Mosques in Europe Why a solution has become a problem

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NEF Initiative on Religion

and Democracy in Europe

Mosques

in Europe

Why a solution

has become a

problem

Editor Stefano Allievi

in collaboration with

Ethnobarometer

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Published by Alliance Publishing Trust

Creative Commons Attribution‑Noncommercial‑No Derivative Works 3.0

You are free to share – to copy, distribute, display, and perform the work – under the following conditions:

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Why a solution has become a problem – NEF Initiative on Religion

and Democracy in Europe

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Preface

This book and the ‘Religion and

Democracy in Europe’ initiative

The Network of European Foundations (NEF), based in Brussels, is an opera‑ tional platform primarily committed to strengthening the potential for coop‑ eration in the form of joint ventures between foundations at the European level. The NEF offers its members the opportunity to identify common goals and, as

an open structure, to join forces with other foundations in Europe which may share similar concerns and objectives. It is also open to collaboration with the public and private sectors in developing its initiatives. Its areas of intervention to promote systemic social change include migration, European citizenship, support for the European integration process, youth empowerment and global European projects.

In January 2007 the NEF launched a special initiative on ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’. This was conducted with the participation of Hywel Ceri Jones, NEF European policy adviser, and was based on a partnership between several foundations, including: Van Leer Group Foundation (chair); Arcadia Trust; Barrow‑Cadbury Trust; Bernheim Foundation; Compagnia di San Paolo; Ford Foundation; Freudenberg Stiftung; King Baudouin Foundation; Riksbankens Jubileumsfond; Stefan Batory Foundation; and Volkswagen Stiftung.

The ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative focused on the relation between religion and democracy in European societies, covering both religion and the public domain and religion and the state. The aim was to contribute to a better‑informed debate on the topic through seminars and research on related issues.

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6 MOSqUES IN EUROPE: WHY A SOLUTION HAS BECOME A PROBLEM

The first year of activities, which included a roundtable with specialized journalists and a series of youth debates, culminated in the publication through Alliance Publishing Trust of a compendium in which all the material presented in an international symposium on 'Religion and Democracy in Contemporary Europe' held in Jerusalem was collected. This publication is available on NEF’s website at www.nef‑europe.org.

The second phase of the ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative (2008–9) aimed to develop a series of reports addressing specific aspects of the interaction both between the state and religion and between religion and society. The reports were supposed to be a mapping exercise of existing practices and different approaches to specific issues, set in the broader context of the religion and democracy debate. They intended to target practitioners, policy‑makers and civil society actors.

Of one of these researches, on mosques in Europe, that I have directed, has been already published a synthesis (Stefano Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques

in Europe. Policy issues and trends, 2009), together with the other research reports

(Luce Pépin, Teaching about Religions in European School Systems, 2009; Dimitrina Petrova and Jarlath Clifford, Religion and Healthcare in the European Union, 2009; Beate Küpper and Andreas Zick, Religion and Prejudice in Europe: New Empirical

Findings, 2010: all published by Alliance Publishing Trust, and available also at

www.nef‑europe.org).

Given the importance and the political and media attention given to this report – published right before the Swiss referendum on minarets – and given the interest and originality of the national reports produced for this research, together with NEF we have decided to update and publish them, adding new chapters on different other countries not included in the original research project.

For this book we have written a new introduction, discussed some more recent developments (from the Swiss referendum, November 2009, to the debate around the so called Ground Zero mosque, August 2010) and updated the sta‑ tistics. Some elements of the previous synthesis are also resumed here. The comparative table, originally present also in the previous publication, contains more recent data, new items and a larger number of countries: it should therefore replace the previous one.

For more information, and an extensive bibliography, we ask the reader to refer to the original synthesis, of which we have republished here only the main suggestions.

For more information on NEF and the ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe Initiative’, please contact project.assistant@nef‑europe.org

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About the contributors

Editor

Stefano Allievi is Professor of Sociology at the University of Padua specializing

in migration issues, sociology of religion and cultural change. Among his pub‑ lications on Islam in Europe are Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities

in and across Europe (eds. S. Allievi and J. Nielsen), Leiden‑Boston, Brill, 2003; Muslims in the Enlarged Europe, Leiden‑Boston, Brill, 2003 (eds. B. Maréchal, S.

Allievi, F. Dassetto, J. Nielsen); Le trappole dell’immaginario: islam e occidente, Udine, Forum, 2007; Al‑Islâm al‑Itâlî. Rihla(t) fî waqâ’i’ al‑diyâna al‑thâniya (Italian Islam), Abu Dhabi, Kalima, 2010; Producing Islamic Knowledge in Western Europe, London, Routledge, 2010 (eds. M. Van Bruinessen and S. Allievi).

Authors

Azra Aksamija is a Sarajevo‑born Austrian artist and architectural historian.

She studied at the Technical University of Graz, Austria (Dipl.Ing. degree) and Princeton University, USA (M.Arch. degree). She is currently researching her Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of Architecture, MIT (Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture). Besides her academic research, she also has an international career as a conceptual artist and a curator, focusing primarily on the representation and mediation of Islamic presence in the West. Her publica‑ tions include ‘Flocking Mosque’, Forward 110. Architecture and the Body (Spring 2010):14–19; ‘Postsozialitische Moscheen’, Bauwelt 43 (2009): 26–31; ‘Generative Design Principles for the Contemporary Mosque’, The Mosque. Political,

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Architectural and Social Transformations, eds. E. Erkoçu and C. Bugdaci: 129–139

(Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2009).

Jonathan Birt is Commissioning Editor at Kube Publishing. He has

written academically on British Muslims for a number of years, and is currently co‑editing the book British Secularism and Religion: Islam, Society and the State (Markfield, 2010). An archive of his academic output, policy papers and journal‑ ism is maintained at www.yahyabirt.com.

Maria Bombardieri has taken postgraduate studies in Religious

Sciences at University Ca’ Foscari of Venice and University of Padua. Her disser‑ tation ‘Mosques in Italy: right to place of worship and socio‑political debate’ was published in Italy in 2010. She has recently carried out research on Muslim partici‑ pation in Italian political parties. She established the association Laboratory of Religious Sciences (LSDR), to promote the history of religions teaching in Italian state schools. Her principal research interests are Islam in Italy and Europe, the interreligious dialogue and the sociology of religions.

Felice Dassetto is Professor emeritus at Catholic University

of Louvain‑la‑Neuve (UCL) in Belgium, and president of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in the Contemporary World (CISMOC/ CISCOW at UCL). He is the author of many publications and reports on Islam in Europe.

Ernst Fürlinger is head of the Center for Migration and Religion at

Danube University Krems (Department Migration and Globalization) and a lecturer in the Institute for Religious Studies at the University of Vienna. At pre‑ sent he conducts the research projects on mosque conflicts in Austria and on Muslims in Lower Austria. He directs the university course ‘Islam and Migrations in Europe’ at Danube University Krems.

