SPECIAL PURPOSE ATTACKS

3180

3-150. The CAB may also be tasked to conduct special purpose attacks such as an ambush, counterattack, 3181

demonstration, feint, raid, spoiling attack. The commander’s intent and mission variables of METT-TC will 3182

determine the specific attack form. Special purpose attacks share many of the planning, preparation, and 3183

execution considerations of the attack.

3184

A

MBUSH 3185

3-151. The ambush is an attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or 3186

temporarily halted enemy. (FM 3-90-1) An ambush capitalizes on the element of surprise. Ambushes are 3187

categorized as near, or far ambushes, based on the proximity of the friendly force to the enemy and hasty or 3188

deliberate. A hasty ambush is an immediate reaction to an unexpected opportunity conducted using SOPs and 3189

battle drill. A deliberate ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target.

3190

3-152. The CAB will most likely execute company level and below ambushes as offensive tasks to a larger 3191

operation. Because the ambush relies on the element of surprise, conducting a deliberate ambush in a populated 3192

urban area with multiple actors is a challenge for large Armored vehicle formations. However, tank and BFV 3193

units well trained in battle drills can achieve the element of surprise through the application of audacity, 3194

concentration, and tempo to conduct hasty ambushes at opportunistic times. The precision, lethality and range 3195

of tanks and BFVs are well suited for far ambushes in open terrain that afford some means of concealment.

3196

3-153. The three types of ambush are point, area, and anti-armor. In a point ambush, a unit deploys to attack a 3197

single kill zone. In an area ambush, a unit deploys into two or more related point ambushes. A unit smaller than 3198

a platoon does not normally conduct an area ambush. Antiarmor ambushes focus on moving or temporarily 3199

halted enemy armored vehicles. The ambush by its very nature is a violent and decisive action and requires 3200

Soldiers to harness the aggression that comes with its execution in a professional manner according to the laws 3201

of war and rules of engagement.

3202

Organization of Ambush Forces 3203

3-154. A typical ambush is organized into three elements: assault, support, and security. The assault element 3204

fires into the kill zone to destroy the enemy force. The assault force, normally BFVs and Infantry dismounts, 3205

attacks into and clears the kill zone and may be assigned additional tasks, to include searching for items of 3206

intelligence value, capturing prisoners, and completing the destruction of enemy equipment to preclude its 3207

immediate reuse. The support element consisting of BFVs and tanks, support the assault element by firing into 3208

and around the kill zone, and it provides the ambush’s primary killing power. The security element isolates the 3209

kill zone by blocking enemy avenues of approach into the ambush site after the ambush has commenced. They 3210

provide early warning of the arrival of any enemy relief force and security for ambush elements.

3211

Planning and Preparing an Ambush 3212

3-155. A key to the planning and preparation of any ambush is site selection. The site should provide 3213

concealment and element locations, insertion and exit routes for assault forces, and natural, manmade, or 3214

military obstacles to integrate with direct and indirect fires to trap enemy elements in the kill zone. (Refer to FM 3215

3-90-1 for more information on ambush planning, preparation considerations, and the types of formations and 3216

their use in point and area ambushes.) 3217

commander, or representative debriefs the force on enemy tactics, procedures and patterns utilized against the 3221

ambush, in order for future units to account for these when planning for ambush operations.

3222

C

OUNTERATTACKS 3223

3-157. A counterattack is an attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for 3224

such specific purposes as regaining ground lost, or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the 3225

general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in attacking. In sustained 3226

defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives. (ADRP 3227

1-02) Counterattacks are conducted to regain key terrain and ultimately regain the initiative.

3228

3-158. A counterattacking force maneuvers to isolate and destroy a designated enemy force. It can attack-by-3229

fire into an EA to defeat or destroy an enemy force, restore the original position, or block an enemy penetration.

3230

Once launched, the counterattack usually becomes a decisive operation for the commander conducting the 3231

counterattack. The integration of reconnaissance forces, indirect fires, and other enablers is critical for the 3232

success of a counterattack. The CAB, with its communication systems, responsiveness, firepower, 3233

maneuverability, and protection, makes it a very powerful counterattack force. The CAB can be used as a 3234

subordinate element within a larger counterattack force, as the counterattack force, or use one or more of its 3235

subordinate elements as a counterattack force within the CAB’s AO.

3236

positions when he intends to counterattack using primarily direct and indirect fires. Assuring the mobility of the 3241

CAB counterattack elements is critical to the success of the defense. Engineer assets generally are task-3242

organized to support the striking force or the reserve.

3243

3-160. The two levels of counterattacks are major and local counterattacks. In both cases, waiting for the 3244

enemy to act first may reveal the enemy’s main effort and create an assailable flank to exploit. A defending unit 3245

conducts a major counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy and defeat him through offensive action 3246

defense by immediately committing all available resources to prevent the enemy from consolidating his gains.

