CPB Document
No 31 May 2003
Performance contracts for police forces
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis Van Stolkweg 14
P.O. Box 80510
2508 GM The Hague, the Netherlands
Telephone +31 70 338 33 80 Telefax +31 70 338 33 50
Contents
Preface 7
Executive summary 9
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 13
1 Introduction 17
1.1 Rationale 17
1.2 Research question 18
1.3 Contribution to policy making 18
1.4 The Interior Department as principal 19
1.5 Approach 20
1.6 Structure 21
1.7 Defining the object of analysis 22
1.8 Scope 22
2 The government’s objectives for regional police work 27
2.1 Aim and structure 27
2.2 Translating tasks into objectives 27
2.3 Reasons for the regional police forces’ level of discretion 28
2.4 The dimensions of overall police performance 30
2.5 Conclusions 32
3 Realizing the objectives 33
3.1 Aim and structure 33
3.2 The Department’s challenge 33
3.3 Incentives from the Department’s policies 35
3.4 Other incentives 41
3.5 Conclusions 43
4 Empirical evidence on police performance 45
4.1 Aim and structure 45
4.2 Hypotheses 45
4.3 Crime clear-up rate Nordrhein-Westfalen vs. the Netherlands 45
4.5 Overall productivity of the police, 1980-2000 48
4.6 Possible explanations for the decline in efficiency 50
4.7 Conclusions 55
5 The rationale for performance contracts 53
5.1 Aim and structure 53
5.2 What is a performance contract? 53
5.3 Conditions for effective performance contracts 54
5.4 Empirical evidence on the potential of performance contracts for policing 57
5.5 Conclusions 58
6 The proposed performance contracts 63
6.1 Aim and structure 63
6.2 Brief history and plans for the future 63
6.3 The design of the performance contracts 64
6.4 Conclusions 65
7 Anticipating gaming of the performance evaluation 67
7.1 Aim and structure 67
7.2 Objective performance measures and the tradeoff between incentives and gaming 67
7.3 Shifting from objective to subjective performance evaluation 73
7.4 Conclusions 75
8 Effectiveness of the proposed performance contracts 77
8.1 Aim and structure 77
8.2 Assessing the proposed method of performance evaluation 77
8.3 Assessing collection of data 82
8.4 Assessing the proposed design of the performance rewards 83
8.5 Conclusions 87
9 Brief overview of policies in the United Kingdom and Australia 91
9.1 Aim and structure 91
9.2 Policies in England and Wales 91
9.3 Policies in Australia 94
9.4 What can we learn from these countries? 95
10 Conclusions 99
10.2 What goals might performance contracts serve? 99
10.3 Are the proposed performance contracts likely to be effective? 100
10.4 What are options for policy? 102
Abstract 107
References 109
Annex 1. The measures for the system of performance rewards 117
Preface
The regional police forces are seeing their budgets grow in a time of cutbacks in public expenditures. Regional police forces have a great degree of autonomy in choosing how to allocate these funds. The great degree of discretion makes regional police forces responsible for thinking about what they want to achieve and the manner in which they will attain their goals. Performance contracts could be instrumental in making these choices explicit. As such, they could contribute to improved police accountability and incentives.
The nature of police work makes the application of performance contracts highly challenging. Many questions still need to be answered. Can performance measures be selected that reflect the quality and variety of police work? Can targets be set at the right level? Are financial incentives a good way of rewarding efforts? These issues have been discussed in a range of research studies and policy documents - particularly by policy makers and analysts in Anglo-Saxon countries. In this study, Ben Vollaard reviews some of the existing literature in this area and applies it to the current debate on performance contracts for the police forces.
We are indebted to the people listed in the annex, who were interviewed or consulted in conducting the analysis. Several people kindly took the time to review a draft of the report, and provided many useful suggestions on how to structure the analysis and how to present the results. Special thanks go to Frits Vlek from the ‘Commissie Politie en Wetenschap’, Caspar Wiebrens from the ‘Parket Generaal’ of the Prosecution Council, Oskar Huurdeman and Esther de Kleuver from the Interior Department, and CPB colleagues Pierre Koning, Taco van Hoek, Marcel Canoy, Richard Venniker and Marc Pomp. We owe thanks to Sam Loeb for linguistic advice and to Simone Pailer for the lay out of the report. We would like to thank the Department of Economic Affairs and the Institute for Humane Studies for their financial support.
Executive summary
In the beginning of 2003, the Secretary of the Interior, the Minister of Justice and police administrators signed the ‘National Police Covenant’. The covenant states the way by which the police forces will contribute to the national goal of reducing crime and disorderly behaviour by 20 to 25 percent over the next three years. As part of the covenant, performance contracts will be signed with each individual regional police force by no later than July 2003. The contracts establish financial rewards for meeting a number of quantitative performance targets. The targets are related to output (fines, charges), citizen satisfaction, and internal performance (including sickness absence and telephone response times). The expectation is that the performance contracts will improve police accountability and incentives.
Concerns about police performance
In accordance with the government’s ambitions, the scarce empirical evidence indicates that there is scope for improvement in police accountability and incentives. Data from the
prosecution council show great differences in performance between the forces. Moreover, some poorly performing forces are not catching up. These findings indicate that there is room for a more lively exchange of best practices between the forces.
Recent empirical studies provide indications that the overall performance of the police has been declining. Crime clear-up rates have been on the decrease over the last 20 years, whereas they have been stable or improving in other countries. The number of solved crimes per officer (weighted with the respective penalty) has decreased over the last five years. When cleaning police data from red light and speed camera tickets, the overall productivity of the police appears to be on the decrease since 1990. These findings indicate that there is also room for a more systematic improvement of policing strategies through carefully evaluated experiments. However, based on the available data, we are not able to draw hard conclusions on the background of the decline in measured police performance. Unfortunately, many of the rich sources of administrative data of the forces have not been opened up yet. Consequently, little is publicly known about the way police budgets have been spent or the results of police work. Is the police unable to cope with changes in crime patterns and disorderly behaviour? Or are police officers choked by an ever-increasing administrative burden and a lack of upstream capacity in the criminal justice system? The lack of information on police efficiency and effectiveness alone is an indication of the low importance attached to understanding and improving police
Performance contracts as seemingly attractive policy instrument
At first sight, entering into performance contracts with the police forces seems to be an attractive way of improving their accountability and incentives. The rewards for meeting the performance targets support the motivation to improve. The rewards compensate the forces for the time and effort spent on evaluating operations and motivating employees to share and implement best practices. Moreover, the rewards acknowledge the efforts of police officers and managers who have to overcome (bureaucratic) barriers to change and the continuous, strong pressure to respond to the issues of the day.
Proposed performance contracts not likely to be very effective
A closer look at the proposed performance contracts learns that they are not likely to be very effective in achieving verifiable improvements in police performance. We base this conclusion on the following findings:
• Fixing desirable improvements into a contract invites the forces to ‘meet the numbers’ at the cost of quality of police work. The performance contracts allow for several ways of achieving the targets, many of which are not in line with the government’s objectives. If the forces are expected to react to the (financial) incentives, then paying off for behaviour other than what the government is seeking undermines the effectiveness of performance contracts. The contracts reward the forces for substituting away from tasks that do not affect the performance measures to tasks that do (at the possible cost of pro-active crime prevention). Within activities that affect the measures, the contracts also pay off for lowering the quality of output (frivolous fining, picking the easiest criminal charges, producing charges with questionable evidence). These are all easy and therefore tempting ways of meeting the targets.