Sophie Gilliat‑Ray is a Reader in Religious & Theological Studies at

Cardiff University, and Director of the Centre for the Study of Islam in the UK. She has authored a number of books and papers about Islam and Muslims in Britain, the most recent of which is Muslims in Britain: an Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Michael Kreutz is an Orientalist, neohellenist and political scientist. He

took his doctorate in 2005 and is currently at the University of Halle‑Wittenberg. His latest book is Arabischer Humanismus in der Neuzeit (2007). He is at present completing a larger volume on religion and enlightenment.

Nico Landman is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies and Director

of Studies of the Department of Religious Studies and Theology at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. His research interests include the training of Imams in European countries, Islamic diversity in Turkey, and the institutionalisation of

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 9

Islam in the Netherlands. A recent publication is ‘The Islamic Diaspora: Western Europe’ in W. Ende and U. Steinbach (eds.), Islam in the World Today, A Handbook of

Politics, Religion, Culture, and Society (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press

2010), 548–582.

Göran Larsson is an associate professor of religious studies in the

Department of Literature, History of Ideas and Religion at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. While his research is primarily focused on Islam and Muslims in Europe, he has also written about Islamic theology, quranic stud‑ ies and issues related to religion and the media. His most recent publication is the edited volume Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries, published by Routledge in 2009.

Stéphane Lathion is currently working coordinator of the GRIS

(Research Group on Islam in Switzerland), which is linked with the ORS (Religions Observatory in Switzerland) at Lausanne University. Among his publications are Islam et Modernité, Identités entre Mairie et Mosquée (Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 2010); Les minarets de la discorde (Infolio/Religioscope, Freiburg, 2009); Islam et musulmans en Europe, la transformation d’une présence (La Medina, Paris, 2003); De Cordoue à Vaulx‑en‑Velin, les musulmans en Europe et les défis de la

coexistence (Georg, Genève, 1999).

Omero Marongiu‑Perria has a PhD in sociology and is Executive direc‑

tor of the Centre d’Action pour la Diversité (CAD, Centre for Diversity), Lille, France. He is a member of the CISCOW (Centre for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in the Contemporary World) at the University of Louvain, Belgium, and is responsible for the module ‘Sociology of Muslims in Europe’ on the Master of Islamic and Arabic Studies course at Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), Barcelona, Spain.

Jordi Moreras is Professor of Social Anthropology at the Faculty of

Humanities, University Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain), and member of the Research Group on Islam in Diaspora (GRID). He is the author of Musulmans

a Catalunya. Radiografia d’un islam implantat (Barcelona: Institut Europeu de la

Mediterrània, 2008); Actors i representacions. L’associacionisme d’origen marroquí a

Catalunya (Barcelona: Secretaria per la Immigració–Generalitat de Catalunya,

2009) and Una mesquita al barri. Espai públic i conflicte (forthcoming).

Olivier Abdessalam Ralet is a philosopher. He is president of the

Collectif pour un Islam d’Ouverture and Director of the Collectif Entre Deux Mondes. He is an associate member of the Cismoc. His publications include ‘Cultures populaires de guérison dans le Maghreb et l’immigration maghrébine’,

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Aladdin Sarhan (M.A.) was born 1978 in Egypt and studied Islamic

Studies and Political Science in Germany at the University of Bochum. Thereafter he enrolled as a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Erfurt. From 2008 till 2010 he was coordinator of the project ‘Humanism in the Era of Globalization. An Intercultural Dialogue on Humanity, Culture and Values’ at the Institute of Advanced Study in the Humanities (KWI) in Essen. Now he is working as research fellow at the Chair of Islamic Studies of the University of Erfurt.

Athena Skoulariki graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy, University

of Athens and completed her postgraduate studies in Media studies and Communication at the University of Paris 2 (Pantheon‑Assas). In 2005, she obtained her doctorate (PhD) degree. She also studied Balkan history and geography and Serbian and Croatian languages at INALCO (Paris). Since 2006 she has been teaching sociology of nationalism and discourse analysis at the Sociology Department of the University of Crete. She is a member of the Centre for Minority Groups Research (KEMO, Greece) and the co‑editor of the book

Immigrants and Minorities. Discourse and Politics (in Greek, 2009).

Davide Tacchini has a Ph.D from Milan Catholic University and now

teaches Islamic Studies and Arabic Language and Literature at the university; he is also Lecturer of Islamic Studies at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas. In 2008–09 he was Visiting Professor of Islamic Studies and Christian‑Muslim relations at Hartford Seminary in Hartford, CT, USA. He has authored several publications in the fields of modern and contemporary Islamic thought, reform in Islam, radical Islam, the relationships between Islam and the West, the Muslim perception of Christianity, and Muslim places of worship in the USA and Europe.

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Acknowledgements

I wish first of all to thank the researchers who have worked on this project, which has required not only commitment and professionalism, but intense research time and rapidity of writing. All this would not have been possible if they were not among the best in their field in their respective countries. So heartfelt thanks to Azra Akšamija (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Maria Bombardieri (Italy), Felice Dassetto and Olivier Ralet (Belgium), Ernst Fürlinger (Austria), Göran Larsson (Sweden), Jordi Moreras (Spain) and Athena Skoulariki (Greece), who carried out the empirical research in their respective countries, and Sophie Gilliat‑Ray and Jonathan Birt (Great Britain), Michael Kreutz and Aladdin Sarhan (Germany), Nico Landman (Netherlands), Stéphane Lathion (Switzerland), Omero Marongiu‑Perria (France) and Davide Tacchini (United States), who have written the chapters on the situation in the countries indicated – and again Göran Larsson (for the Nordic and Baltic countries: Finland, Norway and Denmark; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Jordi Moreras (Portugal), for their further contributions.

But this book, as also the whole research project on the conflicts over mosques in Europe, would not even have seen the light without the institutions that have made it concretely possible. All my gratitude goes to the Network of European Foundations (NEF), which financed this ambitious project, and con‑ tributed in such an extraordinary way to the dissemination of its results, for the possibility it offered me to carry out this research in absolute freedom. The Freudenberg Stiftung, inside the NEF, took a special interest in the fate of the first phase of work of the European comparative research, and so I have a profound

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debt of esteem with them too. Ethnobarometer is the organization that was the first to show me their enthusiasm for the project, and which proposed it to the sponsors who then took it under their wing; but they have also been a constant source of support during all the stages of work, from the planning to the final editing, passing through the relations with the authors of the various national contributions. For all the support given to me from the initial idea of the design of the research, I am extremely grateful.

