiqifrrinthefuture*

when

this

beso.

We

should not indeed

deny

that, even

when

there

was

no

consciousness

on

the earth,there

may

have

been

conscious beings elsewhere inthe Universe,

on

other planets;

we

shouldriot

deny

thatthere

may

be

some

now

;nor should

we

deny

thatthis

may

still

be

so,

when

(ifever) the time comes,

when

all consciousness

upon

the earthis_{again extinguished.}

But

we

should, I think,hold that there

_may

have been,

and

may

be

_{again, long periods} in the history,ofthe material Universe,during

which no

consciousness

was

attached to _any ofthe bodies in it

when

no

conscious acts were

taking place

anywhere

init.

We

_{believe, that}is_{to say, that just}as consciousness_certainlyis

now

attachedto_{comparatively}

_few

_among

the material_objectsinthe Universe, so there

_may

have beeninthe past

and

may

beagaininthefuture,long periods

when

it

was

orwill

be

attachedto noneat all.

This

is, I think, one beliefof

Common

Sense with _{regard to the} relation of consciousness to material

objects; and, if itbeso, itiscertainlyan important elementinour generalviewof the Universe.

So

far,.then,theelements

which

Ihavetriedto_emphasizeinthe

Common

Senseviewof_{the Universe, are}these. _Firstly,thatthere certainly are _{jr^tfce U^Yfflffi?,,*^}

,

V

^tTTnft

fc

WHAT

IS

PHILOSOPHY?

II

X

namely

i^teli^

secondly,as

to therelationof these

two

_{kinds of things three points}:thefirst_(i)

that conscious,acts jure attached to

_comg^tivelj^

few

_among

the

m^erialobjectsinJ&j^jnwerse,;

tJ#3l3#s;t

^ajprit^^matefial

^arelmconsciQus^ Jfideed the#nly_{bodiestp wjiiqhw^sliQuld}

We

shouldnot

deny

that they

may

beattachedalsotoother bodies

on

other_planets: that there

_may

on

other _planets be other _{livingbeings,}

which

are conscious.

But

we

should, Ithink,saythatconsciousacts certainly are not attachedtothevast _{majority of the material objects in}the Universe. Thisis one of our beliefs about therelation of acts of consciousness to _{material objects.}

A

second is ₍₂₎ that,material objects areallofsuchakindthat_they

_may

exist, even

when

we

are

^^conssioWiSi.of.them,

and

that

many

eto

m

fectso exist.

And

the thirdis_{(3)that^the^ww^^hayeJ>epa}atipae.whea, arts.olcQG^cious-ness

were

_attac^

_W

theJt&uyfirse,

and

_may

again

be

suctua~tuue>

and

/that thejce_{aliaost certainly}wasa

tjmewhen

there

_w^^np^human

_boc|i^K^ij^thujp^,C(msciousness

attachedTo them,ugonj:hisearth.

AndlQow"tKereare_only

two

other_{points in}theviewsof

Common

Sense aboutthe Universe,to

which

Iwishtocallattention.

\

_{The_firstjs}onie,

which

I haveconstantly

assumed

in

what

Ihave

alreadysaid,but

which

I wish

now

tomention_expressly. Itisthis.

That_all.material

objects,

j^AalLtbiXfl^^

our-selves

and

other

anim^sJJRQn,th^gafl^^

I _say 'are in time*;but, tospeak

more

accuratelyIoughttosay.eitherhavebeen

intime or areso

now

orwillbeso inthe future:_{eith^-'iS^or"(Sse}

^Mpp-^-^.v., -*^.---.^ -_--.-,>..

t .v_{+*-*p--*"+f*+*"Y^'.}

-u. -f

W

*vf^r>+m<*t,rntn*r*t-+f.~:^+.

allthree both teve

_be^ju^

so

^now,

and

wOTEey

inthefuturerForjustoneofthe things

which

we mean

by

talkingoPtime'is^bat therearesuchthingsasthepast,the present

and

the_future,andthatthereisa_{great difference}betweenthethree.

None

ofthe_mat^ri^

_^^VrtR

in

^pacfr

^

npne

ofoqr ^qtsof

con-at all,Jf*4ffffgiteyists

ciitfu

_{time^toktchj^w^}

_{only those of}them,for instance,

which

exist attietimeat

which

I

am

now

_speakingcan

now

betruly said

toexistatall:of othersit

_may

betruethat_{they did}existin_{the past}

orthat_theywillexistinthefuture,butitcannotbetruethat_they

doexist.

