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Capability Variable Assumptions

In document Distributed surface force (Page 102-104)

C. INITIAL TRIAL RUNS

3. Capability Variable Assumptions

As stated earlier, the capabilities that require evaluation include force structure, unit network capability, missile range, sensor range, and salvo size. These capabilities are discussed in more detail below. Although at least 30 simulations runs for each variable set are typically required for result data analysis (Ross 2009), only 10 runs were performed during this initial model trial for each variable set. The reduced number of runs might diminish the value of the results for analytical purposes such as drawing statistical inference, but is adequate to gain initial insights into the model design and required capabilities.

(1) Force Structure

The force structure is the number of individual ships in each flotilla group. Because the small SSC is by design a single-mission offensive platform, multiple SSCs and support units are required to provide both offensive and defensive capabilities. Two DDGs and two LCSs are included in all trial runs to provide this support. During this analysis portion, only 10 small combatant ships were evaluated. A more robust set of ship combinations were evaluated in subsequent model iterations, described in Chapter V Section D.

(2) Unit Network Capability

Unit network capability (a variable) defines the ability of each ship within the flotilla group to communicate with all other assets. From a real world perspective, this variable models the robustness of communications systems and the necessity to communicate in adverse environments. The two possible states for unit network capability are “on” and “off.” These states are respectively identified as one and zero in the result summary sheets. When network capability is “on,” units are assumed to be able to communicate by relaying targeting and engagement information to all other units within communication range. The method with which communication occurs is not specified, nor is it important (for this modeling) how it occurs. An in-depth analysis of communication methods, performed by the Joint C4I Capstone class on the NPS campus, can be found in Appendix A. When network capability is off, units cannot relay targeting

and engagement information to other units. This inability to communicate is meant to simulate an EM-denied environment in which no alternative communication capabilities are effectively employed. In the “off” condition, multiple ships may engage an enemy target if within sensor and weapons range.

(3) Missile Range

Missile range is the effective range of the missile being deployed from all U.S. combatant ships. The missile range is more a function of the missile type than the ship itself. For this model, two missile ranges were evaluated. On the low end, a 60 nm range is evaluated. This range was chosen because it roughly reflects the anti-ship missile range of U.S. Navy warships. More specifically, this range is similar to that of the Harpoon missile (Boeing 2014). The other alternative considered is a 90 nm range. This range is meant to simulate the range of alternative missiles either currently deployed or being designed. In particular, this range closely reflects the low end of the effective range of the naval strike missile (Naval Technology 2014b), and will adequately represent a minimum capability of the LRASM currently in development by the U.S. Navy (Defense Industry Daily 2014a).

(4) Sensor Range

Sensor range is defined as the effective detection and classification range that the SSC is capable of achieving through either organic or inorganic sensor networks. With respect to the model, the method with which this extended sensor range is achieved is less important than the fact that it can be achieved. The first sensor range scenario assumes that the detection range of the SSC’s sensor network is 30 nautical miles (or 60,000 yards), and the range at which the network can positively classify a target and obtain a usable firing solution is 15 nautical miles (or 30,000 yards). These ranges are comparable to radar systems that exist on most modern naval combatants, making it the minimum expected SSC capability.

The next sensor range scenario assumes that the detection range is 45 nautical miles (or 90,000 yards), and a classification range (with all of the capabilities with respect to identification and solution development as described above) of 22.5 nautical

miles (or 45,000 yards). These sensor ranges are based less on any existing capabilities or planned systems, but serves mostly as a method of extending the range to evaluate the result’s significance.

The last sensor range combination is a detection range of 90 nautical miles (or 180,000 yards), and a classification range of 45 nautical miles (or 90,000 yards). These ranges are outside the realm of feasibility for todays (or for that matter, the near term futures) shipboard radar systems. An external sensor system must be used to achieve these extended ranges. One possibility to achieve these ranges is to utilize existing unmanned platforms with inherent communications capabilities, such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Deploying a UAS from a platform, like the LCS, is already within the capabilities of today’s Navy (United States Navy Fact File 2013c). External sensors do not, however, have to be limited to this traditional thought. Use of unmanned surface or subsurface vessels can extend significantly extend the ship’s sensor range, as can rapidly deployable lighter-than-air devices and space-based technology. This study does not focus on the how (determining what required capabilities are more important is the goal).

(5) Salvo Size

The last major variable that this model evaluates is the numerical missile salvo size for the SSC. One base SSC design assumption is that it can rapidly deploy missiles, and also rapidly rearm and reengage in combat. The first variation of the model evaluates launching two missiles per salvo. The other variation evaluates launching four missiles per salvo. These two variations are based on minimizing the cost of the fire control system, as well as using canister stored and launched missile delivery systems on the small surface combatant. Should the analysis prove that varying the salvo size has a significant impact, a more detailed analysis will be conducted.

In document Distributed surface force (Page 102-104)