• Fixing levels of output conflicts with the need to respond to changing regional circumstances. By putting the desired number of fines and charges in a contract, they are made independent of changes in the nature and frequency of criminal and disorderly behaviour. The targets limit the responsiveness of regional police forces to changes in their environment. Therefore, the
demands of the performance contracts and reality may well start to deviate. Clearly, this is not in the interest of effective policing.
• The government does not have the data to set the performance targets at the right level. In the absence of any firm knowledge about the means by which the targets can be achieved, each target included in the performance contract is likely to be either out of reach or too little ambitious. Detailed information on business processes and regional circumstances is lacking. Back-of-the-envelop calculations indicate that the targets for the number fines and charges are little ambitious - certainly given the future increase in the number of police officers. The goals for customer satisfaction may also be little ambitious since they are based on the own historical
performance (‘perform at least as good as you did in the past’). If the targets are set too low, the force may stop their efforts as soon as the target is reached (‘satisficing behaviour’).
• The performance targets conflict with the wish for flexibility at the national level. Frequently, the government places new demands on the police forces. These changing policy priorities may well make the performance targets obsolete. When anticipating on future changes, the forces would have little incentive to meet the current targets. Furthermore, negative experiences with some of the performance measures may prompt the government to change the terms of contract. Such changes are not unthinkable given the inexperience with this policy instrument. Altering the method of measuring and rewarding performance along the way does not support the forces’ incentives either.
• The financial rewards could provoke undesirable biases in police work. Awarding the financial reward requires a yes/no decision based on weighing multiple performance measures. It is hard to replace subjective judgement with mechanical rules, however. The government does not have the data to choose the appropriate weights. When the weights included in the decision rules are picked wrong, undesirable biases in police work may result. The forces can be expected to look for the target that can be achieved with the least effort and the greatest reward.
• The financial rewards conflict with the lack of consumer choice. By not increasing the budgets of forces that did not sufficiently improve their performance, citizens pay twice for poor police management within their region. In contrast with schools and hospitals, citizens cannot switch to a better performing force other than by moving somewhere else.
Some of the shortcomings can be alleviated...
The performance contracts could made more effective by making changes. Some of the options are:
• Search for better performance indicators. Better measures could limit the side effects and lower the conflict with flexibility at the regional level. Of all measures included in the contract, the output measures number of fines and number of charges most strongly invite the forces to just ‘meet the numbers’. They also limit the discretion of the forces most strongly. An option is not to include the number of fines in the contract. The charges can be weighted with their respective penalty. Then the forces no longer have the incentive to focus on the easiest cases.
• Tie financial incentives to police managers’ remuneration rather than the forces’ budgets. That way, customers of police services will no longer pay twice for poor police performance.
• Gather better data to improve target setting. Better data on how the forces spend their resources and what outputs are produced are necessary to make a better informed guess on what the targets should be. To that end, the rich sources of administrative data of the forces would need to be opened up.
... but there remain serious drawbacks to the use of performance contracts
Also with these changes, there remain serious drawbacks to the use of performance contracts. The need to react to changing regional and national circumstances will always make it hard to contract police output in advance. Setting targets at the right level requires a level of knowledge about the specifics of police work and regional circumstances that is unlikely to be present at the national level. Furthermore, the quality and variety of police work is just hard to capture in quantitative performance measures. Therefore, the performance measures will always allow for ways of meeting the targets that are not in line with the government’s objectives.
Towards an alternative approach: organizing accountability to customers and peers
Considering the serious drawbacks related to the contractual approach, it is worthwhile to look across the borders for alternative ways of achieving the government’s objectives. Australia and the United Kingdom are two countries that have been working on greater police accountability and incentives for a long time. Interestingly, in these countries experts have been closely involved in the design of policies towards the police. Neither Australia nor the United Kingdom have opted for performance contracts with financial incentives for the forces. Instead their prime focus is on benchmarking the police forces. Many years have been invested in improving the reliability of police data and methods of benchmarking forces in a fair and meaningful way. A similar approach could be worked out for the Dutch police. In that case, the role of the national government is not to put down desired changes in a contract but to organize accountability to customers and peers. The outcomes of evaluations by customers and peers from other forces can be an input into decisions about promotion and remuneration of a force’s management. Customers and peers are in the best position to assess performance - and to provide ideas for improvement. Customers not only include citizens currently surveyed through the Citizen Police Monitor (PMB), but also businesses and public prosecutors. Managed peer reviews are a necessary mean to conduct a thorough and comprehensive assessment of policing strategies. Through peer reviews, the management of each police force is forced to develop and present a coherent picture of the problems in their region, their strategy to tackle these problems, and the results relative to other forces. This approach of ‘organized accountability’ could contribute to a culture within the police of systematically following, evaluating and improving performance.
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)
Begin 2003 tekenden de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijkrelaties, de Minister van Justitie en de korpsbeheerders het ‘Nationaal Politie Convenant’. Het convenant geeft aan welke bijdrage de politie zal leveren aan de nationale doelstelling een vermindering te bereiken in crimineel en orde verstorend gedrag van 20 to 25 procent over de komende drie jaar. Als onderdeel van het convenant sluit de overheid vóór juli 2003 prestatiecontracten af met elk regionaal politiekorps. In de contracten staat dat de korpsen een financiële beloning zullen ontvangen als zij een aantal kwantitatieve doelstellingen behalen. De afspraken betreffen productie (bekeuringen, zaken naar Openbaar Ministerie), tevredenheid van burgers en interne organisatie (onder andere ziekteverzuim en snelheid van telefonische beantwoording). De verwachting is dat de prestatiecontracten zullen bijdragen aan de prestatieprikkels voor en verantwoording door de politiekorpsen.
Zorgen over politieprestaties
De resultaten van het weinige beschikbare empirische onderzoek geven aan dat er ruimte is voor verbetering in prestatieprikkels en verantwoording. Gegevens van het Openbaar Ministerie laten grote verschillen zien in de prestaties van de korpsen. Bovendien halen sommige minder presterende korpsen hun achterstand niet in. Deze bevindingen vormen een aanwijzing dat er ruimte bestaat voor een meer levendige uitwisseling van best practices tussen de korpsen. Ook laten recente empirische studies een daling zien in de prestatie van de politie. Over de afgelopen 20 jaar zijn de ophelderingspercentages voortdurend gedaald, terwijl ze stabiel waren of zelfs verbeterden in andere landen. Het aantal opgehelderde misdrijven per agent (gewogen met de bijbehorende straf) is gedaald over de laatste vijf jaar. Wanneer politiegegevens geschoond worden voor flitspaal-boetes blijkt de productiviteit van de politie sinds 1990 te dalen. Deze resultaten geven een indicatie dat er ruimte is voor een meer systematische aanpak van het verbeteren van de prestatie met behulp van zorgvuldig geëvalueerde experimenten. Op basis van de beschikbare gegevens kunnen we echter geen harde conclusies trekken over de precieze achtergrond van de gemeten daling in politieprestaties. Helaas zijn de rijke bronnen van administratieve gegevens van de korpsen nog niet goed toegankelijk. Hierdoor is publiekelijk weinig bekend over de manier waarop de budgetten worden besteed of over de resultaten van politiewerk. Is de politie niet in staat veranderingen in criminaliteit en orde verstorend gedrag bij te houden? Of zijn politieagenten verstikt in een voortdurend groeiende administratieve rompslomp en een gebrek aan capaciteit hoger in de strafrechtketen? Het gebrek aan informatie over efficiëntie en effectiviteit van de politie is zelf al een indicatie van het lage belang dat gehecht wordt aan het begrijpen en verbeteren van de prestatie van de politie.
