CONTROL MEASURES FOR AN ATTACK

2974

3-125. Units conducting offensive tasks are assigned an AO within which to operate. Within the AO, the 2975

commander normally designates the following control measures whether or not the attack takes place in a 2976

contiguous or noncontiguous environment:

2977

 AOs for subordinate units of battalion size or larger.

2978

 Phase line as the LD, which may be the line of contact (LC).

2979

 Time to initiate the operation.

2980

 Objective.

2981

3-126. A commander can use any other control measures necessary to control the attack. Short of the LD/LC, 2982

the commander may designate assembly areas and attack positions where the unit prepares for offensive tasks or 2983

waits for the establishment of the required conditions to initiate the attack. Beyond the LD/LC the commander 2984

may designate checkpoints, phase lines, PLD, assault positions, and direct and indirect fire support coordinating 2985

measures. Between the PLD and the objective a final coordination line, assault positions, support-by-fire and 2986

attack-by-fire positions, and time of assault to further control the final stage of the attack can be used.

2987

PLANNING

2988

3-127. The CAB directs its main effort against an objective, ideally an enemy weakness, which will cause the 2989

collapse of the enemy defense. The battalion seeks to attack the enemy’s flanks, rear, or supporting formations.

2990

By doing so, the CAB retains the initiative and reduces its own vulnerabilities.

2991

3-128. The commander seeks to identify a poorly defended avenue of approach, a small unit lacking mutual 2992

support within the enemy defense, or a weak flank that he can exploit to gain a tactical advantage. (See Figure 2993

3-5.) When attacking a well-prepared enemy defense, the CAB commander usually tries to isolate and then 2994

destroy small vulnerable portions of the enemy defense in sequence. The commander and staff develop the plan 2995

using a reverse-planning process from actions on the objective back to the LD or assembly area. They 2996

incorporate plans for exploiting success and opportunities that develop during execution. They emphasize 2997

synchronization of mounted and dismounted movement, maneuver, fires, and support throughout the attack.

2998

2999

Figure 3-5. CAB attack 3000

PREPARATION

3001

3-129. The battalion uses available time prior to the attack to conduct extensive reconnaissance, precombat 3002

checks, inspections, and rehearsals while concealing attack preparations from the enemy. The commander and 3003

staff refine the plan based on continuously updated intelligence. Subordinates conduct parallel planning and 3004

start their preparation for the attack immediately after the battalion issues a FRAGORD. As more intelligence 3005

becomes available, the commander revises orders and distributes them via FM or FBCB2. Regardless of the 3006

time available, the commander must conduct detailed planning and supervision of subordinate preparations.

3007

I

NSPECTIONS 3008

3-130. The battalion commander supervises subordinate troop leading procedures to ensure planning and 3009

preparations are on track and consistent with his intent. The commander may inspect subordinate unit order 3010

briefs and rehearsals. He focuses his inspections on the main effort and critical events such as assaults, 3011

breaching operations, and passages of lines.

3012

R

EHEARSALS 3013

3-131. The CAB should conduct rehearsals, but the type of rehearsal and technique may vary based on time 3014

available. The primary focus of the rehearsal is actions on the objective. Each subordinate commander 3015

addresses the conduct of his mission as the rehearsal progresses. The rehearsal places special emphasis on 3016

timing of actions and the coordinated maneuver of forces. All subordinate commanders must accurately portray 3017

how long it takes to complete assigned tasks and how much space is required by their force. Direct and indirect 3018

fire plans are covered in great detail, including the massing and control of fires. The commander ensures 3019

subordinate plans are coordinated and consistent with his intent. The rehearsal also covers the following:

3020

 Plans to execute follow-on missions or exploit success.

3021

 Likely times and locations where a reserve is needed.

3022

 Execution of the fire support plan, including shifting fires, employing CAS, adjusting FSCMs, and 3023

positioning observers and snipers.

3024

 Breaching, gap crossing, and countermobility operations.

3025

 Passages of lines.

3026

 Contingency plans for actions against enemy counterattacks, repositioning, commitment of reserves, 3027

or use of CBRN capabilities.

3028

 Consolidation and reorganization.

3029

 Execution of branches or sequels assigned by brigade.

3030

3-132. Effective and current intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful attack. Before mounting an attack, 3034

the commander needs to determine the enemy’s strength and disposition. In an attack, the entire intelligence 3035

collection, analysis, and dissemination process must rapidly respond to CCIR. The BCT provides most of the 3036

information available to the CAB commander and staff through updates and crosstalk, as well as updates based 3037

on the brigade’s collection plan. The CAB commander must receive an accurate picture of the enemy’s defense 3038

so he can decide on a COA and act faster than the enemy can react. Often, the BCT cavalry Squadron can 3039

provide the best information to focus the CAB’s attack. In addition, the CAB commander may use elements of 3040

the sniper squad for surveillance, and in order to provide real time information of the objective or other areas of 3041

interest.

