Critical theory

Critical theory recognises and accepts the notion that all paradigms have an inherent political subjectiveness as the above discussion illustrates. As Oakley states: “All research is political … [although] the “cookbooks” of research methods largely ignore the political context of research” (in Roberts 1990:54-55). Critical theory could be seen to be supportive of the complementary diversity view discussed above, in that it makes no claims of superiority over any other methodological paradigm (Lakomski 1997). Rather, critical theory separates itself and stands away from other paradigms, as per Lather’s (1991) depiction in Table two, and theoretically does not indulge in debating the relevance of paradigms, only defending its own. Interpretivists are left to criticise positivists for reductionism, and positivists to criticise interpretivists for their relativism (Lakomski 1997). Furthermore positivists could arguably be labelled relativist as well, from a post modern perspective.

One of the advantages of adopting a critical theory research approach therefore is that “It is possible to have a social science which is neither purely empirical nor purely interpretive” (Lakomski 1997:169). In this sense, critical theory asserts that it can escape some criticisms levelled at it by both positivists and interpretivists, and be practically and politically more emancipatorily desirable. As Walker and Evers suggest: “… critical theorists go one step further [than interpretivists]” (1997:24), as is reflected in Table two, with Lather separating the interpretivist from the critical into two separate sub- paradigms.

Lakomski (1997) explains and rationalises critical theory by pointing to the fundamental historical problem of social science, that is the relationship between theory and practice. Drawing upon Habermas, she states:

‘… the connection between knowledge and social action has become an instrumentalist one, a relation which assumes the neutrality of science. Science is considered to be free of values and cannot,

therefore, give people any guidance on how to conduct their lives. This development is the result of the victory of ‘scientism’ or positivism, which, … presents itself as the only valid form of knowledge. As a consequence, it has become impossible … to reflect critically on current forms of domination since even they appear as problems which are solvable by technical means. Habermas’ aim is to restore to theory the dimension of reflection and present a social theory which … rewrites theory with practice’ [emphasis added] (1997:169).

Habermas contends that human interests are not reliant upon empirical facts about human beings nor based upon a historical subjectivity, but rather upon human conditions and interaction (Lakomski 1997). Critical theory is therefore considered “… a “socially just” educational theory and practice, which is fundamentally reflective in nature” [emphasis added] (Lakomski 1997:168). Habermas also contends that critical theory needs to address the practical concerns of disadvantaged groups and their social identity in an egalitarian manner that fosters a continuous learning experience and creates identity formation25 (Habermas 1978).

A critical methodological approach to research “… rejects scientific endeavours and questions entrenched power structures” (Gall, Borg and Gall 1996:592). Critical approaches attempt to address issues in relation to the traditionally marginalised, oppressed and silenced (Smith 1993b; Lather 1991) and research aims are commonly directed towards emancipation and empowerment as depicted in Table two (Smith 1993b:83). Table two also illustrates that the aim of positivist research is to predict or explain behaviour, interpretive approaches try to understand or describe and post modernism deconstructs, but critical approaches emancipate and empower. As Haraway states: “We need the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made … in order to build meanings and bodies that have a chance for life” (1988:580). Critical educational research therefore endorses a deliberate and controlled action, and is a practical call for change and participation that is implicit in its aims of emancipation and empowerment (Kemmis and McTaggart 1988; Hartsock 1987).

25

Perhaps one of the strongest rationales for utilising a critical theory methodology in this research is that although unemployment itself has been extensively researched utilising positivistic and hybrid quantitative and qualitative interpretive methodologies, there is little research into unemployment from a critical social methodological perspective (Burchell 1992; Feather 1992; Waters and Crook 1990). This use of hybrid methodologies in itself confirms that post positivistic research methodologies and methods have been embraced and accepted by positivistic researchers (ie. complementary diversity), especially for those who subscribe to or endorse a unity paradigm view. Moreover, it has been suggested that social problems such as unemployment need to be addressed, tackled and researched from a range of methodological perspectives as discussed in Chapter one. As Jones comments: “We should oppose excessive reliance on reductionism [either interpretive or positivist] ... We should apply more flexible intellectual approaches to problem solving” (1995:257). Furthermore: “Positivism is not the only true way to do science. It is only one of many possible interpretations” (Gancian 1992:624). A critical theory approach does not therefore relegate other interpretative, positivist, or even post modern research as irrelevant.