As however institutions are made up essentially of persons, and it is to them that they owe their good functioning, I would like to refer to these persons, this time in reverse order. Alessandro Silj of Ethnobarometer, for his friendship, collaboration and the care he has put into this work, which has made him as enthu‑ siastic about it as I myself have been. Christian Petri, of Freudenberg Stiftung, for his warm support and confidence in me right from the initial stages, when there were still delicate organizational problems to resolve. Rien van Gendt and Hywel Ceri Jones, who on behalf of the NEF directed the entire research programme with passion and competence, and promoted its results with conviction, and with intelligent lobbying at a European level, filling me with excitement for the first time in that crucial phase for every work of research when we really want to leave a mark on the reality that we have been called upon to investigate. And finally Cristina Pineda Polo, who from Brussels carried out a fundamental role of coordination, whose efficiency, scrupulous quality of work and personal likeableness were determinant in carrying on this work and making it a real pleasure. It is rare to find a team of such worth with whom to work: rigorous in the initial phase of giving the research a shape, pondered in their assessment of it, and determined in the final phases of publication, lobbying effectively for the common good. It is even more rare to discover that the professionalism and competence can go together with such human warmth, civil passion and personal kindness, producing an added value that I have rarely encountered. I fear that I will have more than one occasion to miss it.

So Alessandro, Christian, Rien, Hywel and Cristina, my most sincere thanks.

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1

Mosques in Europe: Real

problems and false solutions

Stefano Allievi

The ever more statistically significant presence of Muslim communities in European countries should lead as an obvious consequence, similarly to what has been happening in other religious communities, to an ever more common presence of Islamic places of worship, following on historical and sociological trends and the founding juridical principles of European states, all inspired, when not for reasons of realpolitik, by the principle of religious freedom as a fundamental and inalienable right.

In reality, as we know from the newspapers every day, this is not so: Muslim prayer rooms are spreading rapidly, but conflicts over the building of mosques in Europe are multiplying in their turn, at both the local and national level. It is therefore necessary to take them on as a field of study and go into them in depth: without any ideological bias and avoiding the politically‑correct, but also without underestimating their importance with misplaced good intentions.

Mosques of Europe: why the conflict?

Although forms of discrimination on the basis of religion are never completely absent – in particular, cases of discrimination towards certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come before the European courts – in no country and in no other case has the opening of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passing of time, the issue of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates and conflict, even in countries

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where such conflicts were previously unknown and mosques were already part of the landscape.

Confrontations over Islam have been frequent at various levels. Islam is itself questioned, often through essentialist and simplistic interpretations and controversies regarding dogmatic aspects and customs. Some aspects of Islam are also being called into question because of the way they manifest themselves, particularly in Muslim countries: of these aspects, the most discussed are those related to the condition of women and gender equality, and to the relationship between religion and violence, fundamentalism and, more generally, politics. Finally, confrontation has led to questions and debate about the host societies themselves: on their degree of ‘openness’, on the possibilities of and limits to integration, on how best to achieve it (in essence, this is the debate on multicul‑ turalism), and on the definition of any possible ‘tolerance thresholds’, at both an ethnic or religious level.

All this may happen without there necessarily being any debate or direct dialogue or confrontation with Muslims, or between society and the Muslims who live in it. Often these are debates within societies about Muslims and Islam.

The case of mosques is the most significant in this sense, even if it is not the only one, because it relates to a conflict that is not only debated within soci‑ ety, but is about society itself. This point seems particularly significant, in that it implies the perception of control over the territory and its symbolic imprinting. After all, control of and over the territory is not only a cultural and symbolic fact, it is also (and remains, in spite of everything) a very concrete and material sign of dominion and power.

These disputes are not limited to the establishment of places of wor‑ ship, which we will discuss in the following pages; they also include the ques‑ tion of their visibility in European cities, which has an evident symbolic value. This issue encompasses related questions regarding the building and even the

shape of minarets, the broadcasting of the adhan, the call to prayer, as well as the whole problem of Muslim cemeteries. An issue, this, in some ways even more surprising than that of mosques. First, because there is nothing more obvious and natural than that people, apart from living, should also die, and so need a place where to be buried. Secondly, because respect for and burial of the dead is an acquired fact not only of religions, but also of secular humana pietas, and it is disconcerting to see how many people, religious or not, are attempting to stop other people from burying and mourning their dead. And thirdly, because when immigrants decide to be buried in the countries where they have lived, rather than being sent to their countries of origin, which is a frequent and normal first phase of the migratory process, it is precisely because they consider it their country, and

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REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 15

therefore worthy of being their last and final dwelling‑place: an evident sign of integration post‑mortem, so to speak. But just because there are these conflicts, they tell us a great deal about the more general conflict that involves Islam in Europe, of which the mosques and minarets (but also the headscarf, the burqa, and everything that regards the female question in Islam) are the most visible and widespread sign.

These issues are important not only because they show how the pres‑ ence of Islam in Europe is being debated and confronted; they are also crucial in understanding the broader issues of Europe as a whole: its problems, its values and its identity.

Defining the mosque in Europe

What is a mosque? Not necessarily a building with a minaret, dome and half moon. Not only because minarets are being called into question and here and there for‑ bidden, as we shall see, but because the story of mosques in Europe begins with a prayer rug laid out at home, at work, sometimes on a street corner; it continues with a group of compatriots, colleagues or neighbours, coming together to pray at the home of one of them or at work, in a room usually used for other purposes put at their disposal by an association or possibly a parish; it continues with the first premises rented for the occasion (the back of a shop or a basement, and when the numbers grow, storerooms and disused industrial buildings or isolated farmhouses in the countryside); and it ends, or begins to come to an end, with purpose‑built mosques, these having when possible all the characteristics of a traditional mosque, until we arrive at those modernist‑looking mosques, which try to re‑interpret the elements of traditional Islam by grafting them on to the canons of modern Western architecture.

I shall here use an extensive definition and a commonsense criterion: all places open to the faithful, in which Muslims gather together to pray on a regular basis, will be considered to be mosques. I am aware that this definition contains an inevitable margin of error, but at the same time it is more meaningful and more comprehensive of the dimensions and dynamics of the phenomenon under discussion. It appeals to the principal function – prayer – and its collective and public aspect.

Within the category of mosque, a number of differences are discernible. Employing a scale of decreasing importance, the first element is that of ‘Islamic centre’. By Islamic centre we mean a centre of significant size, which has, in addition to the function of prayer and worship, a number of social and cultural functions through various forms of gathering (a Koranic school, courses and

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opportunities for adults, women and converts to meet; conferences and other educational and cultural activities),1_{usually conducted in rooms separate from}

the prayer hall itself. Such a centre also carries out the activities of institutional and symbolic representation of Muslims. Islamic centres are a small but impor‑ tant part of what we call mosques. Only in major cities might there be more than one, and often there are none at all. Not infrequently they perform a centralizing function of representation at a provincial or regional level. Usually, they also organize special meetings, for example those relating to Islamic holidays.