Prestatiecontracten als een schijnbaar aantrekkelijk beleidsinstrument
Op het eerste gezicht lijkt het afsluiten van prestatiecontracten met de regiokorpsen een aantrekkelijke manier om de verantwoording en prikkels te versterken. De prestatiebeloning ondersteunt de motivatie om te verbeteren. De beloning compenseert de korpsen voor de tijd en inspanningen die gaan zitten in het evalueren van hun optreden en het motiveren van agenten om best practices te delen en te implementeren. Bovendien vormt de beloning een erkenning van de inspanningen van agenten en managers die nodig zijn om de (bureaucratische) barrières tegen verandering en de waan van de dag te doorbreken.
Voorgestelde prestatiecontracten zijn waarschijnlijk weinig effectief
Een nadere analyse van de voorgestelde prestatiecontracten geeft aan dat zij waarschijnlijk weinig effectief zijn in het bereiken van aantoonbare verbeteringen van de veiligheid. Wij baseren deze conclusie op de volgende bevindingen:
• Het vastleggen van gewenste verbeteringen in een contract nodigt uit tot een gerichtheid op cijfertjes die ten koste gaat van de kwaliteit van politiewerk. De contracten laten ruimte voor vele manieren om de prestatieafspraken te behalen. Niet alle manieren zijn in lijn met de doelstellingen van de overheid. Als van de korpsen verwacht wordt dat zij reageren op (financiële) prikkels, dan ondermijnt het belonen van zulk gedrag de effectiviteit van prestatiecontracten. De contracten belonen de korpsen voor het substitueren van taken die niet tot uitdrukking komen in de prestatiemaatstaven naar taken die dat wel doen (mogelijkerwijs ten koste van actieve misdaadpreventie). Binnen activiteiten die de prestatiemaatstaven beïnvloeden, belonen de contracten ook het verlagen van de kwaliteit van de productie (pietluttig bekeuren, de eenvoudigste zaken oppakken en het doorsturen van zaken met twijfelachtig bewijs). Dit zijn allemaal eenvoudige en daarom verleidelijke manieren om de prestatieafspraken te behalen. • Het vastleggen van te leveren productie rijmt niet met de noodzaak om te reageren op veranderende
regionale omstandigheden. Door het gewenste aantal bekeuringen en zaken in een contract vast te leggen worden deze grootheden onafhankelijk gemaakt van de aard en het niveau van crimineel en orde verstorend gedrag. De prestatieafspraken beperken dus de mogelijkheid van de korpsen om te reageren op veranderingen in hun omgeving. Hierdoor kunnen de eisen van de
prestatiecontracten en de werkelijkheid uit elkaar gaan lopen. Dit is natuurlijk niet in het belang van effectief politiewerk.
• De overheid kan vanwege een gebrek aan informatie het ambitieniveau van de afspraken niet goed inschatten. Zonder goede informatie over de middelen waarmee de prestatieafspraken zijn te bereiken, is iedere doelstelling in het prestatiecontract waarschijnlijk óf buiten bereik óf te weinig ambitieus. Er is een gebrek aan gedetailleerde informatie over bedrijfsprocessen en regionale omstandigheden. Berekeningen op de achterkant van een sigarendoos laten zien dat de doelstellingen voor het aantal bekeuringen en zaken waarschijnlijk weinig ambitieus zijn
-zeker gezien de toekomstige groei in het aantal politieagenten. De doelstellingen voor
klanttevredenheid lijken ook weinig ambitieus, omdat ze gebaseerd zijn op de eigen prestatie in het verleden (‘presteer tenminste zo goed als in het verleden’). Als de afspraken weinig
ambitieus zijn, kunnen de korpsen hun inspanningen verlagen zodra de doelstelling is behaald. • De prestatieafspraken conflicteren met de behoefte aan flexibiliteit op nationaal niveau. De overheid
stelt regelmatig nieuwe eisen aan de politiekorpsen. Deze veranderende beleidsprioriteiten kunnen de gemaakte afspraken betekenisloos maken. Als de korpsen anticiperen op veranderingen in de toekomst hebben ze weinig prikkel om nu de afspraken te behalen. Bovendien kunnen negatieve ervaringen met prestatie-indicatoren aanleiding geven tot een wijziging in het contract. Veranderingen in het meten en belonen van de prestatie zijn niet ondenkbaar gegeven het gebrek aan ervaring met dit beleidsinstrument. Het tussentijds veranderen van het contract verzwakt ook de prestatieprikkels.
• De financiële prestatiebeloning nodigt uit tot ongewenste verschuivingen in politiewerk. Het toekennen van de prestatiebeloning vereist een ja/nee beslissing gebaseerd op het wegen van verschillende prestatiemaatstaven. Het is echter moeilijk om een subjectieve beoordeling te vervangen door simpele beslisregels. De overheid heeft niet de gegevens om de juiste gewichten te kiezen. Verkeerd gekozen gewichten kunnen leiden tot ongewenste verschuivingen in politiewerk. Van de korpsen kan immers worden verwacht dat zij zich richten op doelstellingen die met de minste inspanning en tegen de hoogste beloning zijn te realiseren.
• De financiële prestatiebeloning conflicteert met het gebrek aan consumentenkeuze. Door het budget van minder goed presterende korpsen niet te verhogen betalen burgers een dubbele rekening voor slecht politiemanagement in hun regio. In tegenstelling tot scholen en ziekenhuizen kunnen burgers niet kiezen voor een beter politiekorps anders dan door te verhuizen. Sommige tekortkomingen zijn te verlichten...
De effectiviteit van de prestatiecontracten is te verhogen door het maken van een aantal aanpassingen. Hiervoor zijn verschillende opties:
• Zoek naar betere prestatie-indicatoren. Betere prestatie-indicatoren kunnen de negatieve bijwerkingen verkleinen en tegemoet komen aan de behoefte aan flexibiliteit. Van alle
maatstaven in het contract nodigen het aantal boetes en het aantal aan het Openbaar Ministerie te leveren zaken het sterkst uit tot ongewenste gedragseffecten. Ook beperken zij de
beleidsvrijheid van de korpsen het meest. Een optie is het aantal boetes te schrappen als prestatiemaatstaf. Ook is het mogelijk de opgehelderde zaken te wegen met de zwaarte van het delict. Dan heeft de politie niet langer een prikkel zich op de makkelijkste zaken te richten. • Verleg de financiële prikkels van het budget naar de beloning van managers. Op deze wijze betalen de
klanten van de politie niet langer een dubbele rekening voor matige politieprestaties in hun regio.
• Verzamel betere gegevens om het ambitieniveau van de prestatieafspraken beter in te schatten.
