In the context of search markets, Armstrong et al. (2009a) and Arm- strong (2012) argue that certain consumerprotection policies such as limit- ing maximum prices can backfire and lead firms to raise their average prices. The intuition is that when prices are less dispersed under a price cap, fewer consumers will make the effort to become better informed, and hence firms face less competition. The present paper also argues that consumer protec- tion policies can be ineffective. The mechanism is, however, different and we focus on obfuscation practices in asymmetric markets.
Abstract. This article investigates consumerprotection on Kickstarter—a popular and sizeable, yet largely unregulated reward-based crowdfunding platform. Speciﬁcally, the article focuses on Kickstarter campaigns’ use of price advertising claims (PACs) and their failure to honor the promised discounts. Analyses show that between 2009 and 2016, more than 500,000 consumers who backed a wide variety of game or technology campaigns lost on average $45.72 because of broken PAC promises. Whereas 75% of PAC campaigns did not provide the promised discounts, in almost 50% of all cases backers who were promised a discount paid more, not less, than the retail price. In contrast, backers of campaigns that did not promise a discount received larger effective discounts. Analyzing an extensive data set comprising 34,745 Kickstarter campaigns, complete backing histories of more than 400,000 backers, and more than 4 million consumer comments, complaints, and reviews, we show that broken PAC promises pose a substantial problem to consumers, that the problem is persistent across more than 6 years, and that it has not been resolved through self-regulation by market participants thus far.
On the other hand, in markets with contrasting outcomes, there is redistribution (rel- ative to natural benchmarks) from naive to sophisticated consumers. The latter bene…t from the presence of the naive because competition between …rms causes some pro…t from the naive to be channelled to them, which in turn harms the naive. Whether, and to what extent, one regards such redistribution as bad depends on the respective welfare weights of the two consumer types in the market in question, but in many settings (which plau- sibly include bank accounts) it may be reasonable to accord a higher welfare weight to naive consumers. Market e¢ciency can also su¤er in markets with contrasting outcomes as the sophisticated take socially ine¢cient actions to avoid the high contingent charges paid by the naive. The market can work worse for both consumer types when there are more sophisticated consumers. Depending on the importance placed on distributional con- cerns, a stronger case for consumerprotection regulation of contingent charges – though not necessarily by price control – is then apparent.
At the federal level, there is a variety of legislation that has created numerous statutes to regulate consumer financial products. These acts include, but are not limited to, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 9 , the Fair Credit Reporting Act 10 , the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 11 , the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 12 , the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) 13 . Each of these acts addresses a specific problem that has developed with respect to consumer financial transactions. The narrow way in which each law is tailored limits the discretion and flexibility of the agencies charged with enforcing the law. 14 This is problematic because federal agencies are often created in order to develop expertise and to alter enforcement rules based on changing market conditions. However, the majority of financial consumerprotection laws handcuff those
The Bureau’s agenda for residential mortgage regulation can be inferred from its various proposed rulemakings, requests for comments, and consumer initiatives. The Bureau is clearly focusing on broadly accepted forms of consumerprotection, such as disclosure requirements and consumer education, that address information asymmetries in the financial markets. It is also promulgating paternalistic regulations that set up bright- line rules for products and behavior in the mortgage market, and is complementing such regulations with closer supervision for formerly under-regulated mortgage market actors—the shadow mortgage banking sector.
satisfy the requisite quality and safety standards. Due to all these consumer have been more critical/aware of the policies and practices of business houses in the recent years than ever before. Consumers are organizing themselves for the protection of their interests. Such a move to better the protection offered to the consumer is called „consumerism‟, which in other word is also called consumers protection awareness. In simple words consumerprotection is a form of social action which is created to attain the well being of consumers. In this context it is necessary that the various groups of society such as Government, Judiciary, and Voluntary Associations of consumers play their role to protect and promote the consumer-interests – economic, social, and environmental.
Page | 59 mainly responsible for their exploitation. They should know their rights and must exercise them. Only then real consumerprotection can be achieved with success. Thus, the concern of consumerprotection is to ensure fair trade practices; quality of goods and efficient services with information to the consumer with regard to quality, quantity, potency, composition and price for their choice of purchase. Such a consumerprotection policy creates an environment whereby the clients, customers, and consumers receive satisfaction from the delivery of goods and services needed by them.
