Relationship between paradigms

Before focusing on methodological approaches and specifically critical theory in more detail it is relevant to momentarily address the view of the “separateness” of paradigms and the commensurable nature of each paradigm. Walker and Evers (1997) provide “views” in relation to paradigms that even question the existence of separate paradigms altogether. Briefly these three major views in relation to research paradigms are considered either “oppositional diversity”, “complementary diversity”, or “unity” (Walker and Evers 1997:22). Oppositional diversity holds that there are “… epistemologically different paradigms which are incommensurable” (Walker and Evers 1997:22). In reference to the two umbrella paradigms under “structural” presented in Table two, positivist and post positivist, Walker and Evers assert that the oppositional diversity view is one of mutual incompatibility between each (1997).24 In other words, there is neither agreement (nor even understanding) between researchers from the different (positivist or post positivist) paradigms. It is perhaps questionably accepted that the two paradigms may research the same phenomenon, but nonetheless compete and debate the integrity and legitimacy of their methodological theories with little or no attempt to empathise.

The complementary diversity view holds again that each paradigm is distinct and incommensurable, but not competitive and is considered equally appropriate depending on the context of the phenomena being researched (Walker and Evers 1997). Each paradigm therefore recognises the authority of the other. The complementary diversity view does not seek to discredit entirely other oppositional paradigms. Therefore it is not as confrontationalist as the oppositional diversity view.

24 _{The post structural or post modern paradigm will be elaborated upon later in this Chapter. Of} concern here (particularly to a post modernist), is that Walker and Evers (1997) make no mention of post modernism as a recognised paradigm within this reference. Furthermore, Holbrook even suggests that it “... has only been over the last decade that research method texts have included qualitative research!” (1997:60)

While both the above views endorse varying degrees of division in research, the “unity view” asserts that the whole idea of different paradigms is mistaken. This view claims that both can be brought into a productive relationship together, and that all researchers operate in the same (ie: structural) paradigm (Walker and Evers 1997).

This prescribed unified approach to educational research is arguably attractive and has been convincingly supported by many research theorists (Zeller 1997; Walker and Evers 1997; Keeves 1997). Perhaps the most compelling argument of endorsement is that a universal research paradigm may result in “… unprecedented levels of research validity” (Zeller 1997:827; Walker and Evers 1997). However it has been admitted that it would be extremely difficult to implement, due to the methodology loyalty most researchers have (Zeller 1997). Furthermore, academic structures tend to be unsympathetic to methodological diversity. Researchers are often comfortable in their own methodology and advocates of one methodology may look with scepticism upon those who are experienced in their methodology and other methodologies as well (Zeller 1992). As Eisner explains :

‘The politics of method are not solely rooted in matters of epistemology; they also stem from human frailties … Our methods and our power are intimately related to the games we are adept at playing. When the prospect of a new game arises, we quite naturally assess how good we are at playing it. The prospect of losing competence or sharing turf, is not, for most of us, attractive; the familiar is much more comfortable’ (1988:18).

Furthermore, perhaps many researchers who are enthusiastic about a unity view do not, in reality, accept or practice it. As Connell comments: “The ambition to produce a generalised science is at odds with practical demands” (1993:111). Or to go one step further, a unity approach could be seen to be even unethical for some: “The habit of mind that balances one extreme position against another and settles for something in the middle shows a preference for comfort, not truth” (Connell 1983:242).

Arguably, it is difficult to envisage that such a unity view could ever be possible, as the status of positivist knowledge has historically been privileged over other forms of knowledge (Humphries 1997). Traditional research approaches have been sanctioned by the state and their dominance is based upon the authority of a research community concerned about the truth of claims to knowledge and appeals to a strict set of rules and ideas about the construction of knowledge. This authority polices the enforcement and exclusion of alternative research approaches (Humphries, 1997). As Edwards and Usher state: “… scientific knowledge and its assumptions of its own legitimacy as a discourse of truth about the world result in the exclusion of other … forms of knowledge and a denial of legitimacy” (1994:158). This is evident in Hammersley’s (1995) work where, for example, he declares feminist, anti-racist, critical and emancipatory research “truths” outside of the norms of legitimate research and dismisses them as being prejudiced, and ideological.

Defining the merits of any or all of these views eventually becomes a cumbersome philosophical, theoretical and academic exercise. Although relevant within discussion on methodological theory, within this research context, such discussion would somewhat compromise the aims of the eventual methodology of this study. This is elaborated upon further later in this Chapter, but the main issue raised by the above discussion is that politics seems to be inherent in discussions on paradigms, methodologies and research. The possibility for methodologies to be reconciled and unified without compromising integrity is indeed a challenging task. With the historical dominance of the positivist paradigm, it is questionable that a truly unified approach to research that justly accepts the post positivist paradigm, beyond the rhetoric of well intending methodological theorists is possible. The whole nature of paradigms themselves is therefore political. This in itself supports critical theory’s notion of research being explicitly a political and subjective act, and therefore credible in its own right.