37 that of most developed countries in the world".

There are many ways that one could look at and examine the White Revolution in terms of both its substance and the consequences it held for the Iranian society in general and the Shah's rule in particular. For example, J. Bill and M. Zonis have looked at it as "the politics of

38 39

system preservation" and "the politics of manoeuvring"

respectively; R. Ramazani has regarded it as "the politics of

40

independence"; and C. Prigmore has analysed it in terms of politics

41

of social modernisation. It could equally be analysed in terms of

what Professor Almond identifies as four major 'revolutions' which leaders of the changing societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America confront in their attempt to change their societies to meet the challenges of time; the four are: "national revolution", "authority revolution",

42

"participation revolution" and "welfare revolution". For the purpose

of this thesis, however, I am most interested in evaluating the White Revolution primarily as a means whereby the Shah originally attempted

to achieve two major objectives: first, to solidify and widen the

popular bases of his leadership and rule; and second, to reduce,

consequently, his dependence on the United States so that he could both minimise outside pressures on his regime and maximise his foreign policy

options on the basis of normalising Iran's relations with the Soviet

Union. The underlying thrust of this, in the sphere of foreign policy,

was to strengthen what the Shah later on called Iran's "national

independent foreign policy". In this context, the White Revolution

process of centrally controlled general mass mobilisation and selected socio-economic reforms, largely in line with Westernisation, in support of his leadership and rule in order to achieve a higher degree of

independence on the basis of his regime's original dependence on the US. Hence, he could maximise his foreign policy options and alter Iran's dependence relationship with the US to a more symmetrical plane. In order to substantiate this, it is necessary first of all to outline the ideological nature and philosophy of the White Revolution and then the Shah's major gains from it to strengthen his position in the conduct of Iran's domestic and foreign policies.

In expounding the philosophy and working programme of the White Revolution, though not very coherent and consistent, the Shah drew on several sources, ranging from Iranian cultural heritage and Islamic principles to 'democracy' and 'Westernisation'. And yet he and the Iranian official sources exalted its originality. One government publication claimed that the "... idea and the philosophy as well as the measures themselves are purely Iranian in concept, planning and execution . It is a 'White' revolution because its accomplishment is

through no disorder and no bloodshed; not even class hatred"

In this context, the Revolution was to encompass a wide-range of innovative changes affecting the whole spectrum of socio-economic life in Iran.

The Shah visualised the forthcoming changes in the Iranian way of life, beliefs, values, organisations and institutions through the White

Revolution in terms of what he called political, economic and social democracy1 and 'Westernisation' for social justice, self-sufficiency and 'true' or 'complete' political and economic independence. His use, however, of terms such as 'democracy' and 'Westernisation' must be

understood within what he called an Iranian context. He declared that by "political democracy" he meant the blend of "the Western principle of parliamentary [system] with the Persian monarchical tradition". This was to involve the institutionalisation of politics, expansion of political participation, and dispersion of power through the formation of 'political parties' which, under the sovereignty of monarchy, would

form the 'actual' and 'alternative' governments. He made it clear that

he preferred a "two party system" over a "one party system" which he 44

condemned as "communistic" and absolute "dictatorship".

By 'economic democracy' he meant the equal distribution of resources, goods, and services according to the ability and needs of the individual and the establishment of a mixed economic system to

be composed of private and public sectors. In this, free enterprise

and government control over the essential services and natural resources of the country were to play important roles in the speedy development

45

of both agriculture and industry. By 'social democracy' he meant

enabling every Iranian citizen to develop himself fully and act freely in every direction within the bounds of the social welfare, national interest and security of Iranians, as a single and united society

46

permitted. With regard to the realisation of such 'democracy' he

concluded:

