the Middle East

By the mid-2000s, some economists were raising questions about the negative aspects of neoliberalism in the region, but it was the shock of rising political discontent culminating in the Arab Spring of 2011 that led to a shift in the research program. In Tunisia and Egypt, for example, a strong argument can be made that neoliberal reform policies were a major contributing factor to popular discontent by not solving but likely exacerbating economic problems like corruption, unemployment, and inequality. Yet the IFIs continued to push their agenda through the Deauville Partnership after 2011 (IMF 2012b), using the language of “sustainable development” and “inclusive growth,” while poorly resourced agencies such as the UNDP and ILO, as well as trade union movements and progressive nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), struggled to propose more deeply inclusive, labor-friendly, and pro-poor alternatives. The dramatic public struggle over control of the state in the Arab Spring countries reflects but also distracts attention from a deeper, quieter, and equally pressing struggle over economic policy for the next period. This struggle defined the contested boundaries in economics for the Middle East as of 2013.

Ultimately, the fallout for European unity and EU expansion was damaging, but not fatal. It did, howev- er, contribute to subsequent timidity in Europe about criticizing Washington’s policies in other parts of the Middle East. Arab governments were generally fearful that a US success in Iraq could portend a more ambitious US agenda for regime change in the region, but when the occupation met increasing Iraqi opposition in early 2004, fears of a spill over effect in the region loomed larger. Token European support for the rebuilding ef- fort in Iraq also began to peel away as all foreign nationals there began to fear kidnap, and some were exe- cuted by the newly emergent Al Qaeda in Iraq and other extremists. After mass attacks on Iraqi civilians triggered sectarian warfare in 2006, the US military was left virtually alone to try to restore security.

Ultimately, the fallout for European unity and EU expansion was damaging, but not fatal. It did, howev- er, contribute to subsequent timidity in Europe about criticizing Washington’s policies in other parts of the Middle East. Arab governments were generally fearful that a US success in Iraq could portend a more ambitious US agenda for regime change in the region, but when the occupation met increasing Iraqi opposition in early 2004, fears of a spill over effect in the region loomed larger. Token European support for the rebuilding ef- fort in Iraq also began to peel away as all foreign nationals there began to fear kidnap, and some were exe- cuted by the newly emergent Al Qaeda in Iraq and other extremists. After mass attacks on Iraqi civilians triggered sectarian warfare in 2006, the US military was left virtually alone to try to restore security.

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The efforts of George Mason University, New York University, and those U.S. universities in Qatar’s Education City clearly require the presence of U.S. faculty. However, a great many of the joint-degree programs and university-affiliated programs do not necessarily require U.S. nationals in the classrooms. A large number of public and private institutions in the Middle East where English is the mode of instruction staff their faculty with western-trained academics from a variety of countries and backgrounds. Ensuring that these individuals are qualified to offer instruction should be a major concern for U.S. and Arab administrators. While U.S. universities do employ individuals with Masters Degrees in classrooms, students and parents, both in the U.S. and the Middle East, envision Ph.D.s as their primary instructors. The individuals who constitute the faculties at the American-affiliated universities may be earnest and wish to participate in a university’s mission, but all too often these “nomadic western adjuncts” find themselves underpaid, overworked, and subject to short-term contracts. Indeed, I have interviewed adjuncts who have been asked to teach courses outside of their academic fields. Many report that students are so ill-prepared in English that their courses, whatever they may be, turn into English language instruction. Owing to these frustrations, many short-term adjuncts have limited loyalty to their host institutions and spend considerable time and energy in search of their next position.

it. With World War II on the horizon, the British government realized it would need Arab support in the Middle East and thus put the idea on hold 4 . After the war, as Holocaust survivors and other Jewish displaced persons streamed toward Palestine, the partition idea was revived. In November 1947, the UN approved a plan to divide Palestine into two states. Zionist leaders once again accepted the plan. Arab governments and the Palestinians however saw the division as the theft of Arab land by Zionists and the governments that supported them. British rule over Palestine ended when Zionists proclaimed the state of Israel on May 14, 1948. The Palestinians were infuriated as their homeland was taken, against their wishes and mostly by force. The reaction was immediate, in what was to be a precursor to four armed conflicts. On May 15, 1948 the armies of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq attacked the new country with the declared intent of destroying it. By August 1949, Israel and all five Arab states had agreed to end the fighting. As a result of the war about 700,000 Palestinians became refugees in Jordan, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Syria 5 .

states as a group. Zafrulla's first step was to visit Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, a tour he was later accused of making at British and American instigation. This he denied outright: the invitation had been extended initially by the Turkish Foreign Minister and his acceptance on the advice of his Prime Minister had been a matter purely between the governments of Turkey and Pakistan.'*' The Turkish invitation had a significance which he did not mention, for in November 1951 Turkey, along with the USA, UK and France, had put forward what became known as the 'Four Power Proposals' on the defence of the Middle East. These proposals were rejected outright by Egypt and produced a revolutionary situation in Syria. The USSR sent Notes to all the Middle Eastern countries warning them against acceptance. Not only the USA and

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Although every place on Earth’s surface is unique, each shares characteristics with other places. Geographers refer to a grouping of similar places as a region. Today, North Africa and the Middle East would constitute a formal cultural region—an area in which the population shares cultural traits (practices), such as religion, language, or traditional livelihood systems. Islam, in its various forms, is the region’s principal defining cultural trait. Arabic is the most widely spoken language, and it is the “official” language for roughly 276 million North Africans and Middle Easterners. Because much of North Africa and the Middle East is arid or semi- arid, pastoralism and irrigated agriculture are common rural economic activities. Urban centers are associated with transportation, trade, the manufacture of traditional goods, and various services. Cities and towns are typically cen- tered around a large mosque (the Friday Mosque or Masjid al-Jami). Most also have associated schools, a public water supply, courts and administrative institutions, a citadel, and a commercial district—the vibrant and colorful suq (Arabic), çarsi (Turkish), or bazaar (Farsi). Beyond the central district are the residential “quarters”—closely knit, homogeneous communities where people live among others of the same ethnic group, religion, or village of origin.

