Case analysis 94

The analysis reflects upon the most important factors present in the conflict that have influenced the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation over the lifespan of the conflict. The analytical framework is divided into a trinity of context, state actors and non-state actors, with each containing a series of key factors:

Context: Social cleavages; popular support; grievances; local politics; national politics; regional politics; international politics/foreign support.

State actors: State action – coercive force; state action – policy solution; state capacity; strong government/weak government.

Non-state actors: Strategy of armed groups; capacity of armed groups; fractionalization; criminalization.

Context

Social cleavages

The Namibian war for independence represents a very complex social phenomena, rather than a struggle in straightforward support of modern political ideologies, following the ideas of Van Walraven and Abbink199.

On contextual level, the uphold and increased social cleavages in Namibia by South Africa were acknowledged by the UNGA, which declared in 1966 that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations towards Namibia, and placed the territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations200. These views were also supported by most of the Western community, leading increasing pressure against the South Africa, aggravated mostly by apartheid regime´s human rights violations201. On international level, majority of Namibia´s were members of the Christian churches, which resulted churches active participation in the conflict. As pointed by Steenkamp, “the role of the church in Namibia […] was shaped by, and in turn shaped the nature of that country´s liberation struggle.202

199  _{Van  Walraven  and  Abbink  2003,  in  Abbink,  de  Bruijn  and  van  Walraven  2003,  1-­‐40.}     200  _{United  Nations:  ´Namibia  –  UNTAG.  Background´,  retrieved  14  January  2016,}  

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagS.htm.  

201  _{Interview  of  Wallace  2015.}    

From South Africa´s perspective, as part of its apartheid policies, the state developed a new strategy of resurrecting and sponsoring ´tribal´ groups, with the objective of ensuring order and inaction. These ideologies of tribe began to permeate African groups and their self- understanding, but the extend of this re-identification varied greatly. However, the major social cleavages existed between the white settlers (or more precisely the white rule of law and administration) and the black population due the apartheid policies, not between the tribes.

203 _{What did however impact more, is the political division. From a political perspective, the}

South Africa´s nationalist government´s view was that Namibia was historically the fifth province of the Republic, with major national importance with its natural resources and geopolitically as a buffer zone against other countries204. In addition, political activism and opposition against South African rule in Namibia made controlling the territory increasingly difficult205_{. This was witnessed during the second and sixth phases, when opposition and}

criticism mainly by the churches, trade unions and student organisations increased societal upheaval, leading to suppression by the state actor.

From SWAPO´s perspective, it was rooted to the northern Ovambo tribe, which formed about the half of the population. There was no religious division, as Namibia was “the most Christian of African countries”, with almost 90% of the population belonging to the Christian churches206, due the Finnish missionary work, which started in 1870s207. What was more pressing was the lack of opportunities for black population to participate in politics and country´s decision making208. In addition, Namibia was treated as colonial territory, exploiting its resources and controlling its population, which was seen mostly as labour force. These conditions did contribute to the creation of resistance and radicalisation, but grievances contributed more to the formation of the conflict209. In addition to SWAPO, also other liberations movements were created, such as SWANU. However, liberation organisations remained split during the whole conflict, and despite their convergence of aims, the two movements were dogged by competition, particularly outside Namibia210. Nevertheless, it is suggested, that the split between SWAPO and SWANU might have been partly accidental and                                                                                                                          

203  _{Wallace  2011,  252-­‐253.}     204  _{Interview  of  Melber  2015.}     205  _{Wallace  2011,  296.}  

206  _{Steenkamp,  P.  1995,  in  Leys  and  Saul  1995,  40.}     207  _{Kiljunen  and  Kiljunen  1980,  230.}    

208  _{Dreyer  1994,  29.}     209  _Ibid.  

result of personal reason, reflecting “accidents of history” as much as political or doctrinal differences211. Also the SWAPO did not have any kind of co-operation with the South African ANC, because of the cultural differences212. All the major movements were brought (forced) together only during the last phase by the independence and multi party governance.

