James J F Forest
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Despite the broad array of security measures that governments have imple- mented in response to attacks over the past several decades, there is little rea- son to believe that terrorists will not continue to target commercial aviation.
The present analysis of the historical record suggests at least three primary reasons why aviation security is still threatened: (1) the nature of terrorist organizations; (2) the modern aviation environment; and (3) the nature of our response to the threat.
First, terrorists—at least the most sophisticated and lethal ones—learn from each other and are continually devising new and creative ways to wreak havoc and murder. 76 Attacks that have not yet occurred but that we are ill prepared for
could include using an aircraft’s in-fl ight oxygen circulation system to infect the passengers and crew with biological pathogens, or unleashing a deadly chemical agent in the cockpit that renders the pilot and crew unconscious and causes the plane to crash. One could imagine a rash of in-fl ight food poisonings (further- ing the notion of in-fl ight meals as pointless) or attempts to corrupt signals from the air traffi c control system in order to redirect planes into each other or crash land in low-visibility conditions. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, TSA offi cials were alerted in October 2007 about the possibility that common remote-control toys could be used to detonate a bomb as part of a terror plot. The additional scrutiny was put in place in part due to intelligence but also because—as one federal offi cial noted—remote-control toys might have been used already by terrorists in Sri Lanka and India. 77 Overall, as Bruce Hoffman
recently observed, we should anticipate that terrorists are constantly searching for new vulnerabilities and adapting and adjusting to our countermeasures. 78
Second, the contemporary aviation environment—an ever-expanding global system, with growth in the number of airplanes in the sky carrying pas- sengers and cargo, the size of these airplanes (like the new Dreamliner), and the number of locations to which you can now fl y—offers more soft targets of opportunity. Terrorists—much like criminals, insurgents, and other violent nonstate actors—exploit vulnerabilities in the systems they target, and these systems are only as strong as their weakest link. Thus, as the commercial aviation system became more globally interconnected, the overall impact of the measures taken at U.S. airports had an important but relatively decreased impact over time in terms of strengthening the aviation sector worldwide. While airports in Europe and North America responded to the rash of hijack- ings and bombings during this period, many other countries—particularly in Africa and Asia—found it diffi cult to impose most of the costly security measures, thus providing vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Any system is only as secure as its weakest link, and a globalized aviation system that in- cludes numerous developing countries plagued with substandard security ca- pabilities, corruption, bribery, and weak governance is inherently weak. At the same time, the Internet provides worldwide access to all types of information that could be useful to terrorists, including fl ight schedules, specifi c details and diagrams of both aircraft and airports, and reports of successful terrorist tactics and countermeasures developed by governments.
Finally, and in a related area of concern, the nature of our response to the global threat to aviation relies on the strength of the partnership between gov- ernments and the private sector and on what each of these partners is willing
Modern Terrorist Threats to Aviation Security 117 to do. In general, the aviation sector is driven by free market competition, and thus airlines must maintain an emphasis on convenience and cost savings, making investment in costly security measures relatively diffi cult. Among governments, we have seen bloated bureaucracies, a lack of intelligence shar- ing across borders (and often even across agencies within a single nation), and an overarching tendency to implement security policies in response to an attack that has already occurred, rather than to embrace preventive measures that might help avoid a type of attack that has not yet occurred.
Beginning in the late 1960s, increasingly robust layers of security measures were put in place in response to the kinds of hijackings described earlier in this chapter. Yet, after four decades of such efforts the aviation sector was still vul- nerable, as demonstrated by the events of September 11, 2001. Since then, we have seen additional security layers such as reinforced cockpit doors, armed pi- lots, more air marshals, and an overall increased awareness of the threat world- wide. So, perhaps the post–September 11 security environment may be one in which the threat to aviation is lower than it has been in the past, but in-fl ight bombings are still occurring, and in the summer of 2006 a major plot to destroy multiple transatlantic fl ights was narrowly averted. Responding to events is in- suffi cient; modern aviation security requires preventive measures, even some that may inconvenience passengers and create some ineffi ciencies, as well as a breadth and depth of intelligence gathering and sharing worldwide.
Further, there has too often been a tendency among government offi cials to underestimate the innovative nature of terrorists. Terrorism is a form of asym- metric warfare. In any asymmetric warfare situation, the statistically weaker enemy will try to attack its stronger opponent in ways the opponent does not expect. The threat posed by thinking enemies requires a robust government response that does more than harden targets. In addition to examining the potential capabilities of terrorists to do harm to others by targeting airplanes and airports, we must commit ourselves to the study of terrorist ideologies, strategies, and motivations, and we must educate both law enforcement and intelligence agencies in all countries about how our enemies might try to “game the system” and exploit new, perhaps even hidden, vulnerabilities in aviation security. Only then will we be able to respond to the threat with greater sophistication and success.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not purport to refl ect the position of the United States Military Academy, the De- partment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
NOTES
1. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Ter- rorism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
2. For example, see David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Anthropoetics 8, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002), for an excellent descrip- tion of four waves of modern terror and the ways in which the evolution of certain technologies has shaped these waves.