DRIVERS OF SECTARIANIZATION Scholars have long recognized the exceptional power of identity in the Middle East and the permeability of regional states to trans-state identity discourses. 7 Barnett and Lynch argued that identity is shaped by discourse competition in a trans-state public space; 8 in the regional states system rival states bid for hegemony using trans-state discourses; 9 and the main threats against which many regimes balance has not been from armies but ideational subversion challenging their domestic legitimacy. 10 After several decades of post-independence Pan-Arab hegemony in the Arab world, oil- bolstered states appeared to be consolidated and less permeable to trans- state identities for a period peaking in the 1980s; but this proved ephemeral and what Salloukh called “the return of the weak state” – indeed failing states have re-empowered identity wars. 11 Yet, if identity has always more or less mattered for regional politics, the identities instrumentalized in this rivalry have hitherto chiefly been inclusive state, Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic identities. Now, however rival states and movements exploit the highly divisive sectarian dichotomy between Sunni and Shia. What explains the rapid diffusion and apparent hegemony of sectarian discourse and practices across the region? Several tendencies, each of which, in themselves, cannot explain it, and each of which contains counter tendencies, nevertheless when cumulative and combined, have constituted powerful drivers of sectarianism.

(My thanks to Steve Yetiv at Old Daminion University for finding this quote for me). The Carter administration nonetheless initiated contacts with the a o m e i n i re@m[r]

Taken together, previous research in peacemaking, negotiation, mediation, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and US foreign policy goes a long way toward answering the question of [r]

The polyvalent neurotropic H.S. vaccine, prepared at the Razi Institute according to the technique developed in Onderstepoort Laboratory, consists of pooled culture materials[r]

Since gaining its independence in 1948, Israel has been burdened with heavy military spending in order to defend itself. Its economy experienced a boom in the 1990’s driven by an influx of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union and a strong high-technology sector. However, the collapse of the Palestinians peace agreements and the escalating Mid-East conflict brought on by the intifada in September 2000 had a negative impact on foreign investment and tourism contributing to the economic recession in 2001-2002. While certain types of imports are prohibited based on health, environmental, or obscenity regulations, export growth and increased public consumption have helped expand the economy in 2003. The top income and corporate tax rates are 50 and 36 percent, respectively. In 2002, the government consumed 31 percent of GDP. Excluding state-owned monopolies in airline and power, and regulated sectors like banking, insurance, and defense, foreign investment is allowed full ownership. Furthermore, current transfers, repatriation of profits, and invisible transaction are not subject to controls or restrictions.

and officials have spoken in support of the use of lethal force against Palestinian assail- ants. II. Settlement Expansion, Land Designations, and Denial of Palestinian Development The continuing policy of settlement construction and expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, designation of land for exclusive Israeli use, and denial of Palestinian development, including the recent high rate of demolitions, is steadily eroding the viabil- ity of the two-state solution. This raises legitimate questions about Israel’s long-term intentions, which are compounded by the statements of some Israeli ministers that there should never be a Palestinian state. In fact, the transfer of greater powers and respon- sibilities to Palestinian civil authority in Area C contemplated by commitments in prior agreements has effectively been stopped, and in some ways reversed, and should be resumed to advance the two-state solution and prevent a one-state reality from taking hold.

34 believe as other Muslims do. However, they are widely regarded as heretical and are persecuted across the Middle East as such. 183 It is estimated that there are 2,000 Ahmadi Muslims in Algeria. 184 The alarming rate of Ahmadi Muslim persecution in Algeria is troubling for several reasons. First, it underscores a growing rise of religious fundamentalism in a nation that is strategically positioned to help the West combat global terrorism. As a matter of fact, since the events of September 11, 2001, Algeria and the U.S. have entered into an uncomfortable alliance. While Algeria was the first Middle Eastern country to condemn the heinous acts of September 11, and has since worked with the United States counter-terrorism efforts, tensions have arisen because it will not allow US to operate unmanned aerial vehicles in its airspace. 185 The suspicion and mistrust that tempers an uneasy alliance with the West, coupled with Algeria’s strategic, geographic position and increasing religious fundamentalism could result in serious breaches in global security.

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The concern with sectarianism in the modern Arab world thus does not simply indicate a political space that is contested by competing religious, ethnic, or other communities. It also presupposes a shared political space. In this sense, the rhetoric about “sectarianism” as insidious in the Middle East emerged as the alter ego of a putatively unifying nationalist discourse. Much like racism in the contemporary United States, sectarianism is a diagnosis that makes most sense when thought of in relation to its ideological antithesis. To identify and condemn racism in America, in other words, one presumably upholds an idea of equality and emancipation. To identify and condemn sectarianism in the Arab world, then, one presumably upholds an idea of unity and equality between (and among) Muslims and non-Muslims. For this precise reason, it was only in the early twentieth century in Lebanon that the Arabic term for sectarianism—al-ta’ifiyya—was coined as a negative term in