Operationalisation of the factors 49

Social cleavages

The presence of social cleavages within a society can result into inequalities between ethnic, religious or regional communities, which causes inter-communal tensions. Rotberg (2010) argued that civil wars stem from or have roots in hostility between ethnic, religious or linguistic communities. De Rouen (2007) identified the processes of dominance and polarisation in highly divided societies. The first occurs when one group forms an absolute majority; while the latter occurs when society is split into two groups. Internal divisions can spark sectarian violence and escalate the conflict, if the indifferences cannot be resolved peacefully.

Popular support, or lack of it, can be indicated both from state-actor and non-state actor perspective, offering both actors necessary bases to sustain their action, whether this is armed resistance (need of recruits, access to local resources etc.), or counterterrorism operations (support of the citizens for government action). According to Wood (2003), repression of legitimate and deeply felt grievances lead to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately. Crucial for this support is an emergence of insurgent political culture, providing a shared view/idea of justification and nurturing a will of ultimate sacrifice. From state-actor point of view, Schuurman (2013) argued that public support is an important factor in counterterrorism operations, as it legitimises the applied policy. However, it also sets boundaries to that same policy for both the state as the non-state actors. The rise and fall of public support for both the government and the oppositional actors can partly explain the developments in levels of violence.

Grievances

Grievances are often invoked in a conflict as legitimation by parties in explaining the origin of the conflict or their motivation for continuing the conflict. Grievances, based on Collier and Sambanis (2002), can follow from different sources, such as economic, political or social basis, and are either objective or perceived. Objective grievances can be measured, such as the distribution of wealth according to the Lorenz curve. Perceived grievances are about the amount to which certain populations perceive the existence of a grievance that does not necessarily exist. Economic grievances constitute, for instance, the extent to which parties share in sources of national wealth. Political grievances are about power relations in communities, and can relate to for instance the legitimacy of the governance system, such as whether there is democracy, what form of democratic system applies, and whether there is a form of political exclusion. Social grievances consider social issues, such as ethnic or religious dominance forms of social exclusion. Grievances are not limited to current grievances, but can also be the result of perceived past injustices that have not been ameliorated.

Local politics

Local political dynamics can be a casual mechanism for conflict dynamics, for example, new elections that change the political strategy of the region. It is also possible that the militants of a specific region are extremely divided, which can result in regional power struggles and rivalries between (political) leaders. Furthermore, when an insurgent group has the ambition of self-determination and secession, it is possible they begin a process of state-building in

their region during the conflict. This creates a separate political institution, with its own sphere of influence. Strong state-building can result in a larger cleavage between the insurgents and the rest of the population and it can increase the popular support for the insurgents, since they provide welfare and security (Stokke, 2006; Berdal, 2005; White, 1996). National politics

The significance of national politics in explaining civil wars is related to the question which system is better to implement in order to reduce conflict. Reynal-Querol (2001) observed that countries with alternative political systems have different probabilities of civil war. The central idea is that in a consociational, inclusive political system, the opportunistic cost of an insurgency rises, and lowers the probability of an insurgency. Therefore, besides the level of civil liberties and freedoms, the level of representation of the population in government can be analysed. In this way, the political system might have an explanatory power concerning the outbreak of a conflict. Additionally, the type of politics, for instance, coalition politics or patronage politics, can be observed to explain heightened levels of violence. Political turbulence can significantly impact the dynamics of the conflict, as a dysfunctional political system can cause significant tensions. From a different perspective, the political arena causes ongoing power struggles with great ramifications for society. In this way, national politics can also offer indications of a weak or strong government. At last, national political processes, such as elections, are an indicator for national politics.

Regional politics

Regional politics, as opposed to the national and international politics, is defined by Dreyer (1994) as ranging from such phenomena as cross-border movements to regional diplomatic, economic and military strategies. Therefore, what includes to the domain of regional politics are actions and decisions that do not occur and are not focused solely on national level, but on regional level, involving neighbouring countries and actors. Indicators for regional politics are support for the insurgent movement, an intervention of the conflict, or pressure exercised by the regional power. Regional politics in the context of civil wars can be seen closely related to the neighbourhood effect of civil conflict, as pointed out by Forsberg (2009). Forsberg pointed out that several studies demonstrate that having one or several neighbouring states with an on-going civil war is an important predictor of civil war in a given country. Therefore, there is a need to analyse also external events and factors in civil wars, such as ethnic kinship linkages, the variation in refugee flows to different neighbouring countries, ethnical polarisation, and impact of inspiration and example of existing conflicts.