Hiervoor zijn betere gegevens over bedrijfsprocessen nodig. Het toegankelijk maken van de rijke bronnen van administratieve gegevens van de korpsen is hiervoor noodzakelijk.
... maar de prestatiecontracten blijven belangrijke negatieve bijwerkingen houden
Ook met deze aanpassingen blijft het gebruik van prestatiecontracten belangrijke negatieve bijwerkingen houden. De noodzaak om te reageren op veranderende regionale en nationale omstandigheden is moeilijk te verenigen met de wens prestaties vooraf vast te leggen. Het inschatten van het ambitieniveau van de doelstellingen vereist een niveau van kennis over bedrijfsprocessen en regionale omstandigheden dat niet goed is te realiseren op nationaal niveau. Bovendien is de kwaliteit en variëteit van politiewerk gewoon niet goed te vangen in een aantal prestatie-indicatoren. Hierdoor zal er altijd ruimte blijven bestaan voor gedragseffecten die niet in lijn zijn met de doelstellingen van de overheid.
Naar een alternatieve benadering: het organiseren van verantwoording aan klanten en collega’s Gezien de tekortkomingen van de contractuele benadering is het waardevol om over de grenzen te kijken naar alternatieve wijzen om de doelstellingen van de overheid te realiseren. Australië en Engeland zijn twee landen die al lange tijd werken aan betere verantwoording en prikkels voor de politie. Het is interessant te zien dat in deze landen experts nauw betrokken zijn bij de vormgeving van het politiebeleid. Australië noch Engeland hebben gekozen voor prestatie-contracten met financiële prikkels voor de korpsen. Zij focussen op het benchmarken van korpsen. Vele jaren zijn geïnvesteerd in het verbeteren van de betrouwbaarheid van gegevens en van methoden om de korpsen op een eerlijke en betekenisvolle manier te vergelijken.
Een soortgelijke benadering is uit te werken voor de Nederlandse politie. Volgens deze aanpak is de rol van de nationale overheid niet om gewenste verbeteringen in een contract vast te leggen, maar om verantwoording aan klanten en collega-korpsen te organiseren. Het management van de korpsen kan worden afgerekend op basis van de uitkomsten van de evaluatie door klanten en collega-korpsen (peer review). Klanten en collega’s zijn in de beste positie om politieprestaties te evalueren - en om ideeën voor verbetering aan te dragen. Klanten zijn niet alleen burgers die nu worden geënquêteerd door de Politie Monitor Bevolking, maar ook bedrijven en officieren van justitie. Intervisie tussen korpsen is noodzakelijk voor een diepgravende en brede evaluatie van de prestaties van een korps. De intervisie tussen korpsen dwingt het management van ieder korps om een coherent beeld te ontwikkelen van de veiligheidssituatie in de regio, de strategie om de problemen aan te pakken en de behaalde resultaten in vergelijking met andere korpsen. Deze aanpak van ‘georganiseerde verantwoording’ kan bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van een cultuur binnen de politie die zich kenmerkt door het systematisch volgen, evalueren en verbeteren van de prestatie.
1
See Smit (2000) and Tak and Fiselier (2002) for international comparisons and Wiebrens (2002b) for trends within the Netherlands.
1
Introduction
1.1
Rationale
Of all public tasks, Dutch citizens give fighting crime and maintaining public order highest priority (SCP, 2001). However, the performance of police services falls well short of
expectations. In no other industrialized country do citizens rate their satisfaction with the work of the police lower than in the Netherlands (SCP, 2002, p. 666). The typical response to calls for better policing has been an increase in police funding. The number of citizens served by each police officer has been brought down from 390 in 1980 to 320 in 2002, a decrease of almost 20 percent. By 2010, this figure will be as low as 306, a further decrease of 4 percent (BZK and Justitie, 2003, p. 2).
However, simply boosting general resource levels to improve safety is no longer seen as sufficient. Public attention is slowly being refocused from the number of officers to what they actually do and the effects of their daily work. So far little use has been made of the rich data sources owned by the police forces (one of the exceptions is PKP, 1988). Consequently, little is publicly known about the way police budgets have been spent or the efficiency and effectiveness of the police. Are the regional police forces getting the most of their yearly budget of EUR 2.7 billion? What can the public expect from a further increase in the number of police officers? Are the streets going to be safer? And if so, how do we know whether the police made the difference? Recent claims that the efficiency of the police is declining dramatically present more questions than answers.1 To what extent do capacity restraints in the criminal justice system put a check on
police work? Are administrative burdens keeping the officers in the police station?
To address concerns about accountability and police performance, the Secretary of the Interior is about to introduce performance contracts for the 25 regional police forces. Measures that indicate the performance of the police have been identified, targets and financial incentives for meeting those targets have been set. The regional performance contracts will be based on the national police covenant that was signed on February 15, 2003. The performance contracts are thought to contribute to greater accountability and a shift towards a results-oriented police organization (BZK, 2002c, p. 72).
2
See Schoof (2002) for an interview with Frits Vlek on the Dutch initiatives. For a critical review of British and Australian experiences see FitzGerald et al. (2002) and Dupont (2001)
Critical observers claim that these contracts are like a Trojan horse.2 The publicly announced
targets and the accompanying flow of performance indicators are appealing in the sense that they create the appearance of control over the police. However, the actual use of such contracts could lead to various undesirable side effects. For example, a strong focus on performance indicators could result in a bias towards objectives that can be quantified at the expense of objectives that cannot so easily be quantified. On the basis of such arguments, sceptics claim that the remedy is worse than the disease.
Uncertainty about the behavioural effects of performance contracts is not unique to the case of Dutch police forces. Other sectors and countries are facing similar problems. For instance, policy makers and analysts in the United Kingdom have spent a considerable amount of time on improving the accountability of their police (see Drake and Simper, 2001 for an overview). Similarly, Australia has built up a body of highly relevant literature on this topic (see Carrington et al., 1997 for instance). Especially given the experimental stage of the Dutch system of performance contracting, it is important that we learn from the insights and experiences that have been built up elsewhere.
1.2
Research question
The following research question is central to this study:
Is it likely that performance contracts for the regional police forces will contribute to realization of the Interior Department’s objectives for regional police work?
It is important to note that we focus on regional police work, not on supra-regional issues such as fighting international crime syndicates. The latter activities are often organized at the national or international level. We will further discuss the scope of this study in Section 1.8.
1.3
Contribution to policy making
We aim to support decision-making at the Department of the Interior by critically reviewing the potential contribution of performance contracts. At present, the performance contracts are in the making. They will be introduced by no later than June 30, 2003. As argued above, an application of the insights and experiences documented in the literature to this practical problem could help the Department appropriately implement this new policy instrument.
3
TK 26345, Nr. 79 (2002): “During this administration the responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior for central management of the police, as well as actual policing has been supported with wider powers. (...) The powers to manage the regional police forces at the national level are concentrated within the Department of the Interior.” Translated from: “In deze kabinetsperiode is de verantwoordelijkheid van de minister van BZK voor het centraal beheer van de Nederlandse politie, alsmede voor de politiezorg nader ondersteund met bevoegdheden. Zo (...) zijn de bevoegdheden op rijksniveau met betrekking tot het beheer van de regionale politiekorpsen bij BZK
geconcentreerd.” 4
Each force has the legal status of independent body (‘Zelfstandig Bestuursorgaan’, ZBO). A ZBO has a high degree of autonomy in performing its public task. Other examples of ZBOs are the Social Benefit Administration (UWV), the Central Bank (DNB) and the Department of Motor Vehicles (CBR).
