Portugal was the least developed country to join the European Communities before the Eastern enlargement. Its economy was characterized by weak commercial ties to Europe, a large agricultural sector employing more than one fourth of the labor force, lacking infrastructure and capital-intensive industries, and having a high illiteracy rate. Integration into the Communities influenced the transformation of Portugal into a modern market economy through three different channels. Firstly, the liberalization brought about by the common market attracted important foreign investments, induced domestic investment activity, promoted the competitiveness of light industries, and consolidated trade relations with Spain. Secondly, the modernization of sectors governed by the specific national or European policies (agriculture, fisheries, banking), was largely affected by the capabilities of the Portuguese administration. Thirdly, the EC Cohesion Policy contributed largely to the convergence with other Member States, but did not eliminate the regional disparities inside of Portugal. Most of the findings regarding the effects of the Europeaneconomicintegration prove to be applicable also in case of the Czech Republic and Hungary, undergoing their transformation and Europeanization two decades later.
The model of “EconomicIntegration” is widely used in the world because of its obvious two strengths called “unique comparative advantages” and “scale economic”. Currently there are some famous economicintegration organizations, and the EuropeanEconomicIntegration is considered as the most successful model. In 2011, the EU’s total population is mo re than 502 million and GDP is as high as $ 15.79 t rillion, with Per Capita GDP up to $ 31,548. In a word, the EU has become the organization of the strongest economy and the most successful economicintegration. Due to late starting and the influence of cross -strait relations, the process of Taiwan Stra it Econo mic Zone seems slow. In the present situation, the economic of Fu jian province is growing rapidly wh ile the level is scarcely higher than other coastal provinces. Honestly speaking, its level is much lowe r than Ta iwan. Meanwhile, the economic structure indicator in Fujian obviously lags behind Taiwan. It is a fact that the agree ment of Econo mic Cooperation Fra me work Agree ment( ECFA for short) weakens the advantage of Fujian Province to Ta iwan, however the unique “Wu Yuan” advantages between Fujian and Taiwan make it possible to build the Strait Economic Zone. In 2008, ZhenTao Liu believed that the key of the Haixi build ing is to circu mvent politica l issues, focus on the economic develop ment etc. . In 2009, ShaoZhen Huang considered there were two mode ls in the Stra it Econo mic Zone: one is functional integration boosts the system integration to pro mote the establishment of a co mmon ma rket. The other is “Three Stages”: Firstly, realizing the normalization of the trade; Secondly, build ing a common market . In this context, it is necessary to explore effective ways to build Strait Econo mic Zone between Fujian and Taiwan in order to promote the economic development of both sides , even the whole national economic.
S econd,grow th regressionscan be used to estim ate the effect ofEuropean integration on incom e grow th. Here the m ost usefulpaper isBadinger (2005) w hich m ade an index of the levelof Europeanintegration foreach EU 15 country from 1950 to 2000 and in apanel-regression setting w ith suitable controlsexam ined itsrelationship w ith grow th and w ith investm ent. T he integration index w hichtookaccountbothofGAT T liberalizationand Europeantradeagreem entsshow sthat55 percentofthe protectionism of1950 w aselim inated betw een 1958 and 1975,afigure w hich then rosesteadily to87 percentby 2000. T heresultsoftheregressionsw erethatchangesinintegration w ere positive for grow th but that the levelof integration had no effect and that changesin integration had som ew here betw een halfand three quartersoftheirim pact through investm ent w iththerem aindercom ingfrom changesinT FP . AcrosstheEU 15 asaw holeGDP w asestim ated to be 26 percent higherthan ifthere had been no econom ic integration after1950 w ith anarrow range from 21.6 percentforS w eden to 28.9 percentforP ortugal. T he peakeffecton the levelof incom e resultingfrom therapid liberalization priorto 1975 w ould have raised the grow th rate over the period by about 1 percent peryear– im pressive but only about aquarterofthe w estern
In his article „La notion de pole de croissance”, François Perroux developed the theory of unbalanced growth of sectors or regions, known as polarized development theory or theory of the growth poles 1 . The theory begins from the fact that development is simultaneously an unbalanced and hierarchical process and that only certain business units act as engine of development. These units are designed poles of economic growth. The growth poles can become parts of territory or infrastructure. In the free market economy, there are relied on the spontaneous attenuation of gaps because of progress wave generated by the growth poles. Diffusion of the economic phenomena can sometimes lead to increase the gaps as the assimilative capacity of the wave of progress is higher in the centres of the growth poles, giving rise to other innovations that will strengthen the position of the growth poles. In addition, there are occurred the filter processes of the development broadcast activities, whereby more developed regions retaining the positive economic elements, dissipating the inconveniences towards the periphery.
