It is, however, important to note that the regime’s perception of Soviet and Arab threats was largely relative to its feelings of
domestic insecurity. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet and 'radical' Arab opposition at any stage constituted r e a l threats in the sense of invading Iran, for this was unlikely under the prevailing regional and international circumstances. On the contrary, Moscow was willing from the start of the Shah's rule to improve its relations with Tehran largely for reasons of r e a lp o titi.'k j although it found it necessary to react sharply against some of the Shah's pro-Western measures which it perceived as threatening Soviet security and interests. There were three major reasons for its reluctance. First, Moscow did not wish
to exert unnecessary pressure on the Shah's regime which could drive it deeper into the Western camp and thus prompt the United States to
increase its presence and activities in a zone vital to the interests and security of the Soviet Union. Second, at the height of the Cold War and bi-polarisation of world politics, Moscow was in search of regional friends and allies; its interests were unlikely to have been well served by taking direct military action against the Shah's regime, as this could have made even the 'radical' Arab forces distrustful of Soviet friendship and support for them. Third, while the international situation was tense under the impulse of the Cold War and the Soviet Union was labouring hard to establish some sort of nuclear parity with the United States, Moscow was careful not to be trapped in a conflict with America in a zone south of its borders.
Consequently, as early as August 1953, the new Soviet leadership, after the death of Stalin, tried to play down past Irano-Soviet
differences and indicate its desire for some sort of accommodation
with the Shah's regime. Malenkov said: "The experience of the thirty- five years has shown that the Soviet Union and Persia are interested
93
in mutual friendship and collaboration". In the meantime, the Soviets initiated talks with Iran on the settlement of a number of
94
frontier problems and mutual financial claims. Moreover, Moscow adopted a rather calm attitude towards Tehran's persecution, arrest and execution of numerous Tudeh members and supporters. Although it condemned and campaigned against actions by Tehran such as joining the Baghdad Pact/CENTO and concluding a military treaty with the US, Moscow seemed to be consistently in favour of improving its relations with Iran whenever the Shah's regime assured the Kremlin of its good neighbourly intentions. For example, after denouncing Iran's membership
of the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet leadership invited the Shah to Moscow and welcomed him warmly in the summer of 1956. As the Shah pledged that his regime "... would never allow either the Pact or [the Iranian] territory to be used in furtherance of aggressive designs upon the
95
Soviet Union , Moscow relaxed its anti-Tehran propaganda and there seemed to be a degree of understanding in the Irano—Soviet relationship for the next three years, until the signing of Iranian-American military treaty. Even then, amid a war of propaganda, the Kremlin again welcomed the Shah to Moscow in mid—1962, and when the Shah gave his personal
undertaking that he would not allow the Americans to establish missile bases in Iran under their military treaty with his regime, Irano-Soviet relations began steadily to improve. This, however, will be pursued further in the next chapter.
As for the perceived 'radical' Arab threat, it lacked the necessary potential either to seriously undermine or to oust the Shah's regime. Undoubtedly, the 'radical' Arab forces were expanding under Cairo's leadership in some parts of the Arab world. But this did not mean that the forces were politically united or militarily strong enough to
endanger the position of the Shah's regime in a country as distant as Iran. While Cairo was deeply pre-occupied in its conflict with Israel and campaigned against what it called Western 'domination', particularly in the wake of the 'Suez crisis', the 'radical' forces were divided and engaged primarily in domestic struggles and rivalries. They had failed either to follow Cairo consistently or gain a strong
foothold against their 'conservative' rivals, who were backed by the British 'protectorate' forces, in the Persian Gulf states except Iraq. 96 Even in the case of Iraq, Qassem's 'revolutionary' republican regime,
which the Shah perceived as a serious threat, soon proved to be more a rival than an ally of Egypt in its bid for the leadership of the Arab
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world. Besides this, Qassem's regime was short-lived: it was replaced by the less 'radical' regime of General Abd al-Salam 'Arif in 1963. 'Arif did not follow Cairo's rhetorical line of a pan-Arabist revolution against regional conservative forces, but rather sought
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better relations with Iran. The Irano-Iraqi disputes, which flared up during Qassem's Government, were not solely ideological, in the sense of 'radicalism' versus 'conservatism' and therefore a by-product of the change of regime in Iraq in 1958. They were also territorial,
concerning the two sides' traditional differences over their borders and Shatt-el-Arab, a waterway off the Persian Gulf which lay between the two countries. This issue, however, will be discussed further in the coming chapters.