One category that we often encounter, especially given its significance in relation to conflicts surrounding places of worship, is that of the ad hoc, or pur‑ pose‑built, mosque, usually with visible signs of a dome and one or more minarets (the real masgids).2_{These may overlap, and are often the same as Islamic cen‑}

tres, but there are cases of organized and structured Islamic centres that are not purpose‑built mosques, as such centres are not infrequently located in converted buildings that do not have the visible form of a mosque and where signs of recogni‑ tion and external visible clues to their existence are limited to a sign or a plaque.

A third category – numerically by far the most significant in all European countries – is the Islamic musalla, or prayer room. Musallas may be located in indus‑ trial buildings, warehouses, storerooms, former shops and apartments. In the literature these are variously called basement mosques, mosquées hangars, house mosques, hinterhofmoschee, backyard mosques, mescit, mescid, etc. They may only serve to host the activity of prayer, but more often than not other activities are also performed there (eg Koranic schools and other educational events). Within this category we also find ‘ethnic’ musallas, which are attended only by members of one ethnic group, usually on the grounds of language (non‑Arabophone ethnic groups, for example). Special mention should be made of the prayer halls or Sufi

zawiyas, ie those belonging to mystical brotherhoods; these sometimes have an

ethno‑linguistic specificity, but some, especially those attended also or mostly by converts, may have a strong inter‑ethnic character. There are also prayer halls belonging to minority Muslim groups (Shiites, Ahmadiyya, etc.), when they have the resources to build their own structures. These three categories of prayer hall have the prerogative of being semi‑closed: that is, in principle they are open to any Muslim, but in reality they are attended only by those belonging to that specific

1_{In this sense they are also among the places where Islamic knowledge is produced, especially}

in what is still the most widespread and pervasive form of production and dissemination of knowledge, the oral form, through celebrations, rituals, meetings, sermons, personal care, teaching, counselling, etc.; on this, see Van Bruinessen, M and Allievi, S (2010), Producing

Islamic Knowledge in Western Europe, London: Routledge.

2_{It is not very useful, however, in Europe to apply the distinction between masgid and jami, or}

between a ‘weekday’ mosque and the traditional congregational mosque where the community meets on Friday. In fact, most mosques in Europe fulfil both functions.

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REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 17

group. This is particularly true of Sufi groups in which – albeit with significant exceptions, notably in the English‑speaking world – there can be no external sign of recognition, and they have no desire to open themselves up to the ordi‑ nary Muslim in the area, who is simply looking for a place to pray, because the moments of the meeting may be different from the usual canonical ones, using particular liturgies and dhikr.

Some musallas are temporary for various reasons. This may be because they share the premises with other activities (which may occur, for instance, in universities, hospitals, centres for immigrants), so they serve as prayer halls only at certain times or in certain periods of the year. Such is the case with mosques that are situated in temporary gathering places (for instance, holiday destinations that attract Muslim workers only at certain times of the year, or rural mosques where seasonal workers are employed in agriculture). Many isolated rural mosques, which are often relatively unknown, are nevertheless stable, although lively only at certain times of the year.

While it is relatively easy to calculate the number of Islamic centres, purpose‑built mosques and major prayer halls, the calculation of ‘hidden’ and temporary mosques is inevitably more complicated and often not very accurate. However, in this book, when we talk of mosques in general, the term is meant to include all types of mosques and prayer halls within a country.

Most mosques play complex and varied roles: religious, social, cultural, political and economic, for instance. Other activities of interest and gatherings often take place around a mosque: halal butchers, ethnic shops, phone centres, import‑export activities, ethno‑religious bookshops (Islamic, but also often places where one can find books, videos, CDs and DVDs of the main ethnic and linguistic community in the area). In neighbourhoods with a strong ethnic char‑ acter or a strong immigrant presence, a mosque will take its place quite naturally in the area. Furthermore, at a local level, mosques are also community centres and act as an interface with various networks – ethnic, national (linked to the countries of origin) and transnational (religious and political).

Role and function of mosques

The presence of mosques in Europe is a recent phenomenon almost linked entirely to the presence of Muslim immigrant workers in Europe. The exceptions are Andalusia and Sicily, which in the distant past were under Muslim domination; the areas under Ottoman rule in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, from Bulgaria to Greece, part of which later came under the Austro‑Hungarian Empire (Bosnia); a small Tatar presence in Finland, and a few other small groups. There are also a

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few mosques from the more recent past, established for various reasons: com‑ mercial and mercantile interests (in ports, such as in the United Kingdom), for military reasons (eg the presence of Muslim units in the Prussian army), or due to the effects of colonization and decolonization (in France, UK and the Netherlands in particular). Nevertheless, the modern and contemporary history of mosques in Europe is linked to immigrant workers coming from Muslim countries.

The spread of mosques has usually taken the following (ideal) path. A prayer room opens in a given area, once a sufficient number of Muslims (often of a single ethno‑national group) have settled in a certain place. These ‘grass roots’ mosques, being created from below and self‑financed, call for a significant effort on the part of family heads (we are dealing here almost exclusively with men), for their own use and the need to transmit their cultural and religious experiences to the next generation.

Gradually, increasing concentrations of the Muslim population are reached; ethno‑linguistic groups tend to differentiate their spaces of worship; political and religious differences too lead to the multiplication of prayer halls. Sometimes these are merely temporary or episodic, and are often precarious, albeit with a certain effervescence and vitality. They also suffer a high mortal‑ ity rate due to a lack of resources and prospects and to bad planning (this may include promises of external funding which never arrives and is sometimes little more than wishful thinking).

At the same time, in capital cities in particular, large purpose‑built Islamic centres are built, financed with external resources, often (especially in the capi‑ tals) with the support of the Muslim World League (Rabita al‑alam al‑islami) under Saudi control. The ambassadors of Islamic countries are usually represented on the boards of these mosques, but control is almost always in the hands of the financing body. Other institutional bodies intervene with funding for their respective national diasporas, such as the Turkish DITIB (Turkish‑Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), the embassies of Morocco, Iranian institutions promoting Shiite mosques, and so forth.

With regard to geographical location, with the partial exception of the large Islamic centres, mosques have mostly been located in the industrial sub‑ urbs, where it is easier to find buildings of sufficient size to adapt to their pur‑ poses at an affordable price, or in ethnic neighbourhoods, on the outskirts of big towns.

It is worth noting that in Europe there is a general trend towards a kind of Westernization of mosque functions, and even, one might say, in purely formal and institutional terms, of their ‘Christianization’. On the one hand, they carry out functions that they would never perform in the countries of origin: celebration of

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REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 19

weddings and funerals, social activities based on language and ethnic groups, counselling on issues related to immigration. On the other, mostly as a result of pressure from the host society and an internal ‘evolutionary’ push, the mosque ends up being treated as a kind of church – the imam of common mosques con‑ sidered a ‘priest’, the imam or emir of the main Islamic centres seen as a kind of ‘bishop’ and representative of all Muslims. Moreover, entry into the mechanism of religious welfare typical of various host countries, applied to pre‑existing reli‑ gious minorities, gives the staff of mosques and the mosques themselves roles and a stability that they did not have, often forcing the pace of institutionalization mechanisms that would occur more slowly if processes were left to their own internal dynamics. In this sense, the institutional advancement in some social aspects that are linked to mosques sometimes appears too rapid, as a result of exogenous factors driving the community, especially when compared with the institutional power and sometimes the financial capabilities of the Islamic com‑ munities involved.