Based upon the complementary diversity view it should be an accepted practice for critical social science to be somewhat grounded and complemented by positivist or interpretivist findings without a paradigmatic debate or critique (Schmuck 1998; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Sarantakos 1994). The main contention here is that this research attempts to employ a underutilised methodology in relation to unemployment and utilise the findings produced from other research approaches to ground, assist in validation, support, and eventually reflect upon, yet not indulge in patronising the unity paradigm view as discussed earlier.

Critical research approaches also advocate the careful thinking of ethical issues in relation to research participants. For example, the standpoint theory approach as

advocated by Harding (1993) suggests that activities that occur at the bottom rather than the top of our social hierarchies can provide the best starting points for thought and knowledge. Harding asserts that it is important that critical research approaches insist on studying up, rather than studying down (1997). Standpoint theory therefore endorses that critical methodologies need to focus on the most marginalised groups of our society (Connell 1993; Harding 1993; Haraway 1988).

Standpoint theory also aligns itself closely to Connell’s first principle of educational justice: “… the interest of the least advantaged” (1993:43). By utilising standpoint theory a study can thus be directed and grounded by the views, opinions and beliefs of the research participants themselves. In this way the research attempts to assist in developing critical thought and practice, while also helping to serve the interests of disadvantaged individuals (Smith 1993b). It also provides the opportunity to think through issues from the standpoint of the research participants, by giving voice to their experiences, desires and needs, thus contributing to the overall collective knowledge and understanding of unemployment. Connell provides an elucidating example, from a teaching perspective, of this approach: “If you were to teach about race relations … “racism” is a qualitatively better organising concept than “natural inferiority”” (1993:39).

Similarly, Wadsworth uses the phrase “critical reference group”, referring to the intended “beneficiary” of the research, explaining the concept in terms of who the research is intended to benefit (1993b:2). Research on people, she contends, is research that has: “… been done on people … where the researcher has come in to do “their” research … which will get at a truth the researcher is seeking – a “truth” which may not be recognised by the researched or may even be harmful to them” (1993b:2). This approach could be placed in the positivist section as depicted in Table two. An example of how top down initiatives, from a policy perspective, can result in ill-informed initiatives is given here by Henry during the ANTA Research Advisory Committee annual conference in 1996:

‘VET26 _{has been a top down, rationally driven policy agenda … defined}

by a small group of influential key players … the failure to achieve equity goals was part of a broader failure to engage local interests in national policy goals, reflecting the earlier conclusions of Knox and Pickersgill (1993:27) … An imposed rational … structure may give formal equity, without advancing substantive equity’ (1996:5).27

Moreover, Burrows observes “Educational history demonstrates that top down reform and restructuring are destined to have little impact …” (1999:9) Alternatively, research for people, Wadsworth suggests, is where the “… researcher has seen themselves as acting in the ultimate interests of the client group. However without the first hand participation of the clients themselves, the … researcher may remain on uncertain territory with regard to whether they really “got it right” for the critical reference group” (1997:2).

Furthermore, research with people is where the researcher has “… come to identify the need…to work “with” clients … However … slippage from clients’ interests may occur. This can often happen subtly and entirely unintentionally, [and] … relates to the unequal power relations that prevail, and which shape the “voice” of the client and limit and restrain the times when this voice can prevail against that of the researcher” (Wadsworth 1993b:2). Both of the above approaches to research could therefore be aligned with either a post modern or interpretive approach to research as per Table two.

Alternatively, Wadsworth (1993b) and Lather (1991) advocate a research approach that involves research done “for” and “with” the participants or critical reference group, on their issues. This approach expects the researcher to “… reverse relationships of power

26 _{VET (Vocational Education and Training) initiatives in Australia have fundamentally been driven} by the Training Reform Agenda instigated by the previous Labor Government, and aims to increase Australia’s international competitiveness. Industry driven curriculum and competency based training approaches are fundamental to VET. In this sense all the training is focused upon gaining skills to meet industry demands. Arguably this is behaviourist and therefore is critiqued by educationalists who subscribe to a humanist style of education (Probert, Lim, Wiseman and Watts 1998).