Here, we just focus on the assessment of whether for a given set of countries, namely the European countries, there is scope for better special- ization so as to allow the achievement of higher levels of the European Net Product. Whether this specialization and the associated redistribution of surplus among the countries should or could take place thanks to interna- tional agreements or through the market mechanism (i.e. market prices) is not a matter of this paper. Below we will consider country specializa- tions that are Pareto improving, in the sense that there exists alternative allocations of produced resources such that individual countries could in principle enjoy higher vectors of consumption goods, i.e. higher surplus.
When Germany shed the shackles on its trade sovereignty established by the Versailles Treaty in 1926, the SFIO, the Belgian Workers Party (POB) and the SPD met to discuss the future of European trade. Their resolution called for a European customs union. 62 Socialist statements supporting free trade, however, were almost always followed by demands for more powerful international institutions, often modelled on interventionist wartime economies. In his 1928 LSI speech Napthali regretted that ‘right after the war a revival of liberal views came about as reaction against the war economy’. ‘Meanwhile’, he continued, ‘almost everyone now recognises that the hardest problems . . . can only be solved through . . . national and international or- ganisations’. The resulting LSI resolution signalled socialists’ disappointment with the 1927 World Economic Conference and adopted the SPD’s call for an ‘International Economic Office’ under the League that would ‘supervis[e] trusts and international cartels’. 63 In 1930 Napthali proposed that the LSI appoint an ‘international secretary for economic policy’ who would reside in Geneva to lobby the League for the LSI’s views on ‘international tariff policy . . . cartels [and] agricultural co-operation’. 64
to consider the important major forces governing cross-border integration outside INTERREG. These are the EuropeanEconomic and Monetary Union (EMU), Schengen, language, business cycles, level of bi-lateral market integration and perhaps further ones. However, many of those forces superimpose the INTERREG-specific results and are closely interrelated with them. Multicollinearity is a problem if just merging all those variables in a regression analysis. The idea to get closer to an insight into the relevance of INTERREG for economicintegration is to consider all those INTERREG and non- INTERREG influences as co-variates and to run a factor analysis incorporating the survey-related indicators and further indicators determining economicintegration across borders. Hence, the factor analysis will be used to specify the right-hand side of the regression equation, while economicintegration will be the left-hand term.
the origin countries are represented by some of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) states: Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovakia, Hungary, Russia and Ukraine. Excepting the last three countries, all the other ones are member states of the European Union. These particular CEE countries were selected from the representative sample of 60 countries with the signifi cant number of emigrants in the UK. For the other CEE countries the data are not available and the number of emigrants is not too high. The explanatory variables are represented by: real GDP per capita, real wage, distance between London and the capital of each state and unemployment rate in these origin countries for immigrants. A dummy variable called the EU member is introduced to mark the states that are in the EU from a certain year. The models are based on panel data, covering these 12 countries and the period from 2004 to 2014. Bulgaria and Romania entered into the EU in 2007, while the rest of the mentioned CEE states, excluding Russia and Ukraine, are the members since 2004. The number of immigrants was taken from the database of the Offi ce for National Statistics in the UK. The distances were measured in kilometres and they refer to air distances, being provided by http://www.distancefromto.net/. The data for the rest of the variables are provided by the World Bank.