What

I_mean,then,

when

I_saythatallmaterial_objects

and

all ouractsofconsciousnessare in time, isthis: thateach of

them

either this, orelse, allthree: bothdidexist at

some

timeinthe

past,

doesexistnow, andwillexistinthefuture.

And

I

_mean,

_{too, that to}

saythata thing 'didexist'is _somethingdifferent

from

_sayingthatit

'doesexist' and both_{these again}

from

_sayingthatit'will_exist';

and

thateachof thesedifferentstatementsisinfacttrueof

some

_things.

Iam, for instance, _{quite sure}thattherehave beeninthe_past

_many

actsof consciousness,bothof

_my

own

andthose ofother

men

; I

am

quite sure that

many

are existing

now; and

I

am

_{very certain,}

though

less certain,that

_many

will existinthefuture.

And

sotoo of

material_objects:

many

haveexisted inthe

past,

many

do

existnow,

and

_many

_(in all

probability) will existin the future. I say

we

all

commonly

believethat_{these things}areso.

We

believe thatthe three

statements 'It didexist'

; 'Itdoes exist*; 'It will exist': are each of

them

true of

_many

material_objectsand

_many

actsof consciousness;

the firsttrue of

some

; the second true of others;

and

the third of

stillothers; andof

many,

again, allthree.

And

we

believe also,that

oneor otherofthese statementsistrue ofallof

them

;eitherthis, or

elsein

some

instancesthatallthreeof

them

aretrue ofone

and

the

same

_{thing: the} sun or the _{earth, for instance,} both didexist, do

exist,and_(probably)will exist. _This, I_say, is

certainlythebeliefof

Common

Sense. /

pr

^

And

thereis_onlyonedthiifrbeliefof

Common

Sense

which

Iwish

tomention:_namely,this.

Webdieve

Mthat

w^do

really

know

allthese thingsthatIhave mentioned.

We

know

thatthereare

and

havebeen

intheUniversethe

two

kinds of_{things material objects}andactsof consciousness.

We

know

that there are

and

have been in the

Uni-verse

_{huge numbers}

of both.

We

know

that

_many

material _objects

exist

when

we

are not conscious ofthem.

We

know

that the vast

majorityof materialobjects areunconscious.

We

know

that_{things of}

bothkindshaveexisted inthe_past,which donotexist_{now, and}that things ofboth kinds

do

exist _now,

which

did not existin the _past. All_{these things}

we

_should, I_{think, certainlysay}that

we

know.

And

moreover

we

believe that

we

know

an

immense

number

ofdetails

about particular material objects

and

acts of consciousness, _past, present and future.

We

know

_{most, indeed,} about the _past; but a

great dealaboutthe present;

and

much

also_{(though perhaps}thisis

only probable knowledge) about the future. Indeed _{the sphere of}

most

of the _{special sciences}

_may

_{be defined as}

being to give us detailed _{knowledge about}

particular objects of the kinds which I

have been _{trying to define}: that is to _say, about material _objects

WHAT

IS

PHILOSOPHY?

13 acts of consciousness of

men

_upon

the earth.

Most

of the _special sciencesconfinethemselvesto

some

_{particulargroup}

_among

_objects

of these

two

kinds;

and

we

believe that_theyhavebeen very

success-ful_{in giving}usa_{great deal}ofreal_{knowledge aboutobjects}of these kinds._{Astronomy,for instance,}tellsus aboutthe_heavenlybodies their size

and movements and

_composition

and

how

_theyact

_upon

one

another. _Physics

and

_{chemistry give} us detailed

_knowledge

about the _composition of different kinds of material _objects,

and

how

_they

and

theirminute_partsact

_upon

one_{another. Biologygives}

us

_knowledge

aboutthedifferences betweendifferent kinds of

ani-mals

_upon

theearth._Botany,aboutthedifferencesbetweendifferent

kindsof_{plants.Physiology aboutthe processes}

which

_go

on

_{in living}

bodies.

_Geology

_givesus

_knowledge

about_{the present}state

and

_past

history of thedifferent layersof rock orsoilof

which

thecrustof the earthis_composed.