27 _{It is relevant to relate this quote to later discussion centred on the applicability of VET courses} for disadvantaged unemployed participants. As well the later discussion on study circles in Sweden (Chapter three), where state policy is influenced by ‘bottom up’ study circle initiatives.

until … the researcher is working with the client group on the clients’ interests and issues” (Wadsworth 1993b:2). Wadsworth suggests that this approach is, however difficult as it rests on “… respect for [the clients’] experiences and a profound trust in their judgements about what is in their interest … researchers often feel afraid that the topics … that they … have identified … might have to go out the window. There is fear that … understandings might be rejected by the client group” (1993b:2). This issue is revisited in Chapter three in a practical discussion in relation to adult learning approaches.

2.5 Critical theory/Post modern tensions

Post modernism as depicted in Table two is located within the post structural paradigm. Lather chooses to include this paradigm yet many writers and methodological theorists either ignore or give cursory mention to this paradigm altogether (Keeves 1997; Walker and Evers 1997; Lincoln and Guba 1984). Post modernism can be seen as a movement that questions the rationality of human nature and other epistemologies (Burns 1995). Post modern researchers subscribe to the notion that there are a variety of different subjectivities and realities. It challenges the determinist and structural mode of explanation for social phenomena put forward by both positivists and post positivists (Humphries 1997). Rather than viewing societies as developing and progressing in a logical manner, post modernists emphasise difference and the particular (Humphries 1997).

However, fundamental post modernism, although important in questioning the dominant ideologies is at times seen by post positivist researchers as “… not having the radical edge of critical theory” (Moseley 1995:62). The challenge faced by the critical researcher is therefore not only the critique by positivistic scientists as mentioned previously but the ideological divide by the supposed ally, as will be explained later, post modernism (Hartsock 1987). An effort to reconcile these differences is important for critical theorists, as Connell warns: “It has long seemed to me that dogmatic and

exclusive theory is the kiss of death for a movement that claims to be democratic, radical, participatory. The essence of contemporary radicalism is participation – mainly as a practice, but also as an idea” (1983:253).

Fundamentally, the post modern criticism toward critical theorists is based upon the problematic notion that critical research compromises individual differences. Post modernism is also critical of positivism primarily as post modernists “… reject traditional assumptions about truth and reality …” (Tong 1992, p. 217). Proponents of post modernism subscribe to the notion that social criticism tends to be “… ad hoc, contextual and plural” (Hartsock 1987:190). Furthermore, post modernists refuse “… to construct an explanatory theory [but recognise and therefore endorse] … plurality, multiplicity and difference” (Tong 1992:217). Post modernists also claim that both positivists and post positivists are structural (as per Table two), and employ research approaches that produce metanarratives which they dismiss as authoritarian (Humphries 1997:5). The argument that post modernists utilise, as Sanguinetti explains, towards critical theorists is that they may:

‘… construct culture conflict as a traumatic problem … This stereotype, constructed by social workers and others, reflecting their professional role as helpers … is a kind of cultural imperialism, seeing … victims; it is a deficit model, carrying the underlying message that diversity is a disadvantage, and overlooking the advantages of having access to more than one set of cultural experiences. There is an implication that the mainstream experience represents the unproblematic ‘ideal’ … [alternative] community life is ‘less than’ and to be remediated’ (1992:9).

Furthermore it is argued by post modernists that it may be presumptuous to assume that particular groups are marginalised, or feel that they are marginalised, that perhaps they wish not to change, nor have any “researchers” enter their world and advise them on how

to address their “false consciousness” (Sanguinetti 1992).28 _{These arguments are also}

similar to the interpretivist critique of critical theory.