Thus, the separate but concurrent opposition to the Shah from the USSR and the 'radical' Arabs was mostly rhetorical and scarcely
amounted to a direct physical threat against his regime. This rhetorical opposition was largely a reaction to the regime's growing dependence on the United States and alliance with the West rather than their underlying cause. The most realistic source of threat against the regime was the domestic opposition. The regime feared in particular that this opposition might receive assistance from the Soviets and
'radical' Arabs. It was largely a sense of domestic insecurity that made the regime continuously search for ways and means whereby it could
strengthen its links with the West as an alternative source of security.
The more, however, the regime forged ties with the West and the pro-Western regional states (Pakistan and Turkey in CENTO), the more it
fuelled Soviet and Arab opposition and increased suspicion on the part of its two non-aligned eastern neighbours, Afghanistan and India. The last two had serious border disputes with Pakistan. They therefore disliked any Western and Iranian support for Pakistan which could
strengthen its position, and sought better ties with Moscow in order to counter-balance such support. Nonetheless, the Shah's regime found it convenient to paint the Soviet and Arab largely rhetorical opposition as a serious threat against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, so that it could sustain and strengthen Washington's commitment for its survival primarily against the strong opposition which it was facing domestically. Thus, the regime played on the perception of a regional threat in order to justify its increasing dependence on the United States and alliance with West, and to obtain continuous American support for enforcing its manipulative and repressive domestic policies.
Chapter IV
'The White Revolution'
Despite its claim to great achievements, by the end of the 1950s, it was clear that the way the Shah's regime had consolidated its
position was very costly for Iran and for the future of the regime
itself. Based internally upon political centralisation and repression,
the regime had nevertheless failed to bring about a marked improvement in the socio-economic conditions of an overwhelming majority of Iranians.
Iran was still essentially a feudal society. In spite of the country's
oil riches, a majority of its people had one of the lowest standards of living in the world and lacked basic civil liberties, a situation which virtually amounted to a "reign of terror".'*' The masses were generally dissatisfied with the regime and the Shah's domestic power-base remained
dangerously narrow. Neither the Shah nor Washington could have much
confidence in the future of his monarchic rule. Consequently,
Washington found it necessary to press the Shah for urgent socio
economic reforms. Eventually, in 1963, the Shah unfolded a reform
programme, which had already been initiated by his American backed Prime Minister 'Ali Amini (1961-62), within the framework of what the
Shah called 'The White Revolution' ('Inqilab-i-Safeid'). The programme
entailed both domestic and foreign policy changes with important implications for the Shah's domestic and regional position and for Iranian-American relationship.
After providing a brief outline of the developments prompting the Shah to launch his reform programme, this chapter will mainly explore
of the White Revolution; (2) the political consequences of the
Revolution for the Shah's leadership and Iran; (3) the link between
the Shah's domestic gains from the Revolution and his use of them in the
conduct of foreign policy; and (4) the consequent changes in Iran's
foreign policy position, particularly in the light of the normalisation of the Iranian-Soviet relationship, during the 1960s.
The Shah's method of consolidating his rule during the 1950s by pursuing a vigorous policy of political centralisation, based on extensive political repression and manipulation, had major drawbacks. He failed to broaden his domestic power base to the point where he could secure sufficient popular support to ensure the effective continuity of
<
his rule. His power base continued to remain very narrow. It was mainly
composed of the armed forces and security apparatus, and the conservative groups of landlords, enterpreneurs and bureaucrats, who formed the most substantial part of Iran's small upper class and slowly growing middle
2
class. The Shah's other source of strength, as he claimed at the
time, was his spiritual vision that he was being instructed by God to 3
lead his predominently Shia Muslim people. This claim to divine right
was bolstered by his belief that there were indissoluble ties between the institution of the Shah and its mass followers, defined and
4