Limitations and Implications for Future Research

In the present studies, we analyzed calculations of ought, goal attainment and effort as cognitive antecedents of the respective emotions. However, previous research has identified other cognitive appraisals that also influence the emergence of moral emotions. For example, the functions of responsibility, (e.g., Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997; Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004; van Dijk, Goslinga, & Ouverkerk, 2008;

Weiner, 1995; 2006) and deservingness (Feather, 1999; 2006; 2012; Feather & McKee, 2009; Feather et al., 2011) are especially well documented in this regard. Furthermore, within the field of appraisal theory a diverse range of further antecedents (see Chapter 5.2) and behavioral consequences or action tendencies have been proposed (for a summary see Scherer et al., 2001). However, so far, none of these approaches has provided an empirical tool for distinguishing moral and non-moral emotions.

Furthermore, as can be seen in Figures 3.1 and 3.3, for each of the combinations of ought, goal attainment and effort, several moral emotions are elicited at the same time (including both positive and negative emotions for one and the same situation). It could be interesting to investigate whether certain personality characteristics, such as self-esteem, empathy or perfectionism; see e.g., Feather, 2012; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 2002) contribute to eliciting specific moral and non-moral emotions. (For an analysis of the influence of perfectionism on shame and guilt, please the manuscript in preparation which is provided on the enclosed CD (Tscharaktschiew, Freymann, Brüggemann, Arnold, Ullmann, & Rudolph, 2014).

The vast majority of studies in the field of moral emotion has been conducted by using some sort of questionnaire or interview. However, other methods can make important contributions to the investigation of moral and non-moral emotions as well. As the experience of (moral) emotions is inseparably linked to brain activity as well as to bodily perceptions and responses, studying the neural correlates underlying the experience of moral and non-moral emotions constitutes an important complement to traditional approaches. Recently, a fast growing body of research has been divided to the study of neuro-physiological correlates of moral emotions and moral cognition (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll, Oliveira-Souza, Zahn, & Grafman, 2008; Ostrosky, 2010). However, evidence with regard to comparisons of brain activation when experiencing moral vs. non- moral emotions is sparse (see Takahashi et al., 2008 for an analysis of brain activation when experiencing pride vs. joy). In this regard, comparing the neural networks involved in

the processing of other moral vs. non-moral emotions may further enhance the understanding of the biological basis of moral emotions. In a similar vein, it may also be interesting to study the involvement of the autonomic nervous system, for example with regard to skin conductance level or heart rate (see e.g., Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; Witvliet, Ludwig, & Bauer, 2002).

4 The Who and Whom of Help-Giving:

An Attributional Model Integrating the Help-Giver and the

Help-Recipient.

4.1. Abstract

In this article, we investigate the influence of responsibility, moral emotions and empathy on help-giving for stigmatized persons in need. Both characteristics of the recipient of help and the help-giver are analyzed within a general theoretical framework. Based on an online study (N = 332), structural equation models confirm and extend an attributional cognition  emotion  action model of help-giving (Rudolph et al., 2004). Conditions promoting help-giving are identified: (1) A potential help-giver who regards himself as responsible for the recipient’s misfortune is likely to experience guilt, regret, and shame, thus increasing the likelihood of help. (2) A potential recipient of help who is regarded as being not responsible for his/her plight elicits sympathy, and is thus more likely to receive help. In contrast, when the person in need is regarded as being responsible for his/her plight, anger and even schadenfreude are elicited, and likelihood of help-giving decreases. (3) Different aspects of empathy as a stable personal characteristic exert direct and indirect (i.e., emotionally mediated) effects on help-giving. Using structural equation modeling, we outline an attributional model of helping conceptualizing helping behavior within an actor-observer-system integrating a variety of moral emotions involved in help-giving.

4.2 Introduction and Theoretical Background

The notion that moral emotions guide our social interactions has a long tradition in philosophy (e.g., Hume, 1740; Smith, 1759/2005). However, it was not until recently that moral emotions became an important research topic in psychology (e.g., Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 2010; Cimbora & McIntosh, 2005; de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Frank, 1988, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Ketelaar, 2004; Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009). Moral emotions are essential elements of social interactions (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Haidt, 2003; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Weiner, 2006), as moral emotions are based on judgments concerning the rightness or wrongness of one’s own as well as other persons’ behavior (e.g., Kroll & Egan, 2004; Weiner, 2006; see also Chapters 2 and 3) and are regarded as a key link between thought and action (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).