As a nation we must demand steady progress, but we must also

realise that the achievement of political, economic and social

democracy perforce takes time. It requires education and

psychological development, the reconciliation of individual

wishes with social responsibility, the rethinking of moral values and individual and social loyalties, and learning to work in cooperation more than ever before. ^

and 'Westernisation', he emphasised that he talked of 'Westernisation' only in "selective and judicious" terms whereby Iran would liberalise its political system and Westernise its way of life only as far as this was compatible with and served to strengthen those Iranian traditions which are important for the preservation of Iran's identity as an old and

sovereign nation with a glorious past and rich cultural heritage. The

monarchy to the Shah was a pivotal tradition of Iranian society; and he

sought sanctuary in the important traditions in order to legitimise the need for innovational changes to blend the traditional institution of

monarchy with the requirement of modern time. He wrote:

Especially in a country with such venerable traditions as ours,

rapid change naturally brings its strains and stress. These are

the price we must pay for Westernisation and modernisation. But

I do not propose that we abandon our great heritage. On the

contrary, I have every confidence that we can enrich it. Religion

and philosophy, art and literature, science and craftsmanship — all will prosper more as we develop our economy so that the common people of this ancient land can enjoy all the essentials of life. Instead of the few flourishing at the expense of the many, they

will do so with the many. Selective and judicious Westernisation

can help us towards the goal of democracy and shared prosperity; that is why I refer to it as our welcome ordeal.^®

These were the Shah's convictions by the turn of the 1960s. It was

against the background of these convictions that he launched the White

Revolution officially in January 1963. The Revolution's philosophy

and reform programme were declared to be instrumental in transforming Iran from an economically poor, socially feudal and divided, and politically bankrupt country into a prosperous, just, industrialised,

49

self-sufficient and truly independent sovereign nation. This goal,

however, was to be achieved largely within the existing framework of

Iran's close friendship and alliance with the West. The Revolution's

guided free enterprise capitalist economic system and for conducting Iran's foreign policy interests largely in convergence with those of the "Free World", as underlined by the Shah's vow that "Westernisation is

50 our welcome ordeal".

Originally, the Shah started off his Revolution by introducing six

major reforms: a comprehensive land reform, which Amini and Arsanjani

had initiated; the 'nationalisation of forests and pastures'; 'public

sale of state owned factories as security for land reform'; 'workers'

profit-sharing in industry'; 'amending the Electoral Law — franchise for

women'; and the formation of 'Literacy Corps'. By the end of the

1960s, he coupled these with the creation of 'Health Corps', 'Development

and Extension Corps', and 'Houses of Equity'; the 'nationalisation of

water'; 'national reconstruction'; and 'administrative and educational

revolution'. During the first seven years of the 1970s, he added five

other reforms: 'expansion of ownership of industrial and manufacturing

units'; 'price stabilisation and campaign against profiteering'; 'free

education'; 'provision of free nutrition and care for all children

from birth up to the age of 2 years old'; and 'provision of health

insurance to the general public'.

In order to implement the initial reforms of the White Revolution successfully, the Shah had already promulgated an enlarged Third Five-Year

Development Plan in September 1962. The Plan represented the first

serious attempt at comprehensive and consistent national planning in

Iran. It defined the Government's underlying development strategy and

objectives, and made projections of the available financial and other resources for the Plan period much more clearly than at any time before.

The Plan called for speedy development of agriculture, industry and social sector. While stressing the importance of both public and private investments, it initially proposed a total outlay of Rls. 190 billion, but this was soon raised to Rls. 230 billion ($3262 million at

51

current prices). Over 66 percent of this expenditure was to be met from oil revenues, which amounted to about $3,000 million during the Plan period, and the rest from domestic financing and foreign loans. Thus, for the first time, a substantial portion of oil income was to be channelled into national development. Of the total outlay, 25.6, 21.5, 15.8, 12.3, 7.9, 6.0, and 3.3 percent were allocated for transportation and communication, agriculture, power and fuel, industry and mines,

52

education, health and regional development respectively. Transportation and communication were given top priority as a vital condition for rapid improvement in all other sectors, as planned. The defence sector, however, was not spelled out in the Plan, though it continued to consume

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