With the passage of time and leadership, some mosques (relatively few until now) have come down from the Islam of the fathers to that of the sons, and have changed in terms of both their character and policies. More often, youth and transnational organizations have produced their own network of mosques. Above all, the strongest and most entrenched mosques have been able to expand

gradually, moving to new premises and acquiring ground on which to build, being able to respond to an obvious growth in needs and numbers, changing from sim‑ ple halls of prayer into community centres. In the meantime an important role has been played in ethnic neighbourhoods by what are called in French mosques

de proximité: for ‘family’ use and a high level of social control operated by the

neighbourhood, which represents a guarantee specifically for first‑generation parents, while allowing more room for movement for the second generation, and, more generally, for categories such as the elderly, for whom the mosque becomes a place that is easy to reach for socializing, for children, who can reach it safely, and for women, for whom it becomes important as a mediator in relation to the host society, a place for counselling and discussion on life and opinions.

The same path is taken, at greater speed but at different times, in coun‑ tries exposed to the new immigration phenomena. Typical in this respect are the countries in the Mediterranean area, which in the past were exporters of labour to Central and Northern Europe.

In countries where a recognized native ‘ethnic’ Islamic presence already exists (Greece, Finland, some countries of Eastern Europe), a new wave of Muslim immigrants have begun to make themselves felt. For the moment, they live in a state of mutual separation, with low levels of interaction and mixité, also because

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they do not enjoy the same rights and recognition linked to places of worship that are enjoyed by historical minorities, who are already part of the institutional landscape of their respective countries.

A European comparison: some figures in order to understand

The following table presents figures for the number of mosques in the main

European countries and in the United States.

Country Population Immigrants Muslims % of Muslim Mosques Muslims × (million) (million) (million) population mosque

Germany 81.9 7.2 3.2–3.4 4.0 2,600 1269 France 65.4 4.9 4.2 6.5 2,100 1571 United 850– 2824– Kingdom 61.8 4.83 _2.4 _3.9 _1,5004 ₁₆₀₀ Italy 60.2 3.9 1.3 2.2 764 1702 Spain 46.2 4.5 0.8–1 2.0 668 1347 Netherlands 16.5 3.1 1 6.1 432 2315 Greece 11.2 1.2 0.2–0.3 2.2 < 400 625 Portugal 10.7 0.3 0.04 0.4 33 1212 Belgium 10.6 1.05 _{0.4–0.5 4.2} ₃₃₀ ₁₃₆₄ Sweden 9.4 1.2 0.4 4.2 > 50 8000 Austria 8.4 0.9 0.3 3.6 > 200 1500 Switzerland 7.3 1.3 0.4 5.4 > 100 4000 Denmark 5.5 0.5 0.19 3.5 115 1652 Finland 5.4 0.09 0.04 0.7 30–40 1143 Norway 4.9 0.6 0.12 2.5 120 1000 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.8 6 1.5 40.0 1,867 803 Europe 16.79 10,989 1528 United States 310.0 37.5 5–6 1.8 1,643 3348

3_{The figure refers to the population of ‘ethnic minority origin’, not immigrants, as these people}

are largely British citizens.

4_{The variability is due to the fact that many mosques are not registered. Valid and complete}

statistical data is available for only about 255 mosques.

5_{The foreign population is greatly underestimated, when compared to other countries (with}

the partial exception of France and the UK), as a consequence of the very simple naturalization policy which means that one can obtain Belgian citizenship after three years; that citizenship is automatic following marriage to a citizen; and that the son of a foreigner born in Belgium is automatically Belgian. If indirect indicators are used, today in Belgium more than one child in ten has a culturally Muslim name and in Brussels the percentage rises to a third.

6_{Rather than immigrants, in the Bosnian case one should speak of ‘displaced persons’ of the}

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REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 21

These figures give us first of all an overall and up‑to‑date picture of the Islamic presence in Europe. They are very reliable, because they are not based only on census figures or sojourn permits, but also on serious estimates by long‑term observers of the phenomenon. They help to give us a reliable picture of the whole of Europe, whether a part of the EU or not.

To the total of Muslims in the countries examined in the table we have to add in fact Muslims present in the other European countries, both Western and Eastern: Albania 2,200,000, Kosovo 1,800,000, Bulgaria 1,000,000, Macedonia 630,000, Serbia 3–400,000, Cyprus 250,000, Czech Republic 200,000, Rumania 70,000, Croatia 58,000, Ireland 32,000, Slovenia 31,000, Poland 30,000, Hungary 20,000, Slovakia 11,000, Estonia 10,000, Latvia 10,000, Luxembourg 8–10,000, Malta 5,000, Lithuania 4,500, for a total of 6,720,500 Muslims. If to these we add the 16,790,000 of our research we have a total of 23,510,500 Muslims who we could call Europeans. To these, to have a really complete picture, we should add the 76,000,000 of Turkey, a country that has applied to join the EU (or at least the over 6,000,000 of its European part) and the 20–25,000,000 of Russia.

If we attempt a first statistical approximation concerning the issue of mosques, as regards the countries that have been the subject of the research of this book, adding the total number of Muslims of the European countries ana‑ lysed and that of the mosques, we obtain the following figures: around 16,790,000 Muslims for a total of almost 11,000 mosques (to be precise 10,989). These figures in themselves are not of secondary interest, but they become even more impor‑ tant if we compare them to the number of the potential faithful per mosque: 1,528. If we even remove the Muslims and mosques of Bosnia and Thrace (not of all Greece: c. 120,000 and 300 mosques), in which Muslims constitute a historically stabilised and institutionalised presence and are not the result of immigration (which would also be true for the small Tatar minority in Finland and a few others), we obtain the figure of 15,170,000 Muslims and 8,822 prayer rooms, corresponding to one prayer room per 1,720 potential Muslims.