The notion that thoughts give rise to emotions, and emotions in turn direct and energize action has been especially well documented in attributional analyses of helping behavior (Weiner, 2006): That is, when a person in need is regarded as being responsible for his/her plight, anger is likely and help tends to be withheld. In contrast, ascriptions of low responsibility promote feelings of sympathy, which in turn increase the likelihood that help is provided (for a meta-analysis, see Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004). To illustrate, imagine a homeless but nevertheless healthy-looking young man asking you for money. We might conclude that he is responsible for his plight (as he might have good chances to earn money). As a consequence, we may feel angry and decide against helping him. In contrast, imagine a blind and homeless man in his seventies. We might conclude that he is not responsible for his plight. Hence, we feel sympathy and decide to help him.

The strong impact of perceived responsibility on sympathy, anger, and help-giving has been studied in the context of social stigmas: Social stigmas are defined as “any mark or sign for perceived or inferred conditions of deviation from a prototype or norm” (Weiner,

Perry, & Magnusson, 1988, p. 738; see also Jones, Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller et al., 1984). These refer to a wide range of conditions such as ethnicity, homelessness, disease, handicaps, disabilities, poverty or unemployment. Social stigmas vary with regard to their perceived responsibility and controllability. Uncontrollable stigmas, such as Alzheimer’s disease or blindness, elicit more sympathy and help-giving than controllable stigmas such as drug abuse or obesity, which are more likely to elicit anger and to reduce the willingness for help-giving (e.g., Menec & Perry, 1998; Weiner et al., 1988). Poverty is a stigma that can be characterized by different degrees of responsibility, depending on the actual causes of poverty. Hence, when poverty is attributed to lack of effort or laziness, a person will be perceived as responsible for her plight. Hence, anger (rather than sympathy) is experienced, and help is withheld. In contrast, when poverty is attributed to sickness or physical handicaps, perceptions of low responsibility are elicited, sympathy (rather than anger) is experienced, and help is provided (Weiner, Osborne, & Rudolph, 2011).

Thus far, attributional explanations of help-giving have focused mainly on characteristics of the recipient of help, and examined the responsibility of the help-giver only to a lesser extent. To illustrate, let us return to our thought experiment about the young man who asks you to give him some money. Imagine you had been his employer until recently, and you dismissed him because you wanted to give the job to a friend of yours. You might realize that he suffers because you dismissed him, as you wanted to give the job to a friend of yours, not because of his bad work results or laziness. Hence, this cause is uncontrollable to your employee. There is evidence that perceptions of one’s own responsibility lead to feelings of regret and guilt, which consequently motivate help- giving (see e.g., Basil, Ridgway, & Basil, 2008; de Hooge et al., 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Moreover, such perceptions of one’s own responsibility might elicit feelings of shame as well, promoting a motivation to withdraw and decreasing the likelihood of help (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). However, there is also some

evidence that under specific circumstances, shame does promote pro-social behavior as well (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010, 2011).

The aim of the present studies is to analyze both the influence of characteristics of the potential help-recipient and the help-giver (i.e., perceived responsibility of both actor and recipient) on help-giving within a common theoretical framework. Thus, two kinds of responsibility will be considered – the responsibility of the potential help-giver, and the responsibility of the potential recipient of help. We assume that each kind of responsibility is connected to different sets of moral emotions: Responsibility of the potential help-giver is likely to influence moral actor emotions (e.g., guilt, regret, and shame), while responsibility of the recipient is likely to influence moral observer emotions (e.g., anger and sympathy). According to our hypotheses, both moral actor and moral observer emotions influence the likelihood of help-giving. Note that high responsibility of the potential help-giver is a facilitating condition of help, while high responsibility of the potential recipient of help represents a condition that is detrimental to help. Two causal chains arise from this analysis:

(1a) Potential Help-Giver  High Self-Ascribed Responsibility  Feelings of Guilt, Regret, Shame  High Likelihood of Help

(1b) Potential Help-Giver  Low Self-Ascribed Responsibility No Feelings of Guilt, Regret, Shame  Low Likelihood of Help

(2a) Potential Help-Recipient  High Perceived Responsibility  Anger rather than Sympathy  Low Likelihood of Help

(2b) Potential Help-Recipient  Low Perceived Responsibility  Sympathy rather than Anger  High Likelihood of Help

We now summarize pertinent research exploring the links between responsibility, moral observer and moral actor emotions, and help-giving. In addition, we will also consider the dispositional empathy of the help-giver, as existing evidence has linked

empathy to help-giving as well. In what follows, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the potential help-giving person as the (moral) actor or help-giver, and to the potential recipient of help as the help-recipient or person in need. In addition, we refer to moral observer emotions (sympathy, anger, schadenfreude) as emotions elicited by the help recipient and experienced by the moral actor, while we refer to moral actor emotions (guilt, shame, and regret) as those emotions which the moral actor experiences toward him/herself (Rudolph, Schulz, & Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Weiner, 2006; see also Chapters 2 and 3).