[PDF] Top 20 Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions

... study sequential auctions for private value objects and unit-demand bidders using second-price sealed-bid ...a revenue-maximizing ordering of the ...the revenue of each auction is ... See full document

... the sequential ascending auction mecha- ...the sequential ascending auction with reserve price e r; moreover, this equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the dynamic virtual pivot ... See full document

... analyzes sequential auctions for private value objects using second-price sealed-bid ...such auctions depend on the information uncertainty of the ...individual auctions that comprise a ...his ... See full document

... We may now calculate the expected payoffs of buyers for each value of n ∈ N . Figure 1 dis- plays an example of these paths for two distributions of values: the uniform and the exponential. A consistent feature of the ... See full document

... in auctions where participation cost plays a significant role in functioning the allocation efficiency and revenue of auctions as well as other performance ...the revenue of the seller and net ... See full document

... the sequential auctions ...or sequential) sale of multiple objects with a fixed set of buyers and ...sealed-bid auctions; for example, the previously referenced Sailer (2006) and Zei- thammer ... See full document

... as auctions are now being widely studied as a means of buying/selling resources in multiagent sys- ...because auctions are both simple and have a number of desirable properties (typically the most im- ... See full document

... study revenue submodularity in auctions and to consider market expansion optimization ...study revenue guarantees for the VCG mechanism, in simpler settings than ...optimal revenue in a ... See full document

... a revenue maximizing politi- cian may find it in his best interest to exclude lobbyists with valuations above a threshold from participating in the all-pay ... See full document

... of auctions that are used for mul- tiple objects: combinatorial [13] and sequential [7, ...the sequential auctions are conducted at different times, a bidder may participate in more than one ... See full document

... such, maximizing the liquid welfare achieves a reasonable compromise between social efficiency and potential for revenue extraction (which is constrained by the ... See full document

... with sequential sealed-bid auctions, I assume that the winning bid in the …rst round is publicly announced by the seller prior to the second ...analyze sequential auctions with no bid ... See full document

... An important result in the theoretical auction literature concerns the revenue equivalence of …rst-price and open ascending bid auctions, see Vickrey (1961), My- erson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981). ... See full document

... of sequential auctions. They find that although first-price auctions give greater revenue than second-price (English) auctions when the goods are substitutes, the opposite is true for ... See full document

... Table 2 shows that these correlations are robust after conditioning on past rain, unit, weekday, schedule, week-of-the-year, month, and individual fixed e ff ects. The table displays the results obtained by regressing ... See full document

... All-pay auctions are widely used in economics to capture such situations, where all players, even the losers, pay their ...all-pay auctions have been shown useful to model rent seeking, political campaigns ... See full document

... objectives, revenue and maximum bid. We evaluate the performance of all-pay auctions in the prior-free setting, ...the revenue and the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium are at least as high ... See full document

... therefore a bidder may participate in more than one auction. In such a scenario, it has been shown that although there is only one object being auctioned at a time, the bidding behaviour for any individual auction ... See full document

... improve revenue in second-price sealed bid common value auctions, there are natural auction models, like the interdependent value model for corporate takeovers we present, in which the optimal design of ... See full document

... IPV auctions is a familiar result, the result here is significant because the class of auction forms considered is broad, and we allow for atoms in the distribution of ... See full document