capital. All three countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand) give the United Kingdom substantial preferences which could, if necessary, be used by them in bargaining with the Six. Since Australia and Canada are big and growing markets they are in a particularly strong position. They might also, in order to secure a share in the expanding European market for foodstuffs and in Canadars case for manufactures too, consider applying for formal association with the new Europeaneconomic group. The removal of protection for their industries would go against the current trend but they should be as well able to contemplate this over an extended transitional period as the poorer European countries such as Greece, Portugal and Turkey, which are already doing so.” (14)
The main theories of Europeaneconomicintegration argue that private economic interests play an important role in the integration process. This role is a positive one, whereby economic interests provide the impetus and pressures for integration to move forward. Public policy analyses of the European Union’s legislative process, however, show that intense lobbying by such interests can prevent legislative proposals from being adopted, even if these economic interests were initially in favour of supranational legislation in the given policy area. So how is it possible that economic interests may initially be favourable to integration in a given policy area but then end up rejecting legislative proposals made by the Commission, usually by intensely lobbying the European Parliament and/or the Council of Ministers? The answer is based on the idea that economic interests initially face great uncertainty as to the precise costs and benefits of integrating a particular policy area. Only once the ‘fog of integration’ lifts – as a result of concrete legislative proposals being tabled by the Commission – are economic interests able to calculate these costs and benefits and, consequently, decide whether to lobby for or against the proposal. To provide a first run at validating the argument, the paper examines two cases of integration failure in the EU: the directive on patenting computer-implemented inventions (‘Software Patent Directive’) and the directive on takeover bids (‘Takeover Directive’). These cases not only indicate that the argument is valid but they also suggest that integration failure can take different forms depending on how economic interest polarize on a given policy issue. This leads us to conclude that regional integration scholars would benefit from integrating the lessons learned from the studies of EU politics and policy-making into their models of Europeanintegration.
In summary, the Europeaneconomicintegration would harmonize those matters considered necessary to enforce the basic liberties established in the Treaty (the free circulation of goods, the provision of services, the freedom of establishment, the free circulation of workers, and capital) as well as to avoid distortions in resource allocation. In this way, it would require a greater convergence in the taxation of capital and labor to avoid dysfunctions; a tax on consumption with easy adjustment in the intra-community transactions; and a greater integration and cooperation of taxation administrations that permit the effective management of the fiscal system.
There is no a priori reason to assume that economic boundaries coincide with territorial borders: the borders are demarcated territorial border and economic savings. Thus, if the economy continues boundaries between different communities, local economies do not always compose a regional economy. Similarly, the economic borders between regions can hinder national economicintegration. Europeaneconomicintegration is guided by efforts to reduce or eliminate the role of public economic frontiers of territorial borders with European neighbors. As experience has already demonstrated, this is a necessary but not sufficient to Europeanintegration. The divides within and between national economies may exist, possibly because of natural barriers (eg mountains, large) whose costs were not sufficiently reduced by measures related to infrastructure and transport and the large disparities in the level of development, times because of anticompetitive activity in a region or country. Even discrepancies with regard to the availability, speed and quality of information can sometimes function as economic frontier.