5
BZK and Justitie (1998): “The differences in safety between the 25 regions (but also within these regions) make it self evident and desirable that the forces set their own priorities (...) to achieve the objectives set at the regional level.” Translated from: “De onderlinge verschillen in veiligheid tussen de 25 regio's (maar ook daarbinnen) maken het vanzelfsprekend en wenselijk dat de korpsen (...) zelf de accenten kunnen leggen voor het bereiken van regionaal bepaalde (veiligheids-) doelstellingen.”
Clearly, there is a particular need for input in the months to come. This study is meant to be a timely contribution to policy making. True to the mission of the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, we will clarify the choices and tradeoffs that are to be made rather than present politically coloured answers.
1.4
The Interior Department as principal
We take the perspective of the Department of the Interior. This Department can be seen as principal of the 25 regional police forces because of its responsibility for the efficiency and effectiveness of the police (BZK, 2002c, p. 66 and Police Act, article 53a). Over the last years, the role of the Department as principal at the national level has been strengthened.3 However, the
position of the Department is different from other principals managing independent bodies.4
Each force is embedded in a regional administrative structure that includes mayors and public prosecutors, the respective authorities for maintaining public order and emergency assistance and law enforcement (see the box below). Actual goals and priorities therefore tend to set at the regional and the local level.5 For this reason, we use a broad definition of a regional police force
that includes the force but also the regional authorities (mayors and public prosecutors). They together are responsible for realizing the objectives of the Department within their region. When discussing the design of performance contracts, we explicitly account for the Department’s unique relation to the forces.
6
So far, the principal-agent theory has not been used extensively in the area of police studies. Exception known to the author is Prendergast (2001). In their review of the literature on the economics of law enforcement, Polinsky and Shavell (2000, section 19) put it as line of inquiry that merits further development.
1.5
Approach
In this study, we apply insights from the literature on the theory and practice of performance contracts to the problem of assessing the value of such contracts for management of the regional police forces. The analysis is qualitative of nature because of its focus on the optimal design of an institution that is still in the making.
Economic theory provides a useful framework for studying tradeoffs in the design of
performance contracts for police forces. The principal-agent model - developed in the economics literature regarding incentives in organizations - provides a meaningful way of analysing the interaction between the Department of the Interior and the police forces.6 A substantial part of
current research on the design of performance contracts is conducted by economists or based on economic theory.
Most of the foreign experiences documented in the literature that we review are based on policies in the United Kingdom and Australia. Several years ago, both countries started a comprehensive review of their police management systems. Since that time, both the United Kingdom and Australia have worked hard to improve accountability of the police. Consequently, they are ahead of the Netherlands when it comes to the evaluation of police performance and
Management at the regional level
At the regional level, each force is managed by the mayor of the main municipality in the region (‘korpsbeheerder’), here forth ‘mayor in command’. He is accountable to the regional council (‘regionaal college’), which he also presides. The council consists of all mayors in the region and the chief public prosecutor (‘hoofdofficier van justitie’). The regional council makes all final decisions on the budget, annual account and the regional policy plan (‘regionaal beleidsplan’). The regional policy plan includes the objectives and priorities of the force. The mayor in command drafts the budget, annual account and the policy plan together with the chief public prosecutor. The (elected) local councils can advise their mayor on issues that are to be decided by the regional council. The chief of police (‘korpschef’) assists the mayor in command with daily management of the force. He has no formal powers. He meets the mayor in command and the chief public prosecutor on a regular basis to discuss management issues (‘regionaal driehoeksoverleg’). There are similar regular meetings at the local level between the mayor, the public prosecutor and local chief of police (‘locaal driehoeksoverleg’). The most striking feature of the regional institutional structure is that all players have multiple roles. Clearly, one of the key players at the regional level is the mayor in command. He combines many roles in one person. He is not only involved in drafting the regional police plan, but also in accepting it as chairman of the regional council. Moreover, he supervises proper execution of the plan.
design of incentives for the police. There could be much to learn from experiences in these countries.
In order to maintain a practical understanding of the issues, we conducted open interviews with people who are involved in policy making and research in this area (see Annex 2 for a list of consulted people).
1.6
Structure
To assess whether performance contracts for the police forces are likely to have a positive effect, we structure the paper along the following three steps:
Step I. What goals might performance contracts serve?
As a first step, we discuss why the Department of Interior would need performance contracts. To that end, we analyse whether the Department’s current policies - without performance contracts - stimulate the forces to work towards their objectives. The objectives for regional police work are defined in Chapter 2. We continue with an analysis of the forces' incentives to realize these objectives in Chapter 3 (before the introduction of performance contracts). In Chapter 4, we assess whether the current empirical evidence is in line with our findings in Chapter 3. Finally, we discuss whether performance contracts are a logical policy instrument to address the need for change in Chapter 5.
Step II. Are the proposed performance contracts likely to be effective?
After defining the goals of performance contracts, step II assesses whether the proposed performance contracts are likely to be effective. In Chapter 6 we provide a description of what is known at this time about the design of the proposed performance contracts. In Chapter 7 we discuss the possible behavioural effects of these contracts. This chapter is the core of the analysis. The conclusions of Chapter 8 provide input for the third step in the analysis: how could the design be improved?
Step III. What is the value of performance contracts for the police?
In Chapter 9, we will provide a brief overview of the policies that are being pursued in Australia and the United Kingdom. This look across the borders is meant to provide ideas for alternative ways of achieving the Department’s objectives. Based on the analysis in the foregoing chapters and the lessons from Chapter 9, we draw conclusions about the value of performance contracts for the police forces in Chapter 10.
1.7
Defining the object of analysis
Here we use a descriptive definition of police services. The table below provides an overview of the activities in which the police forces engage themselves. Later on in the report, we will discuss the objectives that connect these activities to a common purpose. We do not include privately provided police services in the analysis (such as private investigators, private security
surveillance, etc.). In the analysis, we take the public nature of the police as given: we do not go into the discussion of public versus private provision (see Van der Vijver et al., 2001).
1.8
Scope
To keep the analysis tractable, we had to decide which issues are truly essential to the research question and which issues could be left outside the scope of this study. There are four major areas that would justify separate studies.
Interaction within the forces
We focus on the interaction between the Department of the Interior and the regional police forces. As discussed above, there are major policy initiatives at this level - and many unanswered questions. An analysis of incentives within the forces is beyond the scope of this study (the interested reader is referred to Terpstra, 2002).
Table 1.1 Police tasks according to the Activities Code Table (ANP)
Task Definition
Community policing Provision of basic police services by a police unit that works exclusively in a certain geographic working area.
Emergency assistance Providing services to people in acute emergencies on a 24/7 basis.
Criminal investigations Investigation of crimes directed at finding the offender and/or goods. This includes all activities related to support to the public prosecutor. Problem-oriented policing Activities that are directed at a specific item, including large events, traffic, and moral law. Customer-oriented policing Activities at the police station related to in-person or telephone contact with the public. This includes reporting a crime. Special police tasks These activities are exclusively related to protection of persons/ goods, execution of penalties and border patrol.