Though the cases discussed above did not use the word "goodwill", the judges were in essence referring to the "attractive force which brings in custom" to particular businesses that trade in New Zealand; that is, goodwill. Considering damage to goodwill is common and valid in deciding tort and property cases. However, Topline, Mi Woollies and Princess Wool were plainly consumer law cases brought by the Commerce Commission or the Crown. This, in turn, raises an interesting issue that the Court did not explicitly consider: should courts incorporate tort and property law concepts and principles into consumerprotection law? More specifically, should goodwill be taken into account in sentencing decisions made under the FTA?
Enhanced enforcement of all consumerprotection laws by promoting effective resolutions with persons and establishments regulated by the Department. These initiatives included 388 compliance meetings, 132 formal hearings/administrative complaints, 65 formal hearing decisions, 508 Settlement Agreements and Stipulations, 200 Assurances of Voluntary Compliance, 26 subpoenas/civil investigative demands and promulgation of 7 regulations. Processed and provided monetary restitution to consumers who were financially damaged in the
The consolidation became effective July 1, 2011, with the former agency becoming the Gaming Division of the Department of ConsumerProtection. As such, all responsibilities and duties of the Division of Special Revenue were transferred by statute to the Department of ConsumerProtection. Thus, as of July 1, 2011, through its Gaming Division, the Department of ConsumerProtection regulates the State’s legalized gaming activities, pursuant to Chapters 98, 226, 226b, 226c and 229a of the Connecticut General Statutes.
this conference, this work models consumers as rational agents, and as such it provides rationales for consumer policy which do not need to use recent models of behavioral consumers. In the following sections I present three theoretical models which illustrate the merits and drawbacks of a number of familiar consumerprotection policies. First, preventing firms from setting unduly high prices in markets such as credit cards, energy or international mobile telephony may reduce a consumer's incentive to investigate their mar- ket thoroughly. The resulting "model hazard" may well induce firms to raise their prices. As such, a safeguard price cap of this form may be a kind of protection which consumers do not need (although it would be welcomed by firms). Second, policy sometimes aims to prevent firms from rushing their customers' decision making. Sellers may have an incentive to force potential customers to decide then and there whether to buy the product, before the customer has a chance to investigate other— perhaps superior—deals available in the market. When a seller uses this particular sales technique, the result may be a poor match between the consumer and product. In addition, the practice may also lead the seller to set a higher price, which provides another source of consumer harm. While a direct ban on this form of firm behavior may be hard to implement, other common consumer policies such as mandated "cooling off" periods may have the same end result.
Of all the mechanics of consumerprotection in existence in Nigeria, none regulates sales promotions. The reason could be that since sales promotions are a form of advertising, therefore their regulation is implicit in schemes that regulate advertising in general. But it has been pointed out (Kanyip, op.cit., p.248) that sales promotions have distinct characteristics and peculiarities which merit a separate treatment if the protection of the consumer is to be meaningful. The drawbacks of submitting sales promotions in advertising in general lie in the fact that these peculiarities are lost sight of and hence not provided for. It is the Code of Advertising of the Advertising Practitioners’ Council of Nigeria (APCON) (Duru 2010) which contains provisions regulating sales promotions. The Code prohibits certain activities in relation to sales promotions. For instance, Article 3(6) provides that gift items promoting alcoholic beverages must not be directed at children and pregnant women as well as at sportsmen and women. The aim of this provision could be to discourage the consumption of alcoholic beverages by these classes of persons, (but not prohibited to all consumers in general), given the attendant dangers to their health and professions respectively. However, it must be admitted that it is different to adhere to this rule. Except in cases of direct personal selling, sales promotions are often propagated via the mass media and available for public consumption.
To do so, we present a duopoly model where firms select prices (possibly from mixed strategies) and then have the opportunity to make a price comparison to all those consumers who enter their store. In the benchmark case, we show that either banning price comparisons or providing no regulation at all, leaves consumers’ search decisions and the market equilibrium unaffected. However, the introduction of a consumerprotection policy that monitors and withdraws a fraction of all false comparisons produces two effects. The first effect, the ‘competition effect’ makes the market more transparent and stimulates fiercer price competition, while the second, adverse effect, the ‘deterrence effect’, allows firms to anti-competitively use false price comparisons to deter, otherwise optimal consumer search.