These figures are probably comparable to those of the places of worship of the major religions in many countries, both Christian and Muslim. As often happens, it is easier to have figures on minorities than on majorities. But, if only to give a point of comparison, a recent research promoted by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs of Morocco carried out a census of 19,205 mosques, for a population of 31,600,000 inhabitants, equal to one mosque every 1,645 inhabitants7_{. While, for}

a comparison of another kind, in Italy, for a population of 60,200,000 inhabitants, there are 25,682 parishes (one for every 2,344 inhabitants), even if the Catholic

7_{http://www.maroc.ma/PortailInst/An/evenements/Islamic+Affairs+Ministry.htm, accessed}

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places of worship, even just counting those attended regularly, are a higher num‑ ber and difficult to calculate (many other places are indeed used as places of worship regularly, while not being parishes: non‑parish churches, monasteries, hospital chapels, community centres for the elderly or for youth aggregations and associations, and lastly there exist also in this case temporary ‘prayer rooms’, for example in holiday resorts). As is obvious, these figures are in some way com‑ parable with those of mosques in Europe, even though in this case, differently from what happens in the countries cited, we have calculated also less stable places of worship, and sometimes improvised and provisional (this is a criterion that would probably not be adopted if we were assessing a structured majority religion, in which case we would only count recognized and stable places of wor‑ ship). The figure is however sufficient to makes us affirm that in principle and in general there is no problem of religious freedom and freedom of worship for Islam in Europe. So much so that in many European countries there is currently a phase of consolidation and stabilization (and even augmentation) as regards the number of mosques, and also of investment in their internal structures and enlargement of their spaces and functions.

By comparison, in the United States there are between 5 and 6 million Muslims, who are able to use around 1,643 mosques. Taking as a reference the higher figure for Muslims, which is also the most widespread, there is one mosque for every 3,652 Muslims (the variability is enormous, depending on the state, ranging from a single mosque in Alaska and in Hawaii, to 250 in California and 147 in the state of New York).

Furthermore we must bear in mind that so far we have spoken of Muslims, taking the number of Muslims present in each country, so to speak, wholesale. But actually we have to bear in mind that the figures for mosques (as also those for churches) should refer to Muslims who activate their religious references in some way (about one‑third, according to a recent estimate8_{, but probably the}

number for practising Muslims is even less): in this case the number of Muslims per mosque is even significantly lower.

So far we have limited ourselves to averages. But a closer analysis of the situation in the various countries offers further significant material for analysis. First of all, if we can imagine that countries with older immigration are those with a higher number of mosques and so a smaller number of Muslims per mosque, this is not always true in all cases. It is not true for example for Holland, often described as a country invaded by mosques, which has an average that is higher than the European one (432 mosques per 1,000,000 Muslims, equivalent to 2,315 Muslims

8_{Dassetto, F, Ferrari, S and Maréchal, B (2007), Islam in the European Union: What’s at stake in the} future?, Strasbourg: European Parliament. The same criterion should obviously be applied to

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REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 23

per mosque). It is not true for the hyper‑civilized Sweden, which has absolutely the lowest number of mosques in percentage to the number of Muslims (8,000 Muslims per mosque, almost five times the European average) and a large num‑ ber of conflicts on the issue. And it is not true for Switzerland, which has the second‑worst European result (one mosque for every 4,000 Muslims). In part this is due to the prevalence of refugees from ex‑Yugoslavia, which make up half of the Muslims in Switzerland, and to their lower religious activism, but in part it is due probably also to little aperture to the issue and so a low profile held by the Muslims in the country, seen recently also in the recent minaret referendum, even if this is not to be considered a logical and inevitable consequence of a tendency a long time in the making. Furthermore it is significant that also countries of the new immigration, such as Spain, and also Italy, despite a lively conflictuality on the issue, have a large number of mosques, almost as many as Portugal, which has a situation of absolute and peculiar lack of conflict, and some Nordic countries, excluding Sweden, as we have seen. The very high percentage of mosques in the population in Greece (the highest percentage figure in Europe, one mosque for every 625 Muslims) and in Bosnia (the second‑highest figure) is due instead to their peculiar situation, which sees the presence in the whole of Bosnia and the Greek regions of Western Thrace of an indigenous Islamic population that we can consider to all effects autochthonous, and therefore strongly rooted and institutionalised, to such an extent as to make Islam the main religion of the respective areas.

The number of purpose‑built mosques in respect to the analysis of the degree of acceptance of Islam and Muslims is important. These are not buildings originally destined for other uses and then adapted to their new use. Even if they do not always have a strong Islamic character (they are not built on the model of the mosques of their respective countries of origin, nor are they equipped with a dome or minaret or both), their number gives us important information. It is obvi‑ ously not surprising that the countries that have the most, for the reasons men‑ tioned before, are Bosnia (1,472 out of 1,8679_{) and Greece (almost 300, and almost}

all in Thrace, out of almost 400); but there are however almost 200 in France10_{, 100}

in Holland, while we can estimate a figure in‑between in Great Britain, almost

9_{There were 1,703 before the war, of which nearly 1,200 were totally destroyed or damaged}

between 1992 and 1995; 376 were built from scratch in the following years. Today there are three Islamic centres, all funded by Saudi Arabia, while there were none before the war. This destruction, which also involved hundreds of churches, mostly Catholic, was defined by the Council of Europe as ‘a major cultural catastrophe’.

10_{The various sources range from more than 100 to fewer than 200. This is due to the fact that}

French Islam has experienced a period of great effervescence in recent times, in terms of reorganization and visibility, and yet there is no research that measures it. What we present here is a first approximation of a field that is still only partly explored.

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70 in Germany, and many also in Belgium. The countries which instead have the fewest are Denmark (1), Finland (2) and Norway (3), which are however among the countries in Europe with the fewest Muslims (fewer than 200,000). Italy has only 3 too, but has many more Muslims (1,300,000). To emphasize the Italian closure, it is significant that, with far fewer Muslims, Switzerland has 4, Austria 5, Portugal and Sweden 7, and Spain 14. By way of comparison, there are over one hundred in the United States, often with architecturally significant buildings.

One last important figure concerns mosques under construction. And here, to mark a significant trend, and perhaps a real inversion of the trend, also in respect to mainstream European public opinion, are the extremely clear figures from Germany, with its almost 200 projects11_{, and France, with around 60. Holland}

and Greece have around 15, while there are 6 or 7 projects under discussion in Italy, in various stages of maturation, and the same in Sweden.

To conclude, we cannot say that there is a problem of non‑guaranteed religious freedom for Muslims in Europe: the number of places of worship and halls of prayer indicates the opposite. But the increasing number of conflicts over mosques, the nature of which we will analyse in the following pages, attests that a problem exists. Also because it is not enough to simply state the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship with the number of conflicts surrounding mosques in Europe: that is, that there are more conflicts simply because there are more mosques. If this is certainly true, it is also true that the number of conflicts is not easily quantifiable, and the known ones give only a strongly under‑estimated idea of the problem, because in most cases threats and intimidation are not even reported to the police. What we know is what comes to the attention of the media and enters the political debate. On the other hand, if the problem is not of a quantitative nature, there are certainly serious obstacles to accepting its qualita‑ tive nature. They are no less important for that; on the contrary, they are highly relevant and significant. Still, they must be placed within a proper quantitative dimension.