Note: The Activiteitencodetabel Nederlandse Politie (ANP) includes an exhaustive list of police tasks to provide a uniform framework for activity measurement.
7
BZK and Justitie (1998 p. 33): “... often there has been little attention to cooperation between the forces. That has resulted in a patch work of information and management infrastructures.” Translated from: ‘... is er vaak minder aandacht geweest voor onder meer samenwerking tussen de korpsen onderling. Dat heeft ertoe geleid dat bijvoorbeeld de informatiehuishouding en de bijbehorende bedrijfsvoering op verschillende manieren zijn ingericht.’
Supra-regional police work
We focus on police work that has an exclusive regional dimension. We do not go into issues that are beyond the control of a single police force, such as fighting organized crime (the so-called ‘bovenregionale of landelijke politiediensten’) or infrastructure issues such as shared
information and communication technology (ICT). Indeed there are major concerns in this area, particularly about coordination between the forces (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003b concludes that exchange of information for criminal investigations is in the same sorry state as in 1985). Some of these concerns, such as the exchange of information between forces, directly affect issues discussed in this report. After all, without a good facilitating role of the Department, exchange of information within and between the forces will be hindered.7 However, there are
different causes underlying a role for the Department in supra-regional police work (such as externalities and coordination failure) than in the case of exclusively regional police work. Because of the different rationale for intervention by the Department of the Interior, these issues require a different institutional framework (nationally organized units, a centralized ICT organization, etc.). Therefore, an analysis of the role of the Department in supra-regional police work would require a separate study (see for example Kleemans, Brienen and Van de Bunt, 2002).
Changing the organizational framework
Some observers claim that the current organizational framework of the police does not foster a culture of accountability and incentives to improve performance. There are many people involved in making policy for the police, but not many of them bear responsibility for the outcomes. Vague definitions of responsibilities may hinder accountability (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a, p. 18, 19). There is little democratic control of the police forces (Muller, 2002). There is no good distinction between policy making and evaluation (ibid.). The mayors in command have the role of policy maker and auditor (see Section 1.3). The Police Inspection does not have a strong role (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2001). The public prosecutor has only one voice in the regional management council against many mayors. Consequently, there may be too little attention to performance in the area of criminal investigations. Clearly, the organizational framework of the police has effects on performance. We see the organizational framework as a separate issue however. In this study, we take the organizational framework as given and focus on the value of performance contracts.
Behavioural responses outside the economic model
The analysis is based on the economic model of behaviour assuming rational actors that maximize their utility subject to a number of constraints. Behavioural responses that cannot be reduced to this model are outside the scope of this study. We are convinced that the economics literature provides a meaningful framework for studying the behavioural effects of performance contracts. Our comparative advantage is in economics. We leave it to people specialized in other disciplines to complement our analysis. For example, see Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) for a highly instructive review of the effects of incentives on motivation from a psychological
Step I. What goals might performance contracts serve?
Is there a need for change in the Department’s policies towards the forces? And if so, are performance contracts likely to foresee in the need? These are the questions that we address in the first step of the analysis. We define the objectives for regional police work in Chapter 2. Then, we go on to analyse the forces’ incentives to realize these objectives in Chapter 3 (before the introduction of performance contracts). In Chapter 4, we assess whether the current empirical evidence is in line with our findings in Chapter 3. Finally, we discuss whether performance contracts are a logical policy instrument to address the need for change in Chapter 5.
8
Translation from Politiewet 1993: “De politie heeft tot taak in ondergeschiktheid aan het bevoegd gezag en in overeenstemming met de geldende rechtsregels te zorgen voor de daadwerkelijke handhaving van de rechtsorde en het verlenen van hulp aan hen die deze behoeven.”
2
The government’s objectives for regional police work
2.1
Aim and structure
What are the objectives for regional police work? By first defining a clear set of objectives, we can analyse the Department’s policies aimed at realizing these objectives in later chapters. We will argue that the desired discretion of the police forces implies a concern with the overall performance of the forces rather than a detailed prioritization of goals for regional police work. The forces should provide efficient, effective, fair and decent policing within the framework of broadly defined outcomes of regional police work.
We take a number of steps before arriving at this conclusion. First, we discuss the implications of translating the tasks of the police laid down by law into objectives in Section 2.2. Then, we discuss the Department’s interest in providing great discretion to the regional level in Section 2.3. Clearly, the unique relation between the Department and the regional level has implications for the way the objectives are to be defined. In Section 2.4, we discuss these implications and provide a possible definition of the objectives. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2
Translating tasks into objectives
The objectives for the regional police forces are based on the task of the police described in the Police Act of 1993, Article 2:
It is the task of the police to maintain the legal order and to provide help to those who need it - in subordination to the proper authorities and in accordance with the rule of law.8
More specifically, the task areas of the police are (1) maintaining public order (article 12 Police Act 1993), (2) enforcing the law (article 12 Police Act 1993) - this task area includes enforcement of a number of special laws including the Environmental Management Act, Immigration Law, Licensing Act and Traffic Act - and (3) providing emergency assistance (article 2 Police Act 1993).
The general description of tasks needs to be translated into objectives. The actual wording of the translation is essential for the range of activities the police will get involved in. By translating
tasks into objectives, police work is extended beyond the tasks described in the law. For example, a burglary prevention campaign is not written into the law. In theory, the police could take up any activity that contributes to the objectives, not only the tasks that are mentioned in the law. Those activities include prevention work and cooperation with other actors, including the private sector (see the box below for a simple example).
2.3
Reasons for the regional police forces’ level of discretion
The Secretary of the Interior needs to translate the tasks of the police into objectives for the regional police forces while accounting for the unique position of the Department. After all, many of the powers to manage the police - to set goals and priorities - are decentralized to the regional level (see Section 1.3). As we will argue below, this specific institutional structure is in the interest of the Department. By purposefully leaving considerable discretion to the regional level, the Department can make use of the expertise at that level in achieving the objectives for the police. We discuss three reasons why the forces’ experience with policing under regional conditions is essential to effective police work.
Differing regional conditions leave room for regional priorities and methods
Crime and public order problems differ from region to region. The forces need detailed knowledge of local circumstances to be effective. The police needs to know who is who, who lives where, who deviates from the norm, and who had which role in what happened. They need to build up social networks and they need to be aware of cultural patterns in the neighbourhood (Van der Torre and Stol, 2000, Chapter 11). Clearly, the local forces have much better knowledge of the regional conditions. Therefore, it makes sense to give the forces some freedom in setting their own priorities and choosing their own methods.
The need to ration the supply of police services
There is structural excess demand for police services. Once taxes have been paid, the price for additional police services is often low for individuals or groups of people. Given limited police resources, there is an opportunity cost to reallocating resources from one activity to another
Tasks versus objectives: the case of burglary
When the police is expected to execute tasks, they would focus on criminal investigations of burglars. After all, this is what the task ‘enforcement of the law’ included in the Police Act implies. However, when the police is expected to achieve objectives, the exact activities are not prescribed in the law. In this case, the objective could be to lower the rate of burglaries. It is up to the police to decide what activities best serve this objective. In practice, these turn out to be burglary prevention campaigns rather than criminal investigations (see Van der Vijver et al., 2001, p. 39).