3250

A commander however, has to balance the advantages of a quickly developed local counterattack with the 3251

danger of piecemeal commitment of his forces.

3252

Organization of Counterattack Forces 3253

3-161. The CAB commander of a major counterattack force typically organizes units into security, main body, 3254

and reserve forces. He uses those defending forces already in contact with the enemy to fix or contain those 3255

same enemy forces. The commander may use a force committed to the counterattack, such as the striking force 3256

in a mobile defense, his reserve, another echelon’s reserve, or designate any other force he deems appropriate to 3257

be the counterattack force. Any changes in task organization should be completed in time to allow units to 3258

conduct rehearsals with their attached or supported unit.

3259

3-162. A commander conducts a local counterattack with whatever forces are immediately available to retake 3260

positions that have been lost to enemy action or to exploit a target of opportunity. The forces often consist of the 3261

reserves of subordinates and defending forces that survive after completing their withdrawal from lost positions.

3262

If possible, engineer assets should be included to assure mobility. While it is unlikely that the commander 3263

changes the task organization of the forces conducting a local counterattack, he organizes the force into a 3264

security force and a main body. He may be able to designate an element to conduct reconnaissance.

3265

3-163. If the CAB’s defensive scheme depends on a counterattack as the defeat mechanism, the counterattack 3266

force is considered to be committed from the beginning of the defensive operation. In this case, the commander 3267

should designate another force as his reserve.

3268

Planning a Counterattack 3269

3-164. The commander plans the counterattack to strike the enemy when the enemy force is vulnerable. As the 3270

enemy force advances, the defense may create gaps between enemy units, exposing the flanks and rear of 3271

elements of the attacking force. Immediately after an enemy force occupies a defended position, it is often 3272

disorganized and ill prepared to meet a sudden local counterattack. Because the opportunities for effective 3273

counterattacks are usually brief, the commander must assess the situation rapidly, and the force must execute 3274

the counterattack swiftly. The commander assigns objectives or attack-by-fire positions to counterattacking 3275

reason the force directed to conduct a major counterattack, such as the striking force in a mobile defense, should 3280

be involved in developing those plans as well as any plans to exploit potential success. Local counterattacks 3281

may or may not be the result of previous deliberate planning.

3282

Preparing a Counterattack 3283

3-166. Surprise, mobility, coordinated fires, and control are the keys to a successful counterattack. Surprise 3284

enables the counterattacking force to seize control of the situation. If total surprise is not possible, it must be as 3285

close to total as possible so that the targeted enemy force does not expect the attack until it is too late to react 3286

effectively. Thorough planning and preparation help achieve surprise. The commander adjusts the positioning 3287

of his information collection assets and the tasks he gives those assets so that he can determine the location and 3288

targets for his counterattack.

3289

3-167. The commander conducts a leader’s reconnaissance with key personnel to confirm or modify his 3290

counterattack plan. If necessary, the commander modifies the plan and disseminates those changes to 3291

subordinate leaders and other affected organizations. Each element of the counterattack force reconnoiters its 3292

planned axis of advance and routes it will take if possible. The commander maintains close control during 3293

movement to and occupation of hide positions and this reconnaissance process so the enemy does not detect the 3294

counterattack force prior to initiating the counterattack. Leaders enforce camouflage, noise, and light discipline.

3295

3-168. The commander adjusts the planned positions of his weapons systems to obtain the maximum 3296

effectiveness against targets in the planned EA. He coordinates all fires, including those of supporting artillery 3297

and mortars. He wants his fires to isolate the targeted enemy force in the planned EA while preventing the 3298

target’s escape or reinforcement. These fires must inflict maximum damage quickly before the enemy can 3299

respond to the counterattack.

3300

Executing a Counterattack 3301

3-169. Whenever possible, the commander retains his counterattack for his decisive operation, which is 3302

conducted after the enemy reveals his main effort by committing the majority of his combat power. If the 3303

commander orders his reserve to conduct a planned counterattack, the reserve becomes a committed force and 3304

the commander should take measures to designate or reconstitute a new reserve.

3305

3-170. The commander conducts the counterattack in the same manner in which he conducts any other attack.

3306

He shifts support and priorities of fire, and designates targets to be engaged. The counterattack force performs 3307

the same actions as an attacking force:

3308

 Gain and maintain enemy contact.

3309

disorganization on the part of the enemy, such as the confusion that temporarily exists in an attacking force after 3316

it seizes a defended position. A rapidly mounted local counterattack can yield better results than a more 3317

deliberate counterattack executed by a higher echelon. This is because of the speed at which the mounted local 3318

counterattack can be launched.

3319

3-172. In the face of a strong enemy penetration, a commander can conduct local counterattacks to retain or 3320

seize positions on the shoulders of the enemy’s penetration and potentially reinforce those positions with hasty 3321

obstacles. This prevents the enemy from widening the penetration while forces from other defending units 3322

engage the penetrating enemy forces. In addition, holding the shoulders can prevent the sacrifice of positional 3323

depth because the limited gap in the defensive position prevents an attacking enemy from fully exploiting his 3324

success.