International politics

The conflict dynamics can often not be perceived as occurring in an international vacuum, and the nature of the interaction will influence the conflict for the state and often for the non-state actors as well. Wallensteen (2007) argued that the western dominated international system penetrates into all parts of the world, forming a distinct form of social relations which sometimes replaces the traditional local traditions. Dudouet (2010) argued that non-state actors are less sensitive to international sanctions, as they are already operating in an often isolated position. Concurrently, Byman (2007) argued that non-state actors can benefit from cooperation with state partners, but risk losing credibility with the local communities. Ramsbothan et. al. (2011) provided another indicator by arguing that irregular armed conflict can result in diasporas, that itself influence the conflict, for instance, by ideological or financial support. A more economic explanation is used by Malone and Nitzchke (2005), who argued that international actors often get involved in the war economy. Foreign military intervention is the most pervasive form of international politics influencing the conflict dynamics. Accordingly, Bapat (2012) added that state sponsorship can be a form of strategic communication, and result in an improved negotiation position for an international actor, but comes at the cost of potentially losing control over the supported non-state actor.

Natural disaster

Gaillard, Clavé and Kelman conducted research about what influence a natural disaster can have on a conflict. Indicators for natural disasters can be tsunamis or volcano eruptions, but also drought. A disaster can de-escalate the conflict, for instance, because disaster relief and diplomacy can have a positive effect on the peace process. Both parties share grief caused by the same external factor that brings them together. However, natural disasters can also escalate the conflict, for instance,,with unfair distribution of relief aid.

Geography

Fearon and Laitin (2003) implicated that geography influences the nature and the outcome of a conflict. They found that rugged terrain increases the probability of the onset of a civil war. This can be related to the strategic advantages that can be derived from geographical settings. In particular, rain forests and mountains complicate locating non-state armed forces. Thereby, the rugged landscape becomes an incentive to initiate a conflict. It also impacts the course of the conflict, as it influences the strategic choices of state and non-state actors. Another indicator for geography is the geographic diffusion (Kathman, 2010).

3.6.3.2 State

State action – coercive force

According to Schultz (1979), the core of this strategy is to employ ´pain and violence´ to make resistance ´terrible beyond endurance´. In the civil war setting, use of coercive force by the state actor against dissident groups is usually labelled as counterinsurgency (COIN) or counterterrorism. According to the United States Institute of Peace´s special report (1999), these tools that a government uses to respond to terrorism, including deterrence, criminal justice, enhanced defence, and negotiations. In this framework, negotiations will belong to state action – policy solution. In addition, Solomon (2015) mentioned the closure of borders, the establishment of curfews and the deployment of additional security troops. As pointed out by Wood (2003), coercive force used to repress deeply felt grievances can lead to support for armed insurgency when superior armed force is used indiscriminately. Also Collier and Sambanis (2003) promoted a hypothesis that government repression increases opposition, especially in the case when repression is not total, which can promote and lead to violent confrontations. Porch (2013) argued that current counterinsurgency strategies make every person a possible insurgent, because these strategies lack the skills and knowledge to determine to which group citizens belong. This leads to an unfortunate result: making the people the object of the conflict will also make them its most likely victim. Furthermore, Solomon (2015) argued that traditional counterterrorism measures are actually counter- productive since these refuse to acknowledge the underlying complexity giving rise to opposing movements.

State action – policy solution

Policies adopted by states influence the dynamics of a conflict. Schuurman (2013) developed a framework of five categories in which policies can be determined. This framework can be useful in indicating policy solution used in the conflicts in this research, since it provides a broad picture of possible policies. The categories are: the lack of response, where the issue is ignored; reconciliation policies; legal reform policies, which consist of changing laws to increase the capability of the government to combat the terrorist groups, such as anti-terrorism legislation; policy that actively disrupts the terrorist group organisational capabilities; and active repression, including the use of violence to destroy a terrorist group. Is had to be noted that in our research, the last category is part of state action – coercive force.

Complementary to these categories, Dudouet (2011) argued that proscription of non-state actors can result in increased radicalism, and is a direct impediment to negotiations and reconciliation. Adding to this, Mukherjee (2014) argued medium capacity states often prefer a containment policy, which could fit in several of the policy categories proposed by Schuurman (2011).