9
Where individuals or groups have conflicting expectations of the police, research conducted in the United Kingdom tends to confirm that improving satisfaction can be a ‘zero-sum game’ (FitzGerald et al., 2002, p. 113).
activity. However, these costs are often not evenly distributed. For instance, a storekeeper would rather see the police spending more time on reducing shoplifting than on enforcing traffic laws. Clearly, road workers have different interests.
The forces have better information to weigh competing calls for service than the
Department. Their information advantage is based on their training and experience with police work in their specific locality. Therefore, it makes sense to leave the forces some flexibility in deciding whether a call is worth spending time on. This is not an easy job since the police will always dissatisfy some people.9
The nature of police work defies exact task descriptions
A policy of full enforcement of criminal law would imply that the police are required and expected to enforce all criminal statutes at all times against all offenders. It suggests that the police are without authority to ignore violations, to warn offenders when a violation has in fact occurred, or to do anything short of arresting the offender and placing a charge against him for the specific crime committed. There are a number of reasons why there is room in the law to tolerate criminal behaviour (Goldstein, 1963):
• Ambiguity of the law. Criminal law is often expressed in broad terms, which makes it difficult to render a clear interpretation of the legislature’s intentions. Ambiguity may be intentional so as to provide greater flexibility in enforcement. It may also result from a failure to envisage the day-to-day problems encountered by the police or it may simply be a result of language limitations.
• Enacting laws as a symbolic act. Some laws either cannot effectively be enforced or are not meant to be fully enforced (think of the drug laws before they were changed). A lawmaker may enact such laws for several reasons. Maybe she does not want to be known as someone who does not support a law against reprehensible behaviour. Maybe she also does not want to be known as someone who repeals a prohibition because it is not really meant to be fully enforced. She derives her comfort from enactment of the law, not from enforcement of the law. In line with this behaviour, new legislation declaring a form of conduct to be criminal is rarely accompanied by an appropriation to support the resources for its enforcement. It falls to the police to live with the law without enforcing it.
• Obsolescence of the law. The law does not get updated every time reality changes. Therefore, there are obsolescent laws that the police cannot enforce or is not expected to enforce.
In theory, the Department could exactly prescribe the forces when and how to act. However, the unpredictable nature of the demand for police services defies exact task descriptions. The police face unexpected situations all the time. Clearly, there are patterns in criminal and disorderly behaviour, but the precise circumstances differ every time. A police officer is trained to handle these ever-changing situations and builds up expertise over time. Therefore, it makes sense for the principal to leave the police some flexibility.
To conclude, it is in the interest of the Department to actively involve the forces in the process of translating broadly defined objectives into workable goals and methods. Discretion requires the forces to think about what they want to achieve and the most effective way of reaching that goal. In other words, discretion comes with a responsibility for evaluation and innovation.
2.4
The dimensions of overall police performance
Given its unique relation to the regional police forces, what are the Department’s objectives for regional police work? In this section, we will argue that the Department’s focus is on the overall performance of the forces. The forces should provide efficient, effective, fair and decent policing within the framework of broadly defined outcomes of regional police work.
Efficient and effective policing
Because of the great degree of discretion at the regional level, the Department of the Interior has good reasons to define the forces’ objectives in terms of desired effects of police work (outcomes like a change in the level of crime) rather than to provide detailed descriptions of desired outputs (e.g. number of fines) or inputs (e.g. time spent on the streets, ‘blauw op straat’). An outcome is meant to reflect the effect of policing on society. In practice, outcomes also reflect the effects of many other actors and factors.
By focusing on the effects of police work, the Department relies on the forces’ expertise to: • Choose those outputs that contribute most to the desired outcomes (maximum effectiveness). Outputs
include neighbourhood patrols, criminal investigations, prevention programs, etc. For instance, a force may choose to focus on prevention programs rather than repressive means to fight crime.
• Organize inputs so as to maximize output (maximum technical efficiency). For instance, a recent effort to increase technical efficiency refers to the frequency of coffee breaks, the level of reimbursement of travel expenses and the way the car fleet is purchased (TK 26345, 2002, p. 6). Another example is the choice to have one officer on a beat rather than two.
IIIInnnnppppuuuuttttssss
O
O
O
Ouuuuttttccccoooom
m
meeeessss
m
Technical efficiency
O
O
O
Ouuuuttttppppuuuuttttssss
Effectiveness
How the work is done
Resources
-e.g. staff
delivered -
Police services
e.g. arrests
Impact on
communities
and crime
levels
The Department’s concern is with the outcome of these two simultaneous internal processes. In other words: efficiency and effectiveness in terms of desired effects of police work is one of the Department’s main concerns (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1 Efficiency, effectiveness and the relation between inputs, outputs and outcomes
Source: Based on PSP (2000), p. 11.
Fair and decent policing
The police is bound by the imperative of providing assistance and delivering justice in a fair and decent manner. The rules of fair and decent policing include issues such as limitations to the powers of investigations and the use of force and non-discriminatory policing. They also include more informal rules such as providing courtesy in all public contacts. The standards of conduct are constraints as they tend to slow down police work. Clearly, the police cannot always be friendly. However, even when delivering justice to hardened criminals, the forces operate under the imperative of fair and decent policing. Without such constraints, police officers would search houses without a search warrant, seek out criminals without reading them their rights, allowing them to call their attorneys, or releasing them in response to a writ of habeas corpus. The Gestapo was very efficient in maintaining public order and investigating crimes, however defined, but its work does not appeal to our idea of fair and decent policing.
The issue is not that an efficient police force would show no positive interaction with citizens whatsoever. To be able to do its work, it is in the interest of the police to maintain good relations with at least some citizens. These citizens may be helpful in providing information to the police, for example. Moreover, a highly effective police may also enjoy confidence among those who are not confronted with police brutality. The point is that the police should work indiscriminately with all citizens according to nationally defined standards. All citizens should get equal treatment under similar circumstances.
10
Terpstra (2002, p. 57): “... the focus of management has shifted from national priorities to essential conditions for the organization.” Translated from: “... de aandacht [is] verschoven van sturing op beleidsthema’s naar sturing op organisatorische randvoorwaarden.”
A definition of the objectives
Based on the above discussion and the Safety Program published by the (outgoing) Balkenende administration (Justitie and BZK, 2002), we deduce the following definition of the objectives:
The government’s objective for the regional police forces is the reduction of crime, promotion of safety and reduction of disorder in an efficient, effective, fair and decent manner.
This definition of the objectives implies a focus on overall performance of the forces. Clearly, when assessing performance, the desired outcomes can be made more concrete (for example the desired contribution of the police to traffic safety and the quality of living in the neighbourhood). The authorities at the regional level attach weights to the outcomes of regional police work; the Department’s concern is whether regional police work meets the above-mentioned standards of policing. After all, the forces have knowledge of regional conditions and policing unmatched at the national level. Such a focus of the Department agrees with the status of the forces as independent bodies with their own administrative framework of mayors and public prosecutors. It also fits with the recent shift in the Department’s policy away from prescribing policy and management priorities towards setting standards for regional police work (Terpstra, 2002, Chapter 2).10
2.5
Conclusions
As principal of the regional police forces, the Interior Department’s objective is to make sure that they do their work in an efficient, effective, fair and decent manner. Their performance can be judged against outcomes deduced from the overarching objectives of the police: reducing crime, promoting safety and reducing disorder.