3325

D

EMONSTRATION 3326

3-173. A demonstration is a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to deceive an 3327

adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended. (JP 3-13.4) A 3328

demonstration can be achieved by repositioning, or moving forces in order to get enemy forces to reorient their 3329

attention and weapon systems. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.) 3330

F

EINT 3331

3-174. A feint in military deception is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for 3332

the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and time of the actual main offensive action. (JP 3-3333

13.4) Feints must be of sufficient strength and composition to cause the desired enemy reaction. Feints must 3334

appear real; therefore, some contact with the enemy is necessary. The feint is most effective under the following 3335

conditions:

3336

 When it reinforces the enemy’s expectations.

3337

 When it appears to be a definite threat to the enemy.

3338

 When the enemy has a large reserve that it has consistently committed early.

3339

 When there are several feasible COAs open to the attacker.

3340

3-175. Planning for a feint mission follows the same sequence as any other attack. Special planning 3341

considerations include the following:

3342

 Ensure the battalion resources the feint to make it appear as the main effort or as a significant threat 3343

to the enemy.

3344

 Establish clear guidance regarding force preservation.

3345

 Ensure adequate means of detecting the desired enemy reaction.

3346

 Designate clear disengagement criteria for the feinting force.

3347

 Assign attainable objectives.

3348

 Issue clear follow-on missions to the feinting force 3349

R

AID 3350

3-176. A raid is an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, 3351

capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion 3352

of the assigned mission. (JP 3-0) A raid ends with a planned withdrawal. Raids are usually small-scale attacks 3353

requiring detailed intelligence, preparation, and planning. Typical raid missions accomplish the following:

3354

 Capture prisoners, installations, or enemy materiel.

3355

 Destroy enemy materiel or installations.

3356

 Obtain specific information on an enemy unit such as its location, disposition, strength, or operating 3357

scheme.

3358

 Deceive or harass enemy forces.

3359

 Liberate captured friendly personnel.

3360

 Site exploitation (SE).

3361

3-177. The raiding force may vary in size from an Infantry platoon to the entire CAB. It may operate within or 3362

outside the battalion’s supporting range. The raiding force moves to its objective (either mounted or 3363

dismounted) for a quick, violent attack. Once it completes the raid mission, the raiding force quickly withdraws 3364

along a different route. The following are specific planning considerations for a raid mission:

3365

 Conduct detailed reconnaissance and maintain constant surveillance of the raid objective to ensure 3366

the enemy situation remains unchanged and within the capability of the raiding force. The BCT must 3367

provide information collection support to the CAB in order to plan and conduct a raid successfully.

3368

 Position fire support systems to provide immediate responsive fires during the approach, actions on 3369

the objective, and withdrawal. Interdiction fires, deception fires, counterstrikes, and situational 3370

obstacles reduce the enemy’s ability to react to the raid.

3371

 Ensure proper security because the raiding force is vulnerable to attack from all directions.

3372

 Establish clear abort criteria for the raid. These may include loss of personnel, equipment, or support 3373

assets as well as changes in the enemy situation.

3374

 Develop contingency plans for contact prior to and after actions on the objective.

3375

 Plan CASEVAC and raiding force extraction throughout the entire depth of the operation.

3376

 Plan rally points for units to assemble to prepare for the attack or to assemble after the mission is 3377

complete and the force is ready to withdraw.

3378

 Consider logistical factors such as the types and numbers of vehicles and weapons the raiding party 3379

will have, movement distance, length of time the raiding party will operate in enemy territory, and 3380

expected enemy resistance. Aircraft or linkup provides CASEVAC or resupply of the raiding force, if 3381

required, during the withdrawal.

3382

 Conduct withdrawal over a different route than that used to approach the objective.

3383

3-178. The CAB may participate in an artillery raid as part of a division operation. In such an operation, the 3384

CAB supports the positioning of artillery. If necessary, the battalion destroys or defeats enemy forces to allow 3385

the artillery unit to position itself to strike the necessary enemy targets.

3386

S

POILING

A

TTACK 3387

3-179. A spoiling attack is an attack launched from the defense to disrupt the enemy’s attack preparations.

3388

Spoiling attacks focus on the enemy’s critical systems and forces that have the greatest impact on his ability to 3389

mount an attack. Lucrative targets include command and control systems, intelligence assets, fire support , and 3390

logistics. Units can conduct spoiling attacks as often as needed to deny adequate attack preparation to the 3391

enemy. The CAB usually conducts a spoiling attack as part of the higher headquarters operation. Spoiling 3392

attacks are planned and executed in the same manner as an attack.

3393

In document Atp 3-90.5 Combined Arms Battalion (Page 91-95)