IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 PLOT

After returning to Germany, the Hamburg cell conspirators began to make preparations to travel to the United States and begin pilot training. A prob- lem arose when Ramzi bin al-Shibh was unable to obtain an American visa after four tries because he was Yemeni. The others had no problem entering the United States. Since consular offi cers were not trained to detect terrorists in a visa interview, they had little trouble obtaining visas, despite numerous irregularities in their documentation. 34 _{Other attempts to have al Qaeda op-}

eratives to enter the United States and train in pilot training programs failed because at least two were denied visas and another, Mohammed al-Katani, was denied access at Orlando International Airport because the immigration agent became suspicious of him. These failures left only three pilots in training until al Qaeda was able to recruit a fourth pilot, Hani Hanjour. Hanjour had previ- ously completed pilot training in the United States, but his piloting skills were so poor that he had been unable to fi nd a job as a commercial pilot.

In the year before September 11, 2001, the conspirators spent most of their time training for the mission at American pilot training schools. They at- tended various schools in Florida and elsewhere, building up their skill level in fl ying commercial aircraft. Their emphasis was in becoming familiar with fl ying Boeing 757s and Boeing 767s. The reason was that both aircraft were relatively new versions and with upgraded instrumentation they were easier to fl y. They had what is known as glass cockpits. A plane with such a cock- pit “relies on a much smaller number of multi-function displays, television screens in the cockpit.” 35 _{These cockpits provide a simpler interface system}

so that hijackers do not need as much training and experience as they would need to fl y other aircraft. There are also fewer people in the cockpit of these airliners, and it is easier to overwhelm one or two people as opposed to three or four in non–glass cockpit aircraft. Given the level of automation involved, learning to pilot a glass cockpit aircraft into a target should have taken only

about a week of simulation training. 36 _{Actually it took longer for the conspira-}

tors because they had so little experience or interest in fl ying before starting pilot training.

By the middle of the summer of 2001, the plot was gathering steam. In May and June, the muscle men had arrived in the United States. These were the men trained to provide the physical side of the hijacking. They had received training in al Qaeda’s Afghanistan training camps in hand-to-hand combat, to enable them to overpower fl ight crews. 37 _{Most of them were from Saudi}

Arabia, because it was easy for a Saudi citizen to obtain a visa to travel to the United States. 38 _{All that was needed was to fi ll out an application form and}

show up at the American Embassy to pick up the visa. It was an express sys- tem, in which little or no checking of people applying for visas was carried out. Moreover, it was easy to attract Saudis to take part in a martyrdom mis- sion against the United States.

Once the pilot training was over, the conspirators began to study the weak spots in American aviation security. Each of them had fl own in American commercial airliners before, but now they conducted a systematic investi- gation of what they could get away with. In a series of 12 fl ights across the United States, the leadership team investigated the way the security system operated and the way in which to gain access to a cockpit. On one occasion, a fl ight attendant reported that a member of the al Qaeda team, Abdul Aziz al-Omari, requested access to the cockpit; he was allowed in and was able to talk to the pilots. 39 _{On another occasion, the actor, James Wood, because sus-}

picious of the erratic behavior of a number of Middle Eastern men on a fl ight. He reported their actions to the fl ight attendant and the fi rst offi cer. 40 _They

reported the incident to the FAA, but nothing came of this report. Only after September 11 did the report resurface.

From their fl ights, the al Qaeda team came to certain conclusions. First, it was relatively easy to pass small items like knives, box cutters, and Mace containers through security checkpoints. Knives under three inches long and box cutters proved to be no problem because they were legally allowed. It was relatively easy to get Mace through the security checkpoints despite its banned status. Second, it was necessary to purchase seats in the fi rst class sec- tion in order to be close to the cockpit for a successful hijacking. This location cut the time necessary for the hijackers to obtain access to the cockpit, and made it easy to overpower a fl ight attendant near the cockpit entrance. Third, they must have seen that the fl ight attendant in the fi rst class section always had a key to the cockpit, because the attendant would have used it during all of the fl ights. Fourth, they determined that Tuesday was the best day for a hi- jacking because of the low volume of traffi c on that day and the planes would be nearly empty of passengers. They were not concerned with the passengers, except for the ways in which they might interfere with the hijacking and the completion of the mission.

By August 2001, the 19 conspirators had been assigned their respective tasks. They had been divided into four teams—three teams with fi ve members

How the Hijackers on September 11 Approached American Aviation Security 87 and one team with four members. To ensure that nothing went wrong on September 11, it was necessary to obtain fraudulent identifi cation papers for several of the new arrivals. Obtaining such documents proved to be easy after team members paid a Salvadorian immigrant to sign an affi davit for them at a Virginia state motor vehicle offi ce. 41 _{To avoid attracting attention, the con-}

spirators frequently moved to different residences. Money was no problem, because al Qaeda was constantly supplying them with funds. It is estimated that the plot cost around $500,000. 42

Atta was in charge, and he was in constant contact with his al Qaeda han- dlers. On July 8, 2001, Atta fl ew to Spain to meet with Ramzi bin al-Shibh and others to fi nalize plans for the September 11 attacks. They met in the tourist town of Salou, in Spain. Over the following week, Atta met with rep- resentatives of al Qaeda and laid out plans for the attack on American tar- gets. 43 _{At this time, the date of the operation had not been determined. The}

decision was Atta’s to make, but there was pressure from Osama bin Laden to carry out the attacks as soon as possible.

AVIATION SECURITY MEASURES THAT