3. Brian Jenkins, “The New Age of Terrorism,” The McGraw-Hill Homeland Secu- rity Handbook, ed. David G. Kamien (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006).
4. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 189.
5. Richard M. Wrona, Jr., “Beginning of a War: The United States and the Hijack- ing of TWA Flight 847,” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: Inter- national Perspectives, vol. 3, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 38.
6. Brigitte L. Nacos, “Communication and Recruitment of Terrorists,” in The Making of a Terrorist, vol. 1, Recruitment, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005).
7. Brigitte L. Nacos, “Mediated Terrorism: Teaching Terror through Propaganda and Publicity,” in The Making of a Terrorist, vol. 2, Training, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005).
8. Cindy R. Combs, “The Media as a Showcase for Terrorism,” in Teaching Ter- ror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James J. F. Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2006).
9. Alex Schmid, “Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity,” Terrorism and Political Violence 1 (1989): 539–65.
10. Combs, “The Media as a Showcase for Terrorism.” 11. Ibid.
12. Joanne Wright, “Countering West Germany’s Red Army Faction: What Can We Learn?” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, vol. 3, ed. James J. F. Forest, 27591 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).
13. Nicolás Urrutia Iriarte and Román D. Ortiz, “A Slow Road to Victory: Counter- insurgency and Strategic Innovation in Colombia,” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, vol. 3, ed. James J. F. Forest, 310–33 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).
14. Sammy Salama, “Unraveling Al-Qaida’s Target Selection Calculus,” in Terror- ism and Political Islam: A Textbook for the FBI New Agent Training Program, ed. James J. F. Forest, 41–51 (Quantico, VA: FBI, 2007).
15. Akhu Man Ta’a Allah, “What Else Is There to Say about September 11,” Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad), vol. 26, 35–42, quoted in Salama, “Unraveling Al-Qaida’s Target Selection Calculus,” 42.
16. Salama, “Unraveling Al-Qaida’s Target Selection Calculus.”
17. An extensive chronology of aviation attacks is provided in the chapter by Mary Schiavo in this volume.
18. This description of the event is from Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 63–66, 68. 19. Ibid.
20. For more on the organizational learning attributes of terrorist groups, see Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James J. F. For- est (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2006), especially 1–109.
21. Guillaume de Syon, “Aviation Security,” in Homeland Security: Protecting Amer- ica ’ s Targets, vol. 3, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 270. An online description of this event is also available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_ Airlines_Flight_472.
Modern Terrorist Threats to Aviation Security 119 23. Ibid; Also see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 174–79, 186–87, 190, and 194. 24. “Indian Hijack Drama Over,” BBC News, December 31, 1999, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/584729.stm (cited in de Syon, “Aviation Security”).
25. For a complete account of this hijacking and the rescue operation, see J. Paul de B. Taillon, Hijackings and Hostages: Government Responses to Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 109–25.
26. Ibid.
27. For a complete account of this hijacking and the rescue operation, see Taillon, Hijackings and Hostages, 125–38. it is referenced in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 77.
28. See http://middleeastfacts.com/middle-east/popular-front-for-the-liberation- of-palestine.php.
29. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 234–35.
30. In addition to the chapter by Mary Schiavo in this volume, ee the list and descriptions of commercial airliner bombings available on the Aerospace Web site, http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/planes/q0283.shtml.
31. See the list and descriptions of commercial airliner bombings available on the Aerospace Web site, http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/planes/q0283. shtml.
32. De Syon, “Aviation Security.”
33. “Bombings in Air: From Barbados to Scotland,” New York Times in coordi- nation with the Associated Press, December 29, 1988, p. A1. See also the list and descriptions of commercial airliner bombings available on the Aerospace Web site, http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/planes/q0283.shtml.
34. “Closely Watched Planes,” Time, March 9, 1970, http://www.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,878779,00.html.
35. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 262–66. 36. Ibid., 189.
37. Ibid., 262–66.
38. For a complete account of this plot, please see Rohan Gunaratna, “Oplan Bo- jinka,” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James J. F. Forest (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2006).
39. Further, following his capture in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad told his American interrogators that the genesis of September 11 was Oplan Bojinka. Debriefi ng of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Central Intelligence Agency, April 2003. Cited in Gunaratna, “Oplan Bojinka.”
40. This account is from Debriefi ng of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Central Intel- ligence Agency, April 2003. Cited in Gunaratna, “Oplan Bojinka.”