State capacity

Besley and Persson (2010) analysed the cohesion of the capacity of state actors and conflict dynamics. They state that states with a low capacity, which they call weak states, have a higher risk of conflict. Conflict theories mainly consider state capacity as an exogenous factor. However, in this analysis it will be treated as part of the state and possible causal mechanism to drive conflict dynamics, for instance, the quality and quantity of the army, and the state’s economic situation. They also concluded that a conflict is an incentive to invest in state capacity. A larger state capacity will increase the state's chances to control the insurgent conflict. Rotberg (2010) defined the capacity of a state by the level of effective delivery of political goods to the public. This includes the capacity of providing security for its citizens. Weak or strong state

Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that decolonisation creates financially, bureaucratically and militarily weak states. Poverty, state weakness, instability and large populations are factors that enlarge the risk of conflict. The capacity of a state is reflected by effective delivery of political goods to the public, which requires a well-financed and administratively competent government. This can be analysed by assessing the social services offered by the state, but also by reviewing the legitimacy of (para) military forces and the police. Other indicators for weak or strong state are weak or strong political coalitions, or the weak or strong control over the state apparatus.

3.6.3.3 Non state

Strategy of armed groups

Strategy of armed group in civil war context can be approached from the motivation perspective, as motives for rebellion can be argued to be represented in organisation´s strategy. According to Weinstein (2007), insurgency group´s recruitment strategies depend for a great deal on the incentives that are likely to motivate individual participation. Following this, Weinstein presented two major types of insurgency, namely opportunistic rebellions (less risky, possibility for short-term gains, low-commitment participants), and activist rebellions

(risky participation, unlikely of short-term gains, high-commitment participants willing to contribute for future rewards). These different insurgency types produce two different relations to the resident population, either looting and indiscriminate violence, or co-operation and selective violence. Other used indicators for strategy of the armed groups are the use of terrorist tactics (Duyvesteyn & Fumerton, 2009), using peace processes, having ulterior motives (Stedman, 1997) and involving the international community to gain support for their cause. Nevertheless, researchers recognise that there are a wide variety of motives that animates participants in civil wars (Tarrow, 2007, p. 592).

Capacity of armed groups

The capacities of the non-state actor can differ markedly from that of states. After all, as pointed out by Pearlman and Cunningham (2012):  

The imperatives and possibilities of a collective striving to attain statehood, secede from a state, or seize control of a state are quite different from those of the duly constituted government of a state with a monopoly on violence and internationally recognised sovereignty (p. 4)  

The capacity of non-state armed groups to effectuate authority and violence is determined by several factors. Legitimacy or public support is a factor in the capacity of armed groups, especially in relation to the policy of the non-state actor (Schuurman, 2013) or the relative legitimacy of the group versus the legitimacy of the government (Dudouet, 2011; Solomon, 2015). Furthermore, non-state actor´s affiliation with political organisations is an important indicator of its capabilities and motivation to push for policy change (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2013, p. 521). In addition, according to Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2013) factors such number of troop size (p. 521), how capable the rebels are at procuring arms and at fighting (p. 522), and whether they have centralised command structure (p. 522), and do they control territory (p. 523), are essential indicators of the capacity of armed groups. Factionalisation

The factionalisation of an armed group can drive conflict escalation or de-escalation in several ways. Stedman (1997) and Toft (2012) described the possibility that armed groups split into factions, each defending its own sphere of influence. Groups might use violence to frustrate the process, for instance, when they are not invited for peace negotiations. Jonhston (2007) even stated that governments could seek to divide armed groups in order to exploit one or several of them to fight the others. The factionalisation of an armed group can also result in

the end of the conflict, when the factions have not the sufficient capacity to fight the state actor anymore. Duyvestein and Schuurman (2012) explained that if an armed group splits into factions, each subgroup will try to defend and expand their sphere of influence, which could be through the use violence, and spark the conflict.

Criminalisation

Dishman (2001) reflected upon the transformation from terrorist group to transnational criminal organisation, which is believed to take place in different degrees (2001, p. 47). The terrorist groups might only pursue criminal activities to financially support their political activities. Other terrorists might shift their goal to profit-driven criminal acts due to the financial gain. In order to analyse the transformation, the aims and interests must be assessed. Terrorists pursue a political goal, while transnational criminal organisations aim for profits (2001, p. 44). Indicators for criminalisation of an armed group are, aside from the presence of criminal activities as, for instance, bank robberies and drugs smuggling, the change of nature or motive of the armed group from the political goal to crime.