This resulted in four major developments. First, Irano-Soviet relations returned to a situation of mistrust and unfriendliness. Second, for the first time, the young Shah exerted his constitutional position as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces by personally commanding the military operation against the secessionist provinces. This bolstered his leadership and the power of the monarchy in Iranian politics. Third, Iran became further dependent on the West, mainly the United States, for its protection against any possible Soviet reaction. Fourth a severe blow was struck against the crumbling harmony of East- West relations: previously, the Western powers had accused the Soviet Union of disregarding its "own solemn promises" by not pulling its
troops out of Iran as scheduled, but now, from the Soviet point of view, the same Western powers supported Iran in disregarding its agreement with the Soviet Union. It was, indeed, a hard pill for the Soviet
leadership to swallow, to let its southern neighbour slip into the Western camp at a time when the US international behaviour was being guided increasingly by Truman's doctrine for the containment of communism within the Soviet borders. Moscow, therefore, stepped up its underground
support for the Iranian communists and anti-government groups, whose role in Iranian politics, particularly during Dr Mohammed Mossedeq's nationalist and reformist government (1951-1953) provided London and Washington with an ultimate excuse to engineer the overthrow of the Mossadeq government.
Mossadeq And 'Oil Nationalisation'
During the war, as mentioned earlier, the loosening of central authority under Allied occupation allowed various social and political
"groups' with reformist platforms but diverse ideological orientations to emerge and develop on the Iranian political scene. The Anglo-Soviet intervention had resulted in a strengthening of the pro-Moscow Communist Tudeh and Pro-British Eradehyi-Melli into major political parties.
These, along with tens of other factions, dominated the Majlis which had become the seat of political power and symbol of 'democracy' in Iran. But their disunity and group animosities had become largely responsible for political instability and social disturbances. As a result, the life span of no government was more than a year in the 1940s and
successive governments had failed to initiate and implement serious and necessary reforms. After the war and the Azerbaijan affair, however, the Tudeh and Eradehyi-Melli parties had been weakened and, subsequently, because of an attempt on the Shah's life in February 1949, the Tudeh party
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was officially banned. Consequently, Qavam's Democratic Party, which had attracted a balanced membership from various political circles, assumed control of the 15th Majlis and Qavam became prime minister once again. He was respected as a remarkable political tactician in the way he handled Iran's dealings with the Soviet Union. But soon an inner party crisis resulted in his loss of support in the Majlis on 10 December
1947 and his party disintegrated. From then on until 1951 there were three different cabinets, none capable of commanding a working majority in the Majlis for more than a short period. Amid growing socio
political unrest and constant attempts by the conservative forces, headed by the monarchy, to assert their control over the Majlis, " (n)either the prime ministers nor the Majlis displayed significant activity, and
debate and procrastination were substitutes for decisions".100
It was, however, during this period that the Majlis approved (1949) the programme of Iran's First Seven Year Development Plan and authorised the
establishment of a Plan Organisation to execute its projects. The Shah
also paid his first state visit to the United States and pressed for
economic and military aid; and Washington announced the extension of
its first Point IV (economic aid) programme to Iran in 1949101 and agreed to supply the country with arms under the Mutual Defense Aid
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programme m 1950.
In the meantime, a Majlis deputy, Dr Mohammed Mossadeq was emerging
rapidly as a leading nationalist-reformist figure. He had been a
prominent political activist, with controversial background, since early
this century. He had consistently advocated the creation of a
parliamentary 'democratic' system with the power of monarchy limited
and regulated by law; the exertion of Iran's ownership and control over
its resources, particularly oil; and the implementation of rapid
fundamental socio-economic reforms. It was primarily in support
of these interrelated objectives that, after supporting the
Constitutionalist Movement in the 1910s and, subsequently, being elected to the Majlis, Mossadeq led a small group of deputies in opposing Reza Shah's succession to the throne of Persia in 1925 on the grounds that his
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rule could only be dictatorial. He had been imprisoned in the 1930s
for his opposition activities, but returned to political life in 1941 under the Allied occupation and was elected to the Majlis from Tehran. He subsequently initiated the bill of 'no oil concession' to any power in 1944 and played a leading role in the Majlis' rejection of the Irano-
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