During the formation of the conflict, tribalism and ethnicity caused societal polarization, partly because of the traditional division and partly due the new tribal self-identifications advocated by the South Africa. Most of the original liberation movements of 1950s were ethnically divided, such as the Herero Chief´s Council (HCC), base on the Herero identity. During this forming period of national liberation movements, only SWAPO and SWANU emerged as an explicit form of nationalism in which the struggle for national independence was the unifying force, and ethnic differences were downplayed. 213 Nevertheless, it should be noted that Namibia has the second-lowest population density after Mongolia214_{, and therefore}

it can be questioned, how united and strongly the Namibian nationalism was experienced215. In general, as in case of most African nations, the colonial borders of South West Africa and subsequent Namibia created partly an artificial political unit, as traditional tribal connections extended far across the borders that were imposed. Also the division of the country into the northern areas and the ´Police Zone´-the settlers-occupied area of the south and centre-was introduced by the apartheid period. Also most of the ethnic groupings now used to describe tribes (over ten), are colonial creations, as African societies were essentially constituted around powerful leaders and strongest ties were between these ´families and followers´.216 Popular support

Liberation movement and democratic State government both require a popular support to be able to secure required resources and to execute its policies.

On contextual level, SWAPO´s claims and actions enjoyed high support. In addition of official UN recognition, movement was also backed by vast group of international solidarity                                                                                                                          

211  _{Ibid.,  250.}    

212  _{Interview  of  Melber  2015.  See  appendix.}     213  _{Wallace  2011,  249-­‐250.}    

214  _{Department  of  Economic  and  Social  Affairs  Population  Division  (2009):  ´Wolrd  Population  Prospects,  Table}  

A.1”.  Retrieved  10  February  2016,  

http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_text_tables.pdf.  

215  _{Cliffe  et  al.  1994,  31.}     216  _{Wallace  2011,  8,  11.}    

movements, which contributed in keeping the issue live through decades.217 SWAPO´s popular support was also important for it to become a reckoned liberation movement and to become accepted and supported by the 1963 established Organisation of African Unity (OAU) whose funding gave a tremendous boost to SWAPO´s military efforts218.

South African government´s apartheid policies and ´total strategy´ was supported by the white population, as it was presented to protect vital national interest and to counter national threats. Even when the international financial sanctions started to impact the national economy, support for the government policies and support for the Prime Minister Botha remained relatively strong, even that some of the financial circles were critical towards apartheid, as ´it was bad for business´219. However, South African government publicly admitted only that it was fighting a war against SWAPO, but kept it secret that it was also fighting a war alongside UNITA against Angolan government, inside Angola. When this was revealed due the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, and white South African body bags started to arrive ´back home´, this turned the public´s opinion against the government policies and contributed for the end of the conflict in phase seven.220

SWAPO had its origin of support among Ovambos, constituting over 50% of population, but gradually became more broadly supported national movement. Especially the young radicalised students, who fled from Namibia into exile 1974 onwards to SWAPO`s bases in Angola, increased the organisation´s capabilities, and contributed the intensification of the conflict during the fourth phase, and onwards221. Nevertheless, even more crucial source of popular support for SWAPO was the international community, and from the very beginning it focused to achieve diplomatic relations and recognition of the UN and other states in general222. This support and especially the official recognition by the UN, that SWAPO was the ´sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people´, gave additional boost to SWAPO and intensified conflict during the phase four. Even though South African counter- insurgency troop Koevoet terrorised Namibian´s and heavily punished those who supported SWAPO, organisation still managed to remain and retain sufficient popular support in its                                                                                                                          

217  _{Wallace  2011,  284.}    

218  _{Herbstein  and  Evenson  1989,  14.}     219  _{Interview  by  Melber  2015.}     220  _{Herbstein  and  Evenson  1989,  171.}   221  _{Wallace  2011,  280.}    

main operations areas in the north223. However, as SWAPO had been created by the Ovambos, some other tribes/ethnic groups and political parties shied away from it, due the prospect of “an independent Namibia dominated by an Ovambo majority”, therefore it did not enjoy undivided support224. Also South Africa was unable to mass anti-SWAPO electoral victories in Namibia during the conflict, because of SWAPO´s strong popular support225.

Grievances

On contextual level, existing grievances and South African policies, which obviously increased them, received increasing criticism and condemnation from both UN and international community, making South Africa an eyesore of international politics.