In line with this definition of the objectives, the Department relies on the forces’ expertise to choose those outputs that contribute most to the desired outcomes (maximum effectiveness) and organize inputs so as to maximize output (maximum technical efficiency). The great degree of discretion of the forces is based on their superior expertise in deciding (1) whether to tolerate criminal behaviour or not, (2) how to handle criminal or disorderly behaviour, (3) how to handle competing calls for service (4) what priorities to set and methods to use in the region. In the next chapter, we will discuss the way in which the Department supports the forces’ efforts to improve their performance.
3
Realizing the objectives
3.1
Aim and structure
How does the Department of the Interior support the police forces in their efforts to improve their overall performance? In this chapter, we discuss the Department’s policies to realize this objective. First, we introduce the challenge facing the Department in Section 3.2. The
Department has good reasons to provide the forces with great discretion, but is responsible for their performance at the same time. We describe how the Department addresses this tension in its policies towards the forces in Section 3.3. We discuss other factors affecting the forces’ motivation to work towards their objectives in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2
The Department’s challenge
The Interior Department may be responsible for efficient, effective, fair and decent regional police work, the forces know ‘where policing is all about’ and ‘what is really going on in the region’. Clearly, this is not an easy position to be in. Below, we argue that the Department will need to rely on incentives rather than rules to realize its objectives for policing, simply because it does not have the expertise to prescribe the forces how to organize their internal processes. By devising well-targeted incentives, the Department can support the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of the forces to improve their performance.
3.2.1 The rationale for providing incentives
The Department may set some rules to support improvements in performance such as compulsory outsourcing of the car fleet, but these rules have only limited reach. The desired discretion of the forces does not facilitate the establishment of such rules. After all, the Department does not have the relevant information to see what works best. Is patrolling with one officer rather than two a good idea to improve efficiency? Are prevention campaigns the best way to lower the rate of housebreaking? Without the expertise in policing and specific regional circumstances, the Department will have difficulty making these judgements.
If the Department is not able to prescribe how the forces should improve their performance, then it will have to rely on incentives to ensure that the forces achieve maximum value for money. Incentives do a call on the creativity of the forces. Given their information advantage, the police forces are in a much better position to identify opportunities to improve their
performance (and to implement these ideas effectively). Incentives challenge the forces to find the best way of improving performance. As such, incentives can support the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of the forces.
11
The ‘quality model’ is an adapted version of the EFQM Excellence Model (as worked out by the Institute Dutch Quality, INK). The model describes the interaction between the determinants of quality and results. Areas include leadership, human resource management, strategy, resource management, processes, employee satisfaction, results, customer satisfaction and citizen satisfaction.
3.2.2 The need to support ‘intrinsic motivation’
Clearly, police employees are not only driven by external incentives in the form of financial rewards or career perspectives. People may choose to work for the police because of an inherent tendency to seek out challenges, to extend and exercise their capacities, to explore, and to learn. They are motivated to do their work well by factors that are intrinsic to them. Similarly, the police forces can be seen as ‘intrinsically motivated’ to realize their task in their specific region. If their motives are in line with the objectives for the forces, then the Department task of improving police performance through ‘instrumental motivation’ can be alleviated.
Indeed there are numerous examples of initiatives to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police work. One major initiative is the peer-evaluation that is part of ‘quality management’ (‘kwaliteitsstelsel politie’). Every four years, each force conducts a self-assessment. The
self-assessment follows the ‘quality model’ of the Dutch police.11 The self-assessment is critically
reviewed by a team of auditors from the police and someone from outside the police. One year later, a review committee assesses what issues have been taken up after the self-assessment and audit. The committee consists of a mayor in command, a chief public prosecutor, a chief of police and someone from outside the police. The findings of the committee are sent to the Secretary of the Interior and the Police Inspection. The evaluations have resulted in some critical remarks about the organization of the police, including a lack of focus on results and low quality of management (FRP, 2000).
Such initiatives can be supported by recognizing and rewarding efforts to improve police performance. There are basically two reasons for performance evaluations and accompanying incentives:
• Feedback. Performance evaluations provide feedback to the forces on their perceived strengths and weaknesses. For example, forces may be unaware of whether their actions are satisfactory; an important purpose of performance evaluations is to tell the forces what areas they can improve in (Prendergast, 2002, p. S117).
• Recognition. When the efforts that go into improving performance go unnoticed, the drive to identify and share best practices may be weakened. In a normal market there is an automatic reward for high performance in the form of higher returns to investment. With the monopoly
12
The police forces may lose ‘market share’ from ‘competitors’ in the private security sector however. Indeed, the number of employees in private security per 10 police officers has risen from 2.7 in 1990 to 4.6 in 1999 (Source: CBS Statistical Yearbook, 2002). See Van der Vijver et al. (2001), p. 76 for a discussion of factors that drive this trend.
status of regional police forces there is no such reward.12 Improving performance is a process of
trial and error that comes with high costs. It takes considerable investment in data systems, entry of data, methods to analyse the data, and informal exchanges of experiences within and between forces. Based on the findings painful changes may need to be made in the organization. The accompanying costs can either be financial (e.g. investment in technologies for more efficient scheduling) or immaterial (e.g. stress stemming from effective personnel
management). In the process, enterprising individuals within forces may have to overcome bureaucratic barriers and a continuous, strong pressure to respond to the issues of the day. Moreover, some benefits of the effort go to others (‘external effects’).
Therefore, incentives are instrumental in sustaining the motivation to improve police
performance. That way, the Department can provide a stimulus - necessary to signal exceptional performance and to overcome the multiple barriers to action. Incentives do not replace but complement intrinsic motivation. The rewards can be either financial (e.g. performance rewards) or immaterial nature (e.g. status). As we will discuss later, it is essential that the incentives are well targeted. Poorly designed incentives may result in ‘intrinsic frustration’ rather than support intrinsic motivation (see the box on the Policing for London study in Chapter 5). However not providing incentives may not be appropriate response to the challenge of designing effective incentives. Indeed, there is some evidence from psychological research that a lack of incentives may have a negative effect on effort:
... because of systems that are insensitive to performance, some employees can vary their performance substantially with little effect on tangible reward. A low level of performance is often observed in such situations. Cognitive evaluation theory would explain this result as a lessening of intrinsic interest. Alternatively, employees may learn that their performance is largely irrelevant to reward, and such learned helplessness may have a detrimental effect on task performance. (Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996, p. 1164).
3.3
Incentives from the Department’s policies
How does the Department address the challenge of taking responsibility for the performance of police forces that have a great degree of discretion? The Interior Department has two policy instruments: the distribution of budgets and the exercising of oversight. In this section, we
13
Budgeting and oversight get more closely related in the situation that forces are under ‘special oversight’ of the Department (‘preventief overzicht’, applied to six forces in 2000). In that case, the Secretary of the Interior needs to agree with (changes in) the budget (In ‘t Veld et al., 2001, p. 55).
analyse whether these policy instruments indeed support the motivation to improve performance.
3.3.1 Distributing budgets
T