Since the end of the Cold War, the world has undergone a dramatic shift in military missions and priorities. The United States finds itself in a situation with an outdated surface-to-surface or anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) engagement capability against a possible competitor. For example, as China continues its economic and military expansion this ASCM deficiency has moved to the forefront of military decision makers concerns as they evaluate the current and future threats. The primary issue is that “The Navy has not prioritized defeating enemy warships at sea since the collapse of the Soviet Union.” (Majumdar 2014). The lack of emphasis on surface-to-surface engagements means both weapon potency and current fleet experience in deploying these weapons is called into question.
The U.S. would be limited to the dated Harpoon anti-ship missile if this engagement were to happen today. Originally developed in the 1970s, “the Harpoon missile provides the Navy and the Air Force with a common missile for air, ship, and submarine launches” (Federation of American Scientists 2014a). Although state of the art when originally deployed, the last modification to the Harpoon design occurred in 1982 with the Block 1C (Federation of American Scientists 2014a). Since the cold war, many nations have had the time to develop superior anti-ship weapons. The result has been a lessening of the comparative advantage in power projection than the U.S. has enjoyed historically. The Harpoon is an outmoded missile with an insufficient range and inadequate survivability for today’s open-ocean and littoral battle spaces. The United States must consider new technology to bridge the gap between its Navy and those of its competitors. The Navy’s deficiency in the ability to address these opponents could create
a significant threat to American security. At a minimum, lack of an effective ASCM restricts high-end multi-mission ships’ employment to environments where the U.S.
enjoys air superiority, as the U.S. possesses no weapon system that holds an adversary’s surface combatants at risk.
The United States requires a deployable surface-to-surface missile to engage the enemy in a littoral combat scenario. Merely modifying or improving the Harpoon is not a viable option, even in the short term. Experts agree the Harpoon missile “does not have the range or survivability to defeat emerging surface threats” (Majumdar 2014).
Additionally, the U.S. Navy has strongly reduced the number of Harpoon missiles deployed each year; the Navy’s ability to effectively implement Harpoon in battle is diminished as compared to the 1980s fleet.
To address this surface missile deficiency the U.S. Navy gave authorization to begin increment two of the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) program, which is a continuation of the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency’s (DARPA) Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) (Majumdar 2014). An illustration of LRASM is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. LRASM anti-ship missile (from Lockheed Martin 2014).
It is important to note that LRASM is not a long-term solution. The missile “is merely a stopgap for the Navy until it can develop a more comprehensive solution in the form of OASuW Increment Two—which will be used by aircraft, surface warships, and possibly submarines.” (Majumdar 2014). The “stopgap” concept makes sense from a cost effectiveness standpoint and is in-line with classic U.S. missile technology acquisitions.
Lockheed estimates the cost of LRASM at about $2 Million (Aviation Week 2013) each, and for that price the Navy gets an anti-ship missile that offers a long-range (500 nm) (Defense Industry Daily 2014a) precision strike capability that can be fired out of the existing VLS system currently on Aegis cruiser or destroyer (CRUDES) ships.
LRASM is not the only viable missile technology available. Kongsberg’s naval strike missile (NSM) is another potential option. The NSM is a lightweight (1000 pounds) and long range (130 nm) weapon (Defense Industry Daily 2014b). Stealth is the key feature of the NSM and was a major consideration throughout its design. To ensure difficulty for early warning radar systems and electronic support measures (ESM), the missile was designed to not include onboard radar. Additionally, the missile utilizes imaging infrared (IIR) and travels at a speed under supersonic (Defense Industry Daily 2014b). A potential barrier to the U.S. Navy purchasing NSM is that it is a new and unproven system and currently made by an overseas supplier (Norway).
In addition to NSM, Kongsberg also makes the helicopter launched Penguin anti-ship missile that is designed to operate in both littoral and open-ocean environments. The Penguin may also be useful in further missile technology studies especially since it is capable of littoral missions (Kongsberg Defence Systems 2013). A picture of the Penguin anti-ship missile is provided in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The Penguin anti-ship missile fired from a helicopter (from Penguin Place Post 8).
Other possible solutions include Mantra BAE Dynamics Alenia’s (MBDA) Storm Shadow/Scalp and the Taurus kinetic energy penetrator destructor (KEPD) 350.
Like the Penguin, these missiles are currently only air launched, but the Storm Shadow/Scalp missile offers long-range accuracy. The Storm Shadow/Scalp utilizes mid-course guidance through global positioning system (GPS) and an autonomous terminal guidance with an (IIR) seeker (Matra British Aerospace Dynamics Aerospatiale (MBDA) Missile Systems 2013). Images of the Storm Shadow and the Taurus KEPD are displayed in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively.
Figure 3. Picture of the Storm Shadow missile (from Deagel 2005).
Figure 4. Picture of the Taurus KEPD 350 MR (from Saab Group 2010).
The KEPD offers high precision in a long-range (300 km), lightweight (1400kg) (Saab Group 2010), all-weather weapon, which can conduct precision strikes on a variety of targets.
This list is not all-inclusive; there are a myriad of possibilities, especially in the long term since increment 2 is merely a stopgap. Given the high level of performance (either during operation or testing), any of these alternatives would meet or exceed the surface-to-surface missile need. This report does not provide a specific solution; rather the purpose is to demonstrate the solution space in order to give the end decision maker enough information to determine the best solution.