103 it could create a new criterion for assessing the operational necessity of using certain

explosives against the humanitarian effects of these explosives. The focus could be on the long-term humanitarian effects of certain types of explosives. The second part of the instrument could contain weapons-specific considerations: for example, self- destruct devices for cluster weapons.207

Related to the overall objective to reach a negotiation mandate for devising a legally binding instrument on ERW was the Dutch objective to remain a front runner in the ERW process. The Netherlands’ substantial role in the agenda-setting process led to increasing international recognition that it was a lead nation with respect to the ERW. When asked by a Member of Parliament whether it would be prepared to accept a leading role, the Dutch government responded that if the Second Review Conference were to adopt a negotiation mandate, it would make an effort to play a leading role that was consistent with the tradition of the Netherlands on humanitarian issues.208

With respect to the content of the discussion, the Netherlands repeatedly tried to widen the scope of ERW. During the spring of 2001, for example, it attempted to include the issue of depleted uranium in the discussion.

Results

The ERW issue was actually discussed during the Second Review Conference. A first concrete proposal for an ERW mandate was discussed during the third PrepCom in September 2001. During the Review Conference (11-21 December 2001) a mandate was reached for a GGE on ERW, but instead of a negotiation mandate it became discussion mandate. It was decided that the GGE would be open-ended and that it would have a coordinator and discuss ‘ways and means to address the issue of ERW’.

The Netherlands consolidated its role as front runner. In January 2001, the government had expressed to Parliament that it would dedicate itself to playing a leading role, even after a mandate had been adopted.209 _{Only two months later, in March 2001, the}

Netherlands was asked by the Chair of the Review Conference (Australia) whether it would be willing to become Friend of the Chair (FoC) and as such to take the lead on the ERW issue. Dutch willingness to do so was communicated at the beginning of April. In December 2001, when the GGE was set up, the Netherlands was appointed as its coordinator.

The objective of remaining a front runner was also stimulated by the Dutch Parliament which proved to be very interested in the topic of ERW. In January 2001, no less than thirty six parliamentary questions on ERW were addressed to the government. Further, individual Members of Parliament occasionally tried to widen the scope of the ERW

207 These objectives were expressed during a meeting of some States Parties in Charlottesville (US) from 20 to 21 February 2001 (file 717619, 28 February 2001).

208 TK, 27400, V and X, nr. 53. 209 TK, 27400, V and X, nr. 53.

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process. In February 2001, for example, it was proposed to include the issue of depleted uranium in the ERW debate. And in the same month, the government was asked to discuss a moratorium on cluster weapons in the NATO Council.210 _{Later in the year,}

questions were raised about the use of cluster bombs in Afghanistan by US forces. There proved to be no support for including the issue of depleted uranium in the ERW discussion. The British, French, American and Australian delegations and the ICRC reacted particularly negative to the Dutch proposal during the second PrepCom of the CCW.

Interventions

The strategy chosen by the Dutch government to achieve the overall objective of a negotiation mandate on ERW was to increase knowledge on the issue.211 _{To that end,}

the Netherlands organised two informal meetings of legal, military and diplomatic experts from a large number of CCW States Parties in The Hague in March 2001, in order to exchange ideas and reach a better understanding of the nature, source and scope of ERW.

The first meeting took place on 28 March 2001, and was organised for the ‘like-minded countries’ (South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Austria, Peru, Australia and Canada). During this meeting the Netherlands carefully assessed whether there would be support for a Dutch resolution on ERW in the UN General Assembly meeting. Although the Dutch government emphasised that it had not yet elaborated a concrete proposal, it argued that such a resolution would open up the possibility of creating measures on ERW outside the framework of CCW, in the event that a fifth CCW protocol were to fail. The reactions in the group were reserved and some countries expressed concern about the risk of politicising the issue.

The second informal meeting in The Hague subsequently took place on 29 and 30 March 2001 and was open to a larger number of countries (the like-minded group, Italy, France, UK, US, Denmark, Germany, China, Russia, Mexico, and India). In preparation for this meeting, the Dutch government assessed the national positions of the governments which were sending representatives to the meeting. Most reports on the positions conclude that many countries were still in the initial phase of thinking about ERW. However, it was clear that some were considered to be difficult countries. Nonetheless, the result of the meeting was a promise of support for adopting a negotiating mandate on ERW during the Second Review Conference. During the meeting all countries turned out to be particularly constructive.

The Chairman’s summary of the meeting contained general ideas that had been expressed during the discussions (although they were not national positions, because of the expert character of the meeting). It was emphasised that ERW is a humanitarian

210 TK, 27400, V, nr. 52. The motion was not adopted. 211 TK, 28000, V, nr. 37.

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