SECURITY OPERATIONS

1832

2-83. Security operations encompass five tasks—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security.

1833

 Screen is a security task that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (ADRP 3-90) 1834

 Guard is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and 1835

reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main 1836

body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires 1837

and functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body. (ADRP 3-90) 1838

 Cover is a security task to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and 1839

reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main 1840

body. (ADRP 3-90) 1841

 Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions 1842

within a specific area. (ADRP 3-90) 1843

 Local security is a security task that includes low-level security activities conducted near a unit to 1844

prevent surprise by the enemy. (ADRP 3-90) 1845

SCREEN

1846

2-84. The primary purpose of a screen is to provide early warning. It observes, identifies, and reports enemy 1847

actions. A screen provides the least amount of protection of any security mission. In general, a screening force 1848

fights in self-defense; however, when necessary, it can engage and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements 1849

within its capabilities. (Refer to FM 3-98 for more information.) 1850

C

OMBINED

A

RMS

B

ATTALION

S

CREEN 1851

2-85. At the battalion level, the scout platoon usually performs screen missions in support of CAB missions.

1852

When the terrain provides multiple enemy avenues of approach, the battalion commander can attach the scout 1853

platoon to a company to conduct a screen. The screening force establishes a series of observation posts and 1854

conducts patrols to observe NAIs and targeted areas of interest (TAIs) to meet the CCIR. Additionally, the BCT 1855

might task the CAB itself to perform screening missions in support of a BCT defense or other operation. (See 1856

Figure 2-6.) In this instance, the CAB maneuver companies take on the role traditionally performed by the 1857

battalion scouts who may or may not be placed OPCON to a company commander.

1858

1859

Figure 2-6. CAB conducting screen mission for ABCT 1860

P

LANNING A

S

CREEN 1861

2-86. When assigning a screen mission to a company, the commander designates the general trace of the screen 1862

and the time it must be established. This general trace is based upon the S-2’s designation of NAIs. The initial 1863

screen line should be forward of the general trace but remain within range of supporting artillery and battalion 1864

mortars. Screen lines are depicted as phase lines; passage graphics are included in the overlay. Other planning 1865

considerations are:

1866

 Designate the left and right limits of the screen as well as a phase line for the near boundary. This 1867

phase line also can become the on-order battle handover line (BHL).

1868

 Confirm which unit has responsibility for the area between the screening force’s rear boundary and 1869

the main battle area (MBA). This should be the company that occupies the areas behind the screen.

1870

 Propose general locations for observation posts that enable observation of the avenues of approach 1871

into the area.

1872

 Propose locations for prepared or situational obstacles.

1873

 Develop trigger lines to mass direct and indirect fires.

1874

 Select routes or lanes to facilitate rearward displacement.

1875

 Augment the security force as needed to provide intelligence, engineer, air defense, signal, and 1876

sustainment.

1877

 Ensure rearward passage of lines (RPOL) planning and rehearsals are executed.

1878

2-87. When the CAB receives a security mission, the BCT usually provides this general guidance:

1879

 Force or area to be secured.

1880

 Location and orientation of the security area.

1881

 Time allocated to establish the security force.

1882

 Criteria for ending the security mission.

1883

 Task organization and augmentation of security forces.

1884

 Engagement and displacement criteria.

1885

F

ORCE OR

A

REA TO BE

S

ECURED 1886

2-88. The commander must designate the exact force to be secured. This designation determines the limits of 1887

the security force’s responsibilities. If the main body moves, the security force also moves to maintain its 1888

position in relation to the main body.

1889

L

OCATION AND

O

RIENTATION OF THE

S

ECURITY

A

REA 1890

2-89. The commander determines the location, orientation, and depth of the security area in which the security 1891

force will operate. The commander might also designate specific avenues of approach or NAIs he wants 1892

covered. Depth in the security area provides the main body with more time to react to approaching enemy 1893

ground units. Occupying a deep security area allows the security force to destroy enemy reconnaissance assets 1894

without compromising critical observation posts or positions, or becoming decisively engaged. The wider the 1895

area to be secured, the more difficult it is for the security force to position in depth; this is because it must 1896

position itself across the width of the area.

1897

2-90. The CAB then conducts a detailed analysis of the terrain in the security area. The commander establishes 1898

his initial dispositions (usually a screen line) as far forward as possible on terrain that affords good observation 1899

of avenues of approach. Next, he clearly assigns responsibility for identified avenues of approach and 1900

designated NAIs. For a screen, the initial line must be within supporting range of the main body, yet provide the 1901

desired amount of early warning.

1902

T

IME

A

LLOCATED

T

O

E

STABLISH THE

S

ECURITY

F

ORCE 1903

2-91. The commander must determine when to establish the security force based on the activity of the main 1904

body and expected enemy activity. To prevent enemy forces from penetrating the security area undetected, he 1905

must allow enough time for the security force to move into and occupy the security area.

1906

C

RITERIA FOR

E

NDING THE

S

ECURITY

M

ISSION 1907

2-92. Security operations are usually time- or event-driven. The criteria for ending a security operation can be 1908

T

ASK

O

RGANIZATION AND

A

UGMENTATION OF

S

ECURITY

F

ORCES 1912

2-93. The commander is responsible for task-organizing elements to augment the security force as dictated by 1913

METT-TC. Depending on the threat and the size of the security area, additional combat assets may augment the 1914

security force’s organic combat power. Additional augmentation also can come from the military intelligence 1915

company in the form of ground-based sensors or UAS attachments; engineer augmentation to enhance mobility, 1916

countermobility, and survivability; or from the fires battalion.

1917

E

NGAGEMENT AND

D

ISPLACEMENT

C

RITERIA 1918

2-94. The commander provides general engagement and displacement criteria as an extension of his 1919

commander’s intent. Engagement criteria establish the conditions under which units are expected to engage the 1920

threat, and what conditions dictate handing over threat elements to the CAB. The commander’s understanding 1921

of the BCT commander’s expectations, coupled with his knowledge of the threat’s most likely COA, enables 1922

him to determine his battalion’s engagement criteria. The commander might require units only to observe threat 1923

actions, but not engage the threat; the purpose is to deceive the enemy as to the whereabouts of his screen line.

1924

He also could opt to engage all threat personnel or lightly armored vehicles on sight. When conducting stability 1925

tasks, he may stipulate nonlethal weapons.

1926

2-95. With clear engagement criteria, the commander can now establish displacement criteria based on what the 1927

battalion can, cannot, or—because of tactical considerations—will not destroy. The commander defines the 1928

events or triggers that will cause the security force to displace; such as, a certain size force, or specific element 1929

of the threat formation reaching a given point or graphic control measure.

1930

In document Atp 3-90.5 Combined Arms Battalion (Page 53-56)