ORIGIN OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 PLOT

Leaders of al Qaeda were aware of the weaknesses in both American and in- ternational aviation security systems, and they planned to exploit them. They realized that hijacking to free prisoners was unproductive and that planting bombs was becoming increasingly diffi cult, so there was little interest in these tactics. But this did not mean that other terrorists with contacts with al Qaeda weren’t interested in penetrating aviation security to plant bombs. Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, had been busy in Manila, the Philippines, designing a nitroglycerin bomb to be trig- gered by a Casio watch. His experimentation led to the killing of a 24-year- old Japanese engineer, Haruki Ikegami, during a fl ight from Manila to Cebu City in the southern Philippines. Yousef’s bomb almost caused the airliner

How the Hijackers on September 11 Approached American Aviation Security 83 to crash, but a skillful pilot landed the aircraft at Naha Airport in Okinawa. Yousef’s plans for a massive bombing campaign to include as many as 12 com- mercial aircraft in a plot later named Operation Bojinka ended when Yousef had an accident mixing chemicals in his Manila hotel.

Yousef did not let the mishap in Manila spoil his long-range planning. Be- fore his accomplice, Abdul Murad, was captured in Manila, Yousef and Murad had discussed the possibility of using aircraft as fl ying bombs in the United States. Murad had received pilot training in the United States, so he knew how easy it would be to send a number of operatives there to receive pilot training. The cost of such training was in the $30,000 range so there was a need of fi nancial support. Yousef and Murad broached this scheme to Yousef’s uncle Khalid Sheikh Muhammed sometime in 1994. Muhammed thought about the potential of the operations, but he realized that there was a need for money and volunteers so he turned to al Qaeda.

The most readily available terrorist organization in the mid-1990s was al Qaeda. Possible state sponsors of terrorism were either out of business or maintaining as low a profi le as possible to avoid sanctions from the west- ern world. Also, al Qaeda had the fi nancial resources that would be needed. Yousef was captured in 1995, but Muhammed made contact with Osama bin Laden in 1996 at the Tora Bora complex and discussed the issue. 25 _{Bin Laden}

was interested in the concept because it would target what he considered his greatest enemy, the United States.

Various plans were considered over the next two years. Muhammed’s fi rst plan, which was to involve 10 hijacked airliners, was too simply too ambitious. It also had Muhammed piloting one of the 10 airliners. He wanted to make a grand statement after landing one of the hijacked planes. First he would kill all of the male passengers and then make a public statement justifying his actions. But this plan posed too many problems to merit for serious consid- eration. 26 _{Another version had fi ve planes attacking American targets in the}

United States, and another fi ve planes hitting targets in Southeast Asia, but this plan was also dropped because it was too complex and there were timing issues.

Bin Laden delayed a decision on the September 11 plot until the spring of 1999. At a meeting in Kandahar, Afghanistan, bin Laden, Khaled Sheikh Muhammed, and Mohammed Atef fi nalized the plans for the mission. 27

Once al Qaeda’s leaders approved the concept of the operation, they made Muhammed operational leader. They soon realized that the original plan call- ing for 10 aircraft to be used in the operation was unworkable. It was decided that the optimum number was four or fi ve aircraft because of the diffi culty of fi nding pilot candidates.

In the meantime, news had already reached the United States of a plot to use an aircraft as a fl ying bomb. While in police custody in the Philip- pines and undergoing interrogation, Murad mentioned an early version of a plan to use an aircraft to crash into CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The police offi ce conducting the interrogation has maintained

that this information was passed to American authorities. There is no col- laborating evidence to support his claim, but there is enough circumstantial evidence to show that this information was communicated in some form to American authorities. The report was lost somewhere in the bowels of the American bureaucracy.

Further confi rmation that the idea of using a commercial airliner as a fl ying bomb was fl oating around in terrorist circles was the failed attempt to use an airliner for this purpose in late 1994. The Algerian terrorist group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), hijacked an Air France aircraft in Algiers in December 1994 with the intention of fl ying it into the Eiffel Tower in Paris. 28 _Hijackers

had the airliner fl own to Marseille in southern France where they ordered more aviation fuel in order to produce more damage at the target. French Special Forces were able to stop the hijackers in Marseilles, but the intention of the hijackers became public knowledge.

Once Osama bin Laden had decided to back Muhammed’s plan, the most diffi cult task for al Qaeda’s leadership was to select the participants for the September 11 operation. Those selected had to be highly motivated and will- ing to be part of a martyrdom operation. The participants had to be able to function without suspicion in Western society with acceptable language skills and unobtrusive behavior. They also had to be intelligent enough to successfully complete a pilot training program in the United States. Finally, both the pilot candidates and the support operatives had to be able to obtain visas and pass the scrutiny of the American immigration authorities. The fi rst four candidates were picked on the basis of their loyalty but they were unable to pass the other tests. Two of them, Walid Mohammed bin Attash and Abu Bara al-Yemeni, were unable to obtain U.S. visas because of their Yemeni background. 29 _{The others, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, could}

obtain the necessary visas and did so, but they were poor pilot candidates because of poor language skills and lack of experience of living in the West. 30

Both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi participated in the September 11 plot but only as secondary leaders, providing logistical support and then participating as members of the hijack teams.

Al Qaeda solved the problem of participants able to function in Western so- ciety without suspicion by recruiting the leaders of the Hamburg cell. These leaders, Mohammed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ziad Jarrah, and Marwan al- Shehhi, were highly motivated religious individuals of the type that al Qaeda was looking for. Moreover, they were intelligent and able to function with- out being noticed in Western society. Once these members of the Hamburg cell joined al Qaeda, it was easy to recruit them for the September 11 plot. After arriving at al Qaeda’s Khalden Training Camp in November 1999, they soon became star products of its training. 31 _{Osama bin Laden met with them}

in December 1999 and broached the idea of their participation in a martyr- dom mission. 32 _{He also asked for and received a loyalty oath ( bayat ) from}

them. After they agreed to participate in the plot, Mohammed Atef, then the military commander of al Qaeda, briefed them on the details of the plan. 33

How the Hijackers on September 11 Approached American Aviation Security 85 Bin Laden then appointed Atta to head the group. It only took a few weeks to prepare them for the mission.

The Hamburg cell had already attracted the attention of the German au- thorities. Security offi cials were keeping track of potential Muslim extremists in Germany and ran across this. They were content to monitor the activities of its members. German law was extremely tolerant of political activities in Ger- many unless they endangered the state. At this time the Hamburg cell seemed to pose no such threat. Thomas Volz, an American CIA agent stationed in Germany, was not as tolerant. He was adamant that the Hamburg cell was a terrorist cell and that the German authorities should arrest its members. His calls for action became so strident that German offi cials considered deporting him from Germany. In the meantime, the German authorities continued to monitor the activities of the members of the Hamburg cell from a distance, even after most of its leaders left for the United States.