_Geography

_{givesus knowledge aboutthe present}

distributionofland

and

water

_upon

the surface of the earth; about

the positions ofmountains

and

rivers; aboutthedifferent soils

and

climates of_{different parts} of theearth. _History

and

_{biographygive}

us

_knowledge

abouttheactions ofdifferent

men

and

collections of

men, which

have existed

_upon

the surface of the earth;

and

also

abouttheir acts _{of consciousness,}

what

sorts_{of thingsthey}

saw and

heard

and

_thought

and

_{believed. FinallyPsychology deals specially}

withtheactsof consciousness of

men

and

to

some

extentofanimals

also;ittriestoclassify

and

distinguish thedifferentkinds ofmental

acts

which

we

_perform,

and

to decide

how

these different acts are

related to one another. All these sciences

which

I have

mentioned

are,

you

will_{observe, occupiedexclusively}with_givingus

informa-tion aboutthe

two

kinds of_objects

which

I have triedto define

namely, material _{objects in space,} and the acts of consciousness of

men

and

animals

on

the surface of the earth.

And

we

_certainly believe that allof

them

have succeededin_{acquiring a great deal} of real_{knowledge aboutobjects}of thesekinds.

We

_{distinguishsharply,} in each case, between things

which

are

now

absolutely

known;

things

which

were formerly believed, but believed wrongly;

and

things

which

we

do not yet

know.

Inthe caseofall thesesciences, there_are,

we

believe, an

immense

number

of things

which

are

now

definitely

known

to be facts; a great

many, which

were formerly believed, but are

now

definitely

known

to be errors;

and

a great

many

which

we

do not

know

and

_{perhaps never}shall kilow. In all

our _ordinary talk, in all _newspapers

and

in all _ordinary books _(by

14

assume

thatthere is this distinction between

what

we

know, what

we

_wronglybelieve,

and

what

we

arestillin_ignorance about:

and

we

assume

that an

enormous

number

of truths about material

objects

and

theactsofconsciousness of

men

belongtothefirstclass

theclass_{of things absolutely}

known

known,

thatis,

_{by some}

man

on

thesurface oftheearth. All thisis, Ithink, certainly

nowadays

part of thebelief of

Common

Sense aboutthe Universe.

Ihavetried, then, toenumeratecertain_generalbeliefsaboutthe

Universe,

which

may,Ithink,befairlysaid tobebeliefsof

Common

Sense: beliefs

which

we

almostallofus

_nowadays

entertain

;

and

I

do

not

mean

to_saythattheseare_{the only views of}

Common

Sense aboutthe Universe;butonlythattheyareviews

which

itdoeshold

some of its _principal beliefs.

But

now

all of these beliefs taken together do not

amount

to a general description ofthe whole Uni-verse: _they are not a general_description of thewhole Universe,in the sensein

which

Isaidthatthefirst_problemof_philosophy

was

to giveussuchadescription.

They

consistin_sayingthatthere_certainly are in the Universe _{certain large classes} of_things,

and

that these thingsare related toone another in certain_ways.

But what

_they

do

not _say, as _{they stand,} is that these _{large classes of things} are the onlyclasses of things

which

are inthe Universe, or

which

we

know

tobeinit:_they donot say that everything

which

we know

_tobein

the Universe _belongsto

one

or other of these classes; they

do

not deny,astheystand, thatthere

_may

bein_{the Universe, or}

_may

even

be known

tobein_it,importantclasses_{of things}

which

donot_belong

to

_any

of the classes I have mentioned. For instance,

Common

Sense_{says,according}to

me

:

There

areintheUniverse

two

classes of things:

There

arematerial

objects in space, andtherearetheacts of consciousness of_living

men

and

animate

_upon

thesurfaceof the earth. _But, in _{order to convert these statements} into _{a general} description of the whole Universe,

we

should have to

add

one or other of

two

_things.

We

should haveto_sayeither:_Everythinginthe

Universe_belongstooneor otherofthese

two

classes; everythingis

eithera material_{object in space,} oranactof consciousness of

some

man

oranimal

on

theearth.

And

this

would

_plainly,if

_any

onesaid

it,professtobeageneraldescription ofthe whole Universe.

Or

else

we

_{might say}:

Everything

which

we

know

to be in _{the Universe,}

does

belongtooneor other of these

two

classes;

though

there

may

be

in theUniverseother_things, which

we

donot

know

tobein it.

And

this also, Ithink,_mightfairlybesaidtobe an attemptto_{give a}