However many antecedents demonstrate that marginalisation such as separation and isolation from others, experiences of powerlessness and meaningless as a result of seeing only limited purposefulness are evident (Brown 1991). For example Brown’s (1991) “structural dimension”, argues that “… marginalisation has at least three stages. At the first stage the marginal do not reap the benefits of economic progress. At the second stage they are deprived of productive power. At the third stage they are deprived of the power of decision” (Brown 1991:43). Alternatively this third stage could be seen as “… exclusionary agenda setting” (Hendey and Muller 1998:347).29 Nonetheless, a post modern response to this argument, which is pertinent to this actual study, is that it “… can also be very depressing to focus on problem areas, such as unemployment, where there are no clear answers” (Sanguinetti 1992:10). In other words, for some, this research ends here … For example to demonstrate how foolhardy it is sometimes seen to entertain the notion of discussing the issue of “unemployment” with unemployed people from a teaching perspective is that there tends to be resistance by both teachers and students to the idea of exploring the issue of unemployment during class time (Brewer 1975; Winefield 1993; Patton 1990). Furthermore it has been found that many teachers do not discuss unemployment with students as they perceive their aim as teaching for work (ie. success), not unemployment (ie. failure) (Patton 1990; Winefield 1993). To discuss unemployment would therefore be seen as defeatist, yet it could be argued that unemployment affects a significant proportion of people either directly or indirectly and is often a key political issue during the election of governments.

28

‘False consciousness’ is a Marxist term used to describe the situation where the proletariat fails to perceive what they believe to be the true nature of its interests and does not develop

revolutionary class consciousness (Abercrombie et al. 1988). As a hypothesis, it is argued that the poor have been socialised to accept the dominant values of elites and to fail to recognise their own objective interests (Headey and Muller 1998).

29 _{A hypothesis established by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963, 1970), in relation to the ‘second} face of power’ where power is allegedly characterised by exclusionary agenda setting; elites exclude the interests and demands of the poor from policy agendas (in Headey and Muller 1998).

In response to this impasse considerable literature has been produced by critical theorists which demonstrates an ambivalence towards the politics and practice of post modernism due to the apolitical stance adopted (Husen 1997). For example, “What is missing … in post modernism is the passion, the anger, the fury, that marks ... a political movement determined to bring about real change” (McLellan in Hyde 1996:5), and “Post modernism is seen not to make any efforts towards a reasoned community and collective purpose, action or struggle” [original emphasis] (Lather 1991:40).

Many critical researchers therefore express frustration with the inability of post modernism to move beyond a multiple interpretative analysis, as this example demonstrates:

‘As educators we have an obligation to be true to our values (critical - questioning - agents of empowerment) even when they come into conflict with the students’ frame of reference [and] political and economic constrictions in current education’ (Moseley 1995:66).

Some views are even more critical “Post modern theories ... deny marginalised people the right to participate ... post modernism represents a dangerous approach for marginalised people to adopt” (Hartsock 1987:191).

Foucault has also been criticised for viewing the social arena as a myriad of unstable power relations (Hyde 1996). He tends to disregard any evidence of institutionalised power relations that may oppress and dominate certain vulnerable individuals. Furthermore, although Foucault was committed to ending injustice, it has been suggested that he failed to prescribe any concrete direction to alleviate unjust power relationships because of an adherence to fundamental post modernism (Hartsock 1987). Habermas, in critiquing Foucault’s post modernist stance, suggests: “Subjects who constitute their own worlds … drop out; consequently, all intentional integrating achievements disappear from view. This wipes out all the hermeneutical tracks that point the way into society for an action theory starting with the actors’ own self- understanding.” (Habermas 1997:47) In this way, some critical theorists argued that to

enact action and change post modern theory alone could be generally restrictive (Hartsock 1987).

Yet for some, post modernism and critical theory are synonymous and can work in unison (Moseley 1995). That is, both react against and question the status quo imposed by positivists as to how knowledge is constructed and by whom. Post modernists, like critical theorists tend to critically question entrenched, hegemonic power relationships.

This challenge of transforming post modern thought and enacting post modern practice is being contested (Lather 1991). Humphries asks, “Can we appeal to a metanarrative of emancipation whilst retaining a concern with the particular and the local?” (1997:8). The largest challenge therefore of critical research is to confront, as Lather terms it “… the central paradox of critical theory” (1991:65). That is, the understandings, knowledges and meanings that emerge from research need to be grounded in relation to the understandings of the participants themselves. Yet the research must seek to enable participants to re-evaluate themselves and their situations. Perhaps one way of addressing this paradox is to disregard the notion of dichotomies.

It has been suggested that a main feature which unites many feminist theorists, despite differences in methodological approaches, is the commitment to ways of knowing that avoid subordination and questio n dichotomies that surround issues of knowledge creation such as objective/subjective, reason/emotion, grand theory/lay theory and