Discussion of Study 2

In line with our expectations, (1) moral actor emotions are influenced by all three cognitive antecedents O, GA and E and their interactions. In contrast, non-moral emotions are influence by O, GA and the interactions of these two antecedents only. Generally, we observed that GA has a comparatively stronger influence on actor than observer emotions, thus confirming previous results (Rudolph et al., 2013). Hence, we conclude that for an actor emotion to be classified as moral or non-moral, effort seems to be the decisive element: For positive moral emotions, 12 to 15 % of explained variance is attributed to E and its interactions. For negative moral emotions 3 to 14 % of variance is explained by effort and its interactions. In contrast, we have 0 % of explained variance that is attributed to effort for any of the non-moral emotions.

Furthermore, as expected, (2) higher degrees of positive moral actor emotions are obtained for morally positive behavior and higher degrees of negative moral actor emotions were obtained for morally negative behavior. Joy and relief were found given both positive behaviors as well as positive outcomes. Furthermore, with regard to pride, both effects are almost equal in size. For self-respect the effect for positive behavior is considerably stronger than the effect for positive outcomes. Especially with regard to pride, subject’s emotion ratings may have been influenced by social desirability: Communicating to be proud of one’s own achievements is often perceived as a sign of

arrogance (see e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2000, 2002; Weiner, 2006; Zammuner, 1996). Consequently, participants may have chosen to report only self-respect as a similar but socially more accepted emotion when they actually (also) felt pride (see also Zammuner, 1996 for a similar point of view with regard to joy).

(3) Negative moral emotions are more likely for negative behavior, thus signaling that one’s own behavior was bad. Furthermore, they are also more likely given negative as compared to positive outcomes. However, as the considered cells of the design partly overlap when evaluating behavior and outcome, this result does not mean that these emotions cannot be considered as moral emotions. Instead, this finding underlines that in addition to judgments of O and E, moral actor emotions rely more strongly on judgments of GA than moral observer emotions.

As expected, (4) positive non-moral actor emotions, are more likely given positive outcomes and (5) negative non-moral emotions are more likely given negative outcomes. To a smaller extent, positive non-moral emotions also communicate that a behavior was positive (i.e., they are also more likely given positive as compared to negative behavior). However, this positive evaluation of invested effort to attain a positive goal is restricted to attained goals only. As for their observer-counterparts, this result excludes both joy and relief from being regarded as a moral actor emotion. More importantly, whereas moral actor emotions contain an evaluative function with regard to both behavior and outcome, non-moral actor emotions show no (negative non-moral actor emotions) or hardly any (positive non-moral actor emotions) evaluation of behavior, that is zero to very small effects were obtained (see Table 3.4).

In sum, in line with previous research, we classify self-respect and pride as moral actor emotions (see e.g., Li & Fischer, 2007; Mauri, 2011; Tangney et al., 2007; Rudolph et al., 2013). We include pride into this category, despite the fact that the average effect of the evaluative function is comparatively small, which, as already mentioned, may have been caused by reasons of social desirability. As their observer counterparts, we classify

both joy and relief as positive non-moral emotions (see also e.g., Ekman, 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2004).

Regret, guilt, shame and embarrassment are classified as moral actor emotions, as all these emotions show a negative morally evaluative function. Again, these results reflect an empirical corroboration and extension of existing approaches (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 2007; Weiner, 2006). Rudolph et al.’s (2013) finding that all moral actor emotions are influenced by judgments of effort was confirmed. However, with regard to shame and embarrassment, these results also contradict previous approaches regarding these emotions as predominantly occurring after negative events related to lack of ability or other forms of incompetence or deficiencies referring to a person’s self (e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tangney, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Weiner, 2006). Nevertheless, we think that these findings can also be regarded as complementary: Both shame and embarrassment may not only be related to ability (as suggested by previous approaches), but also to effort (as suggested by our results). As pursuing morally negative intentions (O-) can be regarded as moral transgressions, previous findings are corroborated in this regard (Baumeister et al. 1994; Tangney et al., 2007). Furthermore, shame may be related to both moral (i.e., moral transgressions, e.g., pursuing negative goals or the violation of the norm of effort) and non-moral (e.g., lack of ability) antecedents and has thus been referred to moral versus non-moral shame (see e.g., Smith, Webster, Eyre, & Parrott, 2002).

In line with our expectations, in contrast to observer-disappointment, its actor counterpart does not contain a morally evaluative function: this emotion seems to be only outcome-related (see van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). The same is true for anger as an actor emotion. Furthermore, as its observer-counterpart, sadness as an actor emotion also does not contain a morally evaluative function. Consequently, all three emotions disappointment (ORD), anger and sadness are classified as non-moral emotions, which

again corroborates previous findings (e.g., Ekman, 1994; Tracy & Robins, 2004; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).