3042

3-133. When preparing for an attack, the commander and staff participate in development of the information 3043

collection plan. This is a well-resourced and coordinated reconnaissance effort that provides a detailed picture 3044

collection effort also provides him with continuous updates during the attack so he can adjust execution of the 3048

operation based on the enemy’s reactions.

3049

E

NEMY

’

S

C

URRENT

A

RRAY OF

F

ORCES 3050

3-134. The intelligence available to the battalion comes from acontinuous stream of information that begins 3051

with information collection systems, such as JSTARS, UAS, BCT cavalry Squadron, snipers, and scout platoon 3052

to establish the intelligence links to the battalion.

3053

3-135. The first priority is to confirm information available on the enemy’s composition, disposition, 3054

capabilities, and most probable COA. The next priorities are the effects of weather and terrain, and how the 3055

enemy is likely to fight. The S-2 tries to determine what the enemy will do and what information about the 3056

enemy’s action the battalion needs to confirm. The battalion information collection effort focuses on identifying 3057

indicators required for confirming the enemy’s actual COA. Ideally, the commander does not make final 3058

decisions on how to execute the attack until he can identify the current array of enemy forces. Key areas of 3059

information that friendly units should obtain about a defending enemy force include:

3060

 Composition, disposition, and capabilities forces along a flank or an area selected for penetration.

3061

 Composition, disposition, and capabilities of security forces.

3062

 Location, orientation, type, depth, and composition of obstacles.

3063

 Locations of secure bypasses around obstacles.

3064

 Composition, disposition, and capabilities of defending formations.

3065

 Composition, disposition, capabilities, and location of reserves.

3066

 Location of routes the enemy may use to counterattack or reinforce his defense 3067

3-136. Reconnaissance assets observe the enemy defense from advantageous OPs to locate gaps, identify 3068

weapons systems and fighting positions, view rehearsals and positioning, and determine the enemy’s security 3069

activities and times of decreased readiness. The S-2 must discern any enemy deception efforts, such as phony 3070

obstacles, dummy emplacements, and deception positions, designed to confuse an attacker.

3071

S

UPPORT ON THE

A

PPROACH TO THE

O

BJECTIVE 3072

3-137. A rapid, secure advance to the enemy’s main defense depends on ISR success in locating enemy 3073

security forces and obstacles. Reconnaissance initially focuses on the enemy’s security forces forward of his 3074

main defense to locate his positions and obstacles along the CAB’s planned routes of advance. Reconnaissance 3075

also locates gaps and the routes that allow them to infiltrate into the enemy’s main defensive area or rear area.

3076

Reconnaissance efforts continue by locating enemy forces that could reposition and affect the battalion’s 3077

approach to the enemy’s main defense. Successful attacks usually have reconnaissance forces placing indirect 3078

3-138. The commander positions information collection assets to maintain observation of enemy reactions to 3082

the CAB’s maneuver. Reconnaissance focuses on areas the enemy likely will use to reposition forces, commit 3083

reserves, and counterattack. As the force-on-force engagement on the objective develops, reconnaissance 3084

elements report enemy reactions, repositioning, and BDA. Reconnaissance elements target and engage enemy 3085

repositioning forces, reserves, counterattacking forces, and other HPTs with indirect fires. Early identification 3086

of enemy reactions is essential for the battalion to maintain momentum and initiative during the attack.

3087

G

AIN AND

M

AINTAIN

C

ONTACT 3088

3-139. The CAB gains and maintains contact during the approach, and is ready to—

3089

 Bypass, breach, or cross obstacles.

3090

 React to all eight forms of contact.

3091

 Transition to different formations based on the terrain and enemy situation.

3092

 Employ forces to screen flanks that could become exposed or threatened during the approach.

3093

 Avoid terrain features that are likely enemy artillery reference points, locations for CBRN strikes, or 3094

locations for situational obstacles.

3095

 Employ indirect fire support to establish conditions for assault forces.

3096

 Destroy or force the withdrawal of opposing enemy security forces.

3097

 Minimize the effects of enemy deception.

3098

3-140. The CAB must counter the effects of enemy security forces to ensure an unimpeded and concealed 3099

approach. Before the attack, reconnaissance forces seek to locate enemy security forces. Once located, the 3100

commander has the following options available:

3101

 Destroy them immediately with indirect fires and CAS (preferred option).

3102

 Destroy them with indirect fires and CAS during the approach to the objective.

3103

 Conduct limited objective attacks prior to execution of the main attack.

3104

 Employ a strong advance guard to destroy or force the withdrawal of enemy security forces during 3105

the approach to the objective.