Symbolism and territory: mosques as a visible dimension

Mosques represent a way for Islam to leave the private sphere and to officially enter the public sphere, in which it becomes qualified as an interlocutor with society and institutions. Moreover, mosques and prayer halls all provide evi‑ dence of specific dynamics, linked to the dynamics of immigration, which have many facets. Mosques are often the only form of ‘ethnic’ association in a territory.

11_{The figure is particularly high compared to other countries as it includes projects on which}

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REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 25

Sometimes they show a higher level of religious practice in emigration contexts. They are a good barometer of the level of organization of the various ethnic and religious communities. They are also an element of growth – often set within conflictual dynamics – of the Islamic leadership, or sometimes a demonstration of its immaturity: clashes between competing leaders have often impeded and sometimes even prevented the establishment of mosques, notwithstanding the occasional goodwill shown by some municipalities. Sometimes the demand for a mosque ends up being only or primarily intended to lend visibility to those who promoted it. Finally, mosques are a factor that measures the ability of Muslims to grasp the opportunities presented by the new context, and to transform them and give them an Islamic slant.

It is interesting to note, from a European perspective, that even some non‑Islamic local authorities are beginning to view the presence of mosques as a sign of cultural openness and ‘globalization’. It must be stressed, however, that the situation is different for small local neighbourhood mosques, those that in the French debate are called mosquées de proximité, and for large mosques, mos‑

quées cathédrales, which play a symbolic, cultural and even diplomatic role, visited

by important foreign guests, trade delegations, institutional representatives and ambassadors. They may actually offer an open and hospitable image of a city – a symbol of integration and openness of the local context to global horizons,

including opportunities to promote cultural activities, exhibitions, debates, inter‑ faith meetings and collective ceremonies. They can play a symbolic and ‘exem‑ plary’ role: providing internal guidance within Muslim communities; hosting the signing of symbolic acts; accommodating meetings between representatives of various groups and associations; holding training courses for imams; and so forth. Mosques may also become the subject of architectural competitions, conferences, exhibitions and art events.

But most of all mosques – like any form of construction that is proposed in an area where previously it was not present – constitute a form of symbolic owner‑ ship of the land. At the same time, resistance to them becomes a very concrete and material sign of dominance and power over the territory. It is clear, therefore, that the conflict surrounding mosques is, above all, a genuine conflict of power. Several different variables come into play in this sphere: the actors deemed to be legitimate, their strength, the resistance of social actors already present (their ‘culture’, as it is often called), and their respective forms of legitimization and

expression of their own beliefs.

A first observation is self‑evident: not all buildings, even those that are new in form and function, produce the same kinds of conflict. Rarely does a public or commercial building produce such forms of protest. A new hospital,

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bank, supermarket or multiplex cinema may be the subject of criticism, but this is rarely expressed in cultural terms. Assessments can be made regarding the appropriateness of its placement, compared to the interests that it may damage (eg a supermarket with reference to the small shops in the surrounding area); or its size and shape (a large building in the context of small‑scale housing, a high‑rise building in an area of low‑rise development); or, again, its aesthetic qualities. But, although frequent, such conflicts rarely induce an identity reflex (and an ‘us/them’ dynamic) similar to those found with regard to mosques. This dynamic may manifest itself (for example, in a district of new residents in a town, or when people come from cities into rural areas), but only occasionally do such situations produce reflexes of collective identity. Mosques, instead, produce them very frequently, in mild or radical form, throughout almost all of Europe, at least at this moment in history. In contrast, churches of confessions other than the dominant one in a given country, or synagogues or temples of other religions, do not produce the same type of reaction and rejection (although it would be wrong to say that historically this has not happened in the past). In this sense the ‘mosque issue’ is real in Europe today.

It is interesting to note that conflicts concerning mosques involve people in the surrounding areas, either directly (public protests, demonstrations, collec‑ tion of signatures, petitions, local committees) or indirectly (political groups and the media, acting or professing to be acting on behalf of local citizens), but not only. Many other actors are involved in these conflicts: the Islamic associations directly involved (and others, which can be in competition among themselves and in opposition to the project); the ethno‑linguistic groups present; local, regional and national institutions; political parties, majority and opposition at the local level, but also locally not present (as is often the case of xenophobic movements and groups which mobilise for the occasion, with their respective interests in cre‑ ating an opposition, or riding already existing discontent, or its containment and the resolution of the conflict); the various levels of justice that are often called to intervene in the decision process, both on the plane of respect for the urbanistic norms and of the protection of the rights of the actors involved; other religious groups, both the local majority group, and the other minorities, which intervene in various ways, and often with opposing positions on their inside, thus bearing witness to a division that is transversal to groups and communities; the local and national mass media; and again those who supply intellectual legitimation to one or the other position12_.

12_{For a description of these various actors, their positions and respective dynamics of}

interrelation, see the report of the main research: Stefano Allievi, Conflicts over Mosques in

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REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 27

Citizens’ reasons for protesting can normally be attributed to the following:

– ‘real’ or supposedly real reasons, such as: a fall in the value of property; fear of increased traffic; parking problems; loss of peace and quiet; fear of increased crime and greater numbers of unwelcome persons; fear of violence, incidents and Islamic fundamentalism; fear of invasion of public spaces (courtyards, pavements, parks, playgrounds) on Fridays and other Islamic holidays; other social priorities in the area;

– ‘cultural’ reasons: foreignness of Islam to ‘our’ culture; defence of women’s rights; reciprocity; ‘non‑integrability’ and/or incompatibility of Islam with Western/ European/Christian values.

While reasons of the first kind may be (but are often not) empirically based, and as such may be constructed discursively, those of the second kind serve only to justify a Kulturkampf whose objective is no longer the mosque as such – which becomes a symbol to be targeted – but Islam itself, as a different and foreign reli‑ gion, ‘alien’ and incompatible with democracy, the West, Liberalism, Christianity or ‘our traditions’, according to the context.

Of course, the two sets of reasons often overlap and reinforce each other. It is therefore useful to keep the two sets conceptually separate, because one can give an empirical answer at a local level to the first set of issues, while the second set requires more time and goodwill to solve the profound problems of acceptance and reciprocal understanding – where these are truly at stake and where the groups actually seek to solve them (both conditions are not always met in practice).

Opposition to Islam has been growing stronger as a result of the traumatic events of recent years, including (among others): 9/11 and other dramatic internal events in various countries, such as the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London; the assassination of Theo van Gogh; the Danish cartoons affair; various turmoil related to the hijab, and not only in France; and debates on the issues of gender and paternal authoritarianism (forced marriages, sensational cases of honour killings, etc.). All this has certainly had an influence on the debate, but probably does not fully explain it. And it cannot be excluded a priori that opposition to Islam is also the result of a thoughtful evaluation of the effects of cohabitation – with Islam in general and mosques in particular – in various countries.

In the event of a conflict, it is very likely that opinions on practical reasons against a mosque intertwine with ‘non‑local’ cultural motives focusing on Islam as such, especially when those ‘political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia’ get involved, and there is an increase in the role and influence of the media.