41. Debriefi ng of Abdul Hakim Murad, Special Investigations Group, National Police Commission, February 13, 1995, 2 and 3. For more on this, see national Com- mission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Report of the National Commis- sion on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Offi ce, 2004), 507, note 8. Available online at http://www. gpoaccess.gov/911 and http://www.911commission.gov.
42. “U.S. Crew Recalls ‘Shoe Bomb’ Ordeal,” BBC News, June 20, 2002, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2055003.stm.
43. “ ‘Shoe Bomber’ Pleads Guilty,” BBC News, October 4, 2002,http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/americas/2298031.stm.
44. Nick Paton Walsh, “Russia Blames Chechen Sisters for Suicide Bombings,” Guard- ian, April 22, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1465936,00.html;
and “Explosions Led to Russia Crashes,” CNN World Edition, August 30, 2004, http:// edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/08/30/russia.planecrash/index.html.
45. According to authorities, the formula included three components that would be assembled in fl ight. The main explosive was to be hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD), a homemade explosive that has been used in several recent ter- rorist attacks. Another homemade explosive was to be used as an explosive initia- tor: triacetone triperoxide (TATP), which can be made from ordinary commercial items like hair treatments, a car battery, drain cleaner, and nail polish remover. The third part of the formula involved an improvised detonator made from disposable cameras. Scientists at Sandia National Laboratory conducted a test using the for- mula, and when a small amount of liquid in a container was hit with a tiny burst of electrical current, a large explosion followed. See “Plot Would Have Killed Thou- sands: Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff Offers Chilling Details about 2006 Airplane Plot and Current Terror Threats,” ABC News, 6 August 2007, http:// abcnews.go.com.
46. “Plot Would Have Killed Thousands.” 47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Eric Lipton, “Airport Security Alert for Toys with Remotes” New York Times, October 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/us/nationalspecial3/02tsa. html?th&emc = th.
50. Of course, it must be recognized that far more commercial airplanes have been shot down by military forces (usually—but not always—by mistake) than by any ter- rorists or other nonstate actors.
51. A statement attributed to al Qaeda claimed responsibility. See “Kenya Missile Attack Sparks New Urgency,” CNN, December 4, 2002,http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ WORLD/meast/12/03/missile.defense/index.html.
52. “Kenya Missile Attack.”
53. FBI Press Release, August 13, 2003, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/ igla081303.htm.
54. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 280–83.
55. Senate Intelligence Committee Testimony, September 18, 2002; Thomas Sancton, “Anatomy of a Hijack,” Time, December 26, 1994; and Hoffman, Inside Ter- rorism, 87, 281.
56. Senate Intelligence Committee Testimony, September 18, 2002.
57. A full account of these events is provided in the offi cial 9/11 Commission Report, http://www.911commission.gov.
58. “Student Arrested after Pilot Uniform Found,” Washington Post, 16 Septem- ber 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp−dyn/content/article/2005/09/16/AR 2005091601286_pf.html
59. “Saudis Foil ‘Air Attack Plotters,’ ” BBC News, April 27, 2007, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6599963.stm.
60. De Syon, “Aviation Security,” 269.
61. These characteristics were drawn from a major study by the National Academy of Sciences, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Research Council, October 2002), 21213. Cited in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism .
Modern Terrorist Threats to Aviation Security 121 63. Portions of this discussion have appeared in the introductory chapter of Home- land Security: Protecting America ’ s Targets, vol. 3, Critical Infrastructure, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).
64. “Permanent Barriers to Go Up at Arizona Airport,” Arizona Republic, Octo- ber 17, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/1017security17.htm.
65. “Massport Plans Logan Airport Security Upgrade,” Associated Press, August 24, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/08/24/mass port_plans_logan_security_upgrade.
66. De Syon, “Aviation Security.” 67. Ibid.
68. This section on aviation security is drawn directly from the Transportation Security Administration’s Report to Congress on Transportation Security, March 31, 2003, http://www.tsa.gov.
69. De Syon, “Aviation Security,” 264.
70. “Chains Go Up to Prevent Airport Security Lapses,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (PA), July 7, 2005,http://www.post−gazette.com/pg/05188/534086.stm.
71. Ibid.
72. “Glitch Forces Fix to Cockpit Doors,” Seattle Times, October 6, 2005, http:// archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/display?20051006cockpitdoor.
73. Ibid.
74. Thomas Frank, “Report: Most Airline Cargo Isn’t Checked for Explosives,” USA Today, 16 November 2005.
75. Ibid.
76. For more on this, see Forest, ed., Teaching Terror .
77. Lipton, “Airport Security Alert for Toys with Remotes,” http://www.nytimes. com/2007/10/02/us/nationalspecial3/02tsa.html?th&emc=th.
78. Bruce Hoffman, personal communication and presentation at West Point, September 14, 2007 .