From South African perspective, apartheid emerged partly as a response to growing economic and social crises, caused by the increasing urbanisation. As the level of urbanisation was much lower in Namibia, and resistance was not at the same level in Namibia, as it was in South Africa, not all apartheid legislation was applied to Namibia. This was partly because the segregation and repressive policies had already become structural and were applied through informal discrimination.226 From South Africa´s colonial era perspective, Namibia was a source of vast natural riches and labour force. South Africa responded to increasing opposition and radicalisation in Namibia with harder policies and with ´total strategy´227, deepening the grievances in the territory. South Africa´s motivations lay deeper in the history, as it had originally conquered the country from Germans in 1915 and its troubles were afterwards awarded by the League of Nations Mandate to administer the territory, and to exploit its vast natural riches. With this background in mind, South Africa felt betrayed, when suddenly after the WWII when the United Nations decided to guide the former mandate- territories to independence. South Africa´s 1948 elected Nationalist Party responded to this by incorporating the Namibia as its fifth province, and hold its position through the whole conflict, until phase seven.228

From SWAPO´s perspective, grievances were at the heart of the Namibian conflict and directly contributed the formation of the conflict. The growth of protest in the decades                                                                                                                          

223  _{Wallace  2011,  285.}    

224  _{Cliffe  et  al.  1994,  39.  See  also  Dreyer  1994,  160.}     225  _{Saul  and  Leyes  1995,  57.}  

226  _{Wallace  2011,  251-­‐252.}     227  _{Dreyer  1994,  137.}     228  _{Lush  1993,  xii-­‐xiii.}    

following the WWII resulted as much from the social and economic effects of South African policy within the territory as from the political debate over incorporation. Constitutional changes were bringing Namibia into closer alignment with South Africa, and African population were brought under much tighter direct control, securing political and economical control for the white community.229 In Namibia´s unequal economy, levels of discontent among workers were high, and strikes common230. Population growth and decreased access to land and resources increased the level of migrant labourers, among which as sense of solidarity developed – an emphasis on the importance of ´brotherhood´-which ultimately strengthen the impulse for nationalism231. Increasing state control further aggravated these migrant labour groups232. Therefore grievances were central in forming of the conflict and increasing suppressive and coercive state action increased the resistance during the conflict. Local politics

On contextual level, emergence of different solidarity movements in support for SWAPO enhanced considerably its publicity campaigning, and assured, that the Namibian question remained known to the international public.

Local politics seems to have had minor role for the South Africa´s action during the conflict. South African policies were directed and controlled by the strong government and increasingly its military wing led by Prime Minister Botha, with strong public support, leaving little room for local politics influence233. Even that local financial elite was to certain extend against apartheid, as it was ´bad for business´234, these arguments did not impact the state actor´s actions before the final seventh phase, as part of the economical considerations to end the conflict235.

From SWAPO´s perspective, local politics had at certain times important supportive effect. Naturally, the organisation itself had it roots in the radicalisation of the migrant workers, were the nationalist movement emerged236. The local support of the churches in a form of publicly criticising the South African policies contributed the phase three, were resistance became                                                                                                                           229  _{Wallace  2011,  250.}     230  _{Wallace  2011,  258.}     231  _{Ibid.,  258.}     232  _{Ibid.,  255.}     233  _{Crocker  1992,  307-­‐308.}   234  _{Interview  of  Melber  2015.}     235  _{Dreyer  1994,  175,  177.}     236  _{Ibid.,  29.}    

nationalised237. Further local movements in a form of trade unions and student organisations increased the societal resistance and upheaval during the 1980s, contributing the emergence of phase seven238. Even though SWAPO experienced an internal power struggle in 1976 and period of ´spy hunt´- an internal repression and persecution – these event didn´t impact greatly to its military operations, and didn´t reduce its popular support until 1989 independence process, when these events became widely know for the first time239. The contributing factors for SWAPO´s ´spy hunt´ were internal criticism towards its leadership, increased South African pressure in forms of infiltration of spies, propaganda, disinformation and direct military attacks on its members, coupled with the increasing power of SWAPO´s internal Security Organisation and SWAPO´s long-standing authoritarian culture. It seems that in the heart of the conflict was the increased divisions within SWAPO, as educated people and non-Ovambos found themselves particularly targeted, experiencing detention, torture and killing in the level of hundreds or even thousands.240

SWAPO´s leadership in exile stayed in firm charge during the whole conflict, and the whole organisation with its national part intact, although partly internally divided241_{. Although that}

various liberation movements were competing with each other, as in the case between SWAPO and SWANU mainly on international level242, it didn´t seem to have impact on conflict dynamics.