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Some forms of conflict could actually be interpreted using the tools of ethology and sociobiology, rather than those of anthropology and sociology, still less those of urban planning. Examples include forms of imprinting on an area, such as the spreading of pig urine, or the placing of pigs’ heads or spilling of blood, or certain politicians’ parading about holding a pig on a lead in the area where a mosque is due to be built, or freeing a live piglet inside a mosque, or throwing pigs’ offal inside a mosque, or anti‑Islamic groups organized outside mosques ostentatiously devouring sausages and drinking wine (both foodstuffs that are forbidden by Islam), to offend and as a sign of open contempt. Cases of this kind have occurred widely, from Sweden to Italy, from France to the Czech Republic, and are in themselves a phenomenon that is worth mentioning because of the use of the primitive proprietary dynamics of privatization, passing through the logics of sacralization and desacralization of space. If we were discussing rela‑ tions between animals, we would say it was simply an appropriation of space by means of unpleasant or aggressive signs and smells – claims of exclusivity to the territory and an assertion of aggressive competitiveness towards other possible contenders.

On the more general question of mosques, one should also note the spread of a vocabulary that refers to contamination, pollution and precaution‑ ary measures (used explicitly, with reference to mosques, by various anti‑Islamic groups), as well as the return of the categories of purity and contagion in the cultural and political debate. Further reflection is needed here, recalling the his‑ torical precedents of the use of this kind of language and interpretation, and the risk that tragic ghosts of the past may re‑appear.

Battles over the minaret

Most conflicts over mosques in Europe include, either primarily or marginally, the question of the minaret, its height, or its very existence. The minaret appears to have become a symbol par excellence of the conflict surrounding Islam, or rather of its visibility in the public space. The politics of identity, as manifested in con‑ nection with mosques, has ended up confining itself in a repertoire of forms, and paradoxically the minaret has ultimately become – both on the side of Muslims and that of society – ‘a structural metonym of Muslim identity’; a situation that has become even clearer with the Swiss minarets (despite the fact that there are mosques in Muslim countries with no minaret and that this feature does not belong to the original history of Islam).

It is not inappropriate to recall here that the minaret, like skyscrapers and the Tower of Babel, is something that rises into the sky, a symbol of power, size

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REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 29

and strength. Even without making too much of its obviously phallic aspect – a symbol of domination, which is not alien to the ethological perspective that we have already introduced – historically towers have always been a sign of power and domination. This is why in the long history of medieval Italian municipalities, the victory of a family or a city over another resulted in the destruction of the tow‑ ers of the defeated family or city; and that, more recently, during the war in the former Yugoslavia there was a race to destroy minarets and church towers, in order to establish dominance. The same degree of competition can still be seen in the present‑day competition between large companies or between big cities, in particular the new economic and financial powerhouses, to build the highest skyscraper in the world as a visible symbol of power. It is a game of ‘political vis‑ ibility’ which is being played, which explains why disputes over minarets can also be interpreted as conflicts of power: in which (among other things, and mainly unconsciously) Muslims attempt to introduce a symbol with high visibility and with an implicit ostentatious function, and why (mainly unconsciously) they are interpreted as such by the local population. Interpretation, indeed, plays a major role. For Muslims it is often more just a question of nostalgia, of doing things as they would ‘at home’, because, after all, ‘a mosque should look like a mosque’13_.

But for non‑Muslim residents, it often becomes a matter of feeling like they have been invaded. This is why, architecturally speaking, the residents of all cities have tolerated without any reaction all sorts of foreign bodies which did not fit in with the surroundings (residential or administrative buildings, shopping malls or leisure facilities, convention centres or sports infrastructures, churches of the majority confession, even the temples of other religious minorities); but yet the minaret has, or is perceived as having, another meaning. This is so much so that, in many cases, the minaret has had to be reduced to a height below that of the local cathedral or the nearest church, and sometimes it has had to be eliminated altogether. And often – to demonstrate the fact that in reality the minaret has a nostalgic function rather than a fundamental identifying purpose or is a response to a real practical need – elimination takes place without any particular reaction from the Muslim community involved.

The case of the Swiss referendum against minarets was a sensational demonstration of how important the minaret issue had become, both in itself, and above all as to how much it teaches us about the problem of the more general relationship of European societies with Islam. And so, to go more deeply into the issue, perhaps it would be better to start from there: from what happened in this little country, with its long‑standing and considerable immigration, and

13_{As a Muslim representative argued, cit. in Maussen, M (2009), Constructing Mosques: The} governance of Islam in France and the Netherlands, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.

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adequate integration policies, but with a profound refusal – which had been how‑ ever slowly but surely manifesting itself– of the visibilisation processes of Islam, which can also tell us something about more general European trends.

An observation point from which to understand the stakes

involved: the Swiss paradox

Conflicts over the building of mosques and the visibility of prayer rooms in Europe have been a significant characteristic and a real fact in the debate over Islam dur‑ ing these years. The referendum against minarets was held in Switzerland on 29 November, 2009, passing with 57.5% of votes in favour of a ban, in as many as 22 of the 26 cantons.

The most sensational thing about the Swiss referendum however was not its result, but the fact that it was completely unexpected: that no one had realised what was happening, of what was coming in public opinion, and the effects it would have; that it took by surprise not only the political classes but also internal and external observers, from academics to journalists 14_.

This iss

Mosques in Europe Why a solution has become a problem

NEF Initiative on Religion

Published by Alliance Publishing Trust

Paper from responsible sources FSC® C020438

Contents

1 Mosques in Europe: real problems and false solutions 13

4 Dutch mosques: symbols of integration or alien intrusion? 110

7 The politics of non‑recognition: mosque construction in Austria 183

11 Why Italian mosques are inflaming the social and political debate 269

15 Mosques as part of history, or something new? The

Preface

About the contributors

Stefano Allievi is Professor of Sociology at the University of Padua specializing

Authors

Azra Aksamija is a Sarajevo‑born Austrian artist and architectural historian.

Jonathan Birt is Commissioning Editor at Kube Publishing. He has

Ernst Fürlinger is head of the Center for Migration and Religion at

Nico Landman is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies and Director

Göran Larsson is an associate professor of religious studies in the

Omero Marongiu‑Perria has a PhD in sociology and is Executive direc‑

Olivier Abdessalam Ralet is a philosopher. He is president of the

Athena Skoulariki graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy, University

Acknowledgements

Mosques in Europe: Real

Mosques of Europe: why the conflict?

REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 15

Defining the mosque in Europe

REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 17

Role and function of mosques

REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 19

A European comparison: some figures in order to understand

REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 21

REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 23

Symbolism and territory: mosques as a visible dimension

REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 25

REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 27

Battles over the minaret

REAL PROBLEMS AND FALSE SOLUTIONS 29

An observation point from which to understand the stakes