3106

3-141. The battalion must maintain tempo. Speed and dispersion, facilitated by close coordination and 3107

communication, are the norm when massing weapons’ effects to destroy the enemy’s defense. If the formation 3108

is too slow or becomes too concentrated, as it can in urban or restricted terrain, it is vulnerable to massed enemy 3109

fires. The three dimensional terrain of an urban environment will challenge the CAB’s ability to maintain 3110

tempo. It is paramount to keep the vehicles constantly mobile, as they are more vulnerable when static. The 3111

CAB’s BFVs and tanks are effective at penetrating defenses and gaining a foothold when mutually supported 3112

with dismounted Infantry.

3113

D

ISRUPT THE

E

NEMY

enemy defense, the initial focus of fires is to destroy the enemy positions at the selected point of penetration.

3118

Fires can also—

3119

 Destroy enemy security forces.

3120

 Weaken or neutralize enemy reserves.

3121

 Disrupt enemy command and control 3122

 Emplace artillery-delivered obstacles to block enemy reserve routes to the objective.

3123

 Deceive the enemy as to the battalion’s actual intentions.

3124

 Obscure friendly movements and deployment.

3125

 Isolate the objective and suppress enemy positions.

3126

 Neutralize the enemy’s indirect fires with counterbattery fires.

3127

3-143. The coordination between fires and maneuver is critical. As maneuver forces approach the enemy 3128

defense, the commander shifts fires and obscuration to suppress and obscure the enemy. Proper timing and 3129

adjustment of fires enable the maneuver force to securely close on the enemy’s positions. The commander must 3130

uncertainty during the battle. The primary goal is to isolate the unit targeted for destruction by preventing the 3138

enemy from laterally repositioning or reinforcing it.

3139

3-145. Usually, a company team fixes the enemy force by attacking an objective that isolates a portion of the 3140

enemy’s defense. In open terrain, the most common task for the shaping force is to fix the enemy with direct 3141

and indirect fire. In more complex terrain, the supporting force may need to seize terrain or destroy key enemy 3142

forces in limited objective attacks. The use of fires and CAS is vital when attacking enemy forces and reserves 3143

in depth because fires and CAS prevent the enemy’s commitment against the battalion.

3144

M

ANEUVER 3145

3-146. The commander maneuvers combat forces and employs fires, situational obstacles, and obscurants to 3146

create favorable conditions for decisive maneuver against the enemy. The commander commits maneuver 3147

forces and fires to isolate, then rupture, a small vulnerable portion of the enemy’s defense to gain a flank or 3148

create a penetration. The CAB achieves final destruction of the enemy force through the attack of assaulting 3149

forces. Timely reporting, crosstalk, accurate assessments, and sharing of information by subordinate 3150

commanders are paramount.

3151

3-147. The attacker must be agile enough to concentrate his forces and mass his combat power by maneuver 3152

before the enemy can reorient his defense. Usually, the destruction of a defending enemy force dictates an 3153

assault of the objective. The shaping force shifts direct and indirect fires, and repositions as required to support 3154

the maneuver of assaulting forces. As the assaulting force commits, the battalion commander and staff ensure 3155

that current information is available about the—

3156

 Locations and types of enemy contact on the objective.

3157

 Locations of friendly reconnaissance forces.

3158

 Locations of lanes and obstacles, including lane markings.

3159

 Recognition signals and guides.

3160

 Specific routes to use for the approach.

3161

 Locations and orientations of fires from friendly forces.

3162

 Additions or modifications of graphic control measures.

3163

3-148. Previously dispersed assaulting forces quickly assemble into combat formations, and rapidly 3164

maneuvers to destroy the enemy forces and clear assigned objectives. The assaulting force moves along covered 3165

and concealed routes to an exposed enemy flank, created penetration, or other position of advantage. The use of 3166

obscurants helps to conceal the movement of assaulting forces. The assault includes destruction of defending 3167

forces and clearance of trenches and fortifications; and can involve a combination of mounted and dismounted 3168

movement. The CAB commander’s main focus is maintaining momentum and security of the assaulting force.

3169

The information collection effort continues to report enemy repositioning, BDA, and enemy counteractions to 3170

the assault. The battalion limits enemy repositioning and massing against assaulting forces through intense 3171

supporting fires and CAS, a rapid assault, and employment of smoke.

3172

F

OLLOW

T

HROUGH 3173

3-149. After seizing the objective, the commander has two alternatives: exploit success and continue the attack 3174

or terminate the offense. The CAB maintains contact and attempts to exploit its success. The higher commander 3175

makes the determination whether to initiate a general, as opposed to local, exploitation or pursuit or terminate 3176

offensive actions. The CAB commander must understand and report the status and limits of his sustainment 3177

support capabilities for follow on actions. Executing the follow-on plans should not over-extend the sustainment 3178

capabilities of the BSB and FSCs, to do so creates risks to the success of the follow-on action.

3179

In document Atp 3-90.5 Combined Arms Battalion (Page 86-91)