Each of the four SSC pillars are a major foundational concept designed to provide foundational background to develop the new platform.
1. System of Systems (Armada) Concept
The CONOPS employs the SSC as a system within a larger fleet of different platforms, creating a system of systems where the capabilities of each complement the overall combat effectiveness of the fleet. The system of systems as a whole is defined to be the armada. The armada represents a formidable force capable of defeating an opposing force at sea. The strength in the armada is utilization of existing force structure, combined with the new SSC, to integrate into a force that can deter aggression and project power in any region.
In 2025–2030, the U.S. naval force structure will feature a large number of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and approximately 30 LCSs. Assuming that a third of the
modular-designed LCSs will be equipped with ASW modules and the other two-thirds will be equipped with either the MCM or SUW module, the SSC will forego redundant force structure capability to save cost. The same philosophy applies to AAW capability, where large numbers of Arleigh Burke class destroyers are sufficient for air defense.
Given this programmed force structure for 2025, the team envisioned employing the SSC in a force composed of ASW-capable LCSs and AAW-focused DDGs alongside multiple dedicated ASUW SSCs. Manned and unmanned sensor platforms such as the MQ-8B Firescout could be used to increase the ISR capability of the force. The P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft could replace or complement the ASW capability of the ASW-equipped LCS. The system of systems approach has the goal of allowing the U.S. Navy to expand its fleet size, but at a lower cost than building multi-mission ships.
One system the SSC is not inherently designed to work with is the aircraft carrier.
Short-duration protection missions such as a strait escort are envisioned, but the SSC will not be well suited for extended blue-water carrier strike group (CSG) operations. The SSC could be considered an external system to the CSG system capable of interacting with but not belonging to the CSG. Sustained operations at sea for prolonged periods, as is normal operating procedure for a CSG, would stress the ship and crew beyond its designed capabilities and will not be considered a core capability of the ship.
2. Forward Basing
In order to execute the SSC’s primary missions, it is essential the vessel be forward deployed in a regional theater, such as the South China Sea (SCS) or southwest Asia. As with the LCS, multiple SSCs are to be forward deployed to allow for rapid employment in response to a quickly developing situation. In a Phase II scenario, where an adversary has achieved strategic surprise with naval forces, forward-based surface forces will be able to respond to changing strategic situations faster than forces based in continental bases in the United States. In addition, this study’s logistical research shows the SSC will have less endurance than an Arleigh Burke class destroyer. The research pointed to fuel capacity as the limiting factor of a SSC. We calculate a 1500-ton SSC will have approximately eight days of endurance if the ship is patrolling at a speed of 15 knots
before it reaches 20 percent fuel level. Transoceanic voyage at high speed in response to a situation is not a capability the SSC is designed to possess. Thus, forward basing complements a ship with endurance in days not weeks.
3. Cost Effectiveness
The motive for building a new follow-on ship class to the LCS is to invest in a force structure that increases the fleet size to meet peacetime demands while increasing the Navy’s offensive combat power. This project team has defined cost effectiveness as delivering additional capability to the force at a unit cost less than that of the LCS. In addition, the loss through combat attrition of one SSC does not constitute a mission kill as the combat power of the group is based on resiliency of multiple SSCs operating in a group.
The ship’s design should strike a balance between manpower and automation.
Manpower will be objectively set at the LCS core crew level, with the threshold manpower numbers arriving through additional investment in automation. Decreased maintenance requirements of installed systems on the SSC shall be a priority of the design, so as not to cause the manpower numbers to rise in order to support maintenance requirements. Manpower, in the form of ship’s crew, will be considered as the optimal number to operate at sea during combat operations and is set at prior manning levels established for U.S. Navy PHMs at 25 personnel.
4. Sustainment
A2AD weapon systems have the ability to place at risk large replenishment ships that traditionally sustain the fleet at sea. Current sustainment methods do not have the flexibility to adapt successfully to the A2AD environment. Alternative methods of sustaining the armada must be established or the armada must leave the threat area to resupply. One method to connect the supplies between large replenishment ships and high threat areas is to employ a vessel such as Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). If the JHSV cargo area was optimized to carry fuel instead of bulk cargo, the JHSV could be utilized as a high-speed shuttle ship from the replenishment ship to the armada. Other options for a fuel ferry include converting LCS’s modular mission zone into a fuel
storage area. LCS is better adapted to combat than the current JHSV due to the LCS’s self-defense capabilities. In the absence of at-sea replenishment, a robust shore supply network may be feasible provided local nations were willing to support U.S. forces operating out of host nation ports. Using ports as resupply networks will decrease on-station time, but decreased on-on-station time may be mitigated by maintaining a reserve force in port and simply rotating from on-station to in-port. This rotation method is a higher cost alternative because twice as many units need to be forward deployed, but may be feasible due to the low cost associated with SSCs and savings from not utilizing JHSV and LCS as shuttle ships.
Fuel conservation is included as a major policy of sustainment in the effort to decrease the demand on supplying ships. Using organic sensor platforms to perform scouting ISR functions should lessen the fuel burned on each ship. In addition, the design of the propulsion plant and hull form should incorporate features to decrease fuel burn.
Doctrine changes, such as allowing the ships to burn down to 20 percent total fuel remaining as a standard operating procedure will increase time on station and utilization of each asset.
Rotational crewing will aid in sustaining the SSC at sea. Rotating crews when fatigue levels get too high will offset the fatigue level of a crew. Rather than externally scheduling the rotation of crews, at-sea or in-port rotations will increase the units’ overall combat effectiveness. Additional manpower cost is offset by higher utilization of each platform.