Setting limits on commercial enterprises. Help consumers in obtaining reliable information does not mean that companies do not resort to different kinds of strategies and tricks of trying to convince to buy your products or escape from responsibility for poor quality goods. Therefore, consumerprotection also includes restrictions on what businesses can do. The starting point is that products must be safe and perform the functions that are expected of it for some time (buyers mainly have a chance to check the time of purchase). Enterprises also can not use unfair terms in contracts (which is a particular problem in the case of services). They should also provide accurate information about their products, including the one contained in the advertisement.
Banks should ensure that external parties under outsource arrangements shall comply with these principles and that they work in the best interest of their consumers and bear the responsibility of consumerprotection. Providers of financial services shall assume the responsibility of the procedures taken on behalf of banks or consumers in accordance with SAMA outsourcing regulations.
Since the discovery of consumerprotection in Vedic period about 3200 B.C human values and ethical practices were considered of great values. Rulers felt that by regulating social conditions and economic life of people with reasonable restrictions on trade, interest of consumer can be better protected and also primary source of welfare. Among Dharma, most important texts are a) the Manu Smirti (800B.C -600 B.C), b) the Yajanavalkya Smriti (300B.C - 100 B.C.), c) the Narada Smirti (100 B.C- 200B.C), d) the Bruhaspati Smirti (200B.C- 400B.C), e) Katyayana Smirti (300B.C- 600B.C). The Manu Smirti is considered as the most important source of law and effective in its nature. Manu Smriti describes the social, political, and economic conditions of ancient society. During the ancient time, the king had power to create monopoly and put restrictions over exported goods. According to Manu “who behaved dishonestly to honest consumer must be liable”. Manu Smriti focused upon many consumers‟ matters, many of which remain of great concern in modern legal system. Kautilya Arthasastra describes the role of the state to regulate trade activity and to prevent crime against consumer. A director of trade was to monitor the entire market and its players. According to Kautilya “there was a fix time to return the purchased goods or payment of price, thereafter could not be returned. During Chandragupta‟s period trade practices were prevailed like goods could not be sold at the place of origin but they were to be carried to the appointed place (Panyasala), where dealer had to decide the quantity, quality and price etc. Every trader was required to take license to deal in the market. Easy access to justice including consumerprotection was having great importance during that period and King was to decide the complaint of the town and village. The mobile and circuit courts worked at night when required.
The credit card issuer cannot demand payment of your bill until your dispute with the seller is settled. If the credit card issuer demands payment in spite of your situation, you may sue and collect from $100-$1000, depending upon the size of your purchase. Under the Federal Trade Commission's Holder in Due Course Rule, and Idaho ConsumerProtection Rules, you have the same right to refuse payment to the finance company as you have against the seller. This rule also protects you if the seller referred you to a particular finance company for credit. You must notify the finance company in writing that you are revoking your acceptance with the seller.
One of the most important milestones in the area of consumerprotection/consumer movement in the country has been the enactment of the ConsumerProtection Act, 1986. This Act has been necessitated because the well-organized sectors of manufacturers, traders and service providers with the knowledge of market and manipulative skills often attempt to exploit the consumers, in spite of the existence of various provisions of different laws for protecting their interests. Moreover, the increase in population has resulted in enormous pendency and delay in disposal of cases in the civil courts. Hence, the ConsumerProtection Act, 1986 was enacted to better protect the interests of consumers. It is one of the most progressive and comprehensive pieces of legislation and is umbrella legislation covering all goods and services. The Salient Features of the Act are as under:
Antitrust and Consumer Protection SMU Law Review Volume 61 Issue 3 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 3 2008 Antitrust and Consumer Protection A Michael Ferrill Leslie Sara Hyman William Hulse Follow[.]
The government can play an important role for protection of consumers. It can enact various legislations for protection of consumers. According to the UN Guidelines for ConsumerProtection, “the government role in consumerprotection is vital and finds expression through policy making legislations and establishment of institutional authority for its enforcement. To provide a legal basis for its enforcing basic consumer rights every country needs to have irreducible minimum of consumerprotection legislation covering physical safety, promotion and protection of consumers’ economic interests, standards for the safety and quality of goods and services, distribution facilities, redress, education and information programmes. Governments also require the necessary machinery to enforce such legislation.”