Effort and Moral Hazard
Risk Aversion as Effort Incentive: A Correction and Prima Facie Test of the Moral Hazard Theory of Share Tenancity
... Mark A. DeWeaver 1 and James A. Roumasset 2 January 18, 2002 Abstract We show that Stiglitz's (1974) classic principal-agency theory of share tenancy does not imply, as alleged, that the optimal tenant share is less than ...
17
Risk aversion as effort incentive: A correction and prima facie test of the moral hazard theory of share tenancy
... 3. Simulating the Optimal Tenant Share In this section we explore the extent to which the risk-bearing- versus-moral-hazard theory, appropriately modified, can explain the distribution of tenancy contracts ...
16
Moral Hazard and Ambiguity
... no effort is implemented, there is no need to use any performance measure in the wage ...some effort is implemented, any measure of performance that reveals information about effort is included in ...
30
Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power
... There is a wide range of potential applications. For example, our moral hazard model could represent a firm-worker relationship, where the worker’s effort is non-contractible. In this case the ...
9
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
... Keywords: Non-exclusivity, Insurance, Moral Hazard. JEL Classification: D43, D82, G22. In a recent paper, Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] (BG) investigate competition among intermediaries in nonexclusive markets ...
10
Essays on Repated Moral Hazard
... repeated moral hazard problem in which the principal privately observes and publicly reports the agent's output, as in Fuchs ( 2007 ...his effort history to work as an incentive device, the agent has ...
119
Altruism, moral hazard, and sharecropping
... There are two points about φ that should be noted. Firstly, φ can be seen as the tenant’s compunction for the landlord which is based on the common tacit background. Secondly, φ is embodied in the form of a psychological ...
10
The Moral Hazard of Contract Drafting
... of moral hazard, the principal must rely on performance based rewards such as bonuses and commissions to induce the agent to ...the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that arise from ...
45
An optimal auction with moral hazard
... greater effort. The leader can induce this greater effort by nudging his bid towards q ⇤ , thereby making the follower more uncertain about his payoff from participating in the auction and hungry for more ...
72
Moral Hazard and Clear Conscience
... action moral hazard ...target effort above the equilibrium effort of the agent and to use equilibrium guilt to better incentivize the ...of effort than an agent with zero proneness to ...
21
Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
... under moral hazard and other frameworks where there is not a one-to-one relationship between effort and output, modeling a limited liability constraint as a lower limit on transfers is not equivalent ...
24
Moral hazard with random participation
... of moral hazard when the agent’s reservation utility is ...the moral hazard problem; this introduces a new trade-off between rent extraction and ...for effort: given a higher cost, the ...
23
Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
... repeated moral hazard with heterogeneous agents and endogenous states are a good example: they require us to solve the problem of each agent and aggregate the resulting individual optimal choices, before ...
53
Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
... hidden effort and hidden assets are a good example: while there is a good qualitative idea of the main predictions of this model, to the best of my knowledge a quantitative assessment in a calibrated economy is ...
53
Moral Hazard in Nursing Home Use
... A critical input into this effort is data over a long span of time on Medicaid policies towards nursing homes. Although there have been efforts to summarize state Medicaid policy for a given point in time (Bruen, ...
30
Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy
... operations. If the costs of public scheme insurance are different from those of private insur- ance, public transfers have implications for average consumption levels and, as u ( · ) > 0, for equilibrium insurance ...
21
Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy
... that effort re- duces the probability of a loss, which is the source of the moral hazard problem, and that the price of insurance is fixed at p = f (0), hence it is actuarially fair if the agent ...
32
Moral hazard in repeated procurement of services
... a moral hazard problem because service performance is intangible and difficult to ...contest effort (to avoid, for example, lobbying) or, contrary, to demand a sunk contest effort such as ...
31
Employer’s moral hazard and wage rigidity
... On the side of the employee’s opportunism, the literature on agency relations sought to establish the features of contracts able to elicit the optimal level of worker effort in the presence of unobservability of ...
33
Moral Hazard in Hierarchies and Soft Information
... other moral hazard set-ups in which side contracting, unlike us, occurs among agents performing almost identical tasks (see Holmstrom and Milgrom [1990], Itoh [1993] and Baliga and Sjöström ...
43