National politics

On contextual level, South Africa and its National Party, which had since its emergence to power in 1948, erected a system that institutionalized white domination and advanced the political and economic interests of Afrikaners (ruling Southern African ethnic group descended from predominantly Dutch settlers), known as ´apartheid´, was generally viewed by Western countries as a world-class pariah. Indeed, its leaders seemed to be increasingly accustomed to behaving like one. Their generalized commitment to reform was linked to a shrill rejection of Western “interference” and a tough external policy.243 On regional level, South Africa´s politics and especially the emergence of strong, militarist Prime Minister                                                                                                                          

237  _{Wallace  2011,  274.}     238  _{Ibid.,  303.}    

239  _{Wallace  2011,  298-­‐299.}    

240  _{Ibid.,  298.  See  also  interview  of  Melber  2015.}     241  _Ibid.  

242  _{Ibid.,  259.}    

Botha (former Defence Minister), and his ´total strategy´ to engage South Africa´s regional enemies, led to the intensification of the conflict.

South African National Party stayed in power during the whole conflict. Strong nationalistic apartheid policies were implemented first under the premiership of Vorster (1966-1978) followed by the former Defence Minister and subsequent President P. W. Botha (1978-1989). Botha, who was described as an authoritarian, hardened political organizer, hypersensitive to criticism, a ´bully´ who was capable of reducing his cabinet colleagues to tears, built up an impressive party, military, and bureaucratic machinery as his base of power244. Already when he was Defence Minister, Botha and the Prime Minister Vorster were the two principal political decision makers who were to control South Africa´s military involvement in the Angolan war245. The result was a leadership that was at once tough and determined and, at the same time, unrealistic about its options246_{. The question of Namibia´s independence was}

unattractive to South African leadership for many reasons: loss of its vast natural resources and important buzzer zone; the negative political imagery of a U.N.-led transition that would favour SWAPO; the risk of SWAPO exploiting its UN, Soviet, Cuban and MPLA support effectively to coerce its way into power; the desire to avoid abandoning Pretoria´s black UNITA allies in Angola; the prospect of a chaotic exodus from Namibia of its white minority; and the loss of Namibian bases for projecting military power into neighbouring states. Furthermore, SADF and Prime Minister Botha himself would lose the means for continuing their ´total strategy´ in Angola. Therefore South African leadership did not see incentives to agree with Namibian independence, as it would have only meant “the red flag in Windhoek”247. South African government was convinced that SWAPO was ´Marxist´, and if in power, it would nationalize the entire country and cause civil war, an eventuality which would force South Africa to invade Namibia. South Africa would rather prefer an indefinite low-level conflict.248Therefore South Africa was not prepared to implement Resolution 435 because it would entail an election victory for SWAPO249.

National politics had direct impact on the formation of the conflict and many of its subsequent phases. South African government responded to SWAPO´s activities with increasing intensity,                                                                                                                           244  _{Ibid.,  111,  307-­‐308.}     245  _{Dreyer  1994,  92.}     246  _{Crocker  1992,  87.}     247  _{Ibid.,  41.}     248  _{Dreyer  1994,  152.}     249  _{Ibid.,  176.}    

finally launching Prime Minister Botha´s ´total strategy´, leading to intervention into Angolan civil war, which intensified the conflict and resulted the phase five250. The effects of national politics can be seen in all the phases: conflict started as a response to South Africa´s nationalist politics, its increasing discriminatory policies aggravated churches for opposition in phase three, and its delay and terror tactics during the 1980s kept conflict going. South Africa continued the same basic policies during the whole conflict. The change in the leadership in the middle of the conflict, when the former Defence Minister Botha became Prime Minister in 1978, increased the influence of the military in policy making significantly and introduced more aggressive ´total strategy´ against SWAPO and regional enemies251, intensifying and prolonging the conflict. From a political support perspective, South African governments and leadership enjoyed strong support of the ruling Nationalist Party.

From the SWAPO´s perspective, South Africa´s national politics per se were the main focus of resistance, but its political processes were a distant concern. Even that SWAPO was never officially banned by the South Africa, probably because in that way it was easier to monitor and keep under scrutiny, it was not recognized by the South African government as an official