This BEEP Briefing paper takes an analytical approach to these issues and to the possible 'framing' involved. Such an analysis reveals a very different picture than the negative framing in such debates has it: there is nothing particular 'a-social' about the internal market or the EU at large. This overall conclusion is reached following five steps. First, several 'preliminaries' of the social dimension have to be kept in mind (including the two-tier regulatory & expenditure structure of what is too loosely called 'social Europe' ) and this is only too rarely done or at best in partial, hence misleading, ways. Second, the social acquis at EU and Member States' levels is spelled out, broken down into four aspects (social spending; labour market regulation; industrial relations; free movements & establishment). Assessing the EU acquis in the light of the two levels of powers shows clearly that it is the combination of the two levels which matters. Member States and e.g. labour unions do not want the EU level to become deeply involved ( with some exceptions) and the actual impact of free movement and establishment is throttled by far-reaching host-country control and the requirement of a 'high level of social protection' in the treaty. Third, six anxieties about the social dimension of the internal market are discussed and few arguments are found which are attributable to the EU or its weakening social dimension. Fourth, another six anxieties are discussed emerging from the socio-economic context of the social dimension of the EU at large. The analysis demonstrates that, even if these anxieties ought to be taken serious, the EU is hardly or not the culprit. Fifth, all this is complemented by a number of other facts or arguments strengthening the case that the EU social dimension is fine.
Parallel with the single market, cohesion policy is one of the key pillars of EU, and its purpose is to guarantee economic, social and territorial cohesion and support equality of opportunities for all parts of the unity. However, this policy has been questioned several times, above all for the disparity within member countries, and especially among the regions of expanded EU. Noticeable disparities in the regional development among certain regions of EU are one of the key problems imposed at this moment and which EU has to solve as soon as possible. It seems that regional problems are of structural nature and they include, besides problems of economic structure, also problems of demographic structure, the structure of employees, and even problems of spiritual structure.
A decision to ‘go European’ requires an assessment of a number of factors: competitive advantage of both the company and comparative advantage of the host country, trade-offs between globalisation and localisation, and modes of entry given the available resources. Whereas the decisions need to be taken on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration firm’s own capabilities and resources as well as industry specificities, several recommendations for business willing to Europeanise can be made, based on an analysis of the regulatory macro-environment of the EU. Those recommendations stemming from specific characteristics of the EU regulatory acquis have been presented in this paper for each of the four freedoms of the Internal Market and the general regulatory environment of the EU.
These local interactions of companies and consumers are one prerequisite for clus- tering. The analysis of horizontal links between companies – including mutual learn- ing effects and therefore fostering innovation – provides another approach to looking at clusters. The three factors Feldman/Audretsch (1999) stress to make the step towards successful innovation clusters refer to these horizontal interconnections. First, complementary activities should be diverse to a certain extent and, if possible, share a thematic platform. This recurs concerning empirical results for example by Glaeser et al. (1992) and Jacobs (1969), showing that diversity proves to be more conducive to innovation than specialisation. Second, they conclude that the endow- ment with technological potential in the past only partly explains the development of innovation clusters. For successful progress it seems to be far more important to efficiently organise the existing structures and business contacts: “The underlying economic and institutional structure matters, as do the microeconomic linkages across agents and firms” (Audretsch 2003: 19). Third, they state that competition spurs innovation more than a monopoly (Glaeser et al. 1992; Audretsch/Feldman 1996). It is not just the fact of competition stimulating technological developments, but also the cooperation among competitors. For this constellation, Brandenburger/ Nalebuff (1996) coins the notion ‘co-opetition’. According to Jonas (2005), from the sociological point of view competition and confrontation play crucial roles in clusters, but this interplay is hardly included in the analysis.
Other important aspect of Spanish regions economic expansion was connected with the existence of certain well developed industrial areas, which, in fact, had been highly developed even before the integration with the EU. Moreover, Spain shares a border with a highly developed economy - France - and those better developed areas, namely the Basque Country, Navarra, Catalonia, and Aragon, were located close to that border (Table 3). It is highly possible that these well-developed Spanish Autonomous Communities were the main source of structural changes, and of speeding up the process of economic development.
EU member states’ dependence upon imported energy is growing. There are undoubtedly enough sources around Europe able to cover the foreseen rise in demand on the continent over the centuries ahead. Nevertheless, the shipment capabilities towards European markets are scarce for the time being. Consequently, one of the main trends of the community energy policies is aimed at diversifying and multiplying the supply sources, as well as the supply routes, especially now, that the European reserves dwindle.