Following the Enlightenment ‘age of reason’ and the growth of secularism, the nineteenth century saw the development of further liberal philosophy that emphasised the primacy of autonomy in the context of a perceived historical struggle between individual liberty and state authority. Discussing the legitimacy of power exercised over the individual, John Stuart Mill argues that ‘the inward domain of consciousness’ demands nothing more that absolute freedom.252 This domain, Mill asserts, is that of ‘the dignity of thinking beings’.253 As such, any attempt to deny an individual the development of their own opinions, beliefs and views was absolutely wrong, primarily because no one could claim knowledge of infallible, objective truth.254 On Mill’s view, the liberty of the individual includes a social right to be free to think and be heard, and anything less would constitute a social tyranny whereby a
251
Roberto Adorno, ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for a Global Bioethics’ (2009) 34(3)
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 223-240.
252
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Penguin 1984) 71.
253
Mill (1984) 96.
254
92 majority view would infuse society and permeate law and legal process. Mill’s thesis is widely cited as critical to the importance and development of a right to freedom to express personal views on religious convictions. It remains an important contribution to discourse on individual freedom of expression in the context of the recognition of plurality and diversity.
This modern development of a principle of absolute, individual freedom of conscience remains central to questions about legitimate state interference. In his
Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that freedom of conscience is fundamental to justice because it constitutes a primary aspect of human life and denotes personal identity. In Rawls’ theory, when individuals contemplate the grounds for justice from, what he refers to as, the ‘original position’, ‘equal liberty of conscience’ is an overriding principle that all will agree on because, he argues, freedom of conscience is critical to each.255 Rawls argues that the argument for a constitutional equality of conscience is strong. It requires ‘a regime guaranteeing moral liberty and freedom of thought and belief, and of religious practice … regulated only on the necessary grounds of public order and security’.256
Equality of individuality is also central to Ronald Dworkin’s foundational legal justice. In a comprehensive analysis of Rawls’ theory, Dworkin argues that it is legal equality that must be established prior to a Rawlsian concept of justice. Starting from a principle of legal equality, rather than freedom of conscience, Dworkin’s concern, nonetheless, is to promote and support the view that there must be no constraint on individual liberty to decide what constitutes a good life.257 For Dworkin, this
255
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised ed, Harvard University Press 1971/1999) 181.
256
Rawls (1971/1999) 186.
257
93 prohibition is strict. Individual rights are political ‘trumps’ against collective views and state interference. Any such interference must be justified by very special reasons.
The socio-political philosophy of Mill, Rawls and Dworkin supports the general principles of Enlightenment philosophy on autonomy and individual liberty. On their views, the free thinking of rational individuals grounds a requirement for positive law and a great degree of individual autonomy and freedom over which the state has extremely limited authority. In these views, Enlightenment ideas regarding self-governance, autonomy and human dignity are represented in arguments for strong individual rights to reign supreme against state interference with any chosen way of life or chosen religious outlook. In addition, this discourse has been developed to include an argument for social plurality as a necessary component of a value for autonomy. For Joseph Raz, autonomy is a concept that expresses the way people shape their destiny by ‘fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives’.258 But, ‘[a]utonomy is exercised through choice, and choice requires a variety of options to choose from’.259 Raz argues, therefore, that ‘valuing autonomy leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism’.260 On this basis, Raz suggests that moral pluralism is the political ideal and justification for the right to individual freedom because it supports and promotes a tolerant society.
Discourse on autonomy, liberty and individual freedom is vast, and the views above represent but a small fraction. The brief overview presented above cannot do justice to the respective theses, nor can it include a critical appraisal of additional
258
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press 1988) 269.
259
Raz (1988) 398.
260
94 critical discourse on their content and scope. Nevertheless, it sketches out a linear view of the historical justifications given for the existence of rights for individuals, of why they are important and of their utility for wider society.261
On the discourse presented, the overarching context for the presentation of the human rights claims of vegans is clear. Individual autonomy is perceived to be a fundamental value to humanity. It is grounded on the dignity principle that is expressed through the rational and normative agency of each and every person. It ought not be limited by the state except for very important reasons, and it gives expression to the morality of pluralism in human society. The idea of individual autonomy does not itself necessarily preclude the existence of compassion for others in community, but the extent to which this historical context for human rights has shaped positive human rights law, at the expense of moral responsibility to others, needs to be assessed.
3.8 The scope of community